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Abstract 
This thesis examines the interrelationship between market structures, firm rivalry, and 
government intervention in the Indonesian manufacturing sector over the period 1975 
to 1995. Two empirical methodologies are used in this study. First, the Structure . 
Conduct - Performance (S-C-P) approach to industrial organisation provides the basic 
framework for our analysis in the first part of the study. The second research 
methodology is indus•ry case studies. Two industry studies presented in this study are 
cigarettes and cement. 
The study begins with an overview of the evolution of Indonesian trade and industrial 
policies and the salient features of the manufacturing sector. An analysis of the trends 
in seller concentration over the period 1975 to 1993 is also provided. The descriptive 
analysis on seller concentration shows that there is a long-term declining trend in 
industrial concentration, particularly in those industries that were highly concentrated 
in the rnid-l 970s. This provides the backdrop into subsequent statistical analysis of 
the interrelationship between concentration and other aspects of structure and 
performance. For this purpose, we specify and estimate a simultaneous equations 
model of industry structure, conduct and performance. The interrelationships among 
six key variables (concentration, profitability, foreign ownership, export intensity, 
import penetration and trade policy) are estimated for two different policy periods; (1) 
pre-1986 period of heavy trade and industry policy intervention, and (2) post-1986 
period of trade and industry liberalisation. 
A number of interesting findings eme~·ged from the analysis. Trade protection, 
interacted with seller concentration, was a major determinant of high profitability in 
concentrated industries in the pre-liberalisation period. This relationship significantly 
weakened as a result of the late 1980s trade liberalisation. High concentration had a 
positive influence on effective trade protection, providing some support for the 
intere:it group model, which asserts that highly concentrated industries find it easier to 
lobby government for protection. However, the level of concentration had no 
v 
significant influence on export intensity or import penetration over and above the 
other variables considered in the analysis. Finally, our results suggest that market 
structure factors (economies of scale, capital costs, product differentiation, market 
size and regional market segmentation) are the major determinants of industrial 
concentration in Indonesian manufacturing. We could not find a direct relationship 
between trade policy, regulation and concentration. These insignificant results 
probably arise due to limitations inherent in cross-sectional tests of the effect of trade 
policy and regulation on market structure. We tested the effect of international 
influences (export intensity, import penetration and foreign ownership) on 
concentration. However, the rci.ults turned out to be statistically insignificant in both 
the pre - and post-liberalisation periods. The study extends the analysis to include the 
determinants of changes in leading firms' market shares. Changes in market shares 
are a good indicator of firm rivalry. The results show that regulations in several 
industries are associated with stable market shares, suggesting that they have reduced 
competition in these industries. 
The second part of thesis presents two industry case studies. The focus of the case 
studies is on the nature of competition among firms, and the influence of regulation 
on this process. In cement, until the industry was deregulated in 1998, government 
regulations - distribution and price controls - had created a market structure that 
closely resembled a cartel. The second casr study is cigarettes. This study estimates 
the effect of advertising expenditure on seven leading firms' market shares, using 
monthly advertising and market share data. Our results show that advertising 
competition reallocates sales between leading firms. An important finding of our 
study is that an equal percentage increase in advertising by all firms will change the 
distribution of market shares in favour of the more successful, larger firms in the 
long-run. This arises because larger firms have an 'image advantage' over the smaller 
firms. This image advantage is an asymmetry that constitutes a barrier to upward 
mobility of smaller, less-favoured existing firms. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Background 
This thesis examines the interrelationship between market structures, firm rivalry, and 
government intervention in the Indonesian manufacturing sector over the period 1975 
to 1995. This study covers the period prior to the financial and banking sector crisis 
that erupted in IUld-1997, and resulted in the lMF and Indonesian government 
Structural Reform programme. Two empirical methodologies are used in this study. 
First, the Structure - Conduct - Performance (S-C-P) approach to industrial 
organisation provides the basic framework for our analysis in the first part of the 
study. The S-C-P framework is a very useful tool in industrial analysis. However, 
there are practical limitations in using this framework to examine competition. In 
particular, the approach is limited in its ability to test different forms of market 
behaviour that are possible for each market structure (apart from pure competition). 
For example, behaviour in an oligopoly can range between price collusion and price 
competition. This motivates the second research methodology - industry case studies. 
The two industry studies presented in this study arc cigru· .es and cement. 
The study of market structures and competition is an important topic. Economic 
theory and experiences of many countries show that strong domestic competition 
brings substantial benefits to the economy, such as improved competitiven~ss of 
industry, increased consumer welfare, long-term growth in employment dnJ incomes, 
and promotes adaptability of the economy. It is well established in the literature thdt 
domestic competition is onr.: of the critical factors contributing to competitiveness of 
domestic markets. If firms compete with one another (and with imports) in domestic 
markets for consumers by offering products of lower prices, higher quality and better 
services, then they are likely to be able to do so successfully in international markets. 
By improving competitiveness, competition fosters long-term economic growth and 
maximises consumer welfare. Consumers benefit from lower prices and hig~er quality 
products and services. Competition also promotes adaptability of the domestic 
economy. Competition prepares businesses to make structural adjustments necessary 
to respond to changing market conditions. There is now a growing body of evidence 
that economies with strong domestic competition are better placed to adjust quickly to 
changing global market conditions. 
The motivation for the study of market structures and competition in Indonesian 
manufacturing is twofold. First, a popular view of the Indonesian economy is that 
seller concentration is relatively high and on the rise, and that the recent policy 
reforms have done little to reverse this trend. Consequently, highly concentrated 
industries are presumed to be monopolistic and therefore anti-competitive. This view 
is uncritically accepted and widely disseminated by authors of the non-professional 
(and sometimes professional) literature on the subject. However, in recent years the 
debate has intensified, as reflected in the extensive coverage of the subject in the 
Indonesian media and numerous seminars on competition policy. The World .Bank 
added new impetus to the debate in two separate reports in 1994 and 1995. In both 
reports, The World Bank noted that industrial concentration in Indonesian 
manufacturing is very high by international standards, indicating a lack of competition 
at the producer level. The reports also noted that a major source of anti-
competitiveness in these industries is regulatory constraints on domestic rivalry. 
Recent research in Indonesia has prim.1rily focused attention on measuring changes in 
industrial concentration levels over a relatively short period of time. No studies have 
identified the determinants of seller concentration and estimated their influence on 
concentration levels in Indonesian manufacturing. Simaudjuntak (1991) was one of 
the first economists to examine concentration over time, and noted a declining tfend 
in industrial concentration between 1983 and 1987. Econitl t1995) recently showed 
that levels of industrial concentration have increased for several industries over the 
period 1988~92. This attempt to examine trends is misleading because only short-run 
1 Econit is a high profile Jakarta-based economic and business consultancy founded by Dr. Rizal Ramli. 
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changes are examined. Little information is conveyed about the long-term trend in the 
levels of concentration or the pattern of change in the levels of highly concentrated 
industries from a four year period. A much longer time period is needed to extract 
more reliable information. This is important because competition is a long run 
phenomenon and concentration levels in tne short run often fluctuate around their 
long-term trend. In fact, by examining concentration trends over the periotl 1975 to 
1993, our analysis shows that there is a longer term declining trend in average 
concentration. The slight increase in concentration between 1988 and 1992 could 
either be a short-term fluctuation around the long-term trend or it could reflect the 
impact of trade liberalisation beginning to show up in import-competing industries. 
The second motivation for the study is that Indonesia's industrialisation experience 
provides us with a good case study of market structures and competition in a rapidly 
developing economy. The manufacturing sector has expanded rapidly over the last 20 
years, and many market structures are not yet "stabilised" to the degree that is found 
in mature industrial economies. This provides us with the opportunity to examine 
c:1 anges in market structures during industrialisation. In particular, we examine the 
direction and magnitude of the change in seller concentration in Indonesian 
manufacturing, the underlying forces of this process, and its relationship with other 
important policy and economic variables including regulation, trade policy, 
international influences and industry profitability. 
Substantive trade and industry policy liberalisation was also introduced over the last 
decade. During the period 1975 to 1986, the Indonesian government's strategy of 
industrial deepening was given high priority. By the early 1980s there was a 
proliferation of tariff and non-tariff barriers and industrial licensing was widely used 
to protect domestic firms from both import and domestic competition. The plunge in 
oil prices in 1986, coupled with the persistent slow growth period between 1982 and 
1986, forced the governm~nt to embark on a substantive trade, industry and financial 
sector liberalisation programme. Tariff rates were significantly reduced, and most 
quantitative import restrictions were replaced by tariffs. Deregulation of the industrial 
sector eliminated man, • of the restrictions on new investment including foreign 
investment. While the pace and extent of market-oriented economic reforms in 
3 
Indonesia since 1986 have been remarkable, many of the govemment-oanctioned 
monopolies and cartel arrangements, as well as other 'sensitive' regulated sectori:. -
plywood, cement, fertiliser, processed sugar, wheat flour milling, BULOG, aircraft 
manufacturing, steel - rem<\ined relatively untouched. Indonesia's liberalisa.tion 
experience provides us with a unique opportunity to examine the impact of past and 
current policies on market structures and domestic rivalry, 
1.2 Methodology 
As indicated above, two empirical methodologies are adopted in this study. Jn Part A 
of the study, the Structure-Conducl-Perfortnance (S-C-P) approach to industrial 
organisation provrdes the basic framework for our analysis. In Part B of the study, the 
research methodology is industry studies. 
Part A: Structure-Conduct-Performance Model 
The essence of the S-C~P approach, in its original fonn, is that certain intrinsic 
structural variables (called basic conditions by Scherer, 1980) determine market 
structure, and that there is a unidirectional flow of causality nmning from market 
structure through conduct to performance. Recent literature has emphasised the 
complexity and interdependence of these three components of industrial organisation 
(Schmalensee, 1989). In other words, in such markets there may not be a simple line 
of causality nmning from structure through behaviour to perfonnance; in certain 
circumstances, the line of causality may be reversed, Thus, the elements of structure, 
conduct and perforniance can be jointly determined in a given market. 
The recognition of the interdependence of various aspects of market behaviour has 
resulted in the use of the simultaneous equations models rather than single equation 
models in recent studies (Chou 1986). Following these studies, we specify a 
simultaneous equations model consisting of six endogenous variables and, therefore, 
six equations. The endogenous variables are seller concentration, industry 
profitability, import penetration, export~orientation, foreign-ownership and trade 
policy measured by effective rates of protection. The model includes all the industry-
4 
level variables that we deem to be relevant to the conditions of Indonesia's 
manufacturing sector, and are available. These are variables previously subject to 
investigation in industrial organisation, either because they indicate normatively 
important dimensions of resource allocation or because the theory of markets 
identifies them as important structural determinants of those performance dimensions. 
The two stage least square (2SLS) technique is used to estimate the structural model 
under the two different policy regimes: (1) the pre-1986 heavy interventionist trade 
and industry policy regime, and (2) post-1986 trade liberalisation period. The 2SLS 
technique is an econometric technique commonly used to estimate simultaneous 
equations models. For this purpose a data base of 67 four-digit ISIC manufacturing 
industries for the" years 1985 and 1993 is constructed from a variety of sources 
including the annual manufacturing surveys and input-output tables. The year 1985 
proxies the pre-trade liberalisation period and the year 1993 proxies the trade 
liberalisation period. Unavailable uata for some of the endogenous variables (e.g., 
effective rates of protection) and exogenous variables for other years restricts the 
estimation of the model to the use of 1985 and 1993 data. 
Dynamics of Leading Firms' Market Shares 
A major limitation of seller concentration statistics is that the) are static measures of 
competition: they simply record the c'1aracteristics of a size-distribution at some 
particular point hi time. Rec..er.l Hterature has shown that previous studies of seller 
concentration, including stur.lies emphasising changes in seller concentration, conceal 
much of the nature of the underlying competitive process (Davies and Gc.;roski, 1997). 
Recent studies of Canadian and the British manufacturing show that persistently high 
concentration ratios can be found along with considerable instability in market shares 
of leading firms (Baldwin and Gorecki, 1994; Davies and Geroski, 1997). Industrial 
organisation theory tells us that if the identity of the dominant fit"'dS were to change 
over time then even persistently high levels of conc~ntration would not necessarily 
imply the absence of competitive forces (Schmalensee, 1989). Ac\'ording to Geroski 
and Toker (1996), turnover in firms' rankings provides at li.:ast some useful 
infom1ation on the 'vibrancy' of the competitive process, and turnover-based 
measures of competition [i.e. changes in market shares] may reflect the dynamics of 
the competitive process more accurately than conventional static measures of 
competition. 
The study extends the analysis of market structures and competition to include 
turnover in leading firms' rank and market shares. While there are several studies of 
this kind for industrialised countries, there are no such studies for developing 
economies known to the author. Thus, our study is the first to examine market share 
dynamics in a developing economy. The purpose of this exercise is twofold. First, we 
wish ~o measure the magnitude of changes in leading firms' ma.;ket shares and 
determine whether persistently high levels of concentration can be found along with 
considerable instability in leading firms' market shares in IndoPP.sian manufacturing. 
If so, then competition would be prima facie stronger in Indonesian markets than 
concentration ratios would suggest. For this purpose, we construct a data set for a 
sample of industries from the ~nmual manufacturing surveys. Th ... data set records the 
changes in firms' rank and market shares in each industry between 1985 and 1993. 
Our results show considerable vai:iat1on ir1 the magnitude of changes in leading firms' 
market share in concentrated industries. The second purpose is to identiF<-· ~~­
determinants of changes in leading firms' market shares and to estimate their 
influence on the observed changes for our cross-section of 67 manufacturing 
industries during the period of trade liberalisation, 1985 to 1993. 
Major Findings of the S-C-P :Model 
Estimation of the structural model has produced a substantial volume of empirical 
results. Limited space prevents us from summarising all findings in the introduction. 
We do this in Chapters 7 and 8. Here we present the major findings for two equations 
of the model, industrial concentration, industry profitability and market share 
instability. 
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Concentration 
Our major results suggest that market structure factors are the major determinants of 
industrial concentration in Indonesian manufacturing: the coefficients of the 
economies of scale, absolute capital requirements, industry size, regional market 
fragmentation, and product differentiation variables all have the expected significant 
relation with concentration. We could not find a direct significant relation between 
trade policy and cor1centratio~. either in 1985 or 1993. This result may arise because 
trade policy .:-ffects concentration indirectly through other variables such as 
economies of scale and capital costs. In the model we included a dummy variable for 
industries with regulations restricting competition. However, we could not find a 
significant relation between concentration and the regulation dummy variable. Like 
the trade policy variable, regulations may affect concentration through other variables 
in the model. The coefficients of the international trade variables (exports a:r.d 
imports) were not statistically significant. The result for export-orientation arises 
because export-oriented and unconcentrated industries share common structural 
characteristics, namely low barriers to entry, and it is the barriers to entry variables 
that are dominant in the conc~ntrai.i~!l equation. Finally, foreign and state ownership 
of industry does not have significant effects on industrial concentration over and 
above the other variabhs considered in the analysis. This result can also be explained 
by the fact that foreign direct investment (FDI), state ownership and concentration 
share common structural characteristics, namely high capital costs and economies of 
scale. State investment f.n capital-intensive industries such as fertiliser, steel and 
cement arises from government strategic imperatives. 
Profitability 
Our analysis of the determinant; of industry profits is consistent with. the well 
established proposition that higher levels of concentration lead to higher profitability. 
The results also show that it is in the more protected industries that concentration has 
a greater impact on industry profits. The study also provides evidence that this 
positive association has weakened since the 1980s policy reforms, establishing a 
direct link between trade liberalisation and industry profits in concentrated industries. 
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The reduction in protection redut::es excessive profits in concentrated industries. 
Changes in Leading Firms' Mflrket Shares 
Several empirical findings derived from estimation of the market share model provide 
invaluabfo insights into the competitive process, and how government policies impact 
on this process. First, our estimation results show that government regulations in a 
selected number of industries - sugar processing, beverages, cooking oil, fertiliser, 
cement, and stee1 - constrain domestic rivalry. This provides a direct link between 
deregulation and competition. Removing regulatory coni::traints on firm behaviour 
should trigger rivalry among firms in these industries. However, trade liberalisation 
(measured by changes in real effective rates of protection) does not appear to have 
disturbed market shares, except in export-oriented industries. Second, there is no 
evidence that MNCs have any impact on domestic rivalry over and above the other 
variables considered in the analysis. This result provides some basis for rejecting :he 
proposition that large MNCs' business practices reduce market rivalry in the host 
(developing) country's markets. Finally, the results of most of the other industrial 
organisation factors tend to be consistent with studies for other countries. Market 
shares tend to be more stable in highly conc;entrated industries, all other things being 
equal. Rapid growth in industry destabilises market shares, while large absolute 
capital requirements constitute a barrier to entry and upward mobility, thereby 
insulating ~eading firms' market shares. 
Part B: Industry Studies ... 
The structure-conduct-performance framework is a very useful tool in indu.,;trial 
analy.>is. However, there are limitations to its practical usefulness. In particular, the S-
C-P framework is limited in its ability to estimate the effects of different forms of 
IT'arket behaviour that are possible for each market structure (apart from pure 
competition). The S-C-P approach is also limited in its ability to estimate the different 
impacts of government policies on structure, conduct and performance. Moreover, 
recent theories of firm strategic behaviour and game theory are not easily amenable to 
testing within the S-C-P approach (Schmalensee, 1989). There are also problems 
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associated with cross-sectional tests of market behavio: ::· and government policies. 
Generally, one should approach a cross-sectional teM ')!the effect of protection and 
regulation on seUer concentration cautiously, beer .. ~ protection and regulation may 
take time to affect market structures. This may partly explain the poor perfonnance of 
these variables in the concentration equation. This motivates our second research 
methodology - industry case studies using primary time series data and applying 
recent advances in industrial organisation theory and statistical methods. This case 
study approach is now increasingly used in industrial organisation studies (See, for 
example, Bresnahan, 1987). 
Two industry studies are presented in this thesis. They are cigarettes (advertising) and 
cement (cartel practices). The case studies are undertaken to explore a•,;pects of firm 
rivalry and policy not adequately captured in the S-C-P approach, in addition to their 
general interest in the field of industrial organisation. Both ind1.1stries have high levels 
of seller concentration (see Table 1.1 ). However, the two industries differ in the 
extent of government intervention in the industry, the nature of rivalry among firms 
and the competitive outcome. Data on the two industry studies, both quar.titative and 
qualitative data, were coUected during my fieldwork in 1995. The data collected from 
firm interviews, producer associations and various other sources are described later in 
the study. 
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Table 1.1 
Characteristics of the Industry Case Studies 
Cigarettes Cement 
~~~~~~~~~=-~~ 
Importance of the 
lndustry: % Share of MVAa 9.9 
Market structure 
Technology 
Product 
Characteristics 
Regulations 
Nature of 
Competition 
IMF programme 
Oligopoly with a 
competitive fringe 
Both capital and 
labour-intensive 
technologies are used 
Consumer good 
Product differentiation 
FDI entry restrictions, 
Import tariffs, 
Differential minimum 
retail prices and excise taxes, 
Clove monopoly 
Intense advertising 
competition 
Cloves monopoly 
disbanded in June, 1998. 
MVA indicates non-oil/gas manufacturing value added. 
Industry Study 1 
1.5 
Oligopoly 
Capital-
intensive 
Producer good 
Homogenous 
Regiona1-
markets 
Distribution 
controls, 
Price controls 
Cartel-like 
practices 
Distribution 
and price controls 
eliminated in February 1998 
Advertising Competition in the Cigarette Industry 
Advertising is the major instrument of competition among large firms in the cigarette 
i:"dustry. This study estimates the ~ffect of advertising expenditure on seven leading 
firms' market shares, using monthly advertising and market share data from August 
1992 to October 1995. These seven firms account for over 90 per cent of total market 
sales ana 90 per cent of total industry advertising expenditure. Our study differs from 
previous research on advertising for other countries on at least three grounds. First, 
we employ recent advances in time-series analysis that allow us to separate the long-
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run relationship between advertising and market share from the short-run impact in 
the estimateo equation. Second, we use monthly advertising and market share data 
which are considered more appropriate than annual data in these kind of studies 
(Clarke, 1976; Landes and Rosenfield, 1994). Finally, unlike most other studies, our 
data set has time Sf.ries sufficiently long to support a regression analysis for a single 
fim1. This allows us to investigate whether the success of advertising differs among 
firms. 
Our results show that advertising competition reallocates sales between leading firms. 
Increases in own advertising expands market share in four of the seve1'1 firms. 
Increases in rivals' advertising reduce market share in three of the seven firm:>. An 
important finding of our study is that an equal percentage increase in advertising by 
all firms will change the distribution of market shares in favour of the more 
successful, larger firms in the long-run. This arises because larger firms have an 
'image advantage' over the smaller firms. This image advantage is an asymmetry that 
constitutes a ba.-rier to upward mobility of smaller, less-favoured existing firms. 
Industry Study 2 
Regulation and Competition in the Cement Industry 
This case study analyses the role of government policies in shaping the structure of 
the cement industry and the nature of competition among firms. In Indonesia, cement 
is considered a 'strategic' commodity because of its importance to the construction 
sector and the importance of that sector to economic development. As a result, there is 
substantial public sector investment in the industry. Five of the nine producers are 
government-controlled firms.2 These firms produced around 38 per cent of total 
cement production in 1994. Until 1998, when the industry was deregulated under the 
IMF Structural Reform programme, the industry was heavily regulated. There were 
regulations governing the distribution of cement, both domestically and for exports, 
and the setting of reference retail prices. 
The official objective of the regulatory regime was to ensure a continuous supply of 
2 In this study, whenever we use present tense we refer to the mid-l 990s. 
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cement to all provinces at reasonable and stable prices. The analysis of this study 
shows that the distribution arrangements had limited success in ensuring a continuous 
supply at stable prices in the face of cyclical demand for cement. Rather, the 
government regulated distribution arrangements exacerbated price instability by 
reducing the contestability of regional markets, deterring new entry and erecting non-
tariff barriers to competing imports. Administrative allocation of supplies prevented 
cement from other regions, including imports, entering to dampen price increases 
when demand rose. Under such circumstances, producers and distributors earned 
additional profits without the threat of other producers penetrating their regional 
markets. The distribution arrangements resembled a cartel. Regional markets and 
market shares were allocated among firms. The cement producers association and the 
Department of Industry and Trade monitored compliance with the distribution system 
by acting as 'trading posts' whereby market information - market shares, export and 
import data - were collected by them and widely disseminated among producers. 
Administered retail prices acted as floor prices during periods of excess capacity, 
1.3 The Financial Crisis and the IMF Structural Reform 
Programme,1998 
Our study focuses on industrial structure, government policies and competition during 
the period 1975 to 1996. At the time of completing the thesis, the banking and 
financial crisis erupted in Indonesia and other countries in the region. The massive 
drop in the rupiah during 1997 /98 and the ensuing capital flight and severe banking 
sector crisis led to a series of agreements between the Indonesian government and the 
IMF, World Bank, Asian Development Bank, and major donors for a structural 
refonn loan programme of US$43 billion. The programme is comprehensive, 
covering trade and industry, the banking and financial sectors, and commercial laws 
and institutions. Measures announced under the programme deal with many of the 
remaining restrictions on trade and industry. These include removing the statutory 
basis of several monopolies and cartels mentioned above including cement, cloves, 
and plywood. All non-tariff barriers, except for those based on health, safety, 
environmental and security reasons, will be eliminated by the end of the programme 
period (year 2003). All tariff rates, with a few exceptions, are to be reduced below 10 
per cent by the end of the programme. Also relevant to competition policy, the 
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Indonesian government agreed to draft and to submit to Parliament a competition law 
by December 1998. 
Successful implementation of these reforms will make the Indonesian economy one of 
the most open in the region, and enhance the competitive environment and overall 
efficiency of domestic markets. However, the events surrounding the agreements and 
the financial crisis in early 1998 are testimony to the powerful vested interests that 
resisted some of these reforms in the early stages of the prograrmne.3 For example, 
shortly after President Suharto signed the second IMF agreement on January 15, the 
clove monopoly and plywood cartel, with the government's apparent approval, 
introduced measures that attempted to circumvent the agreed reforms. The plywood 
cartel continued to insist that exporters provide the plywood association with export 
documents, presumably so they could monitor firms' export shares. They also 
imposed a fee of US$50 per cubic meter of plywood to cover the cost of so-called 
'data collection' in place of the abolished cartel fee of a similar amount. In cloves, the 
Minister of Cooperatives and Small-Scale Industries overseeing the monopoly 
announced a new scheme that would essentially preserve the monopoly. 
These actions along, with other exampl\es of resistance to reforms in banking and 
industry, were widely reported in the local media and were viewed by invest.Jrs and 
the general public as an attempt by vested h1terests to resist the IMF reforms. This 
created doubt over the Government's commitment and administrative capacity to 
implement reforms successfully and, coupled with an expansionary monetary policy 
at the time exacerbated the rupiah's fall (the rupiah hit a low of Rp 17 ,OOO/US$ in late 
January, down from around Rp6,r')() at the end of December, and Rp2,600 in July 
1997).4 
The deepening economic crisis - the economy contracted by an estimated 7 per cent 
in the first quarter of· 1998 over the corresponding period in 1997 - set the stage for 
growing opposition to President Suharto. Widespread student protests and the killing 
3 See Soesastro and Basri (1998) for a discussion on the financial crisis and implementation problems with the 
IMF structural refonn programme in early 1998. 
4 The money base expanded by around 60 per cent between November 1997 nnd February 1998, essentially 
financing capital flight during this period {Bl Monthly Financial Report, various issues 1998). 
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of four Trisakti University students by security forces on May 14 culminated in 
violent riots in Jakarta a few days later and President Suharto's resignation on May 
21. 
1.4 Organisation of the Thesis 
The organisation of the thesis is as follows. 
Part A: Structure-Conduct-Performance Analysis, Chapters 2 to 8 
Chapters 2 presents an overview of the trade and industry policy reforms implemented 
since the mid-1980s, and provides a backdrop to our subsequent analysis on the 
interrelationships between market structures, competition and government trade and 
industrial polices during this period. 
Chapter 3 provides an overview of structural transformation in the Indonesian 
manUJ acturing sector over the last 25 years. The Chapter also describes the saliant 
features of the manufacturing sector, including pattern of ownership, size distribution, 
and export-orientation of firms by ownership type. 
Chapter 4 provides an overview of industrial concentration levels and concentration 
trends in 102 foJr and five-digit ISIC industries over the period 1975-93. The 
descriptive !lnalysis enables one to gauge the magnitude, direction, and pattern of 
concentration change that has occurred among these industries and provides a 
backdrop for the statistical analysis of the underlying factors explaining the observed 
levels of concentration and its effect on other aspects of market structure and 
performance in Chapter 7. 
Chapter 5 presents the Structure-Conduct-Performance framework adopted in the 
study and specifies a strnctural model. The salient features of the structure-conduct-
performance model are discussed in section 5.2. It shows that many aspects of market 
structure, international linkages, government policy, conduct and performance are 
jointly determined. In section 5.3 a structural model explicitly incorporating these 
interrelations is developed for the purpose of the empirical analysis in Chapter 7. 
Chapter 6 describes the database and provides a discussion of the measurement of the 
variables of the structural model developed in the preceding Chapter. The 2SLS 
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econometric procedures used in the estimation of the model are explained. 
Chapter 7 analyses the estimation results of the structural model specified in Chapter 
5 for a cross-section of 67 industries. The model is t stimated under two different 
trade and investment policy regimes. The regression results presented in the Chapter 
are the statistically robust 2SLS results. 
Chapter 8 analyses changes in leading firms market shares between 1985 and 1993. 
First, we measure the magnitude of changes in leading firms' market shares and 
determine whether it is the case for Indonesian manufacturing that persistently high 
levels of concentration can be found along with considerable instability in leading 
firms' market shares. Second, we identify the determinants of changes in leading 
firms' market shares and estimate their influence on the observed changes for our 
cross-section of 67 manufacturing industries. 
Part B: Industry Case Studies, Chapters 9to11 
Chapters 9 and 10 examine competition in the cigarette industry. Chapter 9 provides 
an overview of the development of the Indonesian cigarette industry over the last 
three decades. The descriptive analysis enables one to gauge the linkages between 
competition, government policy and industrial structure over time, and provides ,1 
backdrop for the statistical analysis into the effects of advertising competition on 
firms' market shares in Chapter 10 
Chapter 11 analyses regulation and competition in the cement industry. The Chapter 
is divided into two sections. The first section presents an overview of the 
development of the cement industry over the last 30 years, and descdbes the demand 
conditions of the industry and the structure of the market. The second section presents 
an analysi;; of the impact of n;overnment polices on the stntcture of the industry, the 
nature of competition and cement prices. 
Chapter 12 summarises the major findings of the study and provides a discussion on 
future directions of competition policy in Indonesia with reference to the recent IMF 
structural reform programme. Implications for future research arc also discussed. 
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Chapter2 
Overview of Trade and Industry Policy 
2.1 Introduction 
This Chapter presents an overview of the trade and industry policy reforms 
implemented since the mid-1980s, and provides a backdrop to our subsequent 
analysis of the interrelationships between market structures, competition and 
government trade and industrial polices during this period. 
The plunge in oil prices in 1986, coupled with the persistent slow growth between 
1982 and 1986, forced the government to embark on a substantive trade, industry and 
financial sector liberalisation programme. Tariff rates were substantially reduced, and 
most quantitative import restrictions were replaced by tariffs. Deregulation of the 
industrial sector eliminated many (but not all) of the restrictions on new investment, 
including foreign investment. Two broad indicators of the evolution of trade policy 
during this period are the various estimates of real effective protection, and the 
incidence of non-tariff barriers. The average real ERP estimate for non-oil 
manufacturing sector declined from 59 per cent in 1987 to 16 per cent in 1995 (see 
Table 2.3 below). Equally important, the disp~rsion of real ERPs in non-oil 
manufacturing narrowed considerably: the standard deviation of real ERPs declined 
from 102 per cent in 1987 to 39 in 1995, im1icating a considerable reduction in trade 
policy distortions based on this measure of protection. The coverage of NTBs fell 
from 77 per cent of non-oil/eas manufacturing value added in 1986 to 17 per cent in 
1995. 
Prudent fiscal management, the rupiah devaluation in 1986 and decisive trade and 
industry reform together resulted in a strong economic recovery beginning in 1987. 
Between 1987 and 1995 annual economic growth averaged around 6.5 per cent, 
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approaching that of the 1971-81 period. However, the sources of growth between the 
two periods were different. Recent growth was achieved without buoyant oil 
revenues. For the first time in its history, Indonesia became a significant industrial 
exporter. 
The remainder of this Chapter is divided into the following three sections. Section 2.2 
provides a background discussion on the different economic and policy episodes in 
the last 30 years. Section 2.3 discusses the trade and industry liberalisation 
programme implemented between 1986 and 1995. Finally, section 2.4 provides a 
summary of the main findings of the Chapter. 
2.2 Shifts in Economic Policy in the Last 30 Years 
In the last 30 years, the Indonesian economy has experienced a number of exogenous 
shocks, principally from fluctuations in oil prices. According to Hill (1996: 14-15) 
these shocks have generally resulted in a flexible policy response. Consequently, the 
sources of economic growth and economic policy have changed frequently over the 
past 30 years. At the risk of simplification, it is possible to divide the period since 
1966 into four identifiable economic and policy phases. These phases are discussed 
below. 
2.2.1 Rehabilitation and Economic Recovery, 1966-70 
By the mid-l 960s many observers despaired of any prospect of significant economic 
advance in Indonesia. Economic growth was low and in some years negative rates 
were recorded. There was hyperinflation, such that by 1965 inflation was 594 per 
cent. Part of the economic malaise can be traced back to Soekamo's economic 
policies and political instability at the time. In 1959. President Soekamo introduced 
his 'Guided Democracy' and its corollary 'Guided Economy'. The foundation of this 
'guided economy' was socialism (socialisme a la Indonesia in the President's words) 
with its emphasis on 'self-reliance' and •self-sufficiency'. During this period there 
was a proliferation of controls on economic activities, including price controls, import 
licences, investment restrictions, foreign exchange controls and a rapid expansion of 
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the state enterprise sector. 
In March 1966 Soeharto became Indonesia's second president, and he declared the 
'New Order'. Over the next four years, the government's priorities were to control 
inflation, re-establish ties with the international, non-communist donor community, 
and to rehabilitate physical infrastructure. The introduction of orthodox monetary and 
prudent fiscal policies brought inflation down quickly, from 594 per cent in 1965 to 
19 per cent in 1969. The policy shift away from heavy intervention to a more market-
oriented economy was demonstrated by the government's dismantling of the complex 
import licensing system, removal of controls on foreign exchange, and the 
introduction of a new 'i:xport bonus' scheme in 1967. A new foreign investment law 
was enactecl in 1967. This law constituted the basis for opening up the economy to 
fo1eign investment and it also provided various incentives to foreign investors. These 
included a 30 year guarantee of non-nationalisation, a two year tax. holiday, duty and 
sales tax exemption on imports of machinery and equipment, accelerated 
depreciation, and guaranteed repatriation of capital and profits (Pangestu, 1996). The 
same incentives were extended to domestic investors one year later under the 
Domestic Investment Law of 1968. In 1970, the government introduced a major 
policy reform package. This included the unification of the multiple exchange rate 
system, devaluation of the rupiah, simplification of the export and import procedures 
and elrn..ination of all capital controls. These reforms resulted in significant domestic 
and foreign investment, which in tum contributed to rapid economic growth in the 
early 1970s. 
2.2.2 Rapid Growth and Rising Government Intervention, 
1971-82 
This was a period of continuous high economic growth, fuelled by the oil boom of the 
1970s. Real GDP grew at an average rate of 7.7 per cent per annum and in nll years 
grew by at least 5 per cent. It was alsc> a period of increasing protection and state 
intervention in the economy. At least two factors that can be identified in explaining 
this policy shift towards greater intervention. First, the open door policy to foreign 
investors created resentment in nationalist circles, particularly against the more 
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conspicuous Japanese investors. This resentment culminated in a large protest (known 
as the 'Malari') in Jakarta against the visit of the Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka in 
January 1974. In response to this rising nationalist resentment, President Soeharto 
made several amendments to the Foreign Investment Law, of which the most 
substantive was the requirement that all foreign investors must have a local partner. 
The second factor was the massive increase i:·: "il revenues that provided funds for a 
nationalist economic agenda that was emerging during this period (Hill, 1996: 16). 
There are at least four channels through which the government intervened in the 
economy during this period: 1) the state enterprise sector, 2) trade policy, 3) industrial 
licensing, and 4) fiscal policy. The massive oil revenues helped government to finance 
heavy industry investments and to expand the state enterprise sector into diverse areas 
such as, steel vrodn~tion, fertiliser, cement, sugar, textiles, and food processing. State 
banks (which dominated the banking sector until the early 1990s) also provided 
subsidised credit to specific firms. Over this period trade and foreign investment 
policy became more restrictive. Barriers to imports took the form of both tariff and 
non-tariff protection; it included selective, tailor-made protection, especially for 
heavy, import-substitution industries such as steel, cement, and automobiles. Several 
changes were made to the Foreign Investment Law. The mandatory joint vc::uture I'llle 
was referred to earlier. Divestment rules were also strengthened, and foreign 
ownership was to be l'cduced to 49 per cent after 20 years. 
In 1973, the Government established the Investment Coordinating Board (Badan 
Koordinasi Penanaman Modal or BK.PM). This board was given wide discretionary 
authority to approve both foreign and domestic investment. In 1977, BKPM published 
the annual Priority Investment List for the first time. The publication listed four 
investment categories: {)product groups open to both foreign and domestic investors, 
2) closed to foreign inve11tors, 3) closed to both foreign and domestic investors, and 4) 
sectors open to small-scale domestic investment only. The publication also listed any 
fiscal incentives or conditions (e.g., capacity limits, seographic restrictions, and 
technology requirements) attached to investment. During this period, an increasing 
number of industries were closed to foreign investment, and FDI was more and more 
confined to resource extraction, and inefficient, import-3ubstitution industries. 
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2.2.3 Adjustment to Lower Oil Prices and Economic Recession, 
1982-86 
Falling oil prices, rising external indebtedness 1;Jad a sharp decline in economic 
growth in 1982 signalled an end to the decade of oil-financed growth and abundance. 
The policy response was ambivalent during this phase. The macroeconomic policy 
responses were generally prompt and effective. The government devalued the rupiah 
by 27 per cent in March 1983. The government's heavy industry investment plans 
were rescheduled. Fiscal policy was tightened: public servant wages were frozen, 
reductions in subsidies on domestic fuel, agriculture and state enterprises were 
introduced. The tax system was also simplified. 
However, the govemment's strategy of industrial deepening developed in the era of 
abundance continued to receive high priority. fudeed, non-tariff barriers proliferated, 
exacerbating the problems already faced by a small, inefficient industrial sector. 
Pangestu and Boediono ( 1986), writing at the time when these devices were most 
commonly employed, identified some 22 separate instruments issued by eight 
different government departments. In 1982, the government introduced the approved 
importers system (Tata Niaga Impor, TN!). Prior to this system, importers who 
obtained an import licence from the Ministry of Trade were eithe1 general importers 
who could import most goods, or importer-producer who could import the raw 
materials and intermediate goods for use in their production. Under the TNI system, 
two types of licences were issued. The first wa1; a general licence under which the 
importer could import goods falling under certain categories. The second was a 
specific licence. Only approved importers could import certain goods. The type and 
amount of goods imported was specified and as such there was a built-in quota under 
this system. The list of such goods, the volume of imports allowed, and so!Iletimes 
even the selling price :: ~ " good (e.g. steel products) were detennined after 
discussions between the interdepartmental team, business and industry groups 
(Pangestu and Boediono, 1986: 14). Consequently, the licensing system tended to be 
captured by vested interests and used as instruments for quantitative restrictions on 
imports, including the creation of import monopolies. Examples of products covered 
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under the specific licences were cement, fertiliser, inner tyre tubes and tyres, milk 
powder, meat products, steel, sheet glass, heavy equipment, automotive components, 
newsprint, staple polyester, viscose rayon fibre, and electronics. As the coverage of 
these licences extended to more industries, it became incteasingly obvious that 
powerful political business interests were the prime beneficiaries (Hill, 1996: 113). 
Two bro~J indicators of the evolution of trarl:, policy are the various estimates of 
effective protection, and the incidence of non-tariff barriers. Various estimates of 
effective rates of protection for the period 1971 to 1984 are summarised in Table 2.1. 
Differences in methodologies, concepts and data mean that the different sets of 
estimates can not be compared directly. However, several conclusions can be drawn 
from an examination of these estimates. First, all studies except for Pangestu and 
Boediono (who did not include all non-tariff barriers) found negative protection for 
exportables, indicating that the structure of protection adversely affected export-
oriented industries. This is often referred to as the anti-trade bias of policy. Second, in 
all studies the interindustry variations in protection are extremely large, ranging from 
negative rates to several hur.dred percent. It is clear that the trade regime had a 
marked impact on the distribution of resources among industries. It has tended to 
penalise the more efficient export activities. Third, manufacturing has, on average, 
received relatively high protection. Very high rates of effective protection were 
reported for a diverse range of industries including automobiles, cigarettes, processed 
sugar, and weaving. 
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Table 2.1 
Estimates of Effective Rates of Prote£tion, 1971-84 
(%) 
Pitt Pitt/World Pangestu & Boediono Parker 
Banlc 
1971 1975 1975 1980 1984 
All tradeables 33 30 115 56 133 
Exportables -11 -2 91 32 -4 
Importables: 66 58 n.a n.a 224 
import 
competing n.a 61 121 60 n.a 
non-import 
competing 15 9 21 9 n.a 
Sub-sectors: 
cigarettes 556 4 246 105 n.a 
sugar refining 154 -9 -8 0 141 
weaving na 192 135 127 589 
motor venicles 526 718 2~ 33 2948 
Notes: These series are not directly comparable, except where the same author (Pitt/World Bank) is 
involved. Sources: Pitt (1981: 208-9); Pitt/World Bank (1981: 10-17); Pangestu and Boediono (1986: 
25-6); Parker (1985: 12-17) 
The system of regulation and industrial licensing became more extensive and complex 
during this period. Hundreds of products and product groups were subject to BKPM 
investment restrictions, which particularly affected foreign investors.1 In addition to 
BKPM, line ministries (e.g., Ministries of Trade and lndustry)2 would also issue 
decrees or regulations erecting new entry barriers and restrictions on domestic 
competition. For example, the Ministry of T;:ade issued a series of decrees regulating 
the cement industry, including the geographic allocation of cement supplies, 
quantitative restrictions on imports, and administered regional retail prices. 
Many of the features of the industrial licensing system were examined in a 
controversial, unpublished World Bank report in 1981. The report emphasised several 
key aspects of the licensing system. Many of the provisions of the industrial and legal 
code were (and still are) based on those which the Dutch colonial .regime introduced 
in the 1930s. There was a wide range of decrees emanating from the bureaucracy, 
from different departments, from different tiers within the departments, and from both 
1 See BKPM's Priority Investment Lists, 1983 to 1986. 
2 The Ministries of Trade and Industry were merged into one Ministry of Industry and Trade in 
December 1Sl95. 
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central and regional offices. It was not uncommon for these decrees to be inconsistent. 
The report also noted that to establish and operate a business, the company must often 
obtain numerous licences, approvals and permits involving various levels of 
government (national, provincial, and local government). This often resulted in 
lengthy delays in the planning process, and increased the opportunity for rent-seeking 
activities by bureaucrats. 
According to Professor Sadh (1988),3 the proliferation of industrial licensing during 
this period was partly the outcome of the government's belief that competition among 
domestic firms should be managed to avoid socially wasteful activities, of which 
excess capacity was viewed as one such activity. In principle, a firm or industry group 
which could show that it has sufficient production capacity could petition the Ministry 
of Industry and the BK.PM for restrictions on entry, capacity or regional location in 
the industry. This procedure also tended to be captured by vested interests, and wac; 
widely used as an instrument for protection from both domestic and """r~ign 
competition. 
2.3 Trade and Investment Liberalisation, 1986-95 
The plunge in oil prices in 1986, coupled with the persistent slow growth phase 
between 1982 and 1986, forced the government to embark on a substantive trade, 
industry and financial sector liberalisation programme. First, the government 
introduced the duty drawback facility for exporters in May 1986. In September of the 
same year, the government devalued the Rupiah by a massive 45 per cent. These two 
policies were followed by a series of deregulation packages between October 1986 
and May 1995. The liberalisation programme is discussed below. 
(a) Trade Liberalisation 
The deregulation packages substantially reduced tariff rates, and replaced most 
quantitative restrictions with tariffs. Tile export bonus scheme, which was open to 
3 Professor Sadli of the Faculty of Economics at the University of Indonesia was the Minister of Labour 
and Mines during the 1970s. He also administered the investment regulation in the late 1960s and early 
1970s. 
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abuse, was replaced by the duty drawback facility, known initially by its acronym 
BAPESKT A. This scheme enabled exporters to source imported inputs at 
international prices. Exporters were exempt from all ~uties and regulations on 
imported inputs. They were also allowed to import directly without having to deal 
with : ~need importers. The duty exemption and drawback facility had significantly 
reduced the adverse effect of protection on intermediate inputs embodied in exports 
(Thee and Pangestu, 1994: 10). However, according to Wymenga (1991) and Thee 
and Pangestu (1994), hldonesia's foreign trade regime still adversely affected the 
firm's incentive to export. Wymenga (ibid: 140) showed that export-oriented textile 
and garment firms, though having access to tradable inputs at international prices, 
nevertheless received negative effective protection as their non-tradable intermediate 
inputs still had to be purchased at prices above international benchmarks. On the other 
hand, domestic market-oriented textile and garment producers continued to enjoy high 
effective protection (Table 2.2). Thee and Pangestu (1994: 10) observed, 
'Indonesia's trade regime, though improved in recent years, still 
contains a considerable 'anti-export bias' in the case of the textile and 
garment industries. Under such a protective trade regime, domestic 
market-oriented textile and garment producers will not have a great 
incentive to shift to the less profitable export markets'. 
Table 2.2 
Effective Rates of Protection for Textile and Garment Producers 
by Sales Destination in 1989 
Sectors 
Textiles 
Garments 
Domestic Sales 
109.4 
16.5 
Source: Wymenga, (1991), Table 5, p 140. 
(%) 
Export Sales 
-2.0 
-1.3 
Table 2.3 shows the changes in the estimated real effective rates of protection (RERP) 
and nominal rates of protection (NRP) between 1987 and 1995. RERPs are effective 
rates of protection corrected for trade-policy induced changes in wages. Whereas the 
effective rate of protection of a sector is defined as the proportionate increase in its 
value added per unit due to the complete system of trade policies, the RERP is 
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defined as the corresponding increase in its real value added per unit, where real value 
added is obtained by deflating nominal value added by the nominal wage. The 
advantage of RERPs over the more familiar ERPs is that RERPs allow for the effects 
of protection on the general price level, and hence on the real exchange rate, whereas 
ERPs do not. These estimates of protection are taken from Fane and Phillips ( 1991) 
and Fane and Condon (1996). The authors obtained the RERP estimates using the 
methodology of Humphrey (1969), adjusted for nominal wage effect (see Fane and 
Condon, 1996: 36). The estimates take account of the complete system of trade 
policies: tariffs, quantitative restrictions on imports, and export quotas and tax.es (see 
Fane and Phillips, 1991). The 1987 estimates summarise the situation after the first 
reform package of October 1986, while the 1995 data summarise that after the 
package of May 1995. Table 2.3 confirms and quantifa··; that trade protection has 
been greatly reduced across all broad sectors since the mid-1980s. The RE;RP estimate 
for the non-oil manufacturing sector declined by three quarters, from 59 per cent in 
1987 to 16 per cent in 1995. Equally important, the dispersion of RERPs in non-oil 
manufacturing narrowed considerably over this period. The standard deviation of 
RERPs declined from 102 per cent in 1987 to 39 per cent in ! 995, indicating a 
considerable reduction in trade policy distortions based on this measure of protection. 
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Table 2.3 
Estimates of Nominal and Real Effective Rates of Protection, 1987-95 
(%) 
NRP RERP 
Sector 1987 1995 1987 1995 
All tradable 10 3 4 0 
Ex portables -1 na -13 -13 
Import competing 22 na 29 11 
Sub-sectors: 
Agriculture 14 8 9 4 
Forestry, fishing & hunting -22 -24 -14 -34 
Mining and quarrying 0 1 -13 -6 
Manufacturing 
{excl. oil refining and LNG) 21 6 59 16 
Manufacturing 
(incl oil refining and LNG) 16 5 27 11 
Anti-trade bias (%) 25 16 50 28 
Standard Deviation of RERPs (% ): 
All sectors 17 17 42 26 
Non-oil manufacturing 21 17 102 39 
Source: Fane and Phillips (1991:118) and Fane and Condon (1996: 53). 
Notes: The estimates are weighted by production shares of each sector. 
Na indicates not reported in Fane and Condon (1996) 
A useful summary measure of the extent to which the overall system of tariffs, expori 
taxt::s, and NTBs inhibits trade is the anti-trade bias (ATB) of policy, defined as the 
RERP (or ERP) for import-competing sectors, relative to the RERP (or ERP) for 
exporting sectors (Fane and Phillips, 1991). The ATB fell from 50 per cent in 1987 to 
28 per cent in 1995. An alternative measure of the policy bias against trade can be 
obtained by using average NRPs in place of average RERPs. This <:1ternative measure 
of bias was 24 per cent in 1987 and had fallen to 16 per cent in 1995. The reductions 
in ATBs over this period indfoate that the trade policy refonns 'have significantly 
reduced the anti-trade bias that was prevalent in the structure of protection in the mid-
1980s. 
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Table 2.4 Changes in Real Effective Rates of Protection by 
Major Industry Groups, 1987-95 
ISIC 
Code 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
Food, beverages and tobacco 
Textiles, garments and footwear 
Wood products 
Paper and paper products 
Chemicals 
Non-metallic minerals 
Basic steel and metals 
Machinery, equipment and transport 
Other manufactures 
Source: Fane and Condon (1996), p 39. 
1987 
106 
78 
10 
15 
44 
38 
-1 
121 
95 
1995 
21 
-9 
27 
2 
-7 
15 
-4 
86 
12 
Table 2.4 shows the average RERPs according to two-digit ISIC industries. The table 
shows that RERPs have significantly declined in all but one major industry sector -
wood products. Despite the overall trend towards trade liberalisation, there have been 
some important changes in the opposite direction. The main examples are animal 
slaughtering (ISIC 31111); other milled cereals (ISIC 31169); noodles (ISIC 31179), 
soybean products (ISIC 31242), non-alcoholic beverages (ISIC 31340); leather (ISIC 
32310); plywood (ISIC 33111); other wood products (ISIC 3312/3314); soaps and 
detergents (ISIC 35231); and plastic products (!SIC 35600). RERPs for individual 
industries are listed in the Appendix to this Chapter. 
Tables 2.5 and 2.6 compare the coverage of 'restrictive' NTBs in 1986 and 1995. The 
1986 data summarise the situation before the reform package of October 1986. The 
1995 data summarises the situation after the package of May 1995. Tables 2.5 and 2.6 
confirm and quantify the obvious fact that restrictive NTB coverage has been greatly 
reduced since the mid-1980s. In several manufacturing sectors such NTBs have been 
largely, or entirely, eliminated. For all traded sectors, the NTB coverage of assisted 
value added has fallen from 44 per cent in 1986 to 23 per cent in 1995. For 
manufacturing, excluding oil refining, the fall has been much greater: from 77 per 
cent to 17 per cent. Substantial NTBs remain in processed food and drink products 
(ISIC 31), wood products (ISIC 33) and paper and paper products (ISIC 34). Most of 
these NTBs will be eliminated under the IMF Structural Reform programme. 
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Table 2.5 NTB Coverage of Gross Output and Value Added, 1986~95 
%NTB %NTB 
Coverage of Coverage of 
Gross Output Value Added 
Sector 1986 1995 1986 1995 
Agriculture 64 45 67 48 
Forestry, fishing & hunting 61 43 64 . 46 
Mining and quanying 2 0 2 0 
Manufacturing 
(excl. oil refining and LNG) 80 24 77 17 
Manufacturing 
(incl oil refining and LNG) 62 20 53 14 
All tradeables 52 23 44 23 
Source: Fane and Condon (1996), p 51. 
Table 2.6 NTB Coverage of Gross Output and Value Added by 
Major Industry Groups, 1986-95 
%NTB %NTB 
Coverage of Coverage of 
Gross Output Value Added 
ISIC 1986 1995 1986 1995 
Code 
31 Food, beverages and tobacco 88 45 85 25 
32 Textiles, garments and footwear 82 0 79 0 
33 Wood products 78 58 74 58 
34 Paper and paper products 69 25 72 37 
35 Chemicals 69 0 77 0 
36 Non-metallic minerals 59 0 59 0 
37 Basic steel and metals 53 0 59 0 
38 Machinery, equipment and transport 88 0 87 0 
39 Other manufactures 33 0 34 0 
Source: Fane and Condon (1996), p 39. 
(b) Financial Sector Liberalisation 
Major financial sector reforms were introduced in October 1988. All domestic banks 
were free to open new offices, and new private banks were permitted. These reforms 
had a dramatic impact. The private banking sector boomed, as these institutions began 
to compete for customers and market share. The state banks were slow to adjust to the 
new environment, and the decline in their market share accelerated. The stock market 
grew rapidly over this period. An intensive study by Gultom (1995) on the investment 
impact of the 1983 and 1988 reforms showed that small and medium-sized firms and 
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sized firms and export-oriented firms benefited greatly from improved access to bank 
funds compared with the period before the reforms. 
(c) Liberalisation of the Restrictive Investment Regime 
Substantial progress had been made in dismantling many (but not all) restrictions on 
investment during the last decade. In 1989, BKPM replaced the Priority .lnvestment 
List with the much simpler Negative Investment List. This new publication list the 
sectors closed to domestic and/or foreign investment and sectors closed to investment 
unless certain requirements are met. Importantly, the number of industries included in 
the negative list declined substantially between 1989 and 1995. The number of 
industries closed or restricted fell from 75 in 1989 to 34 in 1995 (Table 2.7). 
Table 2.7 
The Negative Investment List 
Category 
1. Sectors closed unless certain requirements are met 
2. Sectors closed to foreign investment only 
3. Sectors closed to 100% foreign investment 
4. Sectors absolutely closed 
TOTAL 
5. Sectors reserved to small enterprises 
Source: BKPM 
Notes: Category 3 was added in 1995. 
Number of Sectors 
1989 1995 
47 
19 
na 
9 
75 
35 
9 
6 
8 
11 
34 
37 
Linc ministries can, and do, impose investment restrictions on sectors not included in the 
investment list. See Table 2.8 below. 
Equity restrictions and divestment rules on foreign investment were gradually 
removed between 1986 and 1994. In the deregulation package of June 1994, foreign 
firms now have two choices. One is to form a joint venture with 95 per cent foreign 
ownership with no further divestment required thereafter. The alternative is to form a 
wholly foreign-owned subsidiary, in which case some divestment must be undertaken 
after 15 years. The amount of divestment was not stipulated, but the then Minister of 
Industry, Tunky Ariwibowo, stated that 'even one per cent divestment is sufficient' 
(Jakarta Post, June 4, 1994). This deregulation represented a major policy shift: 
previously the maximum initial foreign ownership permitted in a Joint venture was 80 
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per cent, except in the case of export-oriented investments (95 per cent). On 
divestment the previous rule was that foreign ownership had to be reduced to 49 per 
cent after 20 years, except for export-oriented investments in export processing zones. 
Under the new regulation, it is up to the foreign investor to decide whether to have a 
domestic partner, what the composition of foreign-domestic equity should be, and 
whether and by how much to divest to domestic entities. 
While the pace and extent of markf':c-oriented economic reform~ in Indonesia since 
1986 had been remarkable, many of the government-sanctioned monopolies and cartel 
arrangements, as well as other 'sensitive' regulated sectors (plywood, cement, 
fer:iliser, sugar processing, BULOG, aircraft manufacturing, steel, distribution) 
remained relatively untouched during the deregulation period. FDI remained restricted 
in several major sectors listed in the 1995 negative list and 37 sectors were reserved 
for small-scale producers. Also, there had been little progress in the area of state 
enterprise reform. Furthermore, in recent years there have been a number of policy 
reversals and non-transparent means of protection. Examples included the granting of 
a clove monopoly to a private-state trading enterprise joint venture in 1991, tariff 
protection to a large petrochemical plant in February 1995, and the granting of tax 
exemptions to a so-called 'pioneer automotive company' in 1996. All three 
companies are partly owned by former President Soeharto's children. 
Table 2.8 lists several major sectors that remained heavily regulated in the mid-1990s, 
in addition to those sectors included in the negative investment list. The negative 
investment list is not exhaustive. Line ministries (e.g., Ministry of Industry and Trade) 
also issue decrees or regulations that erect entry barriers and restrict domestic 
competition. The list is compiled from various World Bank Reports, academic 
publications ar;:! seminars, newspaper articles and my fieldwork in 1995. The list is 
not intended to be complete, as it is impossible to identify all industries that are 
regulated to some extent. 
Government-sanctioned monopolies or cartels exist in wheat flour milling, sugar 
processing, steel production, cement, fertiliser and plywood to mention a few. Until 
recently, in the cement industry there were regulations governing the geographic 
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distribution of cement, market shares and regional prices. Distribution quotas for the 
domestic and export markets were negotiated at monthly meetings betwe~n officials 
from the Ministry of Industry and Trade and the Cement Producers Association 
(Asosiasi Semen Indonesia), which represents all producers. The official objective of 
this system was to ensure a continuous supply of cement to all provinces at stable 
prices. However, as shown in Chapter 11 the distribution system had limited success 
in stabilising prices. Instead, the regulatory arrangements created a market structure 
that closely resembled a cartel where compethion among firms was greatly restricted. 
In the fertiliser industry, all urea feailiser is distributed by the state-owned producer, 
P.T Pusri. According to a study by Xie and de Bruyn Kops (1995), the distribution 
system exhibits monopolistic characteristics. They estimated that excessive 
distribution fees in the industry cost formers around US$100 million per annum. The 
plywood producers' association, headed by Bob Hasan, a close associate of President 
Soeharto, had authority to control distribution of all plywood production in both the 
domestic and export markets. Jn the highly dispersed sugar processing industry, state 
enterprises are dominant. There are also regulations Mntrolling new entry, imports, 
the geographic distribution of sugar pr\>duction, and retail prices. These regulations 
had perpetuated the 'overcrowding' of sub-optimal plants in the processing industry. 
Until recently, entry and import controls in the wheat flour milling industry µrotected 
the domestic monopolist, P.T Bogasari (a private-state owned enterprise joinl venture 
with first-family connections). It is also believed that the close supplier-buyer 
relationship between Bogasari and its affiliated noodle producer led to the near 
monopolisation of the domestic instant noodle market by the noodle producer. Both 
companies are majority owned by the Salim group, the largest conglomerate in 
Indonesia. 
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Table 2.8: Selected Regulated Manufacturing Industries, Mid-1990s 
Code Industry % VA b 
31164 Wheat flour milling 0.53 
31150 Cookingoil 1.12 
31181 Processed sugar* 0.51 
Salt na 
31330 Alcoholic beveragesa 0.88 
3142/3 Cigarettes 0.44 
33113 Plywood 0.64 
35120 Fertiliser* ~.81 
36310 Cement* 0.37 
37100 Basic steel and iron•+ 1.19 
38411 Shipbuilding* + 0.64 
38340 Automobiles 0.55 
38450 Aerospace*+ 0.50 
Other Sectors and Institutions 
Oil distribution 
Wholesale and retail :~mfo 
BULOG 
Cloves 
na 
na 
3.9 
0.14 
REJU>C Restrictions 
.33 Investment restrictions. Import and 
distribution monopoly held by BULOG. 
-1 Import and entry restrictions, export 
quota. 
44 State dominant producer (SOE), price 
controls, investment restrictions, 
distribution controls. Import monopoly 
held by BULOG. 
na State-owned PT Garam holds n dominant 
position in the industry. Until 1993 PT Garam 
was responsible for the national salt buffer stock. 
Imports of salt restricted. There are regulations 
on mechanisation of snit processing. 
62 New entry prohibited, import monopoly. 
108 Entry restricted in clove cigarettes, 
minimum retail prices baserl on firm size. 
Mechanisation restrictions. 
42 Government-sanctioned export cartel. 
·24 SOE production and distribution monopoly. 
r fatural gas subsidies, direct budget subsidies to 
rrnducers, price controls. Export quota, 
quantitative import resl.rictions. 
-18 Large SOE presence, n1gional 
distribution controls, administered prices. 
-2 SOE dominant producer, M~!'ooolistic 
distribution arrangement.s. Naturai gas 
subsidies. 
-6 Large SOE sector, ban on second hand 
fishing vessels. Budget subsidies to SOE 
producers. 
600 Entry restrictions, preferential tax 
treatment to pioneer company, import 
restrictions on completely built up kits. 
-9 SOE monopoly, budget subsidies 
na 
na 
·2 
Stat~ oil company has wholesale and retail 
monopoly 
Foreign investment in wholesale and 
retail trade prohibit~d. except under licence to an 
Indonesian company. Foreign manufacturers are 
prohibited from directly distributing their 
products in the domestic market. 
State food logistics agency has an import and 
distribution monopoly over several key 
agrii;ulture commodities, includina rice, refined 
sugar, soybeans, wheat and wheat flour, and 
garlic. 
Government granted a cloves trading monupoty 
to 11 private-state trading company joint venture. 
• Viewed as 'Strategic' industries by the government. + state enterprises under the supervision of the th~ 
Minister for Science and Technology, Professor Habibie (now President of Indonesia). 
a. Regulated on social grounds b. % Share of VA refers to percentage share of total value added produced by the 
tradable sector (agriculture, mining/oil/gas and manufacturing). Source; 1993 Input-Output Tables. BULOG 
includes value added of the commodities listed in the table. c. RERP refers to real effective rates of protection. 
Source: Fane and Condon (1996). 
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Why was there a lack of policy reforms in these sectors when many other sectors had 
been deregulated? In the case of the state enterprise sector several factors appear to 
have been important. First, technical ministries have generally resisted the reform 
process, especially if it involves privatisation of state enterprises. State enterprises 
(SOEs) under their control constitute a valuable source of additional funding (Hill, 
1996: 105). State enterprises are also viewed by the department as a vehicle for their 
development objectives, in areas of small enterprise development and the promotion 
of subcontracting networks. In addition, particular Ministers have regarded state 
enterprises as personal fiefdoms, immune from public scrutiny. The obvious example, 
since the early 1980s has been the then Minister for Research and Technology, 
Professor Habibie. He has been able to circumvent the reforms and protect his 
extensive commercial interests through his direct and close contact with the former 
President. To further protect his interests the Strategic Industry Board (Badan 
Pengelola Industri S~."1tegis, BPIS) was established in 1989. Under this aITangement, 
ten of the largest state enterprises were placed under his direct control. Among these 
industries are aerospace, shipbuilding and repair, nuclear energy, ammunitions, and 
the state steel company, P.T Krakatau Steel. 
A second major reason for the limited SOE reform relates to concern over the likely 
buyers. The buyers would almost certainly be either foreign investors or the major 
domestic conglomerates which consist mainly of non-pribumi (mainly ethnic chinese) 
or politically powerful owners. Deep seated pribumi reservations persist over the 
extent of non·pribumi wealth and economic dominance. Faced with public sentiment 
towards non-pribumi business dominance, it is not surprising that the government has 
been reluctant to initiate bold reforms in this area. An additional concem has been 
that there is little point in transforming public monopolies into private monopolies 
and that privatisation without refonns in the fields of trade and competition policies 
would produce little benefit. 
The lack of microeconomic reforms in many of the industries listed in Table 2.8 can· 
also be explained by powerful vested interests. Several politically powerful business 
groups operate in many of these industries (often with state-owned enterprise 
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partners), and are presumably extracting rents through the competition-restricting 
regulations. Tim&, mey are likely to use their strong political connections to resist the 
reform process in these industries.4 Indeed, the absence of reform in these industries 
during this period is testimony to th:. presence of powerful vested interests opposing 
such measures. 
2.4 Summary 
This Chapter described the trade and industry policy reforms implemented between 
the mid-1980s and 1995, and provided a backdrop to our subsequent analysis on the 
interrelationships between market structures, competition and government policies 
during this period. Th~ pace and extent of market-oriented economic reforms in 
lndo"'!Sia since 1986 have been remarkable. Tariff rates were substantially reduced, 
and most quantitative import restrictions were replaced by tariffs. Deregulation of the 
industrial sector eliminated many restrictions on new investment, including foreign 
investment. 
However, many of the government-sanctioned monopolies and cartel arrangements, 
as well as other 'sensitive' regulated sectors (plywood, cement, fertiliser, sugar-
processing, BULOG, aircraft manufacturing, steel, distribution) remained rel~tively 
untouched during the deregulation period. A major empiric:tl issue examined in 
subsequent chapters is the extent to which past and current policies shaped industrial 
structure, the nature of competition and industry performance in Indonesian 
manufacturing. 
4 Major general reference;s on this subject include Mackie and Macintyre (1994) and Bresnan (1993). 
Scrwarz (1994) provides an informative account of busin•!SS and politics through to the early 1990s. 
Sl!;dies which focus particularly on the political economy of policy-making, 11nd emphasise the rent-
seeking and lobbying activities of businei:s include Robison (1986), Yoshihara (1988), and Muhaiman 
(1991). 
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Appetidix 1 
Changes in Real Effective Protection in Manufacturing, 1987 to 1995 
Input-Output Sector Real Effective Rates of Protection 
1987 1995 Change, 1987-95 
·-·---·-
Increases in effective protection (i11dustries= 19) 
44 Slaughtering 49 174 125 
52 Other milled cereals -17c,d 45 62 
54 Noodles etc. 34 126 92 
59 Soybean products -45d 16 61 
63 Non-alcoholic 52c 537 485 
beverages 
72 Leather 
-8 72 80 
75 Plywood 7 42 35 
78 Other wood products 45 142 97 
82 Paper & cardboard 28 31 3 
products 
84 Basic chemicals -5 3 8 
88 Paints & lacquers 65 70 5 
91 Soaps & detergents 88b 352 264 
94x Oil refining 
-14 6 20 
99 Plastic products 79 600u 521 
108 Non-ferrous metal products _7b 3 10 
111 Structural metal products 82 156 74 
112 Other metal products 19 26 7 
115 Electric motors & 12b 77 65 
generat· rs 
123 Motor vehiclt.s 428 600?. 172 
No change in effective protection (i11dustries = 1) 
97 Tyres 6ooa 600a 0 
Decreases in effective protection (11umber of i11dustries = 68) 
45 Processed meat 6ooa 
-8 -608 
46 Dairy products 6ooa 85 -515 
47x Processed vegetables 6ooa 
-26 
-626 
& fruits 
48X Processed fish 6ooa 
-40 -640 
49x Copra, vegetable -1sc,d 
-1 14 
& animal oil 
50 Milled polished rice oc 
-6 -6 
51 Wheat flours 6ooa 
-33 
-633 
53 Bread & bakery 83 66 
-17 
products 
55 Sugar 187c 44 -143 
56 Chocolate & 112d 0 -112 
confectionery etc. 
57 Processed coffee 144d 
-8 
-152 
5gx Processed tea -15d 
-7 8 
60 Other food 43 12 
-31 
61 Animal feeds 30 
-2 
-32 
62 Alcoholic beverages 90 62 
-28 
64 Tobacco products 14d 0 
-14 
65 Cigarettes 6ooa 108 
-492 
66X Yam & cleaning 94d 
-13 
-107 
kapok 
67X Textile weaving 160 
-11 -171 
68X Garments, 71 -8 
-79 
non-apparel 
69X Knitting 10 
-9 
-19 
7QX Wearing apparel 23 
-8 
-31 
7JX Carpet, rope & 12c 
-12 
-24 
other textiles 
73x Footwear, leather 502 
-1 
-503 
products 
74x Sawn processed 
-24 
-13 11 
wood 
76X Wooden building 144 56 88 
material 
77x Furniture 368 62 
-306 
(wood, rattan) 
79x Woven goods, 101 25 
-76 
non plastic 
sox Pulp 516b 0 
-516 
81 Paper & cardboard 516b 10 -506 
83 Printing & publising 
-26 
-9 17 
85 Fertiliser 56b 
-24 
-80 
86 Pesticides 56b 34 
-22 
87 Plastic resins & fibres 37 
-16 
-53 
89 Drug & medicine 37 
-3 
-40 
90 Traditional medicine na 
-14 na 
92 Cosmetics 88b 116 28 
93 Other chemical products 15 
-5 
-20 
95x Liquid natural gas 
-12 
-12 0 96 Smoked & crumb rubber 
-15 
-9 6 
98X Other rubber products 98 
-9 
-107 
100 Ceramics & earthenware 6ooa 31 
-569 
101 Glass & glassware 111 
-2 
-113 
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102 Structural clay products 
103 Cement 
104 Other non-metal products 
105 Basic iron & steel 
106 Iron & steel products 
107 Non-ferrous metals 
109 Tools, cutlery & 
kitchenware 
1 IO Metal furniture etc. 
113 Prime mcver engines 
114 Machinery & apparatus 
116 Electrical machinery 
117X Communication 
equipment 
118 Household electricals 
119 Other electricals 
120 Batteries 
121 Shipbuilding 
122 Locomotives 
124 Motor cycles 
125 Other transport 
equipment 
126 Aircraft 
127x Optical & p ·ecision 
instruments 
128X Jewellery 
129 Musical instruments 
130X Sports equipments 
131 Other manufacturing 
Source: Fane and Condon (1996) 
68 
138d 
21c,d 
7b 
7b 
_7b 
93c 
114 
135b 
135b 
122b 
70 
6ooa 
52 
6ooa 
-7 
na 
6ooa 
86 
na 
3b 
96 
108 
56 
117 
42 
-18 
3 
-8 
-2 
-13 
56 
24 
60 
36 
22 
40 
6 
-1 
-4 
-6 
-9 
-7 
16 
-9 
-11 
-8 
63 
-10 
33 
Notes: Number of manufacturing industries under I-0 classification= 88 
-26 
-156 
-18 
-15 
-9 
-6 
-37 
-90 
-75 
-99 
-100 
-30 
-594 
-53 
-604 
1 
na 
-607 
-70 
na 
-14 
-104 
-45 
-66 
-84 
a. Indicates a sector in which value added at world prices was negative, or the calculated ERP exceeded 
600%. The reported RERP was therefore set at the cut-off point of 600%. 
b. There are several cases in which a single industry in the 1985 I-0 table was separated into two 
industries in the 1990 I-0 table; in these cases, the single estimated RERP for 1987 is shown in both 
rows of Appendix 1, which is based on the 19901-0 table. 
c. Indicates a sector (I-0 1990 basis) whose RERP estimate was obtained by aggregating the Fane and 
Phillip ( 1991) data for its constituent sectors (I-0 1985 basis). 
e. Indicates a sector in which the RERPs in 1987 and 1995 are not absolutlely comparable, because the 
definition of the sector was changed between 1985 and 1990 I-0 Tables for reasons other than those 
indicated in notes b and c above. Most of these reclassifications appear to be minor; e.g. some crop 
processing activities, formerly classified under an agricultural sector, were transferred to the 
corresponding manufacturing sector. 
'x' indicates that the sector is an export-competing industry (See Fane and Phillips, 1991). 
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Chapter3 
Structural Change in the Manufacturing Sector 
3.1 Introduction 
This Chapter presents an overview of structural transformation in the Indonesian 
manufacturing sector over the last 25 years. The Chapter also describes the salient 
features of the manufacturing sector and provides a background to our subsequent 
analysis of market structure and competition. 
Reflecting the patterns of economic growth described in Chapter 2, Indonesia's 
structural transformation has been remarkably rapid. The Indonesia of the 1990s is 
almost unrecognisable compared with that of the mid-1960s, or even the mid-1970s. 
Agriculture's share of GDP declined from around 53 per cent in the mid- l 960s to less 
than 17 per cent by the mid-1990s. Conversely, manufacturing's share of GDP 
increased from a negligible 8 per cent in 1965 to 25 per cent by 1996. There has also 
been a remarkable transformation in exports since 1986. Manufacturing exports as a 
shart:. of total exports grew from around 3 per cent in 1975 to just over 51 per cent by 
1996. The rapid transformation of the economic structure reflects the interplay of 
several factors including natural factor endowments, demand factors and government 
policies reviewed in the preceding chapter. In particular, the liberalisation of trade and 
the investment regime after 1986 stimulated a broad-based, export-oriented industrial 
growth in the last decade. 
The remainder of this Chapter is divided into foul sections. Section 3.2 describes the 
structural transformation of the Indonesian manufacturing sector since the early 
1970s. Section 3.3 charts the transformation in manufacturing exports, particularly 
after liberalisation of trade in the 1980s. Section 3.4 describes the salient features of 
the manufacturing sector, including the pattern of ownership, firm size, and export-
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orientation. Finally, section 3 .5 summarises the main findings of the Chapter. 
3.2 Structural Change in the Manufacturing Sector 
Reflecting the patterns of economic growth outlined in Chapter 2, Indonesia's 
structural transformation has been remarkably rapid. Figure 3.1 shows the changing 
composition of agriculture, industry (manufacturing and non-manufacturing), and 
services over the period 1965 to 1996. Agriculture's share of GDP declined from 
around 53 per cent in 1965 to 17 per cent in 1996. There has been a commensurate 
increase in the share of industry (broadly defined to include mining, manufacturing, 
utilities, and construction), which is more than three times what it wi:;s in 1965: 
industry's share of GDP increased from 12 per cent in 1965 to 43 per cent in 1996. 
The manufacturing share of GDP has grown from just under 8 per cent in the mid-
1960s to reach 25 per cent by 1996, having overtaken agriculture's share of GDP in 
1990. Most of the increase in manufacturing share of GDP occurred after 1987, partly 
as a result of liberalisation of trade and the investment regime. 
The non-manufacturing industry's (broadly defined to include crude oil and natural 
gas mining, otper mining and quarrying, construction and utilities) share of GDP 
declined from a peak of 31.7 per cent in 1980 to 17.7 per cent in 1996. This decline 
was principally due to the fall in the crude oil and natural gas sector's share of GDP 
during this period. Although not shown in Figure 3 .1, the oil and gas sector's share of 
GDP declined from a peak of 26.0 per cent in 1980 to 8.2 per cent in 1996. The 
construction and utilities share of GDP increased over the last two decades, from 6.0 
per cent in 1980 to 9.1 per cent in 1996. 
This pattern of structural change is typical of the development process and has been 
observed in most other industrialising countries. The share of value added in 
agriculture declines during the transformation process, while manufacturing value 
added rapidly grows, overtaking the agricultural sector as the dominant sector. 
ludonesia was a late starter in the development process compared to other countries in 
the region, partly due to the dominance of the oil and gas sector during the 1970s and 
early 1980s (Booth, 1992). 
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Figure 3.1 
Structural Change in the Economy, 1965-96 
(%GDP) 
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Source: BPS, National Income Statistics 
Notes: GDP measured in current market prices, 
Accompanying this remarkable growth has been the structural change within 
manufacturing. Table 3.1 shows the shares of total manufacturing value added (MV A) 
by major indnstry groups, including oil and gas refining. MV A data for non-oil/gas 
manufacturing industries are calculated from the Central Bureau of Statistics (BPS) 
annual manufacturing survey, 1975 to 1993. A consistent series of annual 
manufacturing surveys are available only since 1975. At the time of writing the thesis, 
the latest manufacturing survey available was for 1993. MVA data for oil/gas 
manufacturing are taken from BPS Nafonal Income Statistics, but are available only 
since 1983. Considerable change in MVA shares is observed during the period 1975 
to 1993. The oil and gas sector's share oitMVA declined from 27.7 per cent in 1985 
to 11.3 per cent in 1993, indicating the Jeclining importance of the oil refining sector 
to the economy as a whole. Conversely, non-oil/gas manufacturing share of total 
MVA increased from 73.3 per cent in 1985 to 88.7 per cent in 1993. Within non-
oil/gas manufacturing there has been considerable structural transformation. The food, 
beverage and tobacco sector experienced the greatest change in MVA share, declining 
from 47 per cent in 1975 to 24 per cent by 1993. Most of this decline in share is due 
to the shift in production away from traditional resource-intensive commodities such 
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as processed tea, coffee, sugar and cooking oil. In 1975, these four commodities 
accounted for 58 per cent of the food-processing sector's share of total MV A. By 
1993, these same industries accounted for less than 10 per cent of the sector's share of 
MV A. Textiles, garments and footwear (!SIC 32) and machinery and transportation 
(!SIC 38) had the largest increases in shares of total MVA during this period. 
Chemicals (!SIC 35) experienced a decline in its relative share of MV A, but this was 
principally due to the decline in the importance of the traditional rubber ?rocessing 
industry (ISIC 3552) during this period. Processed rubber's share of tc•tal MV A 
declined from 11.1 per cent in 1975 to 1.1 per cent in 1993. Several other chemical 
products increased their share of total MV A during this period (e.g., plastics). 
The pattern of structural change in manufacturing partly reflects Indonesia's resource 
endowment and is similar to the pattern observed in other countries in the region: 
declining shares of traditional resource-intensive products and an increase in the 
shares of labour and capital-intensive commodities as the industrial structure 
increases in depth and sophistication. Government policies have also had an 
important influence on structural change in manufacturing. Liberalisation of the trade 
and investment regime has increased the flow of resources into industries in which 
Indonesia currently has a comparative advantage such as the labour-intensive sectors. 
Indeed, a substantial proportion of the production growth in garments and footwear 
was due to the rapid growth in exports of these products after trade liberalisation in 
the late 1980s (see Table 3.2). 
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Table 3.1 Share of MV A by Broad Industry Group, 1975-93 
Sector 1975 1985 1993 
1. Oil and gas refining na 27.7 13.3 
2. Non-oil/gas manufacturing na 72.3 86.7 
Share of Non-Oil/Gas MV A: 
31 Food, beverages and tobacco 46.7 32.2 24.3 
32 Textiles, garments and footwear 10.8 14.1 19.4 
33 Wood and wood products 2.5 8.8 9.3 
34 Paper and paper products 4.6 3.5 5.0 
35 Chemicals, and petrochemicals 20.0 16.1 13.2 
36 Non-metallic mineral products 2.6 5.1 4.3 
37 Steel and metal products 0.7 .. 7.3 7.1 
38 Machinery, equipment and transport 12.1 12.8 17.4 
39 Other manufactures 0.1 0.3 0.9 
Major industries 
3142/30 Cigarettes 12.3 15.0 9.9 
35520 Rubber 11.5 3.1 1.1 
31181 Sugar 8.1 3.7 1.6 
31163 Coffee 7.2 1.9 0-2 
31150 Cooking Oil 6.0 2.3 1.2 
31220 Tea 4.8 1.0 0.3 
32112 Weaving 4.7 4.7 3.6 
35120 Fertiliser 2.4 3.4 2.1 
38440 Motor cycles 2.0 1.4 3.1 
32111 Spinning 1.9 3.0 2.7 
38430 Motor vehicles 1.7 1.8 3.9 
36310 Cement 1.5 2.0 1.5 
32400 Footwear 0.9 0.6 2.9 
32210 Garments 0.8 3.6 6.6 
35600 Plastics 0.7 1.4 2.3 
33113 Plywood 0.4 2.4 5.8 
31170 Bakery & noodles 0.2 0.6 5.2 
Source: For rows #1 and #2, National Income Statistics, BPS. For non-oil/gas manufacturing industries, 
Annual Manufacturing Survey, BPS, 1975-93. 
na indicates oil/gas processing value added not available prior to 1983. 
3.3 Manufacturing Export Boom: 1986 to Present 
The structural transformation of the economy is also reflected in Indonesia's changing 
pattern of exports. Figure 3.2 charts the changing composition of exports during the 
last three decades. Between 1965 and 1974, Indonesia's exports were dominated by 
agricultural commodities and oil. The oil price increases in the early 1970s almost 
doubled the contribution of oil in total exports. By 1982, more than 80 percent of the 
value of total expo1ts emanated from the oil sector. The plunge in oil prices in the first 
half of the 1980s cut the share of oil exports by almost half to 45 per cent of the total 
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in 1987. The share of agricultural exports declined sharply in the 1970s, partly as a 
result of lower agricultural commodity prices, and the 'Dutch Disease' effect of the 
oil boom. 1 
Exports of manufactures were negligible during the first 18 years of the New Order 
government. Indeed, manufacturing exports rarely surpassed five per cent of total 
exports during this period. The devaluation of the Rupiah in 1983 and 1986, and the 
1980s trade reforms stimulated rapid expansion in non-oil manufacturing exports in 
the late 1980s. Manufacturing exports as a share of total exports grew from less than 3 
per cent in 1975 to around 12 per cent in 1985 and to just over 51 per cent by 1995, 
Figure 3.2 
Changing Composition of Exports, 1965~95 
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Note: I. The following definitions (SITC) are used: 
Agriculture - SITC items 0,1,2, (excluding 27 and 28), and 4. 
Oil and gas- SITC items 3, 27, 28, and 68. 
Manufacturing - SITC items 5, 6 {excluding 68), 7 and 8. 
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Substantial transformation has also occurred within the manufacturing sector. Table 
3.2 shows the composition of manufacturing exports according to three factor 
intensity classes: labour, capital, and resource intensity. This classification of 
industries according to factor intensity is taken from Ariff and Hill ( 1985) and Hill 
(1992). Table 3.2 shows that the share of total exports emanating from labour-
intensive industries increased from 45 per cent in 1984 to 61 per cent in 1995. 
1 See Warr (in Booth, 1992) for a detailed discussion on the effects of the oil boom on Indonesi!l's 
competitiveness in the 1970s and resuHing policy responses. 
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Conversely, the share of exports emanating from resource-intensive industries 
declined from 46 per cent in 1984 to 25 per cent in 1995. The share of exports 
emanating from capital-intensive industries has fluctuated around 14 for most of the 
last decade. This pattern of manufacturing exports - dominated by labour-intensive 
products - is expected in a labour abundant, developing economy like Indonesia. 
Table 3.2 Major Manufactured Exports, 1980-95 
(US$ million or % ) 
1980 
Labour-intensive 
Total 287 
Percentage of all manufactures 57 
Major items 
Garments 98 
Woven Fabrics 43 
Footwear l 
Electronics 94 
Furniture 3 
Yarn 3 
Toys, sporting equipment n 
Jewellery n 
Resource-intensive 
Total 
Percentage of all manufactures 
MaJor items 
Plywood 
Cement 
Leather 
Capital-intensive 
Total 
Percentage of all manufactures 
Major items 
Paper products 
Steel products 
Fertiliser 
Rubber tyres 
119 
24 
68 
26 
6 
97 
19 
5 
8 
35 
n 
Total, all manufactures 501 
Three largest as % of total 52 
_Manufactures as % of total exports 2 
826 
45 
296 
183 
5 
214 
5 
17 
n 
8 
832 
45 
791 
13 
7 
194 
10 
20 
7 
37 
2 
1,839 
71 
8 
Source: BPS, Ekspor (Export Statistics), various issues 
Note: I. The following definitions (SlTC) arc used: 
1,054 
40 
522 
287 
8 
29 
9 
20 
n 
36 
1,209 
46 
l,127 
41 
15 
418 
14 
33 
58 
127 
11 
2,639 
73 
18 
2,061 
38 
797 
571 
82 
41 
70 
109 
n 
78 
2,575 
47 
2,368 
88 
68 
919 
15 
128 
269 
!34 
45 
5,416 
68 
28 
Resource intensive- SITC items 61, 63, 66 (excluding 664-666), 671. 
4,634 
51 
1,646 
1,132 
570 
204 
286 
109 
57 
57 
3,324 
37 
2,791 
96 
63 
1,183 
12 
154 
188 
193 
66 
9,041 
61 
35 
Labour intensive- SITC items 54, SS, 65, 664-666, 695-697, 749, 778, 793, 81·85, 89. 
9,963 
62 
3,164 
2,494 
1,324 
935 
491 
344 
218 
99 
4,131 
26 
3,501 
105 
61 
2,139 
13 
341 
230 
1&4 
96 
12,517 
61 
3,205 
1,820 
1,888 
2,068 
783 
678 
245 
726 
5,052 
25 
4,125 
30 
47 
2,869 
14 
594 
272 
178 
103 
16,061 20,458 
57 38 
48 51 
Capital intensive - SITC items S (excluding 54 and SS), 62, 64, 67 (excluding 695-697), 7 (excluding 749, 776, 
778, 793), 86-88. This classification was developed by Krause (1982), and subsequently modified by Ariff and 
Hill (1985) for ASEAN and by Hill (in Booth 1992) for Indonesia. 
'n' indicates less than $I million. 
A second feature of the pattern of manufacturing exports is the increasing 
diversification of exports, particularly during the 1990s. Table 3.2 also shows the 
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export shares of major products between 1980 and 1995. In 1986, 73 per cent of 
manufacturing exports came from three products: plywood (43 per cent), garments 
(20 per cent), woven fabrics (11 per cent). By 1995 these three products accounted for 
45 per cent of all manufacturing exports: plywood (20 per cent), gannents (16 per 
cent), and woven fabrics (9 per cent). In the 1990s, rapid export growth occurred in 
paper products, electronics, footwear, yarn, furniture, jewellery, toys, and sporting 
goods. A feature of resource-intensive manufacturing exports is that they remain 
dominated by plywood exports; plywood still accounts for over 80 per cent of RI 
exports. Processed-agricultural manufactures make up a small proportion of total RI 
manufacturing exports in the early 1990s. This small proportion is due to a 
combination of factors including numerous restrictions in the agricultural sector (e.g., 
BULOG's import monopoly over several agricultural commodities) and the lack of 
foreign investment in this sector. 
The increasing integration of the manufacturing sector with world markets is 
illustrated in Figure 3.3. Figure 3.3 shows the export-orientation ratio (exports as a 
percentage of manufacturing output value), import penetration rates (imports as a 
percentage of manufacturing output value), and an index of openness (ratio of total 
trade to manufacturing output value). All three series show increasing openness of the 
manufacturing sector to international trade after trade liberalisation. The export-
orientation ratio increased from a negligible 9.2 per cent in 1986 to 23 per cent by 
1993. Import penetration declined over the period 1980 to 1985, partly as a result of 
heavy domestic protection during this period. The share of imports increased after 
I 986 as a result of trade liberalisation.2 A clearer trend in the degree of integration 
with international markets since 1986 is shown by the index of openness. Prior to 
trade policy reforms the index fluctuated between 20 and 25 per cent of total 
manufacturing output value. In 1987, the index shifted upward and continued to 
incre~se thereafter. The index of openness has increased from a low-point of 19.8 pe:"' 
cent in 1985 to 44 per cent in 1993. 
2 Part of the increase in import penetration is also due to economic recovery after 1987. 
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Figure 3.3 
Rising International Trade in the Manufacturing Sector, 1980-93 
(%manufacturing output value) 
:: j ,,_ / ---=x of openne~f.I 
35 _,.. ....... 
30 --
/ 
Import penetration 
rate 25·'-..... _ _,.--......._ 
% 20 ,_,.. 
15 ~ 
export lnten11ty 
• I 
year 
Source: UNIDO, International Trade Statistics Year Book (various issues). 
Import penetration rate is the percentage share of imports to total manufacturing output. 
Export intensity ratio is the percentage share of exports to total manufacturing output 
Index of openness is the percentage share of total trade to total manufacturing output. The index 
measures the dtgree of openness of the manufacturing sector to international trade. 
3.4 Salient Features of the Manufacturing Sector 
This section examines the salient features of the manufacturing sector including the 
pattern of ownership, firm size and export-orientation by ownership. The BPS 
manufacturing surveys distinguish firms according to ownership type: government, 
foreign, private domestic and joint ventures between the three. Ownership is an 
emp!rically slippery concept in Indonesia. Ret1ecting the impact of domestic equity 
regulations, and multinationals' strategic motives, joint ventures are a particularly 
common organisational form. In view of the large joint venture presence, it is no 
simple matter to devise an operationally satisfactor; definition of "ownership". Some 
previous studies use a "cut off' point so that firms with, say, more than 30% foreign 
equity are defined as foreign-controlled enterprises (Chou, 1986). However, these 
ignore the reality of control in most instances. Aswicahyono and Hill ( 1995) devised a 
more appropriate empirical definition of foreign and state enterprise ownership for 
Indonesia based on the foreign investment regime and the reality of control in many 
cases. As indicated above, from 1974 to 1994 foreign firms were unable to secure 
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100% ownership, and those established before 1974 had been under pressure to divest 
a portion of their equity. Numerous Indonesian case studies (cited in Hill, 1988) have 
demonstrated that, in the large private-foreign group, the local partners invariably 
played a subordinate role, especially in matters of finance and technology. These 
private-foreign groups may therefore be regardd as "foreignu for our purposes. 
Similarly, the small government-private group of firms may be regarded as 
"government". 
This leaves the more complex groups of government-foreign joint ventures (that is, 
GF and GFP). Though small in number, several of these joint ventures are very large 
operations and they dominate a few key industries. This group can be allocated to 
ownership groups only on a case by case basi!i. In particular, there are five industries 
where the government can be regarded as the dominant partner in the joint venture -
processed sugar (!SIC 31181), fertiliser (!SIC 35110), basic metals (!SIC 371), 
cement (!SIC 36310) and ship building (ISIC 38411). In all thc~ie cases, the 
government established the finns in these industries (or in the case of sugar, inherited 
them from the colonial era and subsequent nationalisation), it is heavily involved in 
their development, and assigned them specific strategic objectives. In all other cases, 
th~ government's role in the joint ventures has been a good deal more passive, and 
here. a:. in the P-F group, they may be regarded as foreign owned (and certainly 
controlled). 
Based on these considerations Aswicahyono and Hill ( 1995) defined foreign-
owr.ership as: MNCs = F + FP + (1- Dl) * ( GF + GFP) where F is wholly foreign 
owned, FP is foreign-private joint venture, GF is government-foreign joint venture 
and GFP is government-foreign-private joint venture. Each ownership group is 
measured in terms of their share of industry value added. Dl is a dummy variable 
equal to one if the industry is sugar, fertiliser, basic metals or ship building, otherwise 
zero. Similarly, the definition of state ownership is: 
SOEs = G +GP+ DI* (GF + GFP) where G is wholly state owned, GP is 
government-private joint venture, GF is government-foreign joint venture and GFP is 
government-foreign-private joint venture. Each ownership group is measured in terms 
of their share of industry value added. D 1 is defined above. 
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Figure 3.4 shows the pattern of ownership between 1975 and 1993 for the 
manufacturing secto-:-. The trends in ownership patterns mirror quite accurately the 
government's policy priorities discussed in Chapter 2. The government inherited a 
sizeable industrial state enterpri&e sector, mainly the result of the nationaUsation of 
foreign property in 1957-8 and 1963-4. The 1970s oil boom enabled the government 
to expand the state enterprise sector into heavy industry, such as chemicals, stee!, 
fertiliser and cement. There was a considerable gestation period between planning and 
implementation. Consequent!y, the share of state enterprises was broadly constant in 
the 1970s, actually declined in the early 1980s, but then rose strongly as these 
investments came on stream. The fall in oil prices in the mid-1980s halted further 
state enterprise expansion. After 1987, the relative size of the state enterprise sector 
declined as a result of the liberalisation in the investment regime and the rapid 
expansion ur the private sector. The share of total MV A emanating from state 
enterprises declined from 23 per cent in 1987 to 13 per cent in 1993. Foreign 
ownership was also significant in the 1970s, but declined in the first half of the 1980s 
as foreign investment restrictions took effect. The share of foreign ownership rose 
after 1987 as a result of the liberalisation in the foreign investment regime and trade 
policy. Domestic private firms have also been major beneficiaries of the reforms, their 
share of MV A continued to increase after 1987. Cont:;ary to widespread expectations 
that foreign-owned firms will establish a dominant position in the new liberal, export-
oriented environment, the Indonesian experience at least suggests that this is not 
necessarily an inevitable outcome. 
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Figure 3.4 
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Source: BPS, Annual Manufacturing Surveys, 1975-93. 
Note: The oil-refining sector is not included in these figures. The state petroleum firm, PT Pertamina 
dominates this sector. 
Table 3.3 shows the distribution of the number and manufacturing value added of 
foreign and state enterprises by 2-digit industries. The trends in the pattern of foreign 
firms by broad industry group mirror quite accurately the government's policy 
priorities. Examining the period l "...,5 to 1985 first, it is apparent that a greater 
proportion of foreign firms entet-. . .:.:apitcl-intensive industries. More than half of all 
foreign firms were located in chemicals (ISIC 35) and machinery and transportation 
(!SIC 38). As indicated in Chapter 2, trade policy and the restrictive investment 
regime during this period was desigried to attract FDI into import-substituting 
industries. After liberalisation of trade and the investment regime,. a greater proportion 
of foreign firms entered the export-oriented sector of textiles, garments and footwear 
(ISIC 32). The share of foreign firms in textiles increased from 13.4 per cent in 1985 
to 24.4 per cent by 1993. Just under one third of the MVA produced by foreign firms 
emanated from machinery and transportation in 1993, followed by textiles and 
footwear (19.6 per cent) and chemicals (19.0 per cent). This pattern of FDI is not 
intrinsic to Indonesia or developing economies but rather to small national markets 
generally. It is evident also in countries like Ireland (Andrews, 1972), and Australia 
(Ratnayake, 1993 ). In terms of MV A, state enterprises are concentrated in the capitald 
intensive sectors of basic metal and steel (ISIC 37), chemicals (ISIC 35) and 
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machinery and transportation (ISIC 38), and the resource-intensive, processed food 
sector (ISIC 31). Twenty-five per cent of state enterprises' MVA in food processing 
was derived from the sugar processing industry (ISIC 31181). 
Table 3.3 
Distribution of Foreign and State Enterprises by Broad Industry Group 
(a) Distribution of the Number of Foreign Enterprises(%) 
Sector 1975 1985 1993 
31 Food, beverages and tobacco 23.0 12.3 11.8 
32 Textiles, garments and footwear 13.1 13.4 24.4 
33 Wood and wood products 9.3 11.1 7.9 
34 Paper and paper products 4.1 2.6 2.3 
35 Chemicals 23.5 30.4 20.0 
36 Non-metallic mineral products 3.4 3.5 2.7 
37 Steel and metal products 1.1 0.5 2.2 
38 Machinery, equipment and transport 22.0 24.8 23.9 
39 Other manufactures 0.4 1.4 4.8 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
J.!!2._D~stribution of MV A Produced by Foreign Firms ( % ) 
Sector 1975 1985 1993 
31 Food, beverages and tobacco 41.2 17.l 10.l 
32 Textiles, garments and footwear 17.0 17.0 19.6 
33 Wood and wood products 3.1 5.8 4.9 
34 Paper and paper products 2.9 1.3 2.8 
35 Chemicals, and petrochemicals 16.9 23.8 19.0 
36 Non-metallic mineral products 2.7 10.0 3.6 
37 Steel and metal products 0.3 3.1 10.5 
38 Machinery, equipment and transport 16.0 21.1 27.6 
39 Other manufactures 0.0 0.7 1.9 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
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Table 3.3 Continued 
( c) Distribution of the Number of State Enterprises ( % ) 
Sector 1975 1985 1993 
31 Food, beverages and tobacco 36.1 40.1 49.0 
32 Textiles, gannents and footwear 11.3 9.5 9.5 
33 Wood and wood products 8.3 8.3 5.8 
34 Paper and paper products 9.8 6.8 5.6 
35 Chemicals, and petrochemicals 12.2 7.3 7.3 
36 Non-metallic mineral products 4.9 13.7 19.2 
37 Steel and metal products 0.3 1.9 2.6 
38 Machinery, equipment and transport 16.5 11.8 9.0 
39 Other manufactures 0.6 0.7 0.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
(d) Distribution ofMVA Produced b;y State Firms(%) 
Sector 1975 1985 1993 
31 Food, beverages and tobacco 41.l 19.8 19.1 
32 Textiles, garments and footwear 6.9 4.5 5.1 
33 Wood and wood products 0.6 5.9 1.5 
34 Paper and paper products 5.6 3.1 3.7 
35 Chemicals, and petrochemicals 23.7 22.1 17.6 
36 Non-metallic mineral products 11.0 8.9 9.2 
37 Steel and metal products 0.1 26.l 25.2 
38 Machinery, equipment and transport 10.3 9.8 18.4 
39 Other manufactures 0.1 0.1 0.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: BPS, Annual Manufacturing Survey, 1975-93. 
Table 3.4 shows the average firm size by ownership class in 1993. Firm size is 
measured by the average number of employees per firm. Table 3.4 shows that, on 
average, foreign firms and state enterprises are larger than private domestic firms. 
This pattern of firm size is typical of many small countries, such as in Australia (on 
which see Caves, 1987: 66). 
Table 3.4 
Average Firm Size by Ownership Group, 1993 
(Number of employees per firm) 
Sector MNC SOE POE 
31 Food, beverages and tobacco 331 738 112 
32 Textiles, garments and footwear 1061 684 225 
33 Wood and wood products 480 265 213 
34 Paper and paper products 447 362 139 
35 Chemicals, and petrochemicals 260 506 160 
36 Non-metallic mineral products 421 337 84 
37 Steel and metal products 364 1235 226 
38 Machinery, equipment and transport 384 845 142 
39 Other manufactures 611 na 140 
~--~~~--~--~-"'."~~--~~----------------------------r• Source: BPS, Annual Manufacturing Survey, 1993. na; no state enterprises produced in this industry. 
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Evidence that foreign firms are significant exporters of manufactures is shown in 
Table 3.5.3 Table 3.5 shows that, on average, foreign firms have higher export-output 
ratios compared with local firms. In particular, MNC's export-output ratios are 
relatively high in textiles, garments, and footwear (54 per cent), processed wood 
products (71 per cent) and 'other manufactures' such as, toys and sports equipment 
(68 per cent). Private domestic firms have relatively high export-output ratios in 
textiles, garments, and footwear (30 per cent), processed wood products (57 per cent), 
non-metallic mineral (27 per cent) and 'other manufactures' (33 per cent). 
Conversely, state enterprises have the lowest export-output ratios among the three 
groups, except in wood processing industries ( 10 per cent). 
This pattern of exports by ownership group normally arises because MNCs are better 
placed to penetrate export markets than domestic firms (Willmore, 1992). Foreign 
firms have specialised knowledge of, and access to, export markets, better access to 
technology, and ability to maintain quality standards. When MNCs are present in a 
given industry, there is likely to be a positive spillover to domestic firms which 
induces them to become more export uriented. For example, when a MNC establishes 
an export~oriented venture in Indonesia, its international buyers visit the country and 
local firms may benefit from this. Local firms often acquire the new technology, 
quality standards and knowledge of export markets from MNCs through joint 
ventures with them, or through labour turnover between MNCs and domestic firms. 
3 Export data by ownership were collected by BPS only after 1990. The export data are weak due to 
deficiencies in the survey questionnaire. In the 1993 survey, BPS only asked finns what proportion of 
output was exported. It is unclear whether respondents reported actual quantity or value of exports 
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Table 3.5 
Export~Output Ratios by Ownership Group, 1993 (%) 
Sector MNC SOE POE 
31 Food, beverages and tobacco 13 9 10 
32 Textiles, gannents and footwear 54 14 30 
33 Wood and wood products 71 69 57 
34 Paper and paper products 3 0 1 
35 Chemicals, and petrochemicals 5 10 6 
36 Non-metallic mineral products 24 10 27 
37 Steel and metal products 20 11 9 
38 Machinery, equipment and transport 23 0 10 
39 Other manufactures 68 0 33 
3 Average 31 14 20 
Source: BPS. Annual Manufacturing Survey, 1993 
3.5 Summary 
The structural transformation of the Indonesian economy has been remarkable. The 
Indonesia of the 1990s is almost unrecognisable compared with that of the mid-1970s. 
Agriculture's share of GDP has declined from around 53 per cent in the mid-1960s to 
less than 20 per cent by the early 1990s. Conversely, manufacturing's share of GDP 
has increased from a negligible 8 per cent in 1965 to 23 per cent in 1994. There has 
also been remarkable transformation in exports since 1986. Manufacturing exports as 
a share of total exports grew from around 12 per cent in 1985 to just over 51 per cent 
in 1995. The rapid transformation of the economic structure is partly attributed to 
shifts in government policies. In particular, the 1980s trade reforms have stimulated a 
broad-based, export-oriented industrial growth in the last decade. 
The most important characteristics of Indonesian manufacturing are increasing 
integration with international markets, and a rapidly expanding private (both foreign 
and domestic) sector. In Chapter four we will discuss another important characteristic 
of Indonesian manufacturing: high, but declining, seller coP.centration. These 
structural characteristics prnvide the basis for the analysis of the interrelationships 
between market structure, conduct and performance, and government policy in 
subsequent chapters. 
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Chapter4 
Concentration in Indonesian Manufacturing 
4.1 Introduction 
This Chapter provides an overview of industrial concentration levels and 
concentration trends in 102 four and five-digit !SIC industries over the period 1975-
93. The descriptive analysis presented below enables one to gauge the magnitude, 
direction, and pattern of concentration change that has occurred among these 
industries and provides a backdrop for the statistical analysis into the underlying 
factors explaining the observed levels of concentration and its effect on other aspects 
of market structure and performance in Chapter 7. 
The descriptive analysis 1.-:resented below shows that there is a tendency towards 
industrial deconcentration across manufacturing over the period 1975-93. The simple 
average four-firm concentration ratio (CR4) declined from 63.6 per cent in 1975 to 
53.5 per cent in 1993. Similarly, the weighted average CR4 (weighted by each 
industry's share of total MVA) declined from 55.0 per cent in 1975 to 44.0 per cent in 
1993. The percentage of total industries that are classified as highly concentrated 
(CR4 above 75 per cent) declined from 39.2 per cent in 1975 to 27.5 per cent in 1993. 
Correspondingly, the share of manufacturing valued added emanating from highly 
concentrated industries declined from a peak of around 49.0 per cent in 1980 to 31.0 
per cent in 1993. Allowing for foreign trade redt.1ces average concentration 
substantially. In 1993, for example, the average concentration of a sample of 67 
industries without adjustment for foreign trade was 53.3 per cent whilst allowing for 
foreign trade it was 41.1 per cent. Thus, allowing for such trade indicates that 
competition is prima facie stronger in Indonesian markets than , '1omestic 
concentration ratios would suggest. 
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The analysis of concentration trends presented in this Chapter mainly refers to non-
oil/gas manufacturing. The oil and gas processing industry is highly concentrated 
(CR4=100%) and dominated by the state oil company, PT Pertamina. We adjusted the 
simple and weighted average CR4 ratios to include the oil and gas sector. The 
weighted average concentration ratio for all manufacturing shows a greater decline 
compared to that of non-oil/gas manufacturing over the period 1983 to 1993. The 
manufacturing CR4 ratio declined from 61.3 per cent in 1983 to 51.4 per cent in 1993, 
a fall of 9.9 percentage points. The weighted average CR4 for non-oil/gas 
manufacturing fell by six percentage points during the same period. The greater 
decline in the weighted average CR4 for all manufacturing is principally due to the 
significant fall in the oil and gas sector's share of total MVA during this period. As 
noted in Table 3.1, oil/gas share of total MVA declined from 28 per cent in 1983 to 
13.3 per cent in 1993. 
The remainder of this Chapter is divided into the following ten sections. Section 2 
discusses popular perceptions of industrial concentration in Indonesian 
manufacturing. Section 3 discusses the limitations of concentration measurements. 
Section 4 describes the data base for calculating the four-firm concentration ratio for 
Indonesian manufacturing. Sections 5 and 6 examine the pattern of change and trends 
in concentration over the last 20 years. Section 7 examines the impact of foreign trade 
on seller concentration. Section 8 investigates the characteristics of persistently 
concentrated industries. Section 9 compares Indonesia's industrial concentration 
statistics with those of other countries that have liberalised their trade regime. Section 
I 0 presents some evidence on the extent of conglomeration in Indonesian 
manufacturing. Finally, section 11 summarises the main findings of the Chapter. 
4.2 Views on Industrial Concentration in Indonesian Manufacturing 
A popular view of the Indonesian economy is that industrial concentration is 
relatively high and on the rise, and that the recent policy reforms have done little to 
abate this trend. This view is uncritically accepted and widely disseminated by authors 
of the non-professional (and sometimes professional) literature on the subject, 
including both the Indonesian and foreign press. This deep suspicion of big firms is 
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not new to Indonesia and can be traced back to the early period of Indonesia's 
independence when President Soekarno nationalised a large part of the economy. 
However, in recent years the debate has intensified as reflected in the extensive 
coverage of the subject in the Indonesian media, and numerous seminars on 
competition policy. The World Bank added new impetus to the debate in two separate 
reports in 1994 and 1995. In both reports, the World Bank noted that industrial 
concentration in Indonesian manufacturing was very high by international standards, 
and identified cartel practices in several large industries and commodities: cement, 
fertiliser distribution, sugar processing, plywood distribution, paper production, rice, 
cloves. 
Recent research in Indonesia has primarily focused attention on changes in industrial 
concentration levels over a relatively short period of time. Simandjuntak (1991) was 
one of the first economists to examine concentration over time, and noted a declining 
trend in industrial concentration between 1983 and 1987. Econit (1995) showed that 
levels of industrial concentration have increased for several industries over the period 
1988-92. This attempt to examine trends is misleading for the reason that they are 
examining short-run changes only. Little information is conveyed about the long term 
trend in the levels of concentration or the pattern of change in the levels of highly 
concentrated industries from a four year period. A much longer time period is needed 
to extract more reliable information. This is important because competition is a long 
run phenomenon and concentration levels in the short run often fluctuate around their 
long term trend. In fact, by examining concentration trends over the period 1975 to 
1993, our analysis shows that there is a longer term declining trend in average 
concentration. The slight increase in concentration between 1988 and 1992 could 
either be a short-term fluctuation around the long term trend or the impact of trade 
liberalisation beginning to show up in import-competing industries.I 
1 Aswicahyono, Bird, and Hill (1996) examined the trend in average concentration over the period 
1980 to 1990. They found a statistically significant negative trend irt concentration over this period. 
They also found that the trend in concentration over the period sh1ce 1986 did not differ significantly 
from that of the entire period. They did note that concentration fell more quickly in the must export-
oriented industries (textiles garments and footwear, wood products and miscellaneous manufactures: 
respectively ISIC 32, 33 and 39). 
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4.3 The Limitation of Concentration Measurements 
In the industrial organisation literature, concentration of sales among a few firms in a 
market has been assigned an important role in the analysis of market structure, 
conduct and performance. It is often used as a summary measure of market structure 
(Scherer and Ross, 1990) and as an indirect measure of the intensity of competition 
(Baldwin and Gorecki, 1994). That is, concentration measures the potential for 
collusive or anti-competitive behaviour among firms in a market. For example, 
several analysts have contended that an industry with a small number of firms and a 
four-firm concentration ratio above 75 per cent is more likely to have a 'competition 
problem' than an industry with a large number of finns and a conr~entration ratio 
below, say, 50 per cent (Baldwin and Gorecki, 1994). The concentration-collusion 
hypothesis has been criticised in the literature by several leading industrial 
organisation researchers (e.g. Demsetz, 1973; Brozen, 1982). Demsetz (1973), for 
example, argues that the high concentration-profit result is often the outcome of 
efficient firms growing faster than less efficient firms. In other words, in a 
'Schumpertanain world' industries are concentrated and profitable because existing 
firms are so efficient they have driven other firms out of business. 
Most researchers acknowledge that high concentration is a necessary, but not a 
sufficient, condition for anti-competitive behaviour.2 Concentration measures are only 
one element of market structure; other elements of market structure include entry and 
exit barriers (including regulations restricting entry and exit of firms), and horizontal 
relationships between firms that affect the degree of competitiveness in an individual 
market. Moreover, market structure itself does not fully determine the degree of 
competitiveness in an industry. For each specific market structure (apart from pure 
competition) a range of firm behaviour is possible. An oligopoly's behaviour can vary 
between collusion and price competition (Green and Porter, 1984). Conversely. in 
Indonesian manufacturing some unconcentrated industries have anti-competitive 
outcomes because of government constraints on competition (e.g. sugar processing 
and plywood).3 
2 Posner ( 1976) lists 11 other conditions, in addition to high concentration, for indicating a potential 
for successful collusion. 
3 Xie and de Bruyn Kops (1995). 
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Most of the earlier literature on industrial concentration was developed within a large, 
closed (no international trade) economy model.4 Today, international trade is well 
established and most countries have moved towards free(r) trade. Thus, in a small, 
open economy, domestic concentration (unadjusted for foreign trade) statistics are 
inappropriate measures of market power.s When foreign trade is substantial, exposure 
to trade should significantly influence competition and industry profits. Economic 
theory predicts that concentration will have a significantly reduced impact on profits 
as domestic prices for a small, open economy will tend to be determined by foreign 
markets (Caves et al, 1980). Empirical evidence for other countries show that strong 
import competition constrains market power of domestic monopolies and oligopolies 
in most kinds of markets (De Melo and Urata, 1986; Katics and Petersen, 1994). 
Thus, at the minimum, it is essential to adjust concentration ratios for foreign trade to 
obtain a more accurate measre of market power. We will present evidence on trade-
adjusted concentration measures in section 6. 
The Theory of Perfectly Contestable Markets makes it plain that the level of 
concentration is unlikely to be an important determinant of market performance. If a 
market is perfectly contestable, price always approximate cost, even when there is 
only one incumbent firm (Baumol et al, 1982). For an industry to be perfectly 
contestable it must meet a number of conditions. First, entry and exit must be costless. 
That is, there are no sunk or irrecoverable costs in the industry. Secondly, 
contestability also requires that potential entrants can enter before ir.cumbents can 
retaliate through price cuts, and can exit before retaliation produces negative profits. 
The contestable market theory has been questioned on both theoretical grounds (See, 
for example, Brock, 1983), and on empirical grounds (See Shepherd, 1984). 
According to Green (1987), one might justifiably question the relevance of the 
contestable markets paradigm, if it was not for the growing influence of foreign 
competition. For example, Shepherd (1984), who has been the most scathing in his 
4 In fact, most of the earlier studies examined the effect of seller concentration on profitability of US 
industries in the 1960s and 1970s when import competition was not significant. 
5 Indonesia is a small economy relative to the rest of the world. While Indonesia is the fourth most 
populous country in the world, its economy accounts for less than I per cent of the world's output at 
official exchange rates. Countries like Canada and South Korea (two larger economies than Indonesia) 
are also referred to as 'small' economies in the economics literature. 
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attack on contestable market theory, has suggested that if the theory has any 
applicability, it is in the area of imports. Some economists have gone further and 
argued that the viability of contestable markets depends on imports. Green (1987) 
argued that for Canada, a small open economy, the contestablity paradigm may be 
relevant. Many of the conditions prescribed for the existence of a contestable market 
are met with import competition in a small, open economy. Thus, if sunk costs facing 
foreign exporters are negligible, the possibility of more rapid entry by foreign firms 
exists. This threat of rapid import competition will force domestic firms to set 
domestic prices equal to international prices. 
Concentration statistics are static measures in the sense that they simply record the 
characteristics of a size-distribution at some particular instant. If the identity of the 
dominant firms were to change over time, then even persistently high levels of 
concentration would not imply the absence of competitive forces. Changes in the 
relative positions or market share of the leading firms would indicate healthy 
competitive conditions prevailing in that industry {Baldwin and Gorecki, 1994; 
Geroski and Toker, 1996). Changes in the relative positions or market share of the 
leading firms in Indonesian manufactuimg will be investigated in Chapter 8. 
4.4 Calculating CR4 Levels from the Indonesian Backcastcd Annual 
Manufacturing Surveys 
The CR4 is calculated fror11 the 'backcasted' Annual Manufacturing Survey produced 
by the Central Bureau of Statistics (Badan Pusat Statistik or BPS),6 The survey 
attempts to enumerate all establishments with 20 or more employees in the non-
oiVgas manufacturing sector. Indonesian non-oil/gas manufacturing is classified into 
119 four and five-digit ISIC industries.7 Seventeen industries are dropped from the 
analysis for two reasons. First, eight industries are dropped from the sample because 
6 In the J 985 Industrial Census, BPS discovered around 6,000 establishments that had commenced 
operations before 1985, but were not registered with BPS, Thus, the annual manufacturing surveys 
prior to 1985 are greatly under-enumerated. The 'backcasted' Annual Manufacturing Survey is a 
revised survey of the output values, employment numbers and input values of the discovered 
ei;tablishments over this period. 
7 Actually. up until 1990 BPS classified Indoneisan manufncturmg into 119 ISIC industries. Since 
1990, BPS dissaggregated all four-digit industries into five-digit industries resulting in over 288 five· 
digit industries in the annual manufacturing surveys since 1990. To make a consistent comparison of 
concentration levels over the period 1975 to 1993 we conti11ue with the 119 ISIC industry 
classification. 
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their product classification is so broad that they have no economic meaning: these are 
the 'not else included industries'. Second, nine industries are dropped from the 
analysis because their classification has changed since 1990, and thus can not be 
compared with previous years. This leaves a sample size of 102 industries, which 
produced about 94 per cent of total non-oil/gas manufacturing value added in 1993. 
The CR4s in Indonesian manufacturing are likely to be underestimates of 'true' 
concentration. The underestimation arises for three reasons. First, the data are based 
on establishments rather than on firms, so that multi-establishment firms are recorded 
more than once, even though they are in efffect one commercial entity. Thus, 
concentration ratios will be underestimated in those industries where the leading firms 
own more than one establishment. Secondly, the data take no account of horizontal 
relationships between different firms such as, interlocking directorates, family 
partnership, and business groups or conglomerates. To the extent that these 
conglomerates are horizontally, rather than vertically, integrated many concentration 
ratios will also understate firms' effective market power. Finally, the concentration 
figures refer to national ratios and will be underestimated for industries which are 
regionally fragmented in the sense of having regional submarkets. In almost all cases 
the regionally weighted national concentration ratios will be greater than the 
corresponding unweighted national concentration ratios. The determinant factors in 
the formation of distinct regional and Jocal submarkets in Indonesia are high 
transportation costs and the 'perishability' nature of certain products. However, 
transportation cost.s in Indonesia are rapidly falling in real terms as infrastructure 
improves, and this in turn will ictl11ce regional fragmentation of many market!>. 
According to Scherer and Ross (1990), iii general the most regionally segmented 
commodities are cement, glass and glass prucl11cts, and steel mill products. Although 
high transport cost does not necessarily confine commodities to regional markets, 
there are commodities which by their very 'perishable' nature usually are confined to 
much narrower markets than the nation as a whole; among them are milk, bread and 
bakery products and newspapers. 
Conversely, the CR4s can \JP. overestimated, because the backcasted annual 
manufacturing survey only enumerates establishments with 20 or more employees. 
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Establishments with less than 20 employees are not included in the calculation of the 
concentration ratio. There are data for small-scale firms (those with 20 or less 
employees), but they are less reliable and are not produced on an annual basis - the 
small-scale survey was only published twice in the 1980s. In aggregate this is not a 
serious problem because small firms accounted for less than 15 per cent of 
manufacturing value added in 1985 (Hill 1990a: 89). However, the omission might 
matter in certain industries (e.g. leather processing). Hill (1987: 82) found for a 
sample of 18 industries in 1982 that the CR4s adjusted for small scale and cottage 
industries were not appreciably lower (except for leather processing) than their 
corresponding unadjusted values. Moreover, small and cottage industries are often not 
in direct competition with the factory sector, so the unadjusted estimates of CR4 may 
be a more accurate measure of the intensity of competition. 
The extent of these biases and their impact on industrial concentration statistics in 
Indonesian manufacturing industries are unknown. However, there are re~sons to be 
believe that they may not be substantial. First, conglomerates are more often vertkaily 
intl!grated rather than horizontally integrated in manufacturing. While they are widely 
dispersed across the economy, they often produce in unrelated markets. Second, our 
industry case studies ~how similar concentration ratios based on BPS establir.:.hment 
data and primary firm clata collected during my fieldwork, suggesting that under-
estimation may not be significant, at least for these two industries. In clove cigarettes, 
for example, the CR4 ratio based on BPS establishment data is 82 per cent, while it is 
85 per cent based on primary firm data (Chapter 9). Finally, it is important to 
emphasise that any under and over-estimation of CR4 leve!s may not be serious for 
our analysis of trends in cc :icentration if the net effects of under and over-estimation 
of CR4 levels remain unchanged over time. 
4.5 Inter-temporal Changes in the Distribution of Industries by CR4 
Class 
This section examines inter-temporal changes in the distribution of industries by CR4 
class. Table 4.1 presents the distribution of industries and manufacturing value added 
bv concet1iration class interval. Figure 4.1 presents a two-way classification of the 
number of industries distributed by CR4 class intervals for the years 1975t 1985 and 
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1993. Concentration is divided into quartile class intervals: CR4 between 0 and 24 per 
cent, between 25 and 49 per cent, between 50 and 74 per cent, and between 75 and 
100 per cent. Those industries with a CR4 above 75 per cent are referred to as highly 
concentrated industries. Those industries with a CR4 between 50 and 75 per cent are 
referred to as moderately concenirated industries, and those industries with a CR4 less 
than 50 per cent are referred to as low concentrated industries. These four class 
intervals are chosen for comparative purposes with other studies. 
Table 4.1 
The Distribution of Industries and Share of MV A by CR4 Class Intervals 
(a) Number and Percentage* of Industries 
CR4 Class 1 1975 1980 
CR4:75 to 100 40 29 
(39.2%) (28.4%) 
Ck4:50 to 74 31 35 
(30.4%) (34.3%) 
CR4:25 to 49 19 30 
(18.6%) (29.4%) 
CR4:0 to 25 12 8 
(11.8%) (7.9%) 
-
*Percentages in parenthesis 
102 non-oil/gas industries 
1985 
23 
(22.5%) 
30 
(29.4%) 
32 
(31.4%) 
17 
(16.7%) 
1990 
22 
(21.6%) 
25 
(24.5%) 
37 
(36.3%) 
18 
(17.6%) 
(b) Share of Manufacturin Value Added(% of total non-oil/ as MVA) 
1993 
28 
(27.5%) 
24 
(23.5%) 
36 
(35.3%) 
14 
(13.7%) 
CR4 Class 1975 1980 1985 1990 1993 
CR4:75 to 100 36.1 49.0 36.6 35.0 31.1 
CR4:50 to 74 27.6 15.1 11.4 14.0 18.1 
CR4:25 to 49 9.0 l o.5 21.4 19.0 31.7 
CR4:0to25 27.3 17.4 30.6 32.0 19.l 
Source: BPS, Annual Mnnufactunng Survey, 1975-93. 
Examining Ta))le 4.1 first, there is a fair degree of variation between different CR4 
class intervals in the number of mdustries and the share of manufacturing value added 
(M' 'A). There has been a decrease in the number of industries and a decrease in the 
shar ~ of m<mufacturing value added in bighly concentrated industries. Over the period 
197·i-93, the number of high concentrated industries has declined from 40 (or 39 per 
cent of total industries) in 1975 to 28 (or 27.5 per cent of total industries) in 1993. 
The share of manufacturing value added e1nanating from highly concentrated 
industrie!> has fluctuated over this period from a peak of 49 per cent in 1980 to 31.1 
per cent in 1993. Almost 70 per cent of the MVA emanating from highly concentrated 
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industries in 1993 is attributed to four ind· ... 1tries only: clove cigarettes (9.6 per cent), 
noodles (4.8 per cent), automobiles (3.9 per cent) and motor cycles (3.2 per cent). 
Over the sub-period of 1990 to 1993 the number of highly concentrated industries has 
increased from 22 to 28 industries. The share of MV A emanating from these highly 
concentrated industries actually decreased from 35.0 per cent in 1990 to 31.l per cent 
in 1993. The decline in the share of MVA during this period was primarily due to the 
basic iron and steel industry (6.9 percent of total MVA) shifting: to the moc:k.rately 
concentrated class (CR4 between 50 and 75 per cent) by 1993. The converse is found 
for the lowest two CR4 class intervals. The number of low concentrated industries has 
increased from 31 (or 30 per cent of total industries) in 1975 to 50 (or 49 per cent) 
industries in 1993. The share of manufacturing value added emanating from this class 
has increased from 36.3 per cent in 1975 to 50.8 per cent in 1993. 
Underlying these observations are the shifts in the number of industries between CR4 
class intervals over the period 1975-93. For example, the two-way classification of 
Figure 4.1 shows that of the 40 highly concentrated industries in 1975, 17 declined to 
CR4 levels between 50 and 75 by the year 1985 (Figure 4.la) and 10 by the year 1993 
(Figure 4.1 b ). Three of these 40 industries declined to CR4 levels between 2'.- to 50 
per cent by the year 1985 and eight by the year 1993. Of these 40 industries, 22 are 
included in the 28 highly concentrated industries in 1993. Of these 28 industries, four 
had CR4 ~evels betweeP 50 and 75 in 1975, and two had CR4 leve1s between 25 and 
50 in 1975. 
Figure 4.1 (a) and (b) also indicate that, across the total industry sample, about half of 
all industries remained wit1'!r1 their respective CR4 class. Adding the number of 
industries along the diagonal in Figure 4.l(b), the total number of industries that 
remained within their respective CR4 class interval is 51 (or 50 per cent of total 
industries in the sample). However, the 11umber of industries that shifted to a lower 
concentration class was greater than those industries that shifted to a higher 
concer • ..ration class. This can be seen by comparing the number of industries to the 
'right' as against the 'left' of the diagonal. Industries to the 'left' of the diagonal indicate 
a shift to a lower concentration class and industries to the 'right' of the diagonal 
indicate a shift to a higher concentration class. In the tliffi~rent periods, the number of 
1ndustries with decreases in concentration levels range between 37 and 43 while those 
with increases range between 9 and 15. 
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Figure 4.1 
I·lter-temporal Ctan~es in the Distribution of Industries 
(a) 1975-1985 
1975 
100 
0 
75 
3 
50 
5 
25 
Total number 17 
of industries in 1985 
(a) 1975-1993 
1975 
IUO 
0 
75 
5 
50 
2 
25 
Total number 14 
of industries in 1993 
by CR4 Oass Intervals, 1975-93 
3 
15 
1 3 0 
3 0 0 
32 30 23 
8 10 22 
4 
2 
5 0 0 
36 25 28 
64 
Total number of 
industries in 1975 
40 
31 
19 
12 
Total number of 
industries in 1975 
40 
31 
19 
12 
Table 4.2 presents the total sample of industries distributed according to differing 
magnitudes of percentage point change in CR4 levels over 1975-93. This table 
confirms that the number of industries with decreases in concentration levels is 
greater than the number of increases. Of the 102 industries, 69 industries had 
decreases in concentration, two industries had no change, and the remaining 31 
industries had increases in concentration. Table 4.2 also shows that, in 75 per cent of 
all highly concentrated industries in 1975, concentration decreased. In the majority of 
cases these decreases are 10 or more percentage points in CR4 levels. 
Table 4.2 
Number of Industries with Rising, Stable or Declining Concentration, 
1975-93 
CR4 Class Interval in 1975 
Percentage Point 0 to 24 25 to 49 50 to 74 75 to 100 
Change in CR4 
Increases in CR4: 
Greater than 20 1 3 0 0 
Between l 0 and 20 2 4 4 2 
Between 5 and 10 2 0 2 2 
Between 0 and 5 4 1 1 3 
No Change in CR4: 0 0 0 2 
Decreases in CR4: 
Between 0 and 5 1 3 1 8 
Between 5 and 10 1 0 6 2 
Between 10 and 20 1 5 4 7 
Greater than 20 0 3 13 14 
Total Incr~ases 9 8 7 7 
No Change 0 0 0 2 
Total Decreases 3 11 24 31 
4.6. Trends in Average Concentration 
Totals 
4 
12 
6 
9 
2 
13 
9 
17 
30 
31 
2 
69 
This section examines the trend in average concentration over the period 1975 to 
1993. Concentration trends in sub-samples of ~igh and low concentrated industries, 
export-oriented and import-competing industries are also examined in sections 4.6.2 -
4.6.4. 
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4.6.1 Average Concentration 
Table 4.3 shows the simple and weighted average CR4 levels over the period 1975 to 
1993. A visual interpretation of the average CR4 trends is presented in Figure 4.2. A 
weakness of the simple average CR4 is that it does not take ar.count of the differences 
in output sizes between industries. Therefore, we include two weighted averages of 
concentration. The first weighted average uses the industry's share of total 
manufacturing output in the current year as a weight, and is referred to as the 'current-
year weighted average CR4'. This weighted average CR4 adjusts for differences in 
output sizes between industries. However, changes in the current year weighted 
average CR4 comprise changes in concentration and industry weights. The second 
weighted average CR4 uses the industry's 1975 share of total manufacturing output as 
a weight, and is referred to as the 'constant weighted average CR4'. By keeping 
industry weights constant at their 1975 level, we can decompose changes in the 
current year weighted average CR4 into changes in industry weights and changes in 
concentration. 
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Table 4.3 
A verage F F" C our- 1rm t f R f 1975 93 onc1en ra ion a JOS: . 
Year Simple Average CR4 Current Year Weighted 1975 Constant 
Average CR4 Weighted Average 
CR4 
excl. oil/gas incl. oil/gas excl. oil/gas incl. oil/gas excl. oil/gas 
1975 63.6 na 55.0 na 55.0 
1976 61.9 na 53.8 na 53.6 
1977 61.5 na 54.0 na 53.0 
1978 61.2 na 54.3 na 53.0 
1979 60.0 na 53.6 na 52.1 
1980 57.9 na 53.5 na 52.2 
1981 57.5 na 53.1 na 51.5 
1982 56.0 na 50.9 na 50.2 
1983 54.5 54.9 50.0 61.3 48.5 
1984 53.6 54.1 48.4 63.1 47.3 
1985 52.6 53.1 46.6 58.1 45.8 
1986 52.4 52.9 45.9 54.6 45.5 
1987 52.3 52.8 44.3 53.7 44.2 
1988 51.8 52.3 44.2 52.7 44.5 
1989 52.1 52.6 43.8 52.1 44.7 
1990 50.9 55.4 42.5 52.8 44.7 
1991 51.8 52.3 43.3 51.7 45.5 
1992 53.7 54.1 43.4 51.7 45.3 
1993 53.5 54.0 44.0 51.4 46.2 
% point 
change: 
1975-93 -10.1 na -11.0 na -8.8 
1983-93 -0.9 -0.9 -6.0 -9.9 -2.3 
Columns 3 and 5 include the oil/gas processing sector in the calculation of the simple and current-year 
weighted average concentration ratios for manufacturing. The weighted CR4 for all manufacturing 
(column 5) is calculated as follows: CR4 = SJ *CR41 + sz*CR4z. 's1' is non-oil/gas manufacturing 
share of total MV A in the current year. 'sz' is oil/gas processing share of total MY A in the current 
year. Source: BPS, National Income Statistics. CR41 refers to the weighted average CR4 of non-oil/gas 
manufacturing presented in column (3). CR4z refers to the CR4 ratio of the oil and gas sector which is 
equal to 100% (state monopoly). 'na' refers to not available. I'.eliable dat<.1 on the oil and gas processing 
sector are not available prior 1983 from the National Income Statistics. 
67 
Figure 4.2 Trends in Average Concentration 
(non-oil/gas manufacturing) 
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The trend line represents the linear trend in the simplr average concentration, estimated over the 
peri0d 1975 to 1993. To estimate the trend in concentration the following simple regression 
is estimated by OLS: CR4 1 ::: a+ /3t + µ. where t is time and t=l..19 (i.e. 1975- J 993). 
The estimated intercept term ( a ) is 62.3 and the estimated slope ( f3) coefficient is -0.66. The 
negative slope coefficient {-0.66) indicates that there is a declining trend in average concentration over 
the entire period. The estimated parameters of the trend equation for the the current year weighted 
average CR4 ?.re a = 56.6 and f3 = -0.80 . The estimated parameters of the trend equation for the 
constant 1975 weighted average CR4 are a= 54.7 and /3 = -0.61. The absolute values of the 
estimated slope coefficients of the three trend equations are significantly less than one at the 5% or 
better level of significance. The estimated parameters of the intercept tenns are significantly greater 
than zero at 5% or better. 
Consider, first, the trend in the simple average four-firm concentration ratio for non-
oil and ga3 manufacturing. Average concentration fell from 63.6 per cent in 1975 to 
50.9 per cent in 1990, and increased to 53.5 per cent in 1993. Over the entire period, 
average concentration fell by 10.1 percentage points. Average industrial concentration 
in Indonesian manufacturing is high by international standards, but this is expected 
because of Indonesia's relatively small domestic market size (see Table 4.9 below). 
Second, there is a continuous reduction in average concentration over most of this 
period. This significant negative trend in concentration is expected in a rapidly 
industrialising and growing economy, as Indonesia was over this period. 
Table 4.3 show the results for the weighted averages of concentration. The weighted 
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averages of concentration show a similar trend to the simple average conc~ntration. 
The current-year weighted average concentration ratio fell from 55 per cent in 1975 to 
44 per cent in 1993, a fall of 11 percentage points. In terms of constant 1975 output 
weights, the average concentration ratio fe!l from 55 per cent in 1975 to 46.2 per cent 
in 1993, a fall of 8.8 pert;entage points. 
It is possible to draw a number of conclusions from a comparison of the simple and 
weighted average concentratlon ratios. First, simple average concentration is greater 
than the weighted average concentration, suggesting that concentration must be 
negatively co1Telated with industry output size; that is, concentrated industries are 
smaller on average than unconcentrated industries. Second, we can decompose the 
change in the current weighted average concentration into the change in concentration 
and the change in industry weights. Using 1975 output weights in Table 4.3, the 
change in the current weighted average concentration (-11 percentage points) can be 
decomposed into the change in concentration (-8.8) and the change in industry 
weights (-2.2).8 This shows that about one fifth of the fall in the current weighted 
average is due to the change in industry weights, that is, there is a tendency for more 
concentrated industries to grow at a slower rate than less concentrated industries over 
the entire period, 1975 to 1993. 
Table 4.3 also show•,; the simple average and current-year weighted average 
concentration ratios for all manufacturing industries, including the oil and gas 
processing sector. The current-year weighted average concentration ratio for all 
manufacturing (column 5) shows a greater decline compared to non-oil/gas 
manufacturing concentration (column 4) during the period 1983 to 1993. The 
manufacturing CR4 ratio declined from 61.3 per cent in 1983 to 51.4 per cent in 1993, 
a fall of 9.9 percentage points. The weighted average CR4 for non-oil/gas 
manufacturing fell by six percentage points during the same period. The greater 
decline in the weighted average CR4 for all manufacturing is principally due to the 
significant decline in the oil and gas sector's share of total MV A during this period. 
As noted earlier, oil/gas share of total MVA declined from 28 per cent in 1983 to 13.3 
8 The change in current year weighted concentration between 1975 and 1993 (-I l percentage points) 
less the change in constant weighted concentration (-8.8 percentage points) equals the change in 
industry weights (-11 +8.8=-2.2 percentage points). 
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per cent in 1993 (refer back to Table 3.1). 
4.6.2 Do Highly Concentrated Industries Become Less Concentrated 
Over Time? 
The above trend in average concentration does not distinguish between different 
concentration classes. We would like to know whether the trend in average 
concentration varies across different CR4 class intervals. For example, does average 
concentration m highly concentrated industries decline more rapidly than the other 
CR4 class intervals? To examine the trends in different concentration classes, 
industries are grouped into quartile class intervals according to their 1975 
concentration levels. Figure 4.3 shows the trends in average concentration levels of 
these four groups. 
Examining Figure 4.3, the data point towards a rapid decrease in the average CR4 
level of highly concentrated and moderately concentrated indu:-.tries over the period 
1975 to 1991, and a slight increase in concentration in 1992 and 1993. The data also 
point towards an increase in average concentration of low concentrated industries 
over this period. 
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Figure 4.3 Trends in Average Concentration by 1975 CR4 Class Intervals 
(simple average for non-oil manufacturing) 
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Average concentration in highly concentrated industries (so defined in the base year) 
declined from 88.8 per cent in 1975 to 69.4 per cent in 1991, and increased to 72.3 
per cent in 1993. Over the entire period of 1975 to 1993 average conc,mtration of 
highly concentrated industries fell by 16.5 percentage points, greater than the 
manufacturing average of 10.1 percentage points (Table 4.3). In moderately 
concentrated industries, average concentration decreased from 62 .1 per cent ·,n 197 5 
to 49 per cent in 1985, and it has remained fairly stable since then. Over the entire 
period. average concentration declined by 13.8 percentage points. This contrasts with 
the clas intervals of the two lowest concentrated industries. The simple average CR4 
in the second lowest concentration elm;:; (CR4 between 25 and 50 per cent) decreased 
from 40 per cent in 1975 to 33.2 per cent in 1988, but increased to 42.1 per cent by 
1993. In the lowest CR4 class (CR4 less than 25 per cent) average concentration 
increased from 18.8 per cent in 1975 to 23 per cent in 1993. 
It is possible to draw a number of conclusions from an examination of these trends. 
First, the trends confirm our earlier results (Tables 4.1 to 4.3) that high concentrated 
industries have experienced a decline in their concentration levels over time. This 
trend has also been observed in Canadian manufacturing industries (Khemani, 1980) 
and in United States manufacturing industries (Brozen, 1982). Second, in the words 
of Brozen ( 1982:96) "there is a centripetal tendency for CR4s to move towards the 
manufacturing average". Concentrated industries tend to become less concentrated, 
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moving towards the average concentration ratio. Low concentrated industries tend to 
become more concentrated, also moving toward the central value of all concentration 
ratios. In other words, the trends in average concentration across and within different 
CR4 class intervals suggest that differences in CR4 levels have tended to decrease 
over time. To confirm that there is a tendency for the CR4s to move towards the 
manufacturing average the following simple regression is estimated by OLS: 
CR4 1993,; =a+ /3CR4 1915,; + µ, where i refers to industry i. By regressing the 1993 CR4 
levels on the initial (1975) CR4 levels, we can ascertain whether concentration is 
regressing to the manufacturing average of CR4 (i.e f3 <l), whether concentrated 
industries are becoming more concentrated relative to less concentrated ones 
(i.e[J>l), or whether concentration is stable over time (i.e,B=l). The estimated 
equation is: CR41993•1 = 0.092 + 0.702CR41975,1 • The estimated slope coefficient ( f3) of 
0.702 is significantly less than one, indicating that there is a tendency for CR4s to 
move towards the manufacturing average of CR4. 
4.6.3 The Impact of Trade Liberalisation on Concentration Trends 
From Figure 4.2, there appears to be no clear impact of the policy reforms on average 
concentration trends post-1986. There has been an increase in concentration since 
1991, but it is too early to reach a conclusion on whether this increase is due to the 
1980s policy reforms or is R short term fluctuation around the trend line. This led 
Aswicahyono, Bird, and Hill (1996: 359) to conclude in their study of concentration 
trends over the period 1980-90 that, 'Where there has been a decline (since 1986) it 
appears to represent little more than a continuation of previous trends.' However, 
more confident conclusions can be reached about the impact of policy reforms on 
export-oriented industries. Figure 4.4 shows the trends in average concentration of 
import-competing and export-competing industries. The classification of industries 
into export and import-competing industries is taken from Fane and Condon (1996).9 
It is immediately apparent that average concentration in export-oriented industries is 
substantially lower than in import-competing industries both before and after the 
9 This classification is listed in Appendix I of Chapter 2. 
72 
1980s trade policy reforms. This arises because unconcentrated industries and export-
oriented industries in Indonesian manufacturing share common structural 
characteristics, namely, low capital intensity or barriers to entry. With the exception 
of a few industries, all these industries had very low export inte ·•ty ratios prior to the 
1980s trade reforms, suggesting that the high labour intensh.' of many of these 
industries is a major explanation of the relatively low levels of concentration. 
Figure 4.4 
Concentration Trends in Export-Oriented and Import-Competing Industries 
(non-oil/gas manufacturing) 
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However, it is clear from Figure 4.4 that the trend in average concentration of these 
two types of industries has diverged significantly since liberalisation. In the case of 
export-oriented industries there has been a continuous reduction in average 
concentration over the period 1986 to 1991. Average concentration increased in 1992, 
bm '"iis was due to three industries: kapok (ISIC 31260), wooden boxes and 
containers (ISIC 33120), and jewellery (!SIC 39010). If we drop these three industries 
from the sample, the trend in average concentration stabilises in 1992 and 1993. The 
reduction in average concentration is due to the expansion of the market facing 
domestic sellers. The expansion of export opportunities means that the domestic 
industry can support a greater number of viable producers, thereby reducing 
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concentration. This trend contrasts with that for import-competing industries. Average 
concentration in import· competing industries has remained fairly stable over the 
period 1986 to 1991. There has been a slight increase in concentration since 1991 but 
it is too early to reach a conclusion on whether this is due to liberalisation. A much 
longer time series post"1986 is required. On balance, however, our finding suggests 
that liberalisation has not had the major effects on industrial structure of import-
competing industries that its opponents - or in some cases proponents - maintain. 
Of course, 1ot all export-competing industries have low or declining levels of 
concentration. Firm size and concentration will increase in those industries where 
scale economies are important or where the fixed cost of exporting is substantial. 
Economies of scale are important in exporting industries such as, synthetic fibers, 
spinning, knitting mills, weaving mills and certain processed fond& such as canned 
vegetables and fruits. Concentration will be low, or decreasing, iu industries where 
economies of scale are not important or the fixed cost of exporting is low, such as in 
garments. 
Figure 4.5 Con<'entration in Selected Export-Oriented Industries 
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Figure 4.5 show the trends in concentration of a selected number of highly export-
oriented industries with different structural characteristics. The figure confirms that in 
the industries where economies of scale are important, concentration has increased. 
For example, knitting mills (!SIC 32130) have experienced an increase in 
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concentration as a result of economies of scale, especially since trade liberalisation. 
Except for a few years, concentration in the processed vegetables and fruits industry 
. has remained fairly stable around a CR4 of 90 per cent. Conversely, concentration has 
decreased in those industries where economies of scale are not so important. 
Garments have experienced a rapia decline in concentration since the late 1970s and 
this trend continued throughout the 1980s. Concentration in plywood production 
declined rapidly until the mid-l ?80s, and has remained stable since then. The 
declining trend in concentration was ·primarily due to the government's ban on the 
export of logs in the early 1980s; which resulted in the entry of a large number of sub-
optimal plants. 
4.6.4 Concentration in Broad Industry Groups 
Further evidence on changing concentration over broad industry groups is shown in 
Table 4.4. This table gives trends in unweighted average sales concentration classified 
by two-digit industry class. Concentration is highest in other manufactures (sector 
39), paper and paper products (sector 34) and chemicals and plastics (s,':ctor 35). The 
export-oriented sectors of wood processing (sector 33) and. textiles and garments 
(sector 32) record the lowest average concentration levels in 1993. Over the last two 
decades, signif!~ant falls in average concentration occurred in 'other' manufactures 
(sector 39), woo<l processing and wood products (5ector 33), and paper and paper 
products (sector 34). 
Table 4.4 
Concentration Trends in Broad Industr Grou s 
Sector 1975 1980 1985 1990 1993 
31. Food, beverages and tobacco 61.0 55.8 52.9 52.1 55.9 
32. Textiles, garments and 50.7 44.9 41.1 37.6 42.5 
Footwear 
33. Wood processing and products 51.1 45.1 35.6 32.4 33.2 
34. Paper and paper products 78.5 63.9 63.3 63.2 61.5 
35. Chemicals, rubber and plastic 69.2 64.7 54.4 54.5 60.5 
Products 
36. Non-metallic mineral products 57.6 57.4 46.4. 46.0 45.3 
37. Basic iron and metal 86.0 84.0 82.0 74.0 71.0 
38. Metal products machinery and 66.7 59.8 53.7 53.4 54.1 
Equipment 
39. Other manufactures 92.0 80.0 74.0 59.0 70.0 
Manufacturin Avera e 63.6 57.9 52.6 50.9 53.5 
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4. 7 Adjustments for Foreign Trade 
In interpreting the above results, it is important to remember that the data relate only 
to domestic concentration and do not take account of foreign trade. Whilst the trade 
adjustment concentration ratio itself may contain measurement errors, it is clearly 
important to take account of foreign trade in measuring concentration, in order to 
capture more accurately the extent of mark~t power, especially in a small, open 
economy like Indonesia. 
Adjustments for foreign trade can be made only on certain simpHying assumptions 
using available data. First, it is necessary to assume that industries are dominated by 
the top four firms; that is, foreign firms are not amongst the top four suppliers in the 
Indonesian market. Secondly, it is necessary to assume that the four firms do not 
import goods for sale in Indonesia. And finally, it is necessary to assume that these 
firms export in proportion to their sales so that no special adjustments for exports 
need to be made. Clearly, one can think of examples where each of these assumptions 
would be wrong. Unfortunately, in the absence of detailed knowledge of individual 
industries it is not possible to adjust for these factors in a systematic way. It is 
important, therefore, to bear these limitations in mind when interpreting the results 
reported below. 
On the basis of the above assumptions, it can be shown that concentration adjusted for 
foreign trade becomes: 
CR4MX = CR4(Q- X) 
Q-X+M 
where CR4MX = trade adjusted four-firm sales concentration 
CR4 =unadjusted four-firm sales concentration 
Q = domestic production 
X =exports 
M =imports 
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The import and export data are extracted from the Input-Output Tables for 1975, 
1980, 1985, and 1990. The data for 1993 are taken from a preliminary 1993 Input-
Output Table provided to us by BPS.IO Sixty-seven I-0 industries and ISIC industries 
have an exact or nea.rly matching concordance, and we use these industries to examine 
the trend in trade-adjusted concentration ratios. 
Table 4.5 
Comparison of Unadjusted and Foreign Trade Adjusted CR4 Ratios 
(non-oil/i?aS manufacturin2) 
Year Unadjusted CR4 Foreign Trade Adjusted CR4 
--~~~~~~---"~~~~~~~~~""---~~~-"--~~~~ 
19'75 63.5 46.9 
1980 58.8 ~'5.0 
1985 53.6 42.9 
1990 53.0 41.5 
1993 53.3 41.1 
Change: 
1975-85 
1985-93 
-9.9 
-0.3 
-4.0 
-1.8 
Table 4.5 shows the trend in unadjusted and trade-adjusted average four-firm 
concentration between 1975 and 1993. Two points should be noted. First, it is 
immediately apparent that allowing for foreign trade reduces average concentration 
substantially. In 1993, for example, average concentration without adjustment for 
foreign trade was 53.3 per cent whilst allowing for foreign trade it was 41.1 per cent, 
a difference of 12.2 percentage points. Some part of this difference will be du~ to 
measurement errors in adjusting for foreign trade, in particular, the assumption that all 
imports are competitive. Nevertheless, it seems likely that the bulk of foreign trade 
does reflect the importance of foreign trade in Indonesian markets in 1993. Allowing 
for such trade indicates that competition is primafacie stronger in Indonesian markets 
than domestic concer.tration ratios would suggest. 
Second, over the period 1985 to 1993 average trade-adjusted concentration fell by 1.8 
percentage points compared with a fall of 0.3 percentage points in domestfo 
concentration. While the fall in trade-adjusted concentration is not large in magnitude 
10 The BPS publishes lnput-Ov,tput Tables every five years. At the time of this study the 1995 Input-
Output Table was not availabie 
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it does indicate that most of the decline (1.8 percentage points) in average trade-
adjusted concentration since 1985 is primarily due to rising foreign trade (1.5 
percentage points) and less from falls in domestic concentration (0.3 percentage 
points). fu other words, while domestic concentration shows a slight increase in the 
1990s, rising import competition reverses this trend when concentration is acij11sterl 
for foreign trade. 
4.8 Characteristics of Highly Concentrated Industries 
in 1975or1993 
An examination of the determinants of concentration, requiring the construction of an 
econometric model, is undertaken in Chapter 7. But for illustrative purposes it is 
useful to examine the characteristics of the concentrated industries. This is done in 
Table 4.6 for the industries in 1975 and 1993 for which the CR4 exceeded 75 per 
cent. The results suggest the following pattern: 
( 1) Many of the concentrated industries in 1993 experienced some instability in their 
concentration levels. For example, 7 of the 22 persistently concentrated industries 
(those industries with a CR4 exceeding 75 percent in 1975 to 1993) had changes in 
concentration of more than 10 percentage points between 1975 and 1993. 
(2) Most of the industries are very small. Only seven of the 28 concentrated industries 
in 1993 have a share exceeding 1 per cent of MV A (recall there are 102 industries in 
our sample). fu over half the cases the share is less than 0.3 per cent. Many fudonesian 
industries are concentrated partly because of their small domestic market sizes. 
(3) Several concentrated industries receive relatively high effective protection, well in 
excess of the average for manufacturing as a whole. However, most of these 
industries are far Jess protected in 1995 than they were in the mid-l 980s as a result of 
trade liberalisation between 1985 and 1995. Suh1:tantial reductions in protection are 
observed in ice cream (ISIC 31122), carpets and rugs (ISIC 32140), sheet glass (ISIC 
36220), motor bikes (ISIC 38440), cigarettes (3142/3) and jewellery (ISIC 39010). 
(4) A number of the concentrated industries (wheat flour milling and noodles, cement, 
fertiliser, paper, alcoholic beverages, ship building) have had numerous regulations 
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restricting entry and exit of firms, distribution, imports, and prices over the last two 
decades. These restrictions have reduced competition among firms, and thus, 
economic efficiency. 
(5) The high levels of concentration in many of these industries can be explained 
partly by their technological conditions (i.e., significant economies of scale) or 
product differentiation. Fertiliser, cement, sheet glass, paper and paper products, and 
motor bikes are all characterised by high capital intensity as indicated by the fact that 
their non-wage value added per employee (NWV A) ratios are greater than the 
manufacturing average. 11 Noodles, cigarettes, malt beer, cosmetics, motor vehicles 
and bikes are also characterised by high product differentiation. 
(6) High concentration is to some extent associated with foreign ownership, but much 
less so with state ownership. In the case of foreign ownership this arises because 
foreign enterprises and high concentration share common structural characteristics, 
such as high capital intensity, technology intensity and product differentiation. 
However, there is a view in the literature that MNCs may also cause high 
concentration through their aggressive conduct and possession of intangible assets 
(Lall, 1979). In the case of state ownership, in only two of the 29 industries (fertilser 
and ship building) do state enterprises contribute a majority of value added. In an 
additional case, a government-foreign joint venture is the major producer. In two 
other industries (cement and steel) state involvement is significant. Two industries 
(animal slaughtering and beer) are characterisea by significant regional government 
involvement. 
(7) Allowing for foreign trade reduces concentration in most of the highly 
concentrated industries. Of the 24 domestic concentrated industries that could be 
adjusted for foreign trade, eight industries have low or moderate levels of trade-
adjm;ted concentration (e.g. trade-adjusted CR4 less than 75 per cent). Substantial 
reductions in concentration are ob;)~..ved in carpets and rugs (trade adjusted CR4=63.7 
per cent), wooden boxes and containers (CR4=71 .3 per cent), paper products 
(CR4=68.2 per cent), structural clay products (CR4=32 per cent), and ship building 
(CR4=20 per cent). 
(8) Finally, the table lists two low conceni:rated industries (sugar processing and 
plywood production) that have constraints on competition. These constraints are 
likely to have perpetuated the 'overcrowding' of sub-optimal plants thereby 
maintaining an inefficiently low level of concentration. 
11 The ratio of non-wage value added per employee in Table 4.6 refers to each industry's NWV A per 
employee relative to the manufacturing average. 
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Table4.6 Characteristics of HighP y Concentrated Industries 
ISICNo. Industry Four-Firm Concentration Ratio Trade- Ownership Share RERP(a) MVA Ratio of Regulation 
(Domestic CR4) adjusted (% of production) (%of NWVApcr (b) 
CR4 total) em~lo~ee 
1975 1993 Chan~e 1993 Foreign State 1987;1995 1993 1993 
Persistently Concentrated Industries 
31111 Animal Slaughtering 90.i 89.8 -0.3 89.0 0 66 49,174 0.01 0.22 
31122 Ice cream 96.9 95.2 -1.7 95.2 0 0 600+, 85 0.02 0.39 
31130 Proc. veg and fruit 80.2 89.8 9.6 79.2 0 0 -30,-26 0.18 0.45 
31164 Wheat flour 100 100 0 100.0 0 0 600+,-33 0.32 4.39 entry 
31260 Spices 75.4 77.6 2.2 na 14.1 0 na, na 0.08 0.51 
31310 Alcoholic liquors 98.1 100 1.9 na 0 0 90,62 0.00 0.08 entry 
31320 Wine 79 96.4 17.4 81.9 0 0 90.62 0.03 0.36 entry 
31330 Malt beer 99.1 97.8 -1.3 89.1 99 0 90,62 0.35 5.11 entry 
31430 White cigarettes 76.3 93.9 17.6 93.5 54 0 600+, 108 0.44 3.73 
32140 Carpet and rugs 94.7 78.3 -16.4 63.5 7 0 12,-12 0.11 1.60 
33120 Wooden boxes 75.6 84.5 8.9 71.3 24 0.2 45,142 0.04 0.43 
34190 Paper products 97.7 86.4 -4.7 68.2 34 0.17 28,31 0.67 1.16 
35120 Fertiliser 100 80.3 -19.7 75.5 10 85 56,-24 2.07 2.84 distribution 
35231 Soap and detergents 91.2 76 -15.2 74.5 43 1 88,352 0.50 0.88 
35510 Tyres 87.5 75.8 -11.7 73.4 44 0 600+,600+ 0.82 1.15 
36220 Sheet glass 100 90.6 -9.4 87.2 90 0 111,-2 0.19 1.21 
36310 Cement 93.9 83 -10.9 82 6 31 138,-18 1.52 2.89 price, 
distribution 
36490 Structural clay prod 93.9 89.5 -4.4 32 0 12 68,42 0.02 0.52 
38430 Motor vehicles 100 100 0 100 50 0 -428, 600+ 3.92 4.33 Local 
content 
38440 Motorbikes 96.2 96.5 0.3 96.5 16 0 600+,-7 3.22 12.08 
39010 Jewellery 85.9 85.5 -0.4 na 13 0 96,-8 0.24 1.62 
39020 Musical instruments 100 98.6 -1.4 87.8 98 0 108,63 0.16 1.41 
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Table 4.6 Continued 
ISICNo. Industry Four-Firm Concentration Ratio Trade- Ownership Share ERP( a) MVA Ratio of Regulation 
(Domestic CR4) adjusted (% of production) (%) NWVAper (b) 
CR4 em2Io;):'.ee 
1975 1993 Chan~e 1993 Forei~ State 1987;1995 1993 
Industries that shifted to 1lhe highest CR4 Class 
31171 Noodles 44.6 96.1 51.5 96.0 0 0 34,126 4.83 7.59 V! 
31420 Clove cigarettes 63.5 81.7 18.2 81.7 0 0 600+, 108 9.57 2.20 price 
32160 Kapok 35.6 81.8 46.2 na 29 15 12,-12 0.13 1.02 
35222 Traditional medicine 74.6 80.3 5.7 80.3 5 0 na, -14 0.07 0.14 
35232 Cosmetics 71.5 77.5 6 74.4 57 0 88,116 0.67 1.76 
38411 Ship building 57.7 75.3 17.6 20.6 1 58 -7,-6 1.06 1.52 import ban 
Concentrated Industries that shifted to a lower CR4 class 
31112 Processed meats .99.2 71.5 -27.7 52.7 0.7 1.3 600+, -8 0.03 0.31 
31121 Milk products 86.8 63.1 -23.7 52.8 62 5.7 600+,85 0.54 4.02 local rontent 
'31270 Food pastes etc 77.6 64.5 -13.1 na 72.7 0 na,na 0.49 1.78 
31340 Soft drinks 77.7 39.5 -38.2 39.0 33 0.1 52,537 0.46 0.65 
!32330 Leather products 92.4 38.7 ·53.7 36.9 60.l 0 502,-1 0.34 0.32 
32400 Footwear 77.8 31.2 -46.6 31.0 47 0.3 502,-1 3.60 0.42 
34120 Paper board products 80.4 34.8 -45.6 27.5 16 0.4 28,31 0.69 1.07 
35130 Resins 83.9 51.2 -32.7 16.6 3 47 37,-16 0.06 0.52 
35140 Pesticides 91 48.9 -42.1 46.0 42 2 56,34 0.32 0.91 di';t.°"1bation 
36110 Ceramics 91.4 37.8 -53.6 28.2 25 2 600+,31 0.91 0.63 
37100 Steel and iron 86 71 -15.0 48.9 23 41 7,-2 6.85 5.07 
38140 Metal containers 78.8 56 -22.8 na 36 0 82,156 0.34 0.47 
38311 Storage batteries 86.3 62.0 -24.3 53 58.8 0 600+,-4 0.24 1.58 
38320 Electronics etc 85.2 43.3 -41.9 5.8 49.7 12.6 70,40 1.62 0.78 
39030 Sports equipment 85.9 68.4 -17.5 na 60 0 56,-10 0.07 0.31 
39040 Toys 90,6 34.4 -56.2 na 70 0 na,na 0.23 0.13 
39060 Statione!l:'. etc 100 64.6 -35.4 40.3 4 0 na,na 0.06 0.12 
31181 Sugar processing: 17.4 20.7 3.3 19.4 0.3 74 187,44 1.60 0.56 price, 
distribution 
33113 Pl~ood 53.9 12.9 -41.0 12.0 11 0.8 7,42 6.02 0.75 distribution 
Manufacturina average 63.6 53.5 41.l 22.5 9.4 59, 16 0.98 
Notes: 'entry' indicates the presence of entry restrictions; 'distribution' indicates the presence of distribution controls or monopoly practices; 'price' indicates price setting or controls; 'VI' refers to 
monopoly vertical integration. a RERPs taken from Fane and Condon (1996). b. Source: Xie and de Bruyn Kops (1995) and the author's fieldwork in 1995. Four industries listed as persistently 
concentrated industries (CR4 ratios above 75% in 1975 and 1993) had shifted into lower CR4 classes during the 1980s, but had shifted back into the highest CR4 class by the early 1990s. These 
industries are soaps and detergents, jewellery , spices , and wooden boxes. 
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4.9 Some International Comparisons 
It is of interest to compare concentration levels and trends in Indonesian 
manufacturing with that of other countries. Are there consistent patterns in the degree 
of concentration in similar industries across diverse economies? Is average 
concentration higher or lower in Indonesian manufacturing industries compared to 
other countries? And is the trend in concentration of Indonesian manufacturing 
industries similar to that observed in other countries? Because there are substantial 
differences across nations in industrial classification systems and in the extent to 
which data are reported for the more finely subdivided classes, it is difficult to answer 
the first two questions. 
Ta .... 4.7 
Coml?arison of Concentration Ratios in Selected Industries 
Industries Indonesia South Korea Australia United 
(CR4 in 1993) (CR3 in 1987) (CR4 in 1988) Kingdom 
(CRS in 1989) 
Cigarettes 76a (74) 99 (98) 100 (94) 99 (89) 
Sugar processing 20 (12) 100 (75) 100 (100) 100 (93) 
Flour milling 100 (97) 51 (48) 74 (73) 77 (77) 
Bakery and 92 (92) 84 (84) 60 (57) 52 (52) 
Noodles 
Soft drinks 40 (37) 67 (67) 67 (67) 54 (54) 
Footwear 31 (26) 50 (50) 40 (38) 39 (20) 
Garments 26 (20) 12 (17) 19 (15) 16 (10) 
Weaving 36 (30) 49 (42) 57 (27) 37 (9) 
Sawmill 13 (12) 29 (26) 23 (20) 26 (0) 
Cement 83 (82) 83 (82) 82 (81) 84 (82) 
Steel and iron 71 (43) 84 (41) 80 (70) 95 (72) 
Ship building 75 (20) 86 (73) 72 (57) 38 (29) 
Chem. Fertiliser 80 (75) 64 (49) 95 (88) 48 (20) 
Motor vehicles iOO (100) 68 (5'5) 81 (54) 84 (41) 
Notes: Import-adjusted CR4 in parenthesis 
Indonesia and Korean concentration ratios are based on establishment data. Australian and United 
Kingdom ratios are based on firm data. All CR4s are based on four-digit industries, except for the U.K 
which is based on the three-digit classification. 
a. Indonesian cigarette industry includes both clove and 'white' cigarettes. 
Sources: for Australia, Australian Bureau of Statistics; for South Korea, Korea Development Institute; 
for United Kingdom, Clarke (1993). 
Table 4.7 presents concentration ratios of 14 comparable industries in four countries: 
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Indonesia, Korea, United Kingdom and Australia. Foreign trade adjusted 
concentration ratios are in parenthesis. A considerable amount of variation among the 
four countries is evident, but one can see that certain industries - for example, 
cigarettes, cement, sugar pror.:essing (except in Indonesia), flour milling and fertiliser-
tend to be relatively highly concentrated in every country, while others such as 
weaving, garments, sawmills and footwear, tend to be relatively unconcentrated. The 
variation in concentration of a number of industries in the four countries reflects 
differences in domestic market size, the stage of industrial maturity, and the degree of 
government intervention. For example, concentration in the Indonesian sugar 
processing industry is much lower than in the other three countries because, as noted, 
the government's trade policy has protected a large number of sub-optiwaJ sugar 
processing factories. Concentration in wheat flour milling is also higher in Indonesia 
because the government has restricted entry into this industry. 
This qualitative impression is verified by correlating the concentration ratios for each 
nation pair. We drop the sugar processing industry from thf' table because the 
Indonesian government's policy on sugar processing has substantially distorted the 
level of concentration in the domestic industry. Because of the small sample size, this 
industry has an undue influence on the correlation coefficients. The matrix of 
intercorrelations is as follows: 
Table 4.8 
Rank Correlation Coefficients Between Country Pairs 
(a) Domestic Concentration 
Indonesia Korea United Kin dom 
Australia 0.74 0.75 0.84 
United Kingdom 0.67 0.76 
Korea 0.62 
(b) Forei n Trade"Ad"usted Concentration 
Indonesia Korea United Kingdom 
Australia 0.65 0.64 0.83 
United Kingdom 0.70 0.69 
Korea 0.54 
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All the correlation coefficients are positive, and are statistically significant at the 95 
per cent confidence level or better. Thus, if concentration in some industry is 
relatively high in one nation, it tends to be relatively high in other nations too. There 
are some notable differences in the correlation coefficients between nation pairs. First, 
Indonesia's domestic concentration correlation coefficients with the other three 
countries are the lowest, suggesting that Indonesia's concentration hierarachy is less 
similar to the other three countries. Second, adjusting domestic concentration to 
foreign trade reduces Indonesia and Korea's correlation coefficients with the United 
Kingdom and Australia, and with each other. This may have arisen because of 
differences in trade policy of these four countries during this period. 
A danger in any such analysis is that the small industry sample (i.e we could only 
compare 14 out of our 104 industries with equivalent industries in the three other 
countries) may not be representative. However, a number of other comparative studies 
have reported similar conclusions to ours. Meller' s ( 1978) study compared a number 
of identical industries between ten Latin American countries. It showed that each of 
these countries has a similar seller concentration hierarchy among its industries: the 
industries that have high concentration levels in one country tend to have high 
concentration levels in the other nine countries. Highest levels of seller concentration 
were recorded in tobacco, basic metws, certain chemicals, paper, cement and certain 
foodstuffs and beverages. Scherer et al (1975) found similar results in a comparison 
of 12 industries in six industrialised countries. 
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Table 4.9 
Simple Average Concentration Ratios of Selected Countries 
Countries Year Average CR4 
Panel A: Developing Countries 
South Korea 
Indonesia 
Pakistan 
Turkey 
Chile 
Malaysia 
Sri Lanka 
Panel B: Developed Countries 
United States 
United Kingdom 
Canada 
Australia 
New Zealand 
1987 
1993 
Mid-1980s 
Mid-1980s 
1979 
1990 
1988 
1982 
1989 
1979 
1988 
Mid-1980s 
57 
54 
68 
67 
50 
53 
75 
39 
41 
50 
53 
58 
Sources: for Australia, Australian Bureau of Statistics; for South Korea, Korea Development Institute; 
for Malaysia, Department of Statistics (1990); for United Kingdom, Clarke (1993); for U.S.A Scherer 
and Ross (1990); for Chile, de Melo and Urata (1986); for Canada, Baldwin and Gorecki (1994); for 
Pakistan, Turkey and Sri Lanka, and New Zealand, Centre for International Economics (1990). 
Table 4.9 presents the simple average concentration ratios for a number of selected 
countries. The selection of countries is dictated by the availability of published data. 
Concentration ratios for the developing countries listed in panel A of Table 4.9 
measure establishment concentration. Concentration ratios of the developed countries 
listed in panel B measure firm concentration, and thus are not directly comparable 
with the ratios presented in panel A. Finally, these numbers should be interpreted with 
caution because they refer to different years. The countries in each panel are arrayed 
in descending order according to the size of their manufacturing sector in the 
reference year in the table (the ranking of these countries' manufacturing sectors has 
not changed in the last ten years). Table 4.9 shows substantial variation in average 
industrial concentration among the countries. Sri Lanka, Pakistan, and Turkey stand 
out as having highly concentrated manufacturing sectors. Indonesia's average 
concentration is also high by international standards, although slightly lower than in 
the Korean manufacturing sector. With the exception of New Zealand, the 
concentration ratios of the countries listed in panel B are lower than most of the 
developing countries' establishment concentration ratios. Seller concentration is 
typically higher in developing countries than in developed countries because the 
domestic markets they serve are proportionately smaller (Kirkpatrick et al, 1984: 70). 
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As Scherer and Ross (1990) observe, 'frequently, the markets of small countries are 
simply too small to accomodate many viable competitors'. In addition, government 
intervention in the market place is typically greater in developing economies than in 
these developed countries and this may have an impact on concentration levels in 
these countries. 
More confident conclusions can be reached on concentration trends within countries, 
although trends between couutries are less clear, possibly reflecting differences in the 
time period analysed, the stage of industrial maturity, and policy regimes. Table 4.10 
shows the trend in weighted average concentration of seven countries where some 
published time series data are available. Examining Korean manufacturing first, the 
data show a substantial increase in concentration between 1966 and 1981, followed by 
a reversal in the 1980s. Min (1994: 37-38) argued that the rise in concentration during 
the 1960s and 1970s was due to government intervention favouring specific firms and 
industries through trade protection and subsidised interest rates on bank loans. The 
reversal in the trend in concentration in the 1980s was due to a combination of 
factors, of which the most important were the reduction in govemment intervention, 
and the general promotion of competitiun through trade liberalisation. In contrast to 
Korea's experience, concentration in Chilean manufacturing increased substantially 
during Chile's trade liberalisation experience in the 1970s. Average weighted 
concentration increased from 49 per cent in 1968 to 61 per cent in 1979. De Melo and 
Urata ( 1986) argued that the increase in concentration was the result of the 1970s 
trade policy reforms stimulating structural change in Chilean industry through a 
number of mechanisms. These included mergers among domestic firms, efficient 
firms growing fast and becoming large relative to less efficient firms, and greater 
import competition displacing inefficient firms. For the Uniterl Kingdom, data are 
available at the three-digit level of aggregation and trends in unweighted average 
employment concentration are presented in column (5). The average five-flrm 
concentration ratio increased by 15 percentage points between 1935 and 1968, 
remained fairly stable between 1970 and 1979, and declined by 5 percentage points 
between 1980 and 1989. Clarke (1993: 125) speculates thnt the decline during the 
early to mid- l 980s may have been due to the Britil'h recession, when larger finns 
engaged in a proportionately greater shakeout of employment and production in the 
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period. Henley (1994) suggests that the decline in the 1980s may also be due to thr, 
government's industry and trade policy reforms of the time. In U.S.A manufacturing 
the data show a modest increase in concentration between 1947 and 1963, with a 
reversal evident in the 1970s. In Canada, the average four-firm ratios increased by 
nearly 10 percentage points between 1948 and 1965, but from 1965 through 1982 they 
varied narrowly in the range of 47.8 to 50.8 (Scherer and Ross, 1990: 88). Finally, in 
Australia the average four-firm concentration ratio has increased gradually over time. 
This is partly the outcome of greater competitive pressures resulting from substantial 
trade reforms over the last 15 years. 
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Table 4.10 
Com arison of Trends in Concentration: Selected Countries 
Year Indon South Chile Malay UK* U.S.A Canada Aust 
1935 
1948 
1951 
1954 
1958 
1963 
1966 
1968 
1970 
1972 
1974 
(CR4) 
1975 55.0 
1977 54.0 
1978 54.3 
1979 53.6 
1980 53.5 
1981 53.1 
1982 50.9 
1985 46.6 
1987 44.3 
1988 44.2 
1989 43.8 
1990 42.5 
1993 44.0 
Korea 
(CR3) (CR4) (CR4) 
54.6 
49.0 
58.5 
57.0 
61.8 44.8 
62.0 
56.1 47.3 
44.5 
(CR5) 
26.3 
29.3 
32.4 
37.4 
41.0 
44.8 
45.5 
45.6 
44.0 
43.6 
42.9 
40.4 
40.1 
39.5 
39.1 
(CR4) (CR4) 
35.3 44.3 
36.9 48.7 
37.0 50.2 
38.9 
53.9 
51.1 
39.2 52.9 
51.1 
38.5 
37.1 50.8 
(CR4) 
49.9 
51.6 
~~ ....... ~~--~~~~-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~--·--.:--
'Indon' indicates Indonesia, 'Malay' indicares Malaysia, and 'Aust' indicates Australia. 
Source: South Korea, Korea Development Institute: Malaysia, Yusof and Phang Hooi Eng ( 1993); 
Chile. Urata and de Melo (1984): U.S.A. Scherer and Ross (1990); Canada, Khemeni (1980) and 
Scherer and Ross ( 1990): Australia, Australian Bureau of Statistics 
"'For the United Kingdom, the 1935 to 1968 serie~ consist of 42 three-digit industries (Hart and Clarke, 
1980). The 1970 to 1979 series consist of 93 three·digit industries (Clarke, 1985). The 1980 to 1989 
series consists of 100 three-digit industries (Clarke, 1993). 
All concentration ratios arc weighted average ratios, except for the United Kingdom, which are simple 
CR5 ratios. 
4.10 Conglomeration and Aggregate Industrial Concentration 
This section briefly examines the extent of aggregate concentration in the Indonesian 
economy. Business groups are a feature of many developing countries at som¢ point 
in their industrial development (for a review of the extent of bt!siness groups in 
LDCs, see Kirkpatrick et al 1984: Ch 3). Large business groups are also dominant in 
Japan, several European countries, and to a lesser extent in the U.S.A. Table 4.11 
presents comparable figures on the sales of the top 6, 10 and 15 groups in four 
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countries. 
Table 4.11 
Ratio of Business Gron s' Sales to GDP(%) 
Country 
Indonesia 
Japan 
Korea 
Turkey 
Year 
1990 
1987 
1989 
1988 
Source: The World Bank (1994:59) 
Top6 
Grou s 
23.4 
56.9 
59.4 
29.2 
Top 10 
Grou s 
29.4 
n.a 
68.3 
33.7 
Top 15 
Groups 
34.9 
n.a 
75.9 
36.7 
The figures are taken from The World Bank (1994:59) It needs to be emphasised that 
determining the overall economic concentration in the Indonesian economy, as in 
most countries, is a difficult task. The ratiGs may unclerstate the degree of aggregate 
concentration because of difficulties in identifying firms belonging to particular 
groups, and bf:c-ause they ignore the links that exist between legally autonomous 
companies and corporations within tbP manufacturing sector and between other 
sectors. On the other hand, the ratios wiH overstate the degree of aggregate 
concentration in the domestic economy because they do not exclude business groups' 
revenues generated from overseas. For example, the Salim group, Indonesia's largest 
bu"~ness group, generated about 3!> percent of its sales from overseas activities in the 
early 1990s. Table 4.11 shows that the sales of the top 10 groups in Indonesia is 
approximately equal to 30 per cent of GDP.12 This ratio is substantially lower than in 
Korea, and Japan, and close to that of Turkey. Published 'figures on aggregate 
concentration ratios for other countries are available, but they often refer to the largest 
100 or 200 firms. For example, aggregate manufacturing sales concentration ratios of 
the largest 100 firms for the following countries are: U.S.A (32 per cent in 1982); U.K 
(41 per cent in 1980 and 38 per cent in 1989); EC12 (24 per cent in 1975, 25 per r'!nt 
in 1980); and Australia (41 per cent in 1969, 47 per cent in 1983). Time se1fos data 
for the United States show rising aggregate concentration in the between 1947 and the 
mid-1960s, and a levelling off between 1%5 and 1985 (Scherer and Ross, 19;)0:61). 
12 The World Bank figure is substantially greater than ol!ler published figures for Indonesia. Warta 
Ekonomi (April 24, 1994), a leading Indonesian business magazine, estimated that the largest 10 
business groups accounted for 16 per cent of total sales turnover. The difference betwer.n The World 
Bank and these figures highlight the difficulty and the controversial nature of estimating aggregate 
concentration ratios in Indonesia. 
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Rising aggregate concentration in the U .S economy once raised fears, familar in 
Indonesia today, that the American economy was becoming monopolised by a few 
very large firms (e.g. Berle and Means, 1932). This, of course, has never eventuated 
in the U.S or any other capitalist economy. 
Scherer and Ross (1990; 62) observed that aggregate concentration indices tend to be 
inversely correlated with a country's size, suggesting that scale economies or other 
imperatives push leading firms toward being larger relative to their domestic market 
in small economies than in large ones. Thus, for this reason alone, it is not surprising 
to see relatively high levels of aggregate concentration in small developing economies 
like Ind0nesia. However, political patronage and rent seeking activities of some 
business groups also explain their rise in Indonesia (World Bank, 1994: 58). 
According to the influential work of Robison (1986) the rise of business groups is part 
of the process of capitalist evolution and maturity in Indonesia. 
The major Indonesian conglomerates are listed in Table 4.12, which includes 
information on their principal owner(s), activities, estimated turnover, and the number 
of companies in the group. Several features of these groups stand out. First, the list 
underscores the non-pribumi (non-indigenous) dominance of the economy. The top 
seven are all in the hands of Sino-Indonesia.1 individuals or families. Only four 
pribumi firms make it into the top 25 conglomerates; two of the three largest are 
ow1~ed by the former President's sons. A second feature is that the Salim group is in a 
class of its own, particularly since the late 1992, when the resources of the Astra 
gr01.ip were diluted by the bail-out of Bank Summa, owned by the son of the Astra 
founder William Soeryadjaya. Thirdly, virtually all the groups emerged during the 
New Order. Several of the leading players had not been heard of until as recently as 
the late 1980s, a notable case being the timber tycoon Prajogo Pangestu. Most of t~e 
companies were established in some form before 1966, but generally on a small scale, 
often in trading and with a long history of military ties. Starting as highly personalistic 
companies, centred around the owner and immediate family, they have gradually 
become more professional in orientation. The second-generation owners usually 
possess international education, in marked contrast to most founders, who had little 
formal education (Hill, 1996: 109). 
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Fourthly, while the rank order of the top five conglomerates has changed little 
between 1987 and 1993, there is considerable change in the rank order of the other 
conglomerates. None of the conglomerates ranked in the second top five business 
groups in 1993 were similarly ranked in 1987. Seven of the conglomerates that were 
ranked in the top 25 business groups in 1987 were not ranked in the top 25 in 1993. 
Finally, many of the groups are highly diversified, with investment in finance and 
banking, manufacturing, plantations, real estate, and other fields. According to Hill 
( 1996: 110) their skill lies in ·being able to identify commercial ovportunities, to 
understand the Indonesian bureaucracy and the system of patronage, and to be able to 
marshal packages of finance, management, and technical inputs. Many of the 
conglomerates are dominant in oligopolistic markets, such as certain food products, 
automobiles, steel, cement, sheet glass, plastics, and basic chemicals, athough some 
are found in less concentrated industries such as in soft drinks. 
91 
Table 4.12 Major Business Conelomerates in Indonesia 
Conglomerate Princplel owne~ Principal Activities Turnover Ranking No.of 
Rpb 
1987b 
companies 
1993· 1993· 
Salim Liem Sioe Liong Cement, finance, 18 000 I 450 
autos, argo-industry 
Astra Prasetia Mulya Autos, argo-industry 5 890 2 2 205 
group, and pubhc 
Lippo Mochtar Riady Finance, real estate 4750 3 4 78 
Sinar Mas Eka Tjipta Argo-industry, pup! 4200 4 3 150 
and paper, finance 
Gudang Gara;-:i Rachman Halim Kretek cigarettes 3 600 5 5 6 
Bob Hasan Bob Hasan, Sigit Timber, estates 3400 6 12 92 
Harjojudanto 
Barito Pacific Prajogo Pangestu Timber 3 050 7 26 92 
Bimantara Bambang Trade, real estate, 3 000 8 13 134 
TrihatmodjoP chemicals 
Argo Manunggal The Ning King Textiles 2 940 9 15 54 
Dharmala Soehargo Argo-industry, real 2530 10 14 151 
Gondokusumo estate 
Djarum Budi and Michael Kretek cigarettes 2 360 II 6 25 
Hartono 
Ongko Kaharruddin Ongko Real estate, finance 2100 12 II 5\1 
Panm Mu'minAli Finance 2080 13 10 43 
Gunawan 
Rodamas Tan Siong Kie Chemicals 2000 14 18 41 
Surya Raya Soeryadjaya Property, estates, 1980 15 n.a 242 
trade 
Jan Darmadi Jan Darmadi Real estate 1940 16 9 60 
CCM/Berrca Murdaya Electronics, I 800 17 n.a 32 
Widyawimarto Poo electricity 
Hurn pus Hutomo Mandala Oil, trade, chemicals 1 750 18 23 11 
PutraP 
Gadjah Tunggal Sjamsul Nursa!im Tyres, finance, real 1 650 19 24 49 
estate 
Raja Garuda Mas Sukanto Tanoto Pulp and rayon, 1590 20 34 66 
finance 
Gemala Wanandi Chemicals, autos 1550 21 7 78 
Pembangunan Several Real estate 1390 22 n.a 57 
Jaya 
Metropolitan Several Real estate 1200 23 n.a 57 
Soedarpo Soedarpo Shipping, trade, I 200 23 16 35 
SastrosatomoP pharmaceuticals 
Tahiia Julius TahiiaP Finance 1 200 25 n.a 39 
ab some cases owned by the family of this individual. 'P' denorcs pribumi ownership; otherwise the 
conglomerate is majority or solely non-pribumi owned. 
h n.a indicates the co~glomerate was not ranked in the top 40 in 1987 
Table taken from Hill (1996: 111). Source: Warta Ekonomi, 24 April 1994, and earlier listings in this 
magazine. 
Ratio ofBusiness groups' sales to GDP: Top 6 - 11.3%; Top 10- 16.0%; Top 15 - 19.4% 
It is useful to look at the Salim group in more detail because this group demonstrates 
that some conglomeiates are inevitably in the process of industrial maturation. Liem 
Sioe Uong came to Inrlonesia as a migrant from China in the 1930s. His commercial 
connections with the military began with the 1940s Independence struggle, and were 
strengthened further by his ties with Soeharto in the 1950s when the latter headed 
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Central Java's Diponegoro Division. Liem was able to diversify quickly from his 
trading activities into import-substitution manufacturing in about 1968 and then to 
banking, cement and wheat flour milling in the mid to late 1970s. In the 1980s the 
group expanded rapidly into agro-industry activities, such as palm oil production and 
downstream food processing operations, nvtably instant noodles, and cooking oil. The 
Salim group was one of the first to invest in export-oriented activities. During this 
period the group was dependent .on government support, as demonstrated by the 
government's bailout of Indocement in 1985,13 and in securing government-
sanctioned monopolies in diverse fields as clove imports, flour milling, cement and 
steel. From the mid-1980s the group began to internationalise, becoming a leading 
player in Southeast Asian commerce, so much so that by the early 1990s about 35 per 
cent of its revenues came from abroad (HiU, 1996: 110). According to Hill (1996: 
110) such a process introduced an entirely new element into the political economy of 
the relationship between conglomerates and the State. 'The conglomerates have begun 
to mature beyond their earlier intense dependence on state patronage and support, in 
the process becoming more powerful independent actors' ( 1996: 110). 
Evaluating the competitive implication of conglomerate dominance in an individual 
market is an empirical question, about which a priori theorising is difficult. In a 
controversial report, The World Bank ( 1994) contended that in reality the degree of 
market power of these dominant groups in Indonesia is much greater than might 
appear from a consideration of concentration ratios in individu<i! markets. To the 
extent that these groups are horizontally integrated, many of the concentration ratios 
will understate firms' effective market power. The World Bank report suggested that 
the 'financial staying power' of conglomerates (many of which also owo banks) might 
provide opportunities for firms to engage anti-competitive behaviour, such as cross-
subsidisation and predatory pricing. The World Bank report also referred to the 
"oligopolistic features of vertically integrated industrial groups", such as the 
downward rigidity in the prices of important indu . ;;trial and consumer prices, as an 
example of increased market power possessed by some conglomerates. However, the 
market power of a vertically integrated oligopoly will be constrained in the long-run 
depending on rival finns' ability to vertically integrate, and the degree of import 
13 In 1985 the government cor. verted a large state bank debt into 35 per cent equity in Indocement. 
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competition in the input and product markets. Economic theory shows that if there are 
no regulatory or natural barriers to vertical integration, rival firms will integrate to 
avoid paying higher prices to the upstream monopoly. If a sufficient number of firms 
integrate the input will eventually be supplied competitively (Tirole, 1988). Thus, in 
the absence of constraints on vertical integration or imports of the input, any market 
power arising from an upstream monopoly is likely to be short lived. 
There are a few publicised cases in Indonesia where large, vertically integrated firms 
hav~ monopolised downstream markets, but in most of these cases this has occurred 
because of legal barriers to entry in the upstream input market. Indofood' s virtual 
monopolisation of the noodle industry by the early 1990s was made possible because 
of government entry and import restrictions in the wheat flour industry, and not 
because of vertical integration per se. Several oligopolies in Indonesian 
manufacturing are vertically integrated for reasons other than the desire to increase 
market power. Firms ~n the food processing industry, for example, invest in 
plantations to control the quality of the input and to ensure continuous supply of raw 
material to their processing plants. Vertically integrated structures in the textiles 
industries and in the pulp and paper industries are influenced by technology, and are 
common organisational structures in most countries. Many conglomerates vertically 
integrate because trade policy has restricted their international source of inputs. Thus, 
it is misleading to make general inferences about the competitive effects of business 
groups from their scale and structure alone, although their existence does increase the 
potential complexity of industrial analysis in developing economies. 
4.11 Summary and Conclusion 
The purpose of this Chapter has been to focus on trends in industrial concentration 
over a relatively long period of time. This is important because competition is a long 
run phenomenon, and concentration levels in the short run l)ften fluctuate around their 
long term trend. Contrary to popular public perceptions the results indicate that there 
is a lpng term declining trend in industrial concentration, particularly in those 
industries that were highly concentrated in the mid-1970s. This pattern of change in 
industrial concentration is typical of a rapidly growing small industrial sector: initially 
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high levels of concentration, declining over time as rapid growth reduces barriers to 
entry and broadens the industrial base. Further, the results suggest that liberalisation 
has not had the major effects on industrial structure that its opponents - or in some 
cases - proponents - maintain. Average concentration in import-competing industries 
has remained fairly stable since 1986. There has been a slight increase in 
concentration since 1991, but it is too early to reach a conclusion on whether this 
increase is due to liberalisation. However, more confident conclusions can be reached 
about the impact of policy reforms on export-oriented industries. The results show 
that there has been a continuous reduction in average concentration since 1986. The 
reduction is due to an expansion of the market facing domestic sellers. The expansion 
of export opportunities means that the domestic industry can support a greater number 
of viable producers, thereby reducing concentration. 
We found that allowing for foreign trade reduces average concentration substantially. 
In 1993, for example, average concentration without adjustment for foreign trade was 
53.3 per cent whilst allowing for foreign trade it was 41.1 per cent, a difference of 
12.2 percentage points. Therefore, allowing for such trade indicates that competition 
is prima facie stronger in Indonesian markets than domestic concentration ratios 
would suggest. This finding also suggests that domestic concentration ratios are 
seriously misleading indicators of market power in a small, open economy like 
Indonesia. 
95 
Chapters 
Analytical Framework and Model Specification 
5.1 Introduction 
This Chapter presents the analytical framework adopted in the study and specifies a 
structural model. The salient features of the structure-conduct-performance model are 
discussed in section 5.2. It shows that many aspects of market structure, international 
linkages, government policy, conduct and performance are jointly determined. In 
section 5.3 r. structural model explicitly incorporating these interrelations is 
developed for the purpose of the empirical analysis in Chapter 7. 
5.2 Structure-Conduct-Performance Paradigm 
The structure-conduct-performance (S-C-P) approach to industrial organisation 
provides the basic framework for our analysis. It originated from the pioneering work 
of Mason (1939), and subsequently extended by Caves et al (1980). The essence of 
the S-C-P approach, in its original form, is that certain intrinsic structural variables 
(called basic conditions by Scherer, 1980) determine market structure, and that there 
is a unidirectional flow of casuality running from market structure through connuct to 
performance. 
Examples of intrinsic structural variables include available technologies for 
production and marketing, the nature of the product, and demand conditions. The 
most important variables representing market structure are seller concentration, 
product differentiation, and entry conditions. Seller concentration refers to the number 
and size distribution of sellers within the market. Entry barriers refer to the ease with 
which new sellers may enter the market. Product differentiation r~fers to the extent to 
which the products sold within the market are close substitutes for each other. 
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Market conduct is defined as "the patterns of behaviour that enterprises follow in 
adapting or adjusting to the market in which they sell or buy (Scherer and Ross, 1990; 
9). These activities consist of the pricing policies of firms, determination of quality 
and quantity produced, advertising, brand and market strategies, innovative activity, 
excess capacity, and lobbying activities to obtain protection or favourable concessions 
from government. These factors are assumed to determine market performance. 
There is no unique measure of market performance. However, the most commonly 
used measure of performance in S-C-P studies, and the one used in our study, is 
industry profitability. fudustry profitability proxies allocative efficiency. Allocative 
efficiency measures the degree to which resources are optimally allocated among 
industries. Allocative efficiency require firms to set price equal to average costs, and 
therefore earn 'normal' profits in the Ieng-run. Thus, a competitive (or allocatively 
efficient) market is one where price is equal to average cost in the long-run. A market 
is anti-competitive (or allocatively inefficient) when firms have some control over 
prices, and are able to set prices above average costs and, thus, earn 'above normal' or 
'excessive' profits in the long-run. 
Potentially, the structure-conduct-performance framework is a very useful tool in 
industrial analysis. However, there are limitations to its practical usefulness, and 
dangers of incorrect use if it is applied in an over-simplistic way (Kirkpatrick et al, 
1984: 62). A number of these limitations have been identified through the many S-C-
p empirical studies that have been completed in developed country studies and are 
reviewed by Schmalensee (1989, Ch 16). These general limitations are reviewed 
below. 
The implementation of the S-C-P model using cross-sectional data is based on the 
implicit assumption that each market is in long-run equilibrium. Howev~r. in more 
dynamic market conditions, responses to change are continuous and non-
instantaneous and in such conditions simple forms of comparative static analysis are 
less appropriate. fuvestigators have adopted a number of different t;mpirical 
approaches to overcome the weaknesses associated with the kind of 'snapshof 
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analyses undertaken in many S-C-P studies. The first approach, and the one adopted 
in our study, is to compare cross-sectional estimates of the concentration and profit 
equations between two or more points in time (De Melo and Urata, 1986). The second 
approach is to use panel data (cross-sectional and time series data together). The final 
approach is to investigate the changes in concentration and profit margins between 
two or more points in time using partial adjustment models (Levy, 1985; Weiss, 1993; 
Geroski and Pomroy, 1994). 
As noted above, a key feature of the original S-C-P approach was that causality was 
assumed to run from structure through conduct to performance. Recent literature has 
emphasised the complexity and interdependence of these three components of 
indvstrial organisation (Schmalensee, 1989). Large firms operating within a given 
market may possess sufficient overall power to change the structure of that market 
where they consider their own commercial performance to be unsatisfactory. For 
example, an oligopolistic firm might intensify advertising and marketing strategies 
that may affect product differentiation, or intensify research and development 
activities that can change the nature of the product and the available technology in 
such a manner that rivals are forced out of the market, thus, increasing market 
concentration. Similarly, highly profitable firms would be able to influence the degree 
of seller concentration in the market by increasing the outlay of advertising. Industry-
specific aspects of government policy are generally affected by industries' lobbying 
and other political activity and may also be affected by observed performance. For 
example, oligopolistic firms might lobby the government for tariff or non-tr 'ff 
protection from imports to prevent a.i1. erosion of their market power and excessive 
profits. In other words, in such markets there may not be a simple line of causality 
running from structure through behaviour to performance; in certain circumstances, 
the line of causality may be reversed. Thus, the elements of structure, conduct and 
pe:rformance can be jointly determined in a given market. 
The recognition of the interdependence of various aspects of market behaviour has 
resulted in the use of the simultaneous equations model, rather than single equation 
models in recent studies. Jacquemin et. al (1980), for example, examined the 
simultaneous relationship between concentration and profits, while Martin (1979) 
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analysed the simultaneous relationship between profits, advertising and concentration. 
Chou (1986) considered the simultaneity involved in concentration, profits, and 
international trade for Taiwan. The largest simultaneous equations model was 
estimated by Caves et al (1980) for Canadian manufacturing industries. The authors 
introduced 15 endogenous variables in their SCP model. Few studies, however, have 
entered trade protection as an endogenous variable in the SCP model. Round ( 1980) 
examined the determination of profitability and trade protection in Australian 
manufacturing. More recently, Ratnayake (1990) examined the interdependence 
between nominal tariff protection, concentration, profitability, international trade, 
foreign ownership and advertising expenditure in Australian manufacturing 
industries. 
The analytical framework incorporating these kinds of relationships is now being used 
increasingly for similar purposes in developing economies. The theoretical and 
empiricru difficulties in S-C-P studies that have been described so far are common to 
all tyyiE><: of economies, developed and developing. According to Kirkpatrick et al 
( 1984: 64) there are reasons for believing that these difficulties are likely to be more 
severe in developing economies. In part, this is because the data available in most 
developing economies are less extensive and reliable than in developed economies. 
"At a more fundamental level it is because developing economies possess 
characteristics that make them less suitable candidates for the simpler forms of S-C-P 
analysis" (Kirkpatrick, 1984: 64). Kirkpatrick et al argue that the S-C-P model needs 
to be extensively modified and extended to make it relevant to developing countries 
conditions. The authors listed several developing country conditions that should be 
adequately taken into account when specifying a S-C-P model. Most of these 
conditions are relevant to the study of the Indonesian industrial sector, as clearly 
demonstrated in earlier chapters. 
First, as illustrated in Chapter 3, the Indonesian economy has been industrialising 
rapidly, until recently, and consequently both the relative importance and the 
composition of the manufacturing sector are changing considerably, even over the 
sho11 and medium term. Market structures are not yet "stabilised" to the degree that is 
found in mature industrial economies. It is therefore all the more important to analyse 
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S-C-P relationships over time rather than rely exclusively upon "snapshot" analyses 
of relationships at a given point in time. Secondly, Indonesia is a small, open 
economy. Thus, foreign trade and trade policy are an important influence on market 
structures, conduct and performance and therefore should be taken into account when 
estimating seller concentration and entry barriers. Thirdly, foreign-owned enterprises 
are of much greater relative importance in Indonesia and other LDCs than in most 
DCs. Therefore, there is, if anything, a stronger argument in the case of Indonesia for 
extending S-C-P studies to take explicit account of the types of enterprises operating 
within particular markets. 
Finally, public sector involvement in the manufacturing sector is far more extensive in 
Indonesia than in many developed countries and the S-C-P model needs to be 
modified to take this into account. For example, the profit objective is less relevant to 
publicly owned than to privately owned enterprises. Similarly, governmental 
regulations play a much more important role, in addition to that of market structure, in 
determining market conduct and performance in Indonesia. 
5.3 The Structural Model 
We must first specify which variables are endogenous or exogenous to the system. 
Schmalensee ( 1989) contends that, potentially, most of the variables included in S-C-
p studies are endogenous in the long run. Our system includes all tho industry-level 
variables that we deem to be relevant to the conditions of Indonesia's manufacturing 
sector, and for which data are available. These are variables previously subject to 
investigation in industrial organisation, either because they indicate normatively 
important dimensions of resource allocation or because the theory of markets 
identifies them as important structural determinants of those performance dimensions. 
These are seller concentration, profitability, import penetration, export intensity, FDI, 
and tr:ide policy. Advertising activity is usually treated as an endogenous variable in 
S~C~P studies. Unfortunately, promotional data are only reported in the Indonesian 
annual manufacturing surveys since 1993. In our study we treat product 
differentiation as an exogenous variabie usin! data from U .S counterpart industries 
(Chapter 6). We examine advertising competition in cigarettes in Chapter 9 using a 
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primary data base collected during my fieldwork. Another endogenous variable that is 
often considered in S-C-P studies, but not available to us, is buyer concentration. This 
refers to the concentration of purchases or buyers in a market. It is often asserted in 
the industrial organisation literature that a few, very large buyers may have 
'countervailing power' to push down prices toward competitive levels. 
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In this study, drawing on previous theoretical and empirical studies, we specify the 
following simultaneous equations system. 
CR4 = /(EOS, IZ, RM, AKC, PD, EX, IM, MNC, SOE, REG, TP,11) 
n = /(CR4MX, TP, AKC, RM, PD, CG, GRO, MNC, SOE, REG) 
MNC = /(CR4, TP, EX, PC, EOS, HC, PD, Tl, RM, REG, GRO, 11, SOE) 
EX = /(CR4, TP, MNC, BOS, PC, HC, RI, WP, PD, CG, TI, RM) 
IM = /(CR4, TP, MNC, SOE, EOS, PC, HC, RI, PD, CG, TI, RM) 
TP = /(CR4, MNC.:, SOE, IM, EX1 GRO, IZ, PC, HC, Tl, RI, RM, TP(t -1), 11) 
Where, 
CR4 = seller concentration 
11 = profitability 
MNC = multinational enterprises 
EX = export-orientation 
IM = import penetration 
TP = trade policy 
TP(t-1) = 'historical' trade policy 
EOS = economies of scale 
IZ = output size of industry 
RM = regional markets 
AKC = absolute capital costs 
PD = product differentiation 
SOE = state-owned enterprises 
REG = domestic entry restrictions 
CG = consumer-goods industries 
,..._ 
GRO = industry output growth 
HC = human capita~ 
PC -= physical capital 
TI = technology intensity 
RI = resource intensity 
WP = wood-based intensity 
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As specified, this system incorporates six endogenous variables which are shown in 
bold type in the above equations. The specification of each of these equations is 
discussed below. 
Equation 1: Industrial Concentration 
Inc111strial concentration in Indonesian manufacturing industries is specified as a 
function of the techaological and demand conditions of the industry (economies of 
scale, industry size), regional market fragmentation, international influences (exports, 
import competition, and multinational enterprises), industry profitability, barriers to 
entry (product differentiation and capital ccsts), and government intervention through 
trade protection, constraints on domestic competition and state ownership of industry. 
Economies of Scale and the Size of the Industry 
Economies of scale (BOS), in relation to the size of the market, is generally 
recognised as one of the important factors determining coni:entration. Economies of 
scale are represented by the minimum efficient or optimum plant size (MES). The 
minimum efficient plant size is defined as the smallest level of output at which the 
long rur.. average total unit costs reach a minimum, and depends primarily on the state 
of technology and relative factor prices. 1n general, the larger the MES plant in 
relation to the market size, the greater is concentration because the market can. only 
accomodate a smaller number of viable competitors (Khemani, 1980; Caves et al, 
1980). Thus, we expect a positive relation between economies of scale and 
concentration. 
ThD size of the market (IZ) is also recognised as a major determinant of concentration. 
Economic theory 1'0stulates that, in a closed economy construct, the larger the size of 
the market, L.ie lower is the level of concentration because the market can accomodate 
a greater number of viable firms (Caves et al, 1980). Therefore, we expect a negative 
relation between the size of the industry and concentration. The operative size of the 
market facing producers depends on the geographic size of the country and the 
regional distribution of demand. Indonesia's geographkally dispersed market should 
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have a significant influence on industrial structure. We expect the smaller regional 
markets to constrain the size of Indonesian establishments in some circumstances, 
thereby increasing their number and reducing seller concentration when it is measured 
at the national level. Therefore, we expect a negative relation between concentration 
and the extent of regional fragmentation of the industry (RM). 
International Influences 
The operative size of the market facing Indonesian producers also depends on 
international trade (Caves et al, 1980). Thus, we include variables to represent export-
orientation (EX) and import penetration O:M). The impact of export-orientation on 
concentration levels is ambiguous. A negative relationship may be observed if an 
expansion in export opportunities means that the domestic market can support a 
greater number of viable producers (de Melo and Urata, 1986). A positive relationship 
may be observed if producers engaged in elqmrting activities grow faster than firms 
more strictly confined to supplying the domestic market. This r11ay arise if there are 
significant economies of scale in production. An increase in export opportunities 
means that producers engaged in exporting activities can better exploit economies of 
scale and, thus, grow faster than firms supplying the smaller, domestic market (De 
Melo and Urata, 1986; Chou, 1986). This relationship is more likely if the fixed costs 
of entering export activities are high (De Melo and Urata, 1986). 
The impact of import penetration on concentration is also ambiguous. Greater import 
competition would increase concentration if imports displaced less efficient firms, or 
encouraged mergers among domestic films. But it would reduce concentration if 
producers were induced to improve productivity and thereby raise 'le number of 
efficient producers that can fit into the market (De Melo and Urata, 1986). 
The other possible international influence on concentration is FDI. Caves (1974a) 
explains that MNCis are prevalent in industries with concentrated sellers, because the 
influences giving risfJ :MNCs are identical to the bases of several barriers to entry, and 
entry barriers ~cause high seller concentration. Thus, we expect foreign investment 
activity and seller concentration to be closely associated. The empirical evidence we 
presented in Chapter 4 supports this conjecture to some extent. Even if oligopoly and 
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foreign investment share common structural causes, eith1er one could still wield some 
causal influence on the other. But we must tread cautiously when specifying the 
causal mechanisms and testing them so as to control for their common causes. 1 
There are two comp~ting hypotheses regarding the likely effect of MNCs on 
concentration. The first hypothesis focuses on the competitive entry of MNCs into 
host country markets, and predicts that concentration will decline. Foreign firms are 
able to break down local oligopolies and widen the scope for competition by 
increasing the number of firms in the industry. This is possible because foreign firms 
have greater access to resources on the international capital markets, and intangib~e 
assets to overcome domestic entry barriers (Caves et al, 1980). The second hypothesis 
is that, while MNCs entry may reduce concentration in the short-run (in a purely 
statistical sense), they increase concentration of the industry in the long run for two 
reasons. First, MNCs possess intangible assets that can raise entry barriers against 
local firms and drive out local producers. Second, the aggressive conduct of MNCs 
can speed up the process of concentration (Lall, 1979). MNCs may drive out local 
firms through price cutting wars because they have financial staying power, or 
introduce restrictive business practices that lead to higher entry costs for local 
producers, and a diminished market share (Lall, 1979; Newfarmer, 1980, Long 1981). 
Peiformance 
Neumann et al (1983) show that concentration and performance ( I1 ) are jointly 
determined variables. Performance cpn affect conduct and market structure. For 
example, highly profitable firms may influence the degree of seller concentration in 
the market by increasing their outlay of advertising or by building larger production 
capacity. Further, relatively efficient, and the::efore profitable, firms might drive out 
less efficient firms, which in turn leads to greater market concentration. These 
possibilities suggest a positive relationship between performance and concentration. 
Barriers to Entry 
In the industrial organisation literature the two commonly proposed barriers to entry 
1 Foreign ownership shares, however, measure the effective MNC influence imperfectly. MNCs can 
also influence industry structure and market performance through other strategic arrangements, such as 
licensing technology and brands to domestic firms. 
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are product differentiation (PD), and the absolute capital cost of establishing a plant 
of minimum efficient size (AKC). The effect of product differentiation on market 
structures has been debated for decades. Studies by Bain (1956) and Comanor and 
Wilson (1974) suggest that product differentiation advantages can raise entry barriers 
by increasing the advertising and promotional costs to potential entrants. 
Alternatively, product differentiation may facilitate firm entry into niche markets, 
which in tum reduces concentration (Nelson, 1974). In Indonesia, as in many other 
developing economies, there are several reasons to believe that product differentiation 
may not be positively related to concentration. First, it might be presumed that 
consumers are more price-sensitive and, at least outside the major urban centres, less 
exposed to sales promotion of brands. Lall and Mohammad (1983), for example, 
express reservations about the importance of advertising in their Indian case study. 
Second, for more than a decade, until 1989, television aJvertising was prohibited in 
Indonesia for a variety of reasons related to social values, modernisation impacts, and 
rural-urban migration. Given the ambiguous nature of the theoretical predictions and 
the previous restrictions on television advertising in Indonesia, no attempt is made to 
postulate, a priori, the direction of the relationship between product differentiation 
and concentration. 
Caves et al (1980) argued that the high capital costs of establishing a plant of 
minimum efficient size act as a barrier to entry, thereby raising concentration levels. 
Capital costs are likely to be a barrier to entry in Indonesian manufacturing because 
the financial sector remains underdeveloped, at least compared with its somewhat 
more sophisticated neighbours, Malaysia, Singapore and also Thailand (Hill, 1996). 
However, we would expect the positive influence of capital costs to noderate over 
time as the financial sector continues to grow in depth and sophistication, especially 
after the major financial sector reforms in 1988. The study by Goe!tom (1995) shows 
that financial liberalisation improved smaller firms' access to capital. The progressive 
removal of restrictions on FDI after 1986 should also have contributed to the 
declining influence of capital cost barriers. 
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Government Intervention 
We include three policy variables, trade protection (TP), constraints on domestic 
competition (REG), and state ownership of industry (SOE). 
(a) Trade Policy 
The extent to which imports and exports affect concentration in Indonesian 
manufacturing dq.>ends on the structure of protection. There are two competing views 
in the theoretical literature. The most corm~on view is that protection facilitates the 
'overcrowding' of establishments of sub-optimal size, thereby lowering concentration 
(Khemani, 1980). However, there are several mechanisms by which trade protection 
can also increase concentration. First, by insulating firms from foreign competition, 
high protection may induce producers to become inefficient and thereby lower the 
number of efficient firms that can 'fit into' the industry (De Melo and Urata, 1986). 
Second, the kind of protection offered is important. For example, if protection is 
given to selected firms, then these favoured firms will grow faster, which in turn 
increases concentration of industry. 
( b) Constraints on Domestic Competition 
In Chapter 4 we gave examples of several.industries where constraints on competition 
(entry and exit restrictions, price setting, and distribution controls) may have 
influenced the level of concentration. In some of these cases restrictions may have 
maintained relatively low levels of concentration (e.g., sugar processing), while in 
others they may have increased concentration (e.g., noodles). Since these restrictions 
have different effects on concentration for different industries, we include industry-
specific dummy variables in the concentration equation. The industries identified in 
Chapters 3 and 4, and included in our sample (to be discussed in Chapter 6), as having 
significant constraints on competition for most of the last decade are: sugar 
processing (ISIC 31181 ), cooking oil (ISIC 31150), noodles (ISIC 31171 ), alcoholic 
drinks (31310/30), fertiliser (ISIC 35120), cement (ISIC 36310), and basic metals 
(ISIC 37100). While there: may be other industries that are restricted in some way, or 
have been in the past, the in1:ustries listed above are by far the most important in 
terms of both public policy discussions and manufacturing value added. 
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However, one approaches a. cross-sectional test of the effect of constraints on 
competition (including import protection) cautiously, because the restrictions may 
take some time to affect market structures. In addition, the restrictions may affect 
market structure indirectly through other determinants, and thus the dummy variables 
may not show up as statistically significant in the econometric analysis when in fact 
they are important. For example, entry and exit regulations are likely to influence the 
number and size distribution of plants in an industry, and thus influence economies of 
scale, which in turn influe11ce concentration of the industry. 
( c) State-ownership of Industry 
The final form of government intervention is through state ownership of industry. In 
Chapter 4 we observed that high concentration was les:.; associated with state 
ownership of industry compared with foreign ownership. Further, the concentrated 
industries that have significant state ownership are normally concentrated because of 
their ~.igh capital intensity. Even if oligopoly and state investment share common 
structural causes, state enterprises could still wield some causal influence on 
concentration. State enterprises might cause higher concentration in these industries if 
they are given special facilities and concessions by government. Further, a large state 
enterprise si;ctor might crowd out private sector investment in the industry and deter 
private sector investment to the extent that private investors fear that the government 
will bias commercial conditions to the benefit of their own companies. 
The above theoretical considerations lead to the following specification of the 
concentration equation: 
CR4 = j(EOS, IZ, RM, AKC, PD, EX, IM, MNC, SOE, REG, TP,TI) 
+ - - + +? '? + +? ?+ 
Where EOS is economies of scale, IZ is industry size, RM is regional markets, AKC 
is capital costs, PD is product differentiation, EX is export-orientation, IM is import 
penetration, MNC is the share of foreign ownership of the industry, SOE is the share 
of state ownership of the industry, REG is the dummy variable for the seven 
industries that had been heavily regulated over the last two decades, TP is trade 
policy, and TI is profitabilty. 
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Equation 2: Profitability 
In the standard closed-economy oligopolistic model, industrial concentration and 
barriers to entry have been identified as the basic conditions that enable firms and 
industries to raise price above the competitive level and thereby earn excessive 
profits. When we consider a small, open economy such as Indonesia the hypotheses 
about profit determinants become increasingly vulnerable to the erroneous assumption 
of a closed economy. When foreign trade is substantial, exposure to trade should 
significantly affect industry profits. Economic theory predicts that concentration and 
other explanatory variables (including product differentiation and capital 
requirements) would have a significantly reduced impact on profits, as domestic 
prices for a small open economy would tend to be determined by foreign markets. 
Furthermore, in a small, open economy domestic concentration measures (unadjusted 
for trade) become inaccurate measures of market power. 
Most researchers acknowledge that at least three conditions are necessary (but not 
sufficient) for monopolistic distortion of a market in an open economy. Sellers must 
be few enough to recognise their mutual interdependence in short-run pricing and 
long run ·investment decisions affecting quantity sold in the market. Entry barriers 
must deter entry even when profits are persistently elevated above a normal 
competitive level. And international competition must not constrain the domestic 
price to a closed-economy competitive level. The joint necessity of these conditions 
implies that they should interact with each other in the statistical specification. 
Previous research on the determinants of industry profitability in other small, open 
countries has reached consistent conclusions in some areas but failed to confirm 
relationships in others. Most studies show that seller concentration is positively 
related to profits, but its effect is weak and sensitive to the choice of specification, 
sample, time period and estimation technique. For example, de Melo and Urata 
( 1986) found a significant association between concentration and profits in their post-
trade liberalisation equation, but not in their pre-trade liberalisation equation. 
Jacquemin et al (1980) could not find a significant relationship between unadjusted 
concentration and profits for Belgian manufacturing. The authors argued that the 
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insignificant result for concentration is consistent with the hypothesis that in a iomall, 
open economy market power is constrained by import competition. Similarly, Lee 
( 1986) could not find a significant relationship between concentration and profits in 
Taiwanese manufacturing. On the other hand, Chou ( 1986) found a positive 
correlation between profits and concentration for Taiwanese manufacturing. The 
difference between these two studies might be explained by differences in model 
specification. Chou (1986) estimated the concentration-profits relation within a 
simultaneous four equation model (the four endogenous variables were profits, 
concentration, exports and imports). Lee (1986), on the other hand, treated 
concentration as an exogenous variable in his profits equation and, thus, the 
insignificant result may be due to modei misspecification. Most studies find a 
negative relationship between import competition (either entered separately or 
interacted with concentration) and profits, indicating that strong import competition 
constrains excessive pricing behaviour in the domestic market (Jacquemin et al, 1980; 
De Melo and Urata, 1986; Chou, 1986). 
Other structural variables tend to have a weak effect on industry profitability. Scale 
economies and capital requirement proxies are seldom significant in the profitability 
equation for small, open economies. Caves et al ( 1980: 227) suggest that this might 
arise because of multicolinearity between these two variables and i;oncentration. 
Advertising and industry output growth do not appear to be powerful influences in 
small economies, as they are over the profits of industries in larger economies such as 
the U.S. and U.K. According to Caves et al (1980: 227) these results are fairly 
consistent with our general interpretation of industrial organisation in a small, open 
economy: concentration and other explanatory variables r we a significantly reduced 
impact on profits as domestic prices for a small open economy tend to be determined 
by foreign markets. 
Drawing on previous empirical studies for other small economies and the policy 
regime, industry profitability is specified as a function of trade-adjusted 
concentration, barriers to entry {product differentiation and absolute capital 
requiremr.nts), industry output growth, regional market fragmentation, foreign 
ownership, and government intervention through trade protection, regulatory 
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constraints on domestic competition, and state ownership of industry. 
Concentration 
The market concentration hypothesis asserts that profit margins tend to be higher in 
those markets (other things being equal) where concentration is higher.2 The ability 'Jf 
firms to cooperate in raising price above the competitive level is greater in industries 
where a few sellers dominate. This is mainly because a small number of firms imply 
lower costs of forming and monitoring a cartel (Stigler, 1964). 
We mentioned earlier that it is important to take account of foreign trade in measuring 
concentration to capture more accurately the extent of market power in Indonesian 
markets. Therefore, we use the trade-adjusted concentration ratio presented in Chapter 
4 as our measure of concentration in the profitability equation. In empirical studies 
where the measure of seller concentration takes account of foreign trade, its 
association with profit levels is usually stronger than where trade is ignored 
(Kirkpatrick et al, 1984: 79). 
Several researchers have investigated whether there is some 'critical' or 'threshold' 
.::0ncentration level that separates industries into those that are earning excessive 
profits and those that are earning normal or competitive profits (Caves and Bradburd, 
1982; Rosenbaum, 1994). Put simply, the 'critical concentration' hypothesis asserts 
that there exists some level of concentration that makes anti-competitive behaviour 
more likely. Caves and Bradburd (1982), for example, found a critical CR4 equal to 
70 per cent in their sample of U.S. manufacturing industries. Ghellinck et al (1988) 
found three critical CR4s in his study on U.K. manufacturing industries (CR4=35%, 
75% and 95%). A number of earlier studies for other developing countries have also 
found a discontinuous profit relation: Gan (1978) for Malaysia, House (1973) for 
Kenya and Walgreen (1971) for India. However, most studies find a continuous 
relationship: profit levels are progressively higher in those industries with higher 
concentration levels. This is an empirical question which we will leave open in the 
empirical analysis in Chapter 7. 
2 Numerous studies have derived profit maximising expressions relating profits with measures of 
concentration. See, for example, Saving, 1970; Cowling and Waterson, 1976; Encaoua and Jac~uemin, 
1980; Clarke and Davies, 1982; Neumann et al, 1983. 
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This interpretation of the positive concentration-profits relationship ~:as been 
subjected to some criticisms. The main criticism arises from the fact that there does 
not exist a consensus among theories of oligopoly as to the nature of interdepet.3.!nce 
and collusiv\'\ behaviour. Several oligopolistic models show that the positive relation 
can arise without collusion (e.g. the Cournot model). Some other oligopolistic model'> 
do not suggest a positive relationship at all. For example, the Bertrand price-setting 
model shows that, under conditions of constant marginal costs and no capacity 
constraints, the equilibrium price is equal to marginal costs. and thus only competitive 
profits are earned. The Theory of Perfectly Contestable Markets postulates the 
industry conditions that result when entry is free and exit is costless (fixed capital 
costs are not sunk or irrecoverable upon exit). Contestability also requires that 
potential entrants can enter before incumbents can retaliate through price cuts, and 
can exit before retaliation produces negative profits. When these conditions are 
fulfilled, price always approximates cost, even where there is only one incumbent 
firm (Baumol et al, 1982). 
Finally, there is an efficiency-superiority explanation for large market shares and 
apparent excessive profitability of leading firms (Demsetz, 1973). These models 
explain high concentration in terms of scale and non-scale differences in costs among 
firms. The non-scale differences arise from superiorities associated, in particular, with 
the managerial factor: its capability in monitoring team production (Alchian and 
Demsetz, 1972). Scale differences arise from economies of scale: where there are 
substantial economies of scale, large firms have lower average costs compared to 
smaller firms. Thus, efficient firms will grow faster than less efficient firms, and if 
there are substantial economies of scale, large firms will grow even faster than 
smaller firms. The result is high concentration and i-:gh profits. The high profits are 
'efficiency rents': the reward for been efficient. 
Barriers to Entry 
Investigators of industrial organisation include barriers to entry as explanatory 
variables in the profitability equation. This is in the belief that high entry barriers 
protect incumbent firms from new entrants, who would dissipate excess profits in the 
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long run. Comanor imd Wilson (1974:42) state that, 
"Where entry barriers are important and persist over time, established 
firms can reach an equilibrium position in which excess profits are 
earned. These higher returns represent economic rent, but one 
associated with the market power of the firm rather than with a scarce 
input in the production process." 
We include the same two barriers to entry as in the concentration equation: capital 
requirements (AKC) and product differentiation (PD). We postulate a positive 
relation between these two measures of entry barriers and profits. Product 
differentiation insulates each seller's market by a downward-sloping demand curve. 
Such firms therefore face less elastic demand and, thus, process greater market power. 
Large capital requirements may deter entry to the extent that they are sunk costs (that 
is irrecoverable upon exit). Large sunk costs of production reduce the contestability of 
the industry for local entrants, a~1d this in tum will permit the incumbent firm(s) to 
earn excessive profits. Caves et al (1980:227) suggested that market power is greater 
in concentraterl industries with high cutry barriers compared with concentrated 
industries with low entry barriers. To test this proposition we include two interaction 
terms in the profit equation: CR4MX*AKC and CR4MX*PD. We expect a positive 
relation between these two interaction terms and industry profits: profits will be 
higher in concentrated industries with greater product differentiation and capital 
requirements. 
Regional Markets 
Seller concentration measured at the national level understates effec 'ive concentration 
for industries that are regionally fragmented. Thus, we would expect the 
concentration-profits relationship to be stronger in industries with regional sub-
markets. Therefore, we include the regional markets (RM) variable in the profit 
equation. We expect a positive correlation between regional markets and profits. 
Industry Growth 
Industry growth (GRO) is expected to exert a positive influence on profits. Several 
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hypotheses support this specification. One xs that actual growth is positively 
correlated with deviations of actual from expected growth and hence positively 
correlated with windfall profits (losses). However, a n~gative relation between profits 
and growth may exist if growth attracts rapid entry (Caves et al, 1980). Several 
oligopolistic models show that the impact of growth on profits is different between 
concentrated and unconcentrated industries. For example, Green and Porter (1984) 
and Haltiwanger and Harrington (1991) show that industry growth will have a greater 
positive impact on industry profits of concentrated industries because collusion is less 
likely to break down in rapidly growing industries. Rotemberg and Saloner (1986), on 
the other hand, show that growth will have a smaller impact on profits in concentrated 
industries because oligopolistic coordination is more likely to break down during 
rapid growth if the expected benefits of cheating are greater than the expected penalty 
imposed by the cartel. The results of empirical studies testing these growth 
hypotheses are mixed. Domowitz et al (1986 and 1987) found that it was in the more 
concentrated industries that growth had a greater impact on profits in his sample of 
U.S. manufacturing industries, while Ghellinck et al (1988) found the opposite result 
in their study on a sample of U.K. manufacturing industries. Following these studies 
we also include an interaction term between concentration and growth 
(CR4MX*GRO) in the profit equation. We leave open the direction of this 
relationship. 
Foreign Owners/zip 
Due to the complexities involved in the relationship between FDI and industry 
performance in developing economies, investigators have not been able to reach a 
consensus on the effect of MNC on industry profitability (Cavest 1996: 227). One 
view is that entry of MNCs increases the degree of competition in host countries, 
suggesting a negative relationship between MNCs and industry profits. The opposite 
argument suggests that MN Cs create additional barriers r r compound existing 
barriers, and thereby reduce competitive pressures in domestic industries. This 
suggests a positive relationship. 
The positive relationship can also arise if MNCs are more efficient and, thus, more 
profitable than local producers (Lall, 1978; Ramstetter, 1991). The differential profit 
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rates among MNCs and local finns will increase an industry's weighted average profit 
rate and, thus, produce the positive relation. Finally, it is important to bear in mind 
that any relation between profits and MNCs will be complicated by MNCs' transfer 
pricing practices. Caves (1996: 192-95) showed that, unless tax minimisation is 
curtailed by other constraints such as avoiding tariffs, MNCs have an incentive to use 
transfer prices to the maximum extent to place profits in the low-tax jurisdictions. 
Thus, MNCs' reported profits in a host country may either be over-estimated or 
under-estimated depending on whether the host country is a low or high tax 
jurisdiction. 
Government Intervention 
We include three policy variables, trade protection (TP), state ownership of industry 
(SOEs) and restrictions on domestic competition (REG) 
(a) Trade Policy 
The extent to which imports negatively affect profits in Indonesian manufacturing 
depends on the trade protection structure. In the industrial organisation lit~rature, 
trade protection has been considered as a barrier to entry which protects existing finns 
from foreign competition (Esposito and Esposito, 1971:343; Clarke, 1985:103), 
suggesting a positive relationship between trade protection and profits. Economic 
theory also predicts that it is in the more concentrated industries that trade protection 
has a greater impact on industry profits (Jacquemin et al, 1980}. In a competitive 
industry, trade protection will raise the short run profitablity of the industry, which in 
turn will attract new firm entry and thereby drive profits back to the long-run 
competitiv~ level. Thus, in equilibrium profits are detennined by the interaction of 
protection with concentration. Therefore, we include an interaction tenn between 
trade policy and trade-adjusted concentration (CRMX*TP). We postulate a positive 
relationship between the· interaction term and industry profits. There is some 
empirical evidence in support of this hypothesis. Weiss (1993) found that it was in the 
more concentrated industries that changes in nominal rates of protection had a greater 
impact on changes in industry profits in Mexican manufacturing industries. 
Some investigators (e.g., Round, 1980) have found a negative relation between 
tts 
protection and profits, on the grounds that protection induces entry of a large number 
of small fim1s operating sub-optimal size plants or encourage protected firms to be 
inefficient (in an X-inefficiency sense). 
1 b J State Ownership 
The relation between industry profitability and state-owners!.:_:- of industry is 
ambiguous. A negative relation may be observt:d if the corporate objective of SOEs is 
not profit maximisation. SOEs may have other objectives related to social policy and 
employment that constrain profit maximisation behaviour. Further, the profit 
maximisation objective may be subject to non-economic constraints on their pricing, 
input, and output decisions. In addition, the department overseeing its operation!> may 
interfere in its day-to-day operations for non-economic reasons that reduce 
profitability (Pangestu and Habir, 1989). Finally, many SOEs may be less efficient 
relative to private sector firms because they face a different incentive structure. If the 
SOEs are being subsidised and protected from competition there will ~ less incentive 
to minimise costs and use the most efficient techniques. A positive relation may be 
observed if government assistance increases profits, and these outweigh any loss 
resulting from X-inefficiency. 
( c J Constraints on Domestic Competition 
Finally, we include the seven industry dummy variables to test the effects of anti· 
competitive constraints on industry profits of the seven industries listed earlier in this 
Chapter. The direction of the relationships is ambiguous. A positive relation may be 
observed since leading firms will tend to be less fettered in their market behaviour. A 
negative relation may exist if restrictions induce firms to become inefficient and 
thereby reduce industry profits. 
These theoretical considerations lead to the following specification of the profitability 
equation: 
n = f(CRMX. CRMX*TP, CRMX*GRO, CRMX*PD, CRMX* AKC, TP, MNC, SOE1 + + • + + + ~- ? 
PD, AKC, GRO, REG, RM) 
... + ? I) + 
Where CRMX is the trade#adjusted CR4 ratio defined "" Chapter 4. CRMX*TP, 
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CRMX*GRO, CRMX* AKC, and CRM.X*PD are the concentration interaction terms 
between coJ\centration and trade policy (TP), industry growth (GRO), capital 
requirements l· .KC), and product differentiation (PD). MNC is foreign ownership of 
industry, SOE is state ownership of industry, RM is regional market segmeHtation, 
and REG are seven dummy variables for the industries in our sample that had been 
heavily regulated for most of the last decade. 
Equation 3: Multinational Enterprise Presence 
This section is divided into two parts. First, we briefly review the theory of FDI. 
Secondly, we present our hypotheses on the determination of the inter-industry 
differences in multinationals' share of production of Indonesian industry. 
Theory 
A number of theoretical propositions have been put forward to explain a firm's 
decision to exploit foreign markets by FDI rather than producing at home and 
exporting or licensing production abroad (Dunning, 1981; Caves, l 974b and 1996). 
Most of these theoretical expositions are associated with locational-specific factors 
and firm-specific factcrs or proprietary assets. The existence of MNCs requires, first, 
that locational forces justify dispersion of production so that plants are found in 
different national markets. Given this dispersion of production there must be 
transaction-cost advantages to placing the plants under common administrative 
control, rather than licensing production to a local producer. The locational forces 
can be divided into cost factors and market factors. The cost factors include the cost 
of labour, raw materials, and capital, while the market factors include market 
structure, size of the market, growth conditions, efficiency of local produceri; etc. 
According to the proprietary assets approach to MNC behaviour, firms operating in an 
imperfectly competitive market tend to develop and possess intangible assets that 
enable firms to ovcr:~m~ the intrinsic disadvantages of establishing a plant in a 
foreign country. These assets may be technology, knowledge about how to attain 
lower costs, or to produce a better product. The firm could possess speciaJ skills in 
styling and promoting its products that make it such that the buyer differentiates it 
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from those of its competitors. A firm investing abroad requires these monopolistic 
advantages to offset disadvantages associated with operating in u foreign market. 
These disadvantages are usually ascribed to the firm's lack of knowledge of the host 
country's legal system, its political institutions, differences in culture and tastes, 
differences in the way of doing business, political risks and so on. Firms that possess 
monopolistic advantages over and abov ~ these disadvantages are able to earn rents on 
their proprietary assets in the foreign markets. 
Whether a firm establishes its own plant or licences its proprietary assets to a local 
producer depends on the transaction costs of transferring proprietary assets. The 
transaction cost approach asserts, quite simply, that MNCs w111 exist only if the plants 
tht:y control and operate attain lower -::osts or higher revenue productivity than the 
same plants under separate managements (Caves, 1996:4). These transaction costs 
arise for at least two reasons. First, the market for transferring proprietary assets is 
imperfect due to information asymmetry between the owner of the asset and the 
potential buyer (Rugman, 1980:368). Second, these assets are, at least to some degree, 
public goods. Once a piece of knowledge has been developed and applied at a certain 
location, it can be put to work elsewhere at little extra cost and without reducing the 
capacity available at the original site. In this situation, it is more profitable to the firm 
possessing these assei:s to use them rather than to sell them or to give the right to use 
them (licensing) to a foreign firm. Therefore, the firm tends to internalise these 
monopolistic advantages, and this gives rise to MNCs. 
This application of transaction cost analysis underlies a framework commonly used in 
research on the MNCs (Dunning, 1981). It asserts the existence of three necessary 
conditions for the appearance of FDI: (1) the firm can appropriate some value-
creating proprietary asset ('m.1 aership'), (2) production processes that employ or 
apply the value-creating asset are efficiently dispersed among several national markets 
("location"), and (3) the decentralised application of the proprietary asset is more 
efficiently managed within the owning firm than by licensing it at arm's length to 
another firm ('internalisation"). This framework, developed by Dunning (1981), is 
:-eferred to as "the eclectic theory of foreign investment" and is followed in our study. 
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Hypotheses 
Drawing on these theoretical propositions, we specify MNC presence as a function of 
the sources of proprietary assets such as capital and technology-intensity (PC, Tl), 
-
human capital intensity (HC), economies of scale (EOS) and product differentiation 
(PD); locational factors, such as concentration (CR4), profits ( n) and growth (GRO) 
conditions of industry, export-orientation (EX), a: '.i regional fragmentation of 
industry (fil/f); and finally, government intervention through trade policy (TP), entry 
regulation (REG) and state ownership of industry (SOEs). 
Proprieta1y Assets 
In Chapter 3, we provided some evidence that those MNCs serving the domestic 
market tend to be concentrated in physical capital-intensive, skilled-intensive and 
technology-intensive industries, refkcting MNCs' advantages over local firms in 
these kinds of industries. Therefore, it is expected that the activities of MNCs are 
concentrated in those Indonesian industries which are characterised by high capital 
intensity (PC), high technology intensity (TI) and high skill intensity (HC). 
Entry barriers generated by the possession of intangible assets create a suitable 
environment for FDI (Connor and Mueller, 1982). The presence of entry barriers 
could attract foreign finns because these barriers typically enable firms to achieve 
high profits and MNCs have less difficulty in overcoming such barriers (Caves, 
1996). The two barriers \.o entry identified in Indonesia are capital intensity i:.'1d 
product differentiation. While product differentiation has proven to be a robust 
statistical explail'.ltion of MNCs' activities in developed economies, mixed results 
have emerged ;:~r developing econo-n.ies. Aswicahyono and Hill (1995) tested this 
product differentiation hypothesis for FDI in Indonesian manufacturing, using 
Japanese MNCs' advertising-sales ratios as a proxy. They could not find a significant 
relation between advertising and MN Cs' share of production. Lall and Mohammad 
( 198'3) could not find a significant relationship in their Indian study. Given the mixed 
results of previous empirical studies, no attempt is made to postulate, a priori, the 
direction of the relationship between product differentiation and MNC presence in 
Indonesian manufacturing. 
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Economies of Scale 
The relationship between economies of scale and FDI is ambiguous. Caves (1996) 
suggests that economies of scale might b:! a deterrent to a firm investing abroad. 
Caves (1996:84) argues that "economies of scale have the least affinity for foreign 
investment because they induce firms to centralise production and export to foreign 
markets rather than decentralise and acquire MNC status". Caves did explain that 
economies of scale might favour MNC operations in some instances. For an 
assembled product such as automobiles, economies of scale might be modest in the 
final assembling stage but large in the production of certain components. If there is no 
smoothly working intef11ational arms-length market for the components, MNCs can 
gain an advantage against single-nation firms by producing these components at a 
single location and assembling them in individual markets. Given the ambiguous 
nature of the theoretical predictions, no attempt is made to postulate, a priori, the 
direction of the relationship between economies of scale and MNCs' share of industry 
production. 
Concentration 
The industrial organisation literature lends support to the fact that oligopolistic firms 
are closely related to multinational operations (Caves et al, 1980; Giddy and Young, 
1982). This is mainly because product differentiation and capital intensity are 
associated with oligopolistic market structures. To test whether oligopolistic market 
structures wield some causal influence on MNCs activities independent of capital 
intensity and product differentiation, we include the concentration ratio (CR4) as an 
explanatory variable. We postulate a positive relationship for this variable. 
Profit and Growth Conditions 
Theory also postulates a positive relation between profits (TI) and industry growth 
(GRO) and MNC activities. In other words, MNCs are attracted to markets that offer 
attractive rates of return on capital, or are relatively fast growing (Dunning, 1981, 
Caves, 1996). Therefore, we include the profit and industry growth variables in the 
MNC equation. 
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Export Markets 
In Chapter 3, we showed that MNCs are heavily concentrated in Indonesia's export-
oriented industries, especially since the 1980s trade reforms. This normally arises 
because MNCs are better placed to penetrate export markets than domestic firms 
(Willmore, 1992). Foreign firms have specialised knowledge of and access to export 
markets, better access to tei;hnology, and ability to maintain quality standards. When 
MNCs are present in a given industry there is a positive spillover to domestic firms 
which makes them export oriented. For example, when an MNC establishes an 
export-oriented venture in Indonesia, its international buyers visit the country and 
local firms may benefit from this. Local firms often acquire the new technology, 
quality standards and knowledge of export markets from MNCs through joint 
ventures with them, or through labour turnover between MNCs and ?Ure domestic 
firms. Thus, for these reasons, we expect a positive relationship betw1~en export-
orientation and FDI in Indonesian manufacturing, particularly in the post-reform 
equation. 
Government Intervention 
We include three policy variables: trade protection (TP), state ownership of industry 
(SOEs) and entry restrictions on MNCs (REG). 
(a) Trade Protection 
In Indonesia trade protection tended to attract investment oriented towards the 
domestic market, particularly before the 1980s reforms. Indeed, prior to these reforms 
it was commonplace for MNCs to bargain for tariff protection (Hill, 1988). Thus, we 
expect a positive relationship between trade protection and FDI in the pre-reform 
period. However, we might not expect a strong positive relationship between MNCs 
and trade protection in the post-reform equation. Evidence from Indonesia and other 
countries suggests that MNCs benefit from trade liberalisation because of their world-
wide market networks, and sourcing of components and raw materials. Thus, MNCs 
are less likely to consider trade protection as a positive factor in their decision to 
invest in a country. Therefore, we do not expect a strong positive relationship between 
trade protection and FDI in the post-reform equation. 
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(b) State Ownership of Industry. 
Aswicahyono and Hill ( 1995) found that a large state enterprise sector crowds out 
private sector investment in the industry and deters private sector investment to the 
extent that private investors {bar that the government will bias commercial conditions 
to the benefit of their own companies (except where there are MNC-SOE joint 
ventures). We therefore postulate a negative relation between state ownership of 
industry (SOEs) and FDI. 
( c) Entry Restrictions 
Before the 1980s investment reforms, a large number of industries were closed to FDI 
(Chapter 2). We therefore include a dummy variable in the pre-reform equation to 
control for entry prohibitions on foreign firms. The dummy variable is equal to one if 
entry was prohibited in the industry, otherwise it is zero. We expect a negative 
coefficient on the dummy variable in the pre-reform MNC equation. By 1993, many 
of the restrictions on FDI were removed. To test the impact of the removal of these 
restrictions on the pattern of FDI, we include the same dummy variable in the post-
reform equation. We do not expect a negative relationship between FDI and past entry 
restrictions in the post-trade liberalisation equation (see Table 6.1 for the list of 
industries closed to foreign firms in our sample). 
Regional Market Segmentation 
The other important trade barrier encouraging FDI is transport cost. If transport cost is 
low a firm is likely to locate production at home and to serve the foreign market by 
exports. But if transport cost is high it may not be profitable for the firm to export. 
Therefore, from the host country point of view it can be expected that FDI will be 
greater in industries regionally fragmented because of high transportation costs 
(Caves et al, 1980). Thus, we expect a positive relationship between regionally 
segmented industries (RM) and FDI. 
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The above theoretical considerations lead to the following specification of the foreign 
ownership (MNCs) equation: 
MNC = j(CR4, TP, EX, REG, SOE, PC, HC, TI, TI,GRO, PD, EOS, RM) 
+ + +- - - + + + + + -F ? -+·-
Where CR4 is concentration, TP is trade policy, EX is export-orientation, REG is 
regulation restricting MNCs entry into an industry, SOE is share of state ownership of 
industry, PC is capital intensity, HC is human capital intensity, TI is technology 
intensity, TI is profitability, GRO is industry output growth, PD is product 
differentiation, EOS is economies of scale, and RM is regional markets. 
Equation 4: Export Orientation 
Economic theory offers a number of explanations of the pattern of trade in 
manufactures between developed and developing countries. The traditional factor 
proportions theory implies that labour intensity, in particular unskilled labour 
requirements, will be an important characteristic of less developed countries' (LDCs) 
manufactured exports. Alternative theories of international specialisation suggest a 
range of factors will influence the composition of developing countries' manufactured 
exports, depending to a large ~xtent on the stage of industrialisation. Kirkpatrick et al 
( 1984: Ch 2) note that the product cycle and technology diffusion approaches 
emphasise the dynamic nature of competitive advantage, and suggest that established 
LDCs exporters (e.g., the NICs) will have an increasing advantage in the production 
of standardised, fairly capital-intensive products based on a mature technology (eg., 
sted, shipbuilding, certain engineering products, motor vehicles), while 'second tier' 
LDC exports consists of labour-intensive, subcontracted assembly and processing 
activities based on imported inputs. The internationalisation of production through the 
activities of MNCs implies that the 'sourcing' of productive activities will be 
determined by the comparative costs of different processes in the production cycle, 
rather than by the characteristics of the final products (ibid:23). The availability of 
low-cost labour will influence the relocation of labour-intensive subcontracting and 
assembly activities in LDCs for exporting to other countries (Helleiner, 1973; 
Nankani, 1979; Kirkpatrick and Yamin, 1981). Finally, recent theories have 
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emphasised the influence of imperfect competition (product differentiation and 
economies of scale) on the pattern of intra-industry trade between countries (Helpman 
and Krugman, 1985; Krugman, 1992). 
As explained in Chapter J, Indonesia began exporting manufactured products much 
later than the newly industrialised economies of South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore, 
and the rapidly growing economies of Thailand and Malaysia. Manufactured exports 
as a share of total manufacturing production increased from around 3 per cent in 1981 
to 23 per cent in 1994. In Chapter 3, we showed that Indonesia's changing structure of 
manufactured exports is typical of a labour-abundant, developing economy that has 
recently liberalised its economy. The share of total manufactured exports emanating 
from labour-intensive industries has increased from 41 per cent in 1986 to 61 per cent 
by 1994. Conversely, the share of resource-intensive products (mainly plywood) has 
declined from 46 per cent in 1986 to 25 per cent in 1994. Exports of manufactured 
products have also diversified in the 1990s. The share of total manufactured exports 
emanating from the largest three products (textiles, garments and plywood) has 
declined from 73 per cent in 1986 to 38 per cent in 1994. Substantial increases in 
exports occurred in labour-intensive industries such as electronics, footwear, 
furniture, yarn, jewellery, and toys. 
Drawing on these explanations of international trade and Indonesia's structure of 
exports, we specify export-orientation as a function of capital-intensity (PC), human 
capital (HC), natural resources (RI and WP), industrial concentration (CR4), 
economies of scale (BOS), product differentitation (PD), consumer-goods (CG), 
regional markets (RM), multinationals (MNCs); and trade policy (TP). 
Factor Intensities 
The orthodox factor proportions theory predicts that a labour abundant country like 
Indonesia has a comparative advantage in labour-intensive commodities and will tend 
to export such commodities. Having emphasised the inadequacy of the simple 
Hechscher-Ohlin theory to explain actual trade patterns, Baldwin (1971) and others 
argued for the inclusion of human capital as separate factor. Developing countries at 
the earlier stages of industrialisation typically have scarce human capital resources. 
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Therefore, in the context of manufactures, Indonesia is expected to have a 
comparative advantage in exporting commodities that are relatively intensive in 
unskilled labour. The 'technological gap' and 'product cycle' theories also provide 
support for the hypothesis that Indonesia's exports are overwhelmingly labour-
intensive in character. These views of international trade argue that technological 
developments have an important influence on the pattern of trade and international 
competitiveness (Hirsch, 1967; Vernon, 1966). Tecr11ology is '10t a freely and 
instantaneously available good, and countries that innovate first have an initial 
competitive advantage in new products. As technology becomes internationally 
diffused and the production process becomes standardised, competitive advantage 
shifts to countries with lower cost, unskilied labour. Thus, we expect an inverse 
relationship between physical capital (PC), human capital (HC) and export intensity. 
The factor proportions theory also predicts that a natural resource-rich country will 
have a comparative advantage in resource-intensive commodities and will tend to 
export such commodities. In the context of manufactures, Indonesia is expected to 
have a comparative advantage in resource-based commodities. However, we observed 
in Chapter 3 that most of Indonesia's resource-based manufactures are forestry-based. 
In view of this we include a variable for resource-intensive manufactures (RI) and a 
dummy variable for wood-processed manufactures (WP). 
Economies of Scale 
Much of the recent theoretical literature on trade flows emphasises the importance of 
economies of scale and imperfect market structures. This literature asserts a positive 
relation between economies of scale and a country's exports (Koo and Martin, 
1984: 174). Several researcher have developed models which show that countries tend 
to export the products of industries for which they have large domestic markets.3 
However, this view is not relevant to the new 'platform' industries in Indonesia, such 
as plywood and electronics where a large proportion of the production is exported. 
Consumer Goods and Product Differentiation 
Stage of production theories of intenational trade snggest that developing economies 
3 Krugman (1980, 1993), Helpman and Krugman (1985) and Venables (1985). 
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will specialise in the export of manufactured consumer goods. Hufbauer (1970: 181-2) 
writes: 
'The newly developing country, so the argument runs, will produce for 
itself and may even export consumer goods, while the advanced nation 
will specialise in exporting producer goods. This sequence supposedly 
results from the "natural" practice of industrialising via ba~kward 
integration.' 
This view implies that the export share of Indonesian industry should be greater in 
consumer good industries. However, Kirkpatrick et al (1984: 23) noted that the 
internationalisation of production through the activities of MNCs implies that the 
'somcing' of productive activities will be determined by the comparative costs of 
different processes in the production cycle, rather than by the characteristics of the 
final products. We test this hypothesis by including a variable representing consumer 
goods industry (CG). Recent theoretical literature has postulated a positive relation 
between product differentiation (PD) and trade flows (Krugman, 1992). However, it 
seems prudent to accept the commonplace observation that Indonesia's exports are 
not highly product differentiated. We include product differentiation (PD) and expect 
a negative relationship with export intensity. 
Concentration 
Most of the recent formal studies of trade take place in the context of models of 
monopolistic competition. According to Koo and Martin (1985:177), "perhaps for this 
reason, they have relatively little to say about the impact of market concentration on 
trade flows". The received theory of international trade, however, does offer some 
guidance. Koo and Martin ( 1984) noted that a monopolist who can price discriminate 
and dump may export more than a competitive industry. This suggests a positive 
relationship between concentration and export intensity. But if dumping is not 
allowed, the monopolist might choose to focus attention on the domestic industry and 
export less than a competitive industry. This suggests a negative relationship. Recent 
literature has emphasised domestic competitive pressures as a positive influence on 
the flow of trade between countries. Helpman and Krugman (1985) presented a 
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simple model that showed the home industry will be a net exporter if it has a larger 
number of firms (hence lower concentration) compared with the foreign counterpart 
industry. A similar result can arise if higher concentration leads to X-inefficiency 
resulting from the failure of firms to minimise costs (Round, 1980: 63). Given the 
ambiguous theoretical predictions no attempt is made to postulate, a priori, the 
direction of the relation between concentration and exports in Indonesian 
manufacturing. 
Multinational Enterprises 
Recent research has investigated the influence of MNCs on developing countries' 
pattern of trade (Willmore, J.992; Blomstrom, 1990). Most empirical evidence shows 
that MNCs are positively related to a country's export perfonnance. This arises for at 
least two reasons. First, MNCs invest in export-oriented projects in response to a 
developing economy's relatively low wage cost. Second, MNCs possess proprietary-
assets that reduce the costs of exporting. These include organisational and 
international marketing skills, and direct access to the world's largest markets. For 
example, Indonesian joint ventures with Japanese textile companies enjoy access to 
world markets through links with Japanese trading companies that reduce the costs of 
exporting (Thee and Pangestu, 1994). 
However, the relationship between MNCs and exports depends on the type of FDI: 
whether it is an export-oriented investment or import-substituting investment. The 
later type of investment is unlikely to be instrumental in promoting exports. We 
observed in Chapter 2 that before the trade policy reforms most FDI was located in 
import-substituting industries (partly as a response to trade protection). Thus, we do 
not expect a positive relation between exports and MNCs in the pre-reform equation. 
By 1993 MNCs have shifted their intet.:.:st to export activities (partly as a result of 
trade and foreign investment policies reform) and, thus we expect a positive 
relationship between MNCs and export intensity in the post-reform equation. 
Regional Markets 
It has been postulated in the literature that high domestic and international 
transportation costs reduce the volume of trade (Rousslang and To, 1993). If transport 
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cost is high it may not be profitable for the firm to export. Therefore, it can be 
expected that exports will be lower in industries with regionally segmented markets 
because of high transportation costs (Caves et al, 1980). Therefore, we expect a 
negative relation between regional markets and export orientation. 
Trade Policy 
Government intervention through tariffs and non-tariff barriers, by changing relative 
prices, distorts the pattern of trade based on a country's comparative advantage 
(Deardorff, 1984). The imposition of a tariff on imports can adversely affect exports 
in three wayb. Firstly, the increase in price resulting from the protection on 
intermediate inputs embodied in exports has to be absorbed entirely by exporters. 
Secondly, protection also increases the cost of labour for exporting industries. When 
the import-competing sector is given higher protection, the resultant higher 
commodity prices raise costs of living, causing labour to demand higher nominal 
wages. Third, protection ,.,.;;i divert sales away from the export market to the domestic 
market since the latter becomes more profitable under protection. 
Fane and Phillips (1991) clearly demonstrate that the structure of protection in the 
mid-1980s adversely affected Indonesian exports (refer back to Table 2.3). The duty 
exemption and drnwback facility introduced at the beginning of 1986 removed most 
of the adverse effect ~f protection on intermediate inputs embodied in exports (Thee 
and Pangestu, 1994:10). However, as discussed in Chapter 2, Indonesia's foreign 
trade regime may still adversely affects the firm's incentive to export. Wymenga 
( 1991: 140) showed that export oriented textile and garment firms, though having 
access to tradable inputs at international prices, nevertheless received negative 
effective protection, as their non-tradable intermediate inputs still had to be purchased 
at above international benchmark prices. On the other hand, clomestic market-oriented 
textile and garment producers continue to enjoy high effective protection. Thee and 
Pangestu (1994: 13) observed that, under such a protective trade regime, domestic 
market-oriented textile and garment producers will not have a great incentive to shift 
to the less profitable export markets.. Therefore, we postulate a negative relation 
between protection and export intensity. 
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The above theoretical considerations lf'~J to the following specification of export 
intensity: 
EX= f(PC, HC, RI, WP, EOS, PD, CG, CR4, MNC,RM, TP) 
l -- -+? - +? + --
Where PC is capital intensity, HC is human capital, RI is resource intensity, WP is 
wood-based manufactures, BOS is economies of scale, PD is product differentiation, 
CG is consumer goods industries, CR4 is seller concentration, MNC is the share of 
foreign ownership of the industry, RM is regional market segmentation, and TP is 
trade policy. 
Equation 5: Import Penetration 
We now consider the determinants of import penetration (IM). The variable is 
symmetrical with EX in that it reflects both the comparative advantage position of 
Indonesian industry vis-a-vis its foreign competitors and the extent to which natural 
and artificial barriers to trade limit the international movement of goods. Therefore, 
some independent variables can be treated symmetrically. 
We expect that physical capital (PC), and human capital (HC) will be positively 
related to import penetration. Conversely, we expect resource intensity (RI and WP) 
to be negatively related to import penetration. We also include technology intensity 
(Tl) in the import equation. The empirical evidence from Indonesia and other 
d\weloping economies shows that devdoping countries are net importers of 
technology for the simple reason that they have a comparative disadvantage in 
technology products vis-a-vis industrialised countries (Soesastro, 1998). Therefore, 
we expect a positive relationship between technology and import penetration. The 
variables indicating the propensity to enter into international trade should again be 
included, with regional markets (Reg Mkts) and trade protection (TP) negatively 
related to import penetration. 
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The influence of economies of scale (EOS) remains ambiguous. A negative relation 
might be expected if the lower average costs achievetl through economies of scale 
deter competing imports. However, since Indonesia's market is smaller than those of 
its leading trading partners, such goods might be produced elsewhere at a cheaper 
cost, and we therefore might observe a positive relation. Consumer goods (CG) and 
(PD) product differentiation are expected to have a negative relation with import 
penetration. Product differentiation can impede entry by imports since the foreign 
exporter must incur the fixed costs of creating a goodwill asset in the national 
marketplace. Furthermore, the analysis of multinational companies raises the 
presumption that the firm skilled in product differentiation and promotion of a 
product will choose to serve a foreign market by means of local production instead of 
exports. MNCs are expected to have a positive relationship with import penetration 
because of the prevalence of intra-firm trade and various forms of international 
sourcing in arm's length trade (Willmore, 1993, Athukorala and Hazari, 1988). 
Finally. the relation between concentration (Cx{) and import penetration is ambiguous. 
Economic theory suggests that imports will be inflated by the profit maximising 
actions of either a monopolist who competes with imports that are an imperfect 
substitute for its own output, or a risk neutral monopolist who faces a stochastic price 
of perfectly substitutable imports. Pagoulatos and Sorenson (1976) confirmed this 
relation for the United States, as did Baumann (1976) for Canr!Ja. A negative relation 
might be observed if concentration proxies entry barriers that discourage importers 
activities. This might arise if producers have established exclusive dealerships and 
territories within the distribution chain (Caves et al, 1980). 
The above theoretical considerations lead to the following specification of import 
penetration: 
IM= J<P_f. ~c. ~1. w_P, T.!, E9s. Pp, c_g, Cf 4· M~ct~• 'IT> 
Where PC is capital intensity, HC is human capital, RI is resource intensity, WP is 
wood-based manufactures, TI ii.: technology intensity, EOS is economies of scale, PD 
is product differentiation, CG is consumer good industries, CR4 is seller 
concentration, MNC is share of foreign ownership of industry, RM is regional market 
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segmentation, and TP is trade policy. 
Equation 6: Trade Protection 
This section is divided into two parts. In the first part we will briefly review the 
theories 0i protection .. The second part presents our hypotheses on the determinants 
of inter-industry differences in protection. 
Comparative Advantage/ Adjustment Pressures 
A good starting point in the discussion on protection is the theory of comparative 
advantage. Stapler and Samuelson (1941) suggested that the benefits of protection 
accrued to the factor of production used intensively in the import substitute sector. In 
the simple two-sector modei, this should result in the import substitute sector being 
potec~~d vis-a-vis the export sector. In a multi-sector economy the model is difficult 
to generalise. Greenaway and Milner (1994:400) suggested that protection might 
accrue on a 'ladder of comparative disadvantage' basis. In other words, if labour is the 
scarce factor. the more labour intensive the activity concerned, the greater tl.:: 
protection conferred. According to Greenaway and Milner (ibid: 400), Corden's 
(1974) analysis of the 'conservative social welfare function' fits well with this 
interpretation of the structure of protection. It basically suggests that governments will 
use trade policy instruments in an endeavour to ensure that particular groups do not 
suffer sudden and severe incomes losses as a consequence of changes in trade flows. 
This view. therefore, focuses on the supply of protection and emphasises adjustment 
to changes in comparative advantage. When adjustment pressures are severe, there is 
the greatest likelihood of protection. 
Political Economy Explanations 
The three prinicipal political-economic theories v1e the interest-group model, national 
policy model arid the 'adding machine' model. Each theory implicitly or explicitly is 
embedded in a particular theory of the way political systems and policy-making 
processes operate. It is important to emphasize that, in assessing these models' 
explanatory power, no single model is likely to explain the structuff, of protection. 
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Governments act for a variety of reasons and in response to a number of pressures, 
and these influences vary over time. Moreover, it is no simple matter to discern why, 
in retrospect, governments took particular decisions. Political scientists often examine 
the issue with reference to the statements and behaviour of key policy-makers, and the 
actions of coalitious in their attempt to influence policy. Economists tend to favour 
quantitative approaches and "revealed outcome" analysis, of the type undertaken in 
this study. A detailed treatment, beyond the scope of this study, would draw on these 
various analytical frameworks, both quantitative and qualitative, to address the 
question. 
The interest group model. This model postulates that industries' protection levels are 
the result of interest group pressures (e.g., Cheh, 1974; Caves, 1976; Brock and 
Magee, 1978). Implicitly, the strncture of protection depends on the benefit and cost 
of pressure groups in organising to secure protection. In this theory it is assumed that 
protection generates profits and rental income. The interest group model sees the 
analysis of protection as a political market comprising both demand and supply 
components, with dema:id originating from the industries seeking protection and 
supply granted by the government. Interest groups will allocate resources to lobbying 
until the marginal cost of this lobbying equals the expected marginal gain from these 
activities. From the supply side, it is assumed that politicians are motivated by self 
interest, that is re-election. Some writers have proposed a more elaborate utility 
function which includes politicians' personal wealth. 
The national policy model. This modd, formulated by Caves (1976) assumes 'bat 
governments have a particular policy preference, often based on some ideological or 
analytical framework, which may then transcend sectional or personal interests. 
Governments may take the view that there are particular market failures which need 
to be solved, or there may be other goals which deserve a higher priority than short-
rnn efficiency maximisation. Examples often discussed in the context of developing 
countries include the pursuit of rapid industrialisation, arguments based on infant 
industry notions, or the development of technological competence. Non-economic 
goals usually refer to some distributional considerations, such as employment creation 
or regional development. In these cases, protection will be granted in accord with 
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sectoral priorities consistent with this perception of "national interest". 
Adding machine model. In this model governments act to maximise their chances of 
re-election (Downs, 1957; Caves, 1976). It indicates that each policy is accepted or 
rejected on the basis of the number of voters expected to accept it. This model is 
based on the assumption that government survival depends on success in a majority of 
geographically defined districts, and is therefore suited to an electoral system. This 
model is not suitable for our study owing to the fact that the concept of vote-buying is 
hardly apposite to Indonesia. Moreover, the country has not in the past employed the 
district system in its general elections. 
The approach in our study is to identify the determinants of inter-industry differences 
in ERPs, and to make a comparison of their relative strength between the pre-reform 
and post-reform periods. We do not intend to test one model against another. We now 
move on to discuss the hypotheses concerning the determination of inter-industry 
differences in trade protection. 
Hypotheses 
Capital Intensity (PC) 
The expected sign of this variable is ambiguous. It is commonly asserted in developed 
countries studies that the sign of this variable is negative. The simplified, two-sectc.· 
Stapler-Samuelson (1941) model demonstrates that the scarce factor has the most to 
gain from protection. To the extent that labour-intensive industries are import-
competing industries in high-wage economies, this constitutes a motive for seeking 
protection. According to the interest-group model, pressure groups can make a 
stronger claim for protection if the industry concerned is characterised by high labour 
intensity. 
He ·Wever it is not obvious that such a relationship will exist in Indonesia. First, 
Indonesia has a comparative advantage in labour-intensive, low wage industries and, 
therefore, these industries are unlikely to require protection. Second, workers have 
little influence on political processes: there is no independent, organised trade union 
system which could lobby for protection, and the voting aspect is not important. On 
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the contrary, it is more likely that capital-intensive industries, to the extent that they 
are not internationally competitive, will demand protection, implying a positive 
relationship. Additionally, lobbying activities may be easier to organise in capital 
intensive industries since most of these industries are characterised by a small number 
of firms. In addition to the interest group model, we might also invoke the national-
interest model here, given that the governmunt sees several capital-intensive 
industries as being 'strategic' to the cour:try's economic development. 
The above arguments are posited in the context of a highly simplified two-factor 
model. Relaxing this assumption, and allowing for example the management and 
coordination of large employment activities through producer associations, it is 
possible that labour-intensive industries may seek protection (Basri and Hill, 
1996:249-50). Pangestu and Boediono (1986:35) argued that, in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s, the government granted protection to labour-intensive industries on 
equity grounds. 
Modern versions of the H-0-S model 1 ~cognise that labour is not homogenous -
activities may be intensive in skilled or U~<;killed labour - and production processes 
can be intensive in technology. Thus, in addition to physical capital, we include 
human capital (HC) and technology intensity (TI) variables in the protection equation. 
The expectet\ sign of the human capital variable is ambiguous for the same reasons as 
physical capit.u. The expected sign of the technology variable is also ambiguous. A 
positive sign might be observed if comparative disadvantage/adjustment 
considerations predominate in fashioning the structure of protection. We might also 
invoke the national interest model here, given the government's proclivities to support 
'show case' high-tech industries, and frequent rhetoric on encouraging value added 
production processes, which more often than not refers to technological-intensive 
µroducts in public discussions in Indonesia. 
Industry Size 
It is assumed that larger industries will have more political influence through scale 
economies in lobbying. The very large industries will have a discernible impact on 
national economic fortunes. In the latter case, a positive association could be 
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construed as support for both the interest-group and national policy models. 
Growth and Profitability 
A high growth industry is less likely to demand protection since it is in a position to 
compete with imports. Jn addition, high growth suggests the possibility of many new 
entrants. Jn such a situation there is less scope for establishing coalitions of firms for 
the purpose of lobbying government for assistance. Thus, the relationship is expected 
to be a negative one. By similar reasoning, profitability of an industry may be 
negatively related to protection. 
Seller Concentration 
The interest ~roup model postulates a positive relationship between concentration and 
protection. Theory tells us that the benefits to the protected firms may be greater if the 
industry is highly concentrated since, other things being equal, the costs of 
organisation and lobbying will be lower. Jn addition, the expected rents from 
protection may be greater in concentrated industries if entry can be blocked. Jn purely 
competitive markets, protection will attract new entrants, which in tum will dissipate 
most of these rents in the long run. 
Regional Markets 
Another aspect of concentration that can influence inter-industry variations in 
protection is geographic concentration of firms. Industries tend to be more affected by 
import competition if they have less natural protection. Jn terms of the interest-group 
model, national industries will seek more protection than regionally fragmented 
industries. Jn addition, regional concentration of sellers makes it easier to organise 
and lobby more effectively than is the case for industries that are regionally 
fragmented. Thus, we expect a negative relationship between regional market 
segmentation (RM) and protection. 
State Ownership 
This is a straightforward variable. Governments are expected to favour industries in 
which their own firms are heavily involved. Such protection can be expected owing to 
the lobbying capacity of senior state enterprise management, many of whom 
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them~· 1-.es have a bureaucratic background. As another instance of where the national 
interest model could also apply, governments may simply protect these firms because 
it is believed that the industry in which they operate is inherently desirable for 
distributional goals, as an infant industry, or because of the presence of externalities. 
One caveat that applies to all these arguments is that state dominated industries may 
also be subject to a range of non-economic objectives, such as price stabilisation, a 
requirement that they locate in uneconomic regions, and so on, for which they receive 
implicit assistance (credit assistance, guarantees against insolvency) which are not 
manifested in the form of protection (Basri and Hill, 1996:250). 
Foreign Ownership 
We expect that the relationship between MNCs and trade protection to change 
between the pre-reform and post-reform periods. In Indonesia, as in many other 
developing economies, multinationals often negotiated entrance on the basis of 
expected profitability, one element of which is likely to be fiscal incentives and 
protection from competition. Therefore, the larger the foreign presence in an industry, 
the more likely is protection to be offered. "Tariff bargaining" by foreign firms was 
quite common in Indonesia during the era of high protection through to the mid-1980s 
(Hill, 1988). It has become less common in recent years as protection has fallen, and 
as these firms' interests have shifted to export orientation (Basri and Hill, 1996:250). 
Further, given their world-wide market networks and sourcing of raw materials and 
components, MNCs are better placed to benefit from trade liberalisation. Thus, MNCs 
may be less likely to resist tariff cuts. Therefore, we do not expect a strong positive 
relationship between MNCs and trade protection in the post-reform equation. 
Imports and Exports 
We expect a positive relationship between imports and protection, and a negative 
relationship between exports and protection. Within the simple two-factor H-0-S 
model, one can infer comparative advantage from trade shares - a relatively high 
value of imports (exports) relative to output being indicative of comparative 
disadvantage (advantage). Thus, industries with a high import share (IM) are likely to 
face a greater competitive challenge and therefore greater potential adjustment 
pressures than those with high export shares (ES). Thus, we expect import-competing 
136 
industries to seek protection. The national interest model can be invoked here. The 
government might grant protection on infant industry grounds. These arguments are 
more relevant to Indonesia in the high protection era through to the mid-1980s when 
the government was pursuing an import-substitution strategy. We might expect a 
weaker relationship in the 1990s as protection has fallen. While we expect a negative 
relationship between protection and exports, this relationship should be stronger in 
the 1990s as a result of the reform process. 
Historical Protection Levels 
The interest group model suggests that current levels of protection could be positively 
correlated with past levels of protection because there will be an incentive for firms in 
highly protected industries to resist trade liberalisation (Lavergne, 1983: 129). While 
Basri and Hill (1996:255) contended that political opposition, in the form of interest-
groups, will be a major obstacle to further trade liberalisation in the 1990s, they 
argued that national interest transcended these sectoral interests during the 1980s 
trade policy reforms when they stated (ibid:255), 
'Interest group dynamics have not been the sole element in the policy-
making equation. Seen in this light, the national interest model may still 
have some relevance, in the sense of explaining broad average movements 
in protection, as distinct from inter-sectoral variations at a given point in 
time. When there was a politico-economic imperative for trade reform, as 
in Indonesia in the mid- l 980s, national interest to some extent transcended 
these sectoral interests, and almost all manufacturing protection rates 
declined.' 
To test these propositions for Indonesian manufacturing industries, we include past 
levels of protection as an explanatory variable in the protection equation. We would 
expect a positive relationship in the pre-reform equation since high protection 
persisted through to the mid-1980s. However, given that interest-group dynamics 
have not been the sole element in the policy-making equation during the reform 
process, we leave open the direction of the relationship in the post-reform equation. 
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The above theoretical considerations lead to the following specification of the 
protection equation: 
TP=/(PC, HC, TI, GRO, IT, IZ, CR4, RM, EX, IM,MNC, SOE, TP(t-1)) 
? ? ? - -+ + - - + + + ? 
Where PC is capital intensity, HC is human capital intensity, TI is technology 
intensity, GRO is industry growth, is IT industry profitability, IZ is industry size, CR4 
is concentration, RM is regional markets, EX is exports, IM is imports, MNC is share 
of foreign ownership of industry, SOE is share of state ownership of industry, and 
TP( t-1) is historical protection. 
5.4Summary 
Recent literature has emphasised the complexity and interdependence of the three 
components of organisation: market structure, conduct and performance, The 
recognition of the interdependence of the various aspects of market behaviour has 
resulted in the use of the simultaneous equations model rather than single equation 
models in recent studies. The S-C-P model presented in this Chapter explicitly 
incorporates the interdependence between five variables that we deem to be relevant 
to the conditions of Indonesian manufacturing. These are seller concentration, 
industry profitability, export orientation, import penetration, foreign-ownership, and 
trade policy. 
Our S-C-P model hypothesises that the six variables will be jointly determined within 
a given market. For example, high seller concentration is expected to lead to relatively 
high industry profits (the market power hypothesis). However, the line of causality 
may also be reversed. Highly profitable firms may increase concentration in the 
market by increasing outlay of advertising or by building larger production capacity. 
Thus, concentration and profits might be jointly determined variables within a given 
market. Export expansion is expected to reduce concentration as the industry can 
support a larger number of viable firms. However, the relationship might also be 
reversed. Low concentrated industries may export a larger share of their production 
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compared to high concentrated industries because lower concentrated industries have 
greater domestic competitive pressures, which in turn has a positive influence on 
exports. Thus, concentration and export-orientation might be jointly determined 
variables within a given market. The estimation results of our S-C-P model are 
presented in Chapter 7. 
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Chapter6 
Data Base, Variable Measurement, and 
Estimation Technique 
6.1 Introduction ~ 
This Chapter begins with a description of the data base, followed by a discussion of 
the measurement of the variables of the structural model developed in the preceding 
Chapter. Finally, the econometric procedures used in the estimation of the model are 
explained. 
6.2 Data Base 
The data base for the estimation of the econometric model developed in section 5.3 is 
derived from the following major sources: 
( 1) The annual manulacturing surveys, 1985 and 1993, of medium and large-
scale establishments (defined as establishments with 20 or more employees) 
published by the Central Bureau of Statistics (Badan Pusat Statistik or BPS}. 
(2) The 1985, 1990 and 1993 Input-Output Tables published by BPS. 
(3) Other quantitative data (these sources are discussed in the Chapter). 
(i) Effective rates of protection are taken from Fane and 
P11illips (1991) and Fane and Condon (1996). 
(ii) U.S advertising-sales ratios are taken from Ornstein (1976) 
_(iii) R&D expenditure-sales ratios are taken from the Australian 
Bureau of Statistics 
(iv) Estimates"Of capital stock are taken from Aswicahyono (1998) 
( 4) Qualitative data collected from: 
(i) The Investment Coordinating Board (BK.PM) 
(ii) Other published sources referred to in earlier Chapters 
(iii) Field work interviews 
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The construction of the data base was a component of this research project. The 
Central Bureau of Statistics provided us with the computer data tapes of all annual 
manufacturing surveys from 1975 to 1993. These tapes contain data on establishments 
surveyed by BPS in these years. The annual manufacturing surveys attempt to 
enumerate all establishments that employ 20 or more workers. Establishments are 
classified into 119 ISIC four and five-digit industries. A rich set of data is collected in 
these surveys including the value of gross output, raw materials, fuel, electricity, 
employment (numbers), wages and salaries, indirect taxes, investment in buildings, 
machinery, motor vehicles and inventory, and information on ownership (foreign, 
private and state ownership). The surveys also provide us with each establishment's 
district or kabupaten and provincial location. By LDC standards, the BPS annual 
manufacturing survey is considered as one of the best (and most accessible) in the 
region. 
There are a number of limitations in using the annual manufacturing survey, however. 
The major one is the substantial under-enumeration of firms up to the late 1980s. In 
the 1985 Industrial Census, BPS discovered an additional, hitherto unenumerated 
6,641 establishments. Of these 6,641 establishment$. only 842 stated that they had 
started commercial production in that year. The remaining 5,799 said they had started 
earlier, 1636 of them earlier than 1975. The discovery of these 6.641 establishments 
almost doubled the number of establishments registered with BPS at the time 
(Jammal, 1993: 1 ). The discovery of these establishments occurred because in 1985 
BPS undertook a door-to-door enumeration of firms, while in previous years field 
procedures were deficient in identifying new establishments and merely replaced 
establishments which ceased operations (Jammal, 1993: 1 ). This finding motivated 
BPS to revise the annual surveys. The procedure consisted of three steps. First, 
'fictitious' or 'implausible' establishments were removed from the surveys. Second, a 
sample of discovered establishments were surveyed for historical data on output, raw 
materials and labour. Third, established statistical techniques were used to estimate 
the historical values of the three variables of the remaining newly discovered 
establishments. 1 The end product is known as the 'backcasted' annual manufacturing 
survey. 
1 See Jammal (1993) for an explanation on the techniques used to estimate these historical values. 
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A major limitation of the backcasted survey is that the historical values are estimated 
for three variables only: gross output value, inputs and employment numbers. Since 
1985, BPS had frequently updated the register of firms. By 1994, BPS officials were 
confident that most firms were now on the register and, thus, the major problems 
associated with under-enumeration of establishments in earlier surveys were no longer 
present.2 As a consequence, care has to be taken when devising variables from the 
earlier manufacturing surveys. Variables such as average wages, MNCs and SOEs' 
share of industry output had to be measured using data from the annual surveys. All 
other variables are measured using data from the back.:asted survey such as, 
concentration ratios, regional market segmentation, industry output size, industry 
output growth, value added, and economies of scale. 
A second problem with the annual and backcasted surveys is that the data refer to 
establishments and not enterprises. Thus, the concentration ratios will be 
underestimated in those industries where firms own and operate more than one 
establishment. This issue and others related to estimating concentration ratios were 
discussed in Chapter 4. A third limitation of the surveys is that many other important 
vanables relevant to our study are not collected, or have only recently being collected, 
or are incomplete. Promotional (advertising and sales promotion) expenditure, for 
example, was only reported as a separate expense item in the 1993 annual 
manufacturing survey. Prior to this, promotion.al expenses were lumped together with 
other expenses such as management fees, royalties, telephone expenses etc. Research 
and development expenditure is not reported in the surveys. No information is 
provided on the skill content of employees. The surveys only classify employees 
according to whether they are production or non-production workers, and male or 
female. The percentage of output exported by establishments has only being reported 
in the annual surveys since 1990. and the data are still rather weak, The oil and gas 
refining sector is not included in our sample because the sector was only included in 
the manufacturing survey as a separate industry (ISIC 353) after 1990. Thus, we do 
not have complete data on the oil/gas processing sector prior to 1990. Finally, the 
surveys do not provide information on vertical relationships between firms, an aspect 
2 Interview with project team consultant, Mr. Alex Kornes, April 1994. 
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of market structure that i~ important in structure-conduct-performance studies but 
ignored here because of the lack of data. 
Trade data (exports and imports) and the resource intensity ratios are extracted from 
the 1985 and 1993 Input-Output Tables. Effective rates of protection for 1987 and 
1993 are taken from Fane and Phillips (1991) and Fane and Condon (1996) 
respectively. 
Qualitative data on the types of regulations come from a variety of sources such as 
BKPM's priority and negative investment lists, fieldwork interviews, Indonesian 
business publications and other studies referred to in earlier chapters. Finally, we use 
overseas data to proxy some structural characteristics (technology intensity and 
prutluct differentiation) of industries, on the valid assumption that industry rankings, 
if not absolute values, are internationally transferable (Luy, 1968). 
The sample size is 67 industries. This sample is smaller than the sample of 102 
industries used in the descriptive analysis in Chapter 4. The main reason is the 
unavail&. :lity of ERP estimates and export and import data for all 102 industries. 
Effective rates of protection and trade data are available for 87 I-0 industries, of 
which around 68 are exactly matched with our ISIC industries from the annual 
manufacturing survey. In the earlier stages of our data collection we attempted to 
calculate export intensity -.ind import penetration ratios from the Indonesian Trade 
Statistics. We encountered a number of key problems. First, the trade statistics 
categorise products according to their SITC (Standard International Trade 
Classification). The industry output figures are taken from the annual manufacturing 
surveys, which classify industries according to their !SIC. Thus, we encountered 
concordance difficulties between the SITC trade statistics and the !SIC annual surveys 
for several industries. Secondly, of those industries that we could harmonise, around 
15 of them produce:d export intensity ratios greater than one. These industries are 
unlikely to be re-exporting industries and so their ratios are not sensible. This 
probably arises because exports are valued at f.o.b while output is valued at producer 
prices. 
Plywood (ISIC 33113) was dropped from the sample, because it is an extreme export 
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industry (about 95 per cent of plywood production is exported) and, thus, not relevant 
to the analysis of competition in the domestic market. The sample of 67 industries 
includes industries from all the major industry groups (ISIC 31 to 39), and accounts 
for around 80 per cent of total manufacturing value added in 1993. 
6.3 Variable Measurement 
Endogenous Variables 
Six endogenous variables are included in the model. These variables are discussed 
below. 
Industry Concentration ( CR4) 
The two widely used measures of concentration in the industrial organisation 
literature are the four-firm concentration ratio and the Hirschmann-Herfindahl index. 
In this study we use the domestic four-firm concentration ratio (CR4) and the foreign 
trade-adjusted CR4 (CR4MX). The domestic and foreign trade adjusted CR4 ratios 
were defined in Chapter 4. Our choice is guided by the CR4's intuitive appeal and for 
comparative purposes with other S-C-P studies. 
Profitability( n) 
In the empirical literature, profitability is usually measured by accounting rates of 
return (current profits divided by equity or total assets), or rates of return on sales 
(price-cost margins). Accounting rates of return are not available, because of the lack 
of reliable data on equity or assets in the annual manufacturing survey. 
In our study we use two common measures of price-cost margins. The first one is the 
ratio of gross profits to sales; 
PCM 1 = value of output - inputs - w~ges and salaries 
value of output 
Gross profit (or non-wage value added) is computed as the value of output minus 
inputs, and wages and salaries. Inputs include raw materials, fuel and electricity. 
Wages and salaries are calculated by talc.ing the average wage and salary per employee 
from the annual manufacturing survey and multiplying by employment numbers 
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provided in the backcasted survey. A crticism of this measure of PCM is that the 
denominator (value of output) of PCMl is sensitive to fluctuations in prices of inputs 
and the business cycle effects: A decline in input prices will increase PCMl, while an 
increase in input prices will reduce PCMl. Therefore, PCMI may not be an accurate 
measure of market power. To overcome this problem investigators use a second 
measure of PCM: the ratio of gross profits to value added (Dowrick, 1990): 
PCMZ = value of output - inputs - wages and salaries 
value added 
A problem with both measures of PCMs is that our cost data refer to average costs 
and not marginal costs. If there are no fixed costs, then average costs will equal 
constant marginal costs over the relevant range of output. If there are fixed costs, then 
average costs will deviate from marginal costs, and our measures of PCM will not be 
an accurate measure of market power. In S-C-P studies of the kind undertaken here, 
researchers normally control for this possibility by including .a measure of economies 
of scale in t!:-10 profit equation (Neumann et al, 1983). Another problem with PCMs is 
that they are sensitive to the business cycle. Empirical studies using panel data (cross-
sectiona1 and time series data together) for U.S manufactudng industries show that 
PCMs are positively correlated with the business cycle, and this is more pronounced 
for concentrated industries (Domowitz et al, 1986). Thus, there is a potential bias 
when using cross-sectional data to estimate the relationship between concentration 
and PCMs. It is important, therefore, to bear this limitation in minr · vhen interpreting 
the results in Chapter 7. 
Trade Variables (EX, IM) 
The export-orientation variable is me.;sured as the ratio of exports to industry output, 
valued at producer (or factory) prices. Import Penetration (IM) is measured in two 
ways. One, which we call IMDC, is defined as: 
!MDC= M 
Q+M-X 
where M is imports, X is exports and Q is domestic production. The major limitation 
of this ratio as a measure of competitiveness of domestic industry is its dependence on 
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exports. For instance, for an industry in which export expansion has outpaced the 
increase in imports, the ratio indicates that its international competitiveness has 
deteriorated when in fact the opposite has occurred. On the other hand, the ratio 
understates the loss of competitiveness in a protected industry in which export growth 
has collapsed, even if import growth has slowed to a virtual standstill (Athukorala and 
Hazari, 1988:50). By excluding exports from consideration, and using the ratio of 
imports to domestic prrJductio:t as a measure of import penetration, we can overcome 
this limitation (Athukorala and Rizari, 1988:50-51). We call this measure the import-
domestic production ratio (IMDP). 
Trade Protection (TP) 
In previous studies for other countries two alternative measures have been used: the 
nominal rates of protection (NRP) and the real effective rates of protection (RERP). 
According to Caves et al (1980:72) the effective rate of protection is theoretically 
superior, because it is designed to measure the '~Xtent to which the whole structure of 
tariffs enlarges the value-added slice that can be provided by ar1 industry. The 
advantage of RERPs over the more familiar ERPs is that RERPs cllow for the effects 
of protection on the general price level, and hence on the real exchange rate, whereas 
ERPs do not (refer back to the discussion on RERP~ · , Chapter 3). 
A comparable set of reru effective rates of protection for 87 Indonesian manufacturing 
industries has been estimated by Fane and Phillips (1991) for 1987 and Fane and 
Condon (1996) for 1993.3 The 1987 RERPs were estimated after the first reform 
package of May 1986, but before the second reform package of December 1987. In 
our study we treat the 1987 RERPs as proxies for the RERPs prevai!ing at the 
beginning of the reform period. 
A common problem faced by studies is that available measures of RERPs often do not 
incorporate the influence of non-tariff barriers. Fortunately, this problem is not as 
serious in the Indonesian context because the estimates have been adjusted for most 
important non-tariff interventions. These estimates take into account tariffs, the 
3 Fane and Phillips (1991) and Fane and Condon (1996) estimated NRPs and RERPs for 138 tractable 
sectors based on the 1985 and 1990 Input-Output Tables. Of these 138 sectors, 87 are manufacturing 
industries. 
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various quantitative restrictions on imports and exports, subsidies, and local content 
schemes (Fane and Phillips, 1991; Fane and Condon, 1996). The forms of 
intervention which are not incorporated in the estimates because of the non-
transparent nature of policy-making in Indonesia include firm-specific subsidies to 
SOEs and other private-sector firms, government purchasing preferences, pricing of 
infrastructure services, and bank loans at concessional interest rates. 
A major limitation of the estimated average RERPs is that the du \y rebates given to 
export producers are not captured in the RERP estimates. ThP, duty exemption and 
drawback facility for export-oriented firms provide fre~ access to imported 
intermediate inputs for these firms. However, as domestic market-oriented firms still 
have to purchase their intermediate inputs in the protected domestic markets, the ERP 
for these two categories of finns differ from one another. Ideally, we need separate 
E.RP estimates for export-oriented firms and domestic market-oriented suppliers. 
However, these are unavailable. 
Foreign Ownership (MNCs) 
In Chapter 2, we presented and discussed the operational definition of ownership for 
Indonesian manufacturing devised by Aswicahyono and Hill (1995). We use this 
definition to calculate the foreign-ownership variable. To remind the reader, the 
deJ: .'ttion of foreign-ownership devised by A.swicahyono and Hill (1995) is: 
MNCs~ ...... + -;;':'+(1-Dl)*(GF+GFP) 
where F is wholly foreign owned, FP is foreign-private joint venture, GF is 
government-foreign joint venture and GFP is government-foreign-private joint 
venture. Each ownership group is measured in terms of it share of industry 
production. DI is a dummy variable equal to one if the industry is sugar processing, 
fertiliser, basic metals and ship building, otherwise it is zero. 
Exogenous Variables 
Over 15 exogenous variables are included in the model. Exogenous variables are 
those which have pre-determined values in our model. The exogenous variables are 
discussed below. 
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State Ownership (SOEs) 
In Chapter 2, we measured state ownership as: 
SO Es= G +GP+ DI* ( GF + GFP) 
where G is wholly state owned, GP is government-private joint venture, GF is 
government-foreign joint venture and GFP is government-foreign-private joint 
venture. Each ownership group is measured in terms of their share of industry 
product.on. D 1 is defined above. 
Economies of Scale (EOS) 
In the absence of direct measures of economies of scale based on engineering data, 
inves~igators have used various statistical proxies to represent economies of scale. We 
follow Caves, Khalilzadeh-Shirazi and Porter (1975) and use the minimum efficient 
plant scale (MES) and the cost-disadvantage ratio (CDR) variables to estimate 
economies of scale. Their measure of EOS is the most widely used measure in the 
kind of SCP studies undertaken here. Caves et al (1975) define EOS as: 
EOS=( 1-CDR)*MES 
Where: 
MES is the average plant size of the largest plants accounting for 50 per cent of the 
industry's production. Plant size is measured by the value of output. 
CDR= (VAIL)' 
(VA/L)L 
(V AfL)S is average value added per labour of the smallest plants accounting for 50 
per cent of industry output, 
(V AJL)L is the average value added per labour of the largest plants accounting for 50 
per cent of industry output. 
Davies ( 1980) showed that the measure of MES might lead to misspecification of the 
concentration equation because both MES and concentration are estimated from the 
number and size distribution nf plants in the industry, and thus are highly correlated 
with each other. By interacting CDR with MES, Caves, Khalilzadeh-Shirazi and 
Porter's (197 5) measure of BOS reduces this misspecification identified by Davies 
(1980). 
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The CDR ratio attempts to proxy the slope of the average cost curve below the 
minimum efficient scale. In this way, the MES provides a floor for the number of 
efficient establishments only when the cost disadvantage of small plants is 
appreciable. If there is no cost disadvantage between large and small firms, the CDR 
term will equal one and BOS will equal zero. 
We measure MES and CDR using Indonesian establishment data from the annual 
manufacturing surveys. The.()e statistical proxies may reflect many other influences 
beyond the purely technological variables that they were originally proposed to 
capture. The CDR ratio, for example, will reflect the influence of the small domestic 
market, regional fragmentation, protection, and product differentiation. Additionally, 
plant sizes are typically smaller in developing economies than in large developed 
economies (Kirkpatrick et al, 1984). Establishment sizes may be smaller in LDCs 
because more plants use an older technology with a lower MES or because 
differences in relative factor prices render more appropriate an alternative technology 
with a lower MES. Thus, ~here is a potential for mis-measurement of the economies 
of scale variable using Indonesian establishment data. Caves et al ( 1980:46) argued 
th~111\ere is a case for using U.S data to measure CDR; 
'the small size of the Canadian economy and the possibility that substantial 
proportions of capacity in some industries are of inefficiently small scale 
argue convincingly that that CDR measured from U.S. data is more likely 
to contain information about the true cost curve. Thi': case of MES is 
slightly less clear, because differences between U.S. and Canadian factor 
prices and industries' output mixes could cause relevant information to be 
contained in the variable measured from Canadian data (MESC) that is lost 
when it is measured from U.S. data (MESU). Therefore, both were 
employed. They gave similar results in the regression analysis, but MESC 
proved somewhat more significant statistically'. 
While the authors were concerned with Canadian manufacturing industries, their 
argument is of general relevance to other small economies like Indonesia. 
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Unfortunately, U.S. data on CDR for a comparable set of industries were not available 
to us. Like most other SCP studies on small economies, we use Indonesian data to 
estimate CDR. This weakness of CDR as a statistical proxy should be borne in mind 
when we discuss the regression results in Chapter 7. 
Industry Size (IZ) and Growth (GRO) 
We measure industry size by the value of industry output. Industry growth during the 
pre-reform period is represented by the average annual percentage change in industry 
output between 1978 and 1985. Industry growth during the post-reform period is 
represented by the average annual percentage change in industry output between 1985 
and 1993. We deflated industry output value using the wholesale price index 
published by BPS between 1985 and 1993. The wholesale price index is calculated 
for manufacturing industries at the three-digit ISIC level. 
Regional Fragmentation (RM) 
The degree of regional fragmentation of an industry is measured by the inverse of the 
Hirschmann-Herfindahl index (HHI) of plant dispersion across Indonesia's 27 
provinces. The HHI is calculated as follows: 
27 
HHI = .2,. ( ~i ) 2 where ni is the number of plants in province i. Nj is the total number 
•=I J 
of plants in industry j. The value of HHI varies between -0 and 1. The number 
equivalent of provinces with plants in industry j is obtained by taking the inverse of 
HHI (i.e 1/HHI). The value of the inverse of HHI lies between 1 and positive infinity. 
Thus, the greater the number of equivalent provinces with plants, the greater is the 
degree of regional fragmentation in industry j. 
Our measure of regional segmentation assumes that provinces proxy regional markets. 
Clearly, one could show examples where regional markets do not coincide with 
provincial boundaries. Unfortunately, in the absence of detailed knowledge of 
individual industries and their regional sub-markets it is not possible to adjust for this. 
Therefore, owing to the arbitrary nature of provincial boundaries, it is important to 
bear this limitation in mind when interpreting the results reported in Chapter 7. 
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Factor Intensities (PC, HC, RI, WP) 
Physical capital intensity is measured by the ratio of capital stock to employment 
(PC). The annual survey does not provide reliable estimates of capital stock. Thus, 
researchers have to use established mathematical techniques to estimate capital stock 
from investment data reported in the surveys. Aswicahyono (1998) has estimated 
cap:tal stock values for each ISIC four and five-digit industry from the reported values 
of investment in the annual surveys and has provided us with this data. 
An alternative measure of capital intensity used in some previous studies is the ratio 
of non-wage value added to employment. A major limitation of this measure is that it 
is not a pure measure of capital intensity (Spence, 1977:250). For example, value 
added can be written as VA=rK+wL,. where r is the return to capital and w the wage 
rate. Non-wage value added can be written as 'NWV A=rK. It follows that NWV AIL= 
rK/L. Therefore non-wage value added per worker is determined by (1) capital-labour 
ratio and (2) all the factors that affect the rate of return to capital, including barriers to 
entry and oligopolistic collusion, and business cycle effects. 
Various measures have been used to represent human capital in studie& of trade 
patterns. These measures may be divided into two groups: skill-group measures and 
wage-differential measures. Both of these measures have disadvanta~es as measures 
of human capital. The skill-group measures are deficient since they do not reflect *he 
capital accumulation involved. The major difficulty with wage-differentials is that any 
measure of wage may be distorted by labour market imperfections {Stern, 1975:13). 
Our data base does not include skill differentials. In the absence of an appropriate 
alternative measure, we employ the following measure of human capital: 
HC=w/L where -NIL is average wage per employee. 
A common drawback of these measures is that they reflect only the direct component 
of factor intensities. As Deardorff (1984:480) has shown, direct plus indirect factor 
intensities are the appropriate determinants of trade, since it is these that determine 
autarky prices. The indirect component, or the factor intensities of inputs which are 
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used in the production of finished commodities have been ignored due to data 
limitations. 
Resource intensity (RI) is usually measured by the ratio of direct and indirect 
purchases of domestic inputs from agriculture, fishery, forestry, and mining industries 
to the total value of purchased inputs (Koo and Martin, 1984). The source is the 
Input-Output Tables, 1985 and 1993. We observed in Chapter 2 that most of 
Indonesia's exports of resource-intensive manufactures are forestry-based products. 
Thus, we include a dummy variable equal to one if the industry is forestry-intensive, 
zero otherwise. Thest. manufacturing industries in our sample are: saw milling (!SIC 
33111), wooden building materials (ISIC 31112), wood furniture (!SIC 33210), other 
products made from wood (ISIC 33120, 33140), paper and carton (ISIC 34112), paper 
and carton products (ISIC 34120). 
Technology Intensity (Tl) 
A number of measures have been used to proxy technology intensity. These include 
the ratio of research and development expenditure to sales, the ratio of scientists and 
engineers to total employees and the number of patents. The most commonly used 
measure is the research and development ratio (Tl). This is a proxy measure of short-
term comparative cost advantage of new products. It is used in studies of trade 
patterns with the assumption that the stock of innovations is correctly represented by 
current R&D expenditure (Baldwin, 1971; 128). These ratios are not reported in the 
Indonesian annual manufacturing surveys, nor are they available in any other source 
known to the author. Further, as in most other developing countries, domestic firms 
and MNCs undertake little research and development in Indonesia, except for minor 
adjustments to imported technology (Soesastro, 1998). Thus, for Indonesia there is a 
case for using measures from developed countries to proxy the technological intensity 
of an industry, especially since most R&D expenditure and innovations occur in the 
industrialised economies. However, we should attach a caveat to this argument: an 
industry which is technology-intensive in a high income country can be very labour-
intensive in a developing economy. A good example of this is electronics, which is 
predominantly assembling activities in Indonesia. We use the ratio of research and 
development expenditure to sales of Australian counterpart industries. This data are 
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available for 1985 and 1993 at the Australian Statistics Industry Classification (ASIC) 
three and four-digit level (Australian Bureau of Statistics). Data for U.S counterpart 
industries are preferable but were not available at the time of writing. 
Absolute Capital Cost Requirement (AKC) 
Following Caves et al (1980) we measure the capital cost of establishing a plant of 
MES size as; 
K AKC=-*MES 
Q 
Where K is capital stock estimated by Aswicahyono (1998), 
Q is the value of industry output, 
MES is the minimum efficient plant size, defined above. 
Product Differentiation (PD) and Consumer-Goods Industries (CG) 
We proxy product differentiation by the ratio of advertising expenditure to sales of 
U.S. counterpart industries.4 Our choice is guided by two considerations. First, 
promotional expenditure (advertising, sales promotion activities) is reported in the 
Indonesian annual manufacturing survey for the first time only in 1993. Advertising 
restrictions until 1989 mean that the 1993 ratios are unlikely to be repre:;entative of 
the state of advertising activities in the mid-1980s. Second, and more substantive, 
U.S. advertising sales ratios should be a better indicator of product differentiation. In 
using U.S. advertising sales ratios, we make the assumption that product 
differentiation of an industry is similar across countries. The source for U.S. 
advertising sales ratios is Ornstein (1976). We make the assumption that the rank of 
U.S. industries by advertising-sales ratios remains stable over time. Where there is no 
U.S. counterpart industry, we use the 1993 promotion-sales ratio of the Indonesian 
industry (we use Indonesian data for 11 industries). 
We use a number alternative measures to proxy consumer good industries. First, we 
use a dummy variable equal to one if the industry is a consumer goods industry, zero 
4 Advertising sales ratios, however, are imperfect measures of product differentiation. Geroski 
(1991:171) points out that advertising is often used by fii'ms lo compensate for a lack of product 
differentiation. 
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otherwise (a procedure followed by Caves et al, 1980). Second, we use the percentage 
of total output sold to households (Koo and Martin, 1984). The classification of 
industries by consumer goods and producer goods is made on the basis of an 
examination of the proportion of output sold to households and producers using the 
1985 and 1993 Input-Output Tables. In the empirical literature there are a number of 
criteria for classifying an industry into consumer goods or producer goods. Scherer 
( 1980) defined a consumer goods industry as one where firms sell more than two 
thirds of output to households. Other investigators (Ornstein, 1976; Levy, 1985) 
define a consumer goods industry as one where firms sell more than half of output to 
households. In order to explore the sensitivity of results to the choice of measure, we 
use three alternative measures of consumer goods industries: 
(1) Dummy variable Cg 1 = l, if more than two-thirds of industry output 1s sold to 
households, otherwise zero (Scherer's classification). 
Dummy variabi;.': Cg2 = 1, if more than half of industry output is sold to households, 
otherwise zero (Ornstein's classification). 
Cg3 = percentage of industry output sold to households 
The proportion of industry output sold to Indonesian households is calculated as 
follows: 
C . . household .consumption (I - 0 301) .onsumpuon ratio=-----------------
output value(! - 0 600) - export value(! - 0 305) 
We der'ucted exports from industry output because we do not have information on the 
proportion of output sold to households in foreign markets. We ignore imports as they 
are not included in household consumption (I-0 301) and domestic output (I-0 600). 
Constraints on Domestic Competition (Reg) 
Following our discussion in Chapter 5, we include 7 industry-specific dummy 
variables in the concentration and profitability equations. The industry-specific 
dummy variables are for sugar processing (!SIC 31181), cooking oil (!SIC 31150), 
noodles (ISIC 31179), alcoholic drinks (!SIC 31310/30), fertiliser (!SIC 35120), 
cement (!SIC 36310), and basic metals (!SIC 37100). 
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As discussed in Chapters 2 and 5, direct foreign ownership was restricted in numerous 
industries up to the mid-1980s. Liberalisation of the investment regime since the late 
1980s had opened up most sectors to foreign direct investment. We have attempted to 
capture the impact of Indonesian government policies on FDI in two ways. First, as 
noted above, we used the definition of foreign ownership used by Aswicahyono and 
Hill { 1995) in their study on the determinants of FDI in Indonesian manufacturing in 
1985. Second, we introduce a variable designed to incorporate the effects of 
prohibitions on entry of foreign firms. For this, we draw on the study of Aswicahyono 
and Hill (1995), which listed industries closed to foreign investors in the mid-1980s, 
and the documentation of the government's regulatory agency, BKPM, to determine 
which industries have been closed to foreign investors in our sample of industries. 
Table 6.1 lists the sectors in our sample in which foreign entry was prohibited (at least 
through direct ownership, as distinct from some sort of arm's-length arrangement) for 
all or the major part of the period under study. For these industries, we propose a 
dummy variable (Reg) equal to one if entry was prohibited, otherwise zero. To test the 
impact of the removal of these prohibitions on the pattern of FDI, we include the 
same dummy variable (Reg) in the post-reform equation. It needs to be emphasised 
that there is a foreign presence in some of these industries (especially motor vehicles), 
mainly through strongly developed licensing arrangments. But our primary purpose is 
to detect and explain inter-industry variations in foreign ownership. 
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Table 6.1 
Industries Closed to Foreign Direct Investment 
Sector ISIC Pre-Liberalisation Period Liberalisation Period 
Noodles 31171 
Alcoholic beverages 3131/20/30 
Clove cigarettes 31420 
White cigarettes 31430 
Garments 32210 
Building materials 33112 
Soaps and detergents 35231 
Consumer electronics 38320 
Motor vehicles 38430 
Motor cycles 38440 
(up to mid-1980s) (early 1990s) 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
X indicates sector closed to foreign firms.There were several industries with substantial FDI during the 
period under study, but were closed to further foreign investment. In our sample of 67 industries, these 
included beer (IISC 31130) and white cigarettes (31430). We included these two industries in the 
dummy variable on the grounds that ent11 prohibitions may hnd deterred additional FDI. 
In our sample, a total of 12 industries had entry prohibitions on foreign investment. By the mid-1990s, 
entry prohibitions on FDI were removed from all these industries, except for the two sectors listed in 
Table 6.1. 
Source: Aswicahyono and Hill (1995) and Negative Investment List, BKPM, various issues. 
6.4 Estimation Technique 
We have postulated a model where simultaneity is explicitly incorporated. There are 
several well-known econometric techniques which can be used to estimate a 
simultaneous equations model. These econometric techniques fall into two main 
categories: 'systems methods' and 'single-equation methods'. The systems methods, 
of which three~stage least squares (3SLS) and full information maximum likelihood 
(FlML) are the best known, estimate all the identified5 equations in a system 
simultaneously.6 The disadvantage of these methods is that they require detailed 
specification of the equation system and are highly sensitive to specification error 
(lntriligator, 1978:419). Since these methods estimate all equations simultaneously, 
an error in one equation or variable can be transmiued throughout the whole system, 
resulting in biased estimates of the coefficients of the variables in the system. 
Therefore, the common practice in estimating simultaneous equations systems has 
been to adopt a risk-averse position by resorting to single-equation methods. These 
methods estimate a system of simultaneous equations by estimating each identified 
5 The necessary (but not sufficient) condition for the jth equation to be identified in the system is 
K ~ Nj, where K =all predetermined variables in the equation system, N = number of parameters to be 
estimated in the equation j. If K = Nj, j is just identified, if K>Nj,j is over-identified (Theil, 197 ! :448). 
6 These methods are explained in most econometric texts. See, for example, Intriligator (1978, Chapter 
II). 
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equation separately. Single-eqnation methods include the instrumental variables (IV), 
the reduced form method or indirect least squares (ILS), two stage least squares and 
limited information maximum likelihood (LIML). 
In the present study, the 2SLS technique is used to estimate the structural model. The 
2SLS estimates are less sensitive to the presence of multicolinearity among regressors 
and misspecification of the equations compared to the other single-equation methods 
(Johnston, 1972:409-420). In addition, several studies have shown that the 2SLS 
method ranks the best on the ·basis of asymptotic efficiency and the consistency of 
estimators for small samples.7 Moreover, this method can be applied to both exactly 
identified and over-identified models.8 In this method, endogenous variables which 
appear as an explanatory variable in the model are replaced by a linear combination of 
exogenous variables of the model, and this combination is used as the explanatory 
variable in lieu of the original value. Firstly, endogenous variables are regressed on all 
the exogenous variables in the equation system. Secondly, the predicted or estimated 
values obtained from the first stage regressions are used instead of actual values 
whenever an endogenous variable is included as an explanatory variable in another 
equation. 
While economic theory provides guidance on the choice of explanatory variables and 
the direction of causation between the variables in an economic relationship, it is of 
little help with regard to the choice of functional form. The misspecification of 
functional form in an econometric model will generally result in inconsistent 
parameter estimates. Therefore, diagnostic tests should be performed to determine 
whether the model has been correctly specified. We employ Ramsey's regression 
specification error test (RESET) to examine each equation for functkmal form 
misspecifications. Two non-ne·5ted tests (the J-test, and the F or encompassing test) 
are applied to select a particular specification over one or more alternative models. If 
the variance of each disturbance term varies across industries, heteroskedasticity is 
considered to be present. We have also employed a numbe1 "f heteroskedasticity tests. 
Finally, two informal methods are used to detect multicoHnearity between 
independent variables. Fi~st, we examine the correlation matrix to s~e whether any 
pairs of independent variables are highly correlated. Secondly, we apply a test of 
multicollinearity suggested by F1.1.rrer-Glaubar (Johnston, 1972: 163). 
7 See lntiligator ( 1978:416-20) for n summliry of these studies. 
8 Some of the estimation techniques mentioned above (e.g indirect least squt1res) are defined only for 
'exactly identified' equations. 
157 
Chapter 7 
Empirical Results: 
Structure-Conduct Performance Model 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter analyses the results of the structural model specified in Chapter 5 under 
two different trade and investment policy regimes. The regression results presented in 
the Chapter are the statistically robust 2SLS results. The results are reported in Tables 
7.1to7.10. 
For a number of dependent varil.\bles, we tested two alternative measures. These are 
price-cost margins (PCMl and PCM2), import penetration (IMDP and IMDC), and 
the rate of protection (RERP and NRP). In each ca.'i·~. we selected one over the other 
using non-ne'ited model selection tests, which compare the specification of one model 
against one or more non-nested alternativie models (Chapter 6). 
The remainder of this Chapter is divided into eight sections. Sections 2 to 7 discuss 
the results of the six equations specified in Chapter 5. Section 8 presents the Chow 
test for structural change in the model between the two years. Section 9 summarises 
the main findings of the study. 
7 .2 Industry Concentration 
Table 7 .1 reports the 2SLS estimates of the determinants of industrial concentration 
in Indonesian manufacturing in 1985 and 1993. The elasticities derived from the 
regressions are reported in Table 7 .2. They tell us the percentage change in the 
concentration ratio due to a percentage change in an explanatory variable. All 
equations reported in Table 7 .1 are in linear form. In all cases, the linear specification 
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was preferable to alternative specifications (e.g., the log-linear) in terms of Ramsey 
RESET test for functional form misspecification (Chapter 6). Regressions (3) and (4) 
are our preferred specification of the concentration model based on the higher 
adjusted R2. We dropped the seven industry-specific :tummy variables on the 
grounds that they gave unsatisfactory results in tenns of coefficient signs and 
conventional tests of significance. 1 
The coefficients of the conventional industrial organisation variables (economies of 
scale, industry size., absolute capital cost, product differentiation and regional market 
segmentation) have the expected signs, and all are statistically significant in 1985 and 
1993 (equations (1) to (4)). The coefficient on the economies of scale (BOS) variable 
is positive, supporting the hypothesis that larger economies of scale lead to higher 
concentration of the industry. The BOS elasticity values for 1985 and 1993 are 
reported in Table 7 .2. The elasticity value of 0.141 in the 1993 equation ( 4) tells us 
that, at the sample mean values of economies of scale and concentration, a 10% 
increase in economies of scale causes concentration to rise by 1.41 %. The coefficient 
on the industry size (IZ) variable is negative, supporting the hypothesis that the larger 
the industry size, the lower is the degree of industrial concentration. The industry size 
elasticity value of -0.166 in the 1993 equation (4) tells us that a 10 per cent increase 
in the size of the industry causes concentration to fall by 1.66 per cent. These two 
results confirm our hypothesis that Indonesia's small domestic market size gives rise 
to hie,h seller concentration of manufacturing industries. The coefficient of the 
regional market segmentation (RM) variable is negative. This result suggests that 
concentrntion measurrd at the national level is lower in regional industries, because 
firm sizes are constrained by t\ie smaller sizes of the regional markets. 
1 The poor performanc.e of the industry-specific dummy variables docs not reject the hypothesis that 
1egulatory constraints on competition had influenced the concentration levels in these industries. Our 
crosr;-sectional ·est of the effect of regulation on concentration is probably inadequate for this purpose. 
As discussed in :::hapter 5, one should approach a cross-sectional test of the effect of regulation on 
concentration cautiously, because regulation~ may affecl market structures indirectly through other 
determinants, and thus may not show up as statistically significant in the econometric analysis when in 
fact they are important. For example, entry and exit regulations are likely to affect the number and size 
distribution of plants in an industry and, thus, influence our measure of economies of scale, which in 
turn influence the concentration level of an industry. 
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Table 7 .1: L ~terminants of Industrial Concentration: 2~LS Results 
Independent Pre-trade reform Post-trade reform Pre-traJe reform Post-trade reform 
variables 1985 equation (1) 1993 equation (2) 1985 equation (3) 1993 equation (4) 
Con.t;i,nt 0.379 0.430 0.353 0.412 
(1.10) (2.24)b (2.96)a (2.50)1l 
RERP 0.023 0.013 0.025 0.008 
(0.63) (0.57) (0.95) (0.50) 
PCM! 0.894 0.826 0.858 0.614 
( l.37)c (1.27) (1.29) (1.17) 
IMDP 0.004 -0.083 
(0.21) (0.60) 
EX -0.05 0.052 
(0.05) (0.21) 
MNC -0.077 -0.122 
(0.41) (0.31) 
SOE -0.075 -0.002 
(0.23) (0.01) 
EOS* 0.00005 0.00003 0.00004 0.00003 
(l.37)c (2.3 l)b (1.34)c (3.49)a 
AKC* 0.0004 0.0001 0.0004 0.0001 
(I .86)b (I .65)c (2.56)a ' (2.49)a 
IZ* -0.000002 -0.000006 -0.000002 -0.000001 
(2.49)a (3.64)a (3.79)a (4.55)a 
RM -0.035 -0044 -0.032 -0.035 
(1.73) b (2.IO)b (2.20)b (2.03)b 
PD 1.582 1.807 1.575 1.983 
( l.66)c (l.57)c (1.84)b (2.0l)b 
Adjusted R.l 0.44 0.37 0.49 0.43 
H-test(a) 0.139 0.043 0.293 1.298 
Notes: All equations are in linear form. 
*The coefficients ofEOS, AKC and IZ were multiplied by 10,000 to improve presentation. 
t-ratios are given in parentheses. Significance levels (one-tail test) are a=I %. b=5%, c=10%. 
(a) Heteroskedasticity test. Chi-square test under 2SLS (critical value at 1 % is 6.63). 
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Table 7.2 Elasticities2 
Independent Elasticities Evaluated at Sample Mean I 
Values 1 Variable 
(from equations (3) and (4) ·. 
1985 1993 
EOS 0.044 0.141 
AKC 0.071 0.041 
IS -0.124 -0.166 
PD 0.054 0.068 
RM -0.191 -0.190 
Only elasticities of statistically significant explanatory variables are reported. 
The coefficients of the two variables representing barriers to entry (product 
differentiation and absolute capital costs) are positive. The result for product 
differentiation provides support for the hypothesis that product differentiation acts as 
a barrier to entry in Indonesia's manufacturing industries. The result for the capital 
cost (AKC) variable lends support to the hypothesis that the high capital cost of 
establishing a plant of minimum efficient scale increases the level of concentration in 
Indonesia's manufacturing industries. The elasticity value of 0.41 in the 1993 
equation ( 4) tells us that a 10 per cent increase in absolute costs of capital causes 
concentration to rise by 0.41 per cent. 
The real effective rate of protection (RERP) coefficient has the positive sign, but is 
not statistically significant, either in 1985 or in 1993. This result suggests that trade 
policy has not had a direct effect on concentration levels. Our finding runs counter to 
the conventional hypothesis that high protection increases the numbe;· of firms that 
can survive in a protected industry, which in turn lowers seller concentration (Caves 
et al; 1980). Empirical findings for other developing countries are mixed. Mooney 
(1984) found a negative relation between effective rates of protection and 
concentration in Brazilian manufacturing industries, while Kalirajan (1993) found ?.. 
positive relation between concentration and protection in Malaysian manufacturing. 
As discussed in Chapter 5, one should approach a cross-sectional test of the effect of 
protection on concentration cautiously, because protection may take time to affect 
market structures. Further, protection may affect market structures indirectly through 
2 The elasticity of concentration with respect to all explanatory variable is calculated as follows: 
- -
dCR
4 
* X = a* X where a is the coefficient of the explanatory variable X, and X and 
dX CR4 CR4 
CR4 are the s"mple mean values ofX and CR4 respectively. 
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other determinants, and thus the protection variable may not show up as statistically 
significant in the econometric analysis when in fact it is important. For example, 
trade protection is likely to affect· the number and size distribution of plants in an 
industry (by altering relative prices), and thus influence our measure of economies of 
scale, which in tum influence concentration of the industry. 
The performance (PCM!) variable has the expected positive sign, but does not attain 
statistical significance even at the 10 per cent level, in both 1985 and 1993. Thus, 
there is no evidence that high industry profits induce firms to undertake actions that 
might increase concentration (e.g., increase capacity, greater advertising outlays, etc). 
According to equations (1) and (2), the foreign trade variables have no significant 
effect on concentration. either in 1985 or in 1993. The insignificant export coefficient 
(EX) is consistent with the proposition advanced in Chapter 4 that the high labour 
intensity (the inverse of the absolute capital costs variable) of most of the export-
intensive industries is a major explanation of the lower levels of concentration /in 
these industries. The sign of the import (IMDP) coefficient switches from positive in 
1985 to negative in 1993, but remains insignificant in both years. This result rejects 
the hypothesis that greater import competition resulting from trade liberalisation 
displaces less efficient local firms, which in tum increases concentration. As can be 
seen in a comparison between equations (1) and (2) and (3) and (4), the regression 
results are remarkably resilient to the omission of the trade variables. 
Our results for the foreign trade variables are consistent with the mixed results found 
in studies of other developing economies. De Melo and Urata (1986) could not find 
any significant effect of foreign trade on concentration in Chilean manufacturing 
industries, either before or after trade liberalisation. Chou ( 1986) could only find a 
significant negative relation between export intensity and concentration in Taiwanese 
manufacturing industries. 
The coefficient of foreign ownership variable (MNC) is positive as expected, but it is 
not statistically significant in either of the two years. The state ownership (SOE) 
variable shows erratic sign changes between the two years, and is not statistically 
162 
significant in both cases. These results indicate that the presence of MNCs and SOEs 
do not have any significant effect on industrial concentration over and above the other 
variables considered in the analysis. The positive correlation between the ownership 
variables and concentration noted in earlier Chapters arises because they share 
common structural determinants: the variables that determine concentration also 
determine the share of MNCs and SOEs in industry production. The state ownership 
variable is also a policy variable and policy influences are difficult to capture in 
cross-sectional studies. The poor performance of the ownership variables may also be 
the result of measurement problems associated with the definitions of SOEs and 
MNCs discussed in Chapter 6. 
There is no statistical evidence of any obvious impact of the policy reforms on 
concentration. For example, the trade variables remain insignificant in the 1993 
equation. However, the policy reforms may affect concentration through other 
variables in the concentration equation. We do observe marked declines in the 
absolute values of the capital cost and industry size coefficients.3 The decline in the 
value of the capital cost coefficient shows that the concentration-increasing effect of 
larger capital cost requirements is smaller in 1993 compared to 1985. The decline in 
this variable's coefficient may be due to financial liberalisation and, in particular, the 
removal of entry restrictions on private (including foreign) banks in the 1980s. A 
study by Goeltom (1995) shows that financial liberalisation has improved smaller 
firms' access to capital. This result is also consistent with Stigler's (1968) argument 
that capital costs should not be a barrier to entry in a well functioning, efficient 
financial sector. This result may also be the outcome of opening up sectors to FOi, 
where capital costs are less of an entry barrier for large MNCs. 
The results for the industry size (IZ) variable show that industry size has a negative 
effect on the degree of industry concentration. The magnitude of this impact seems to 
be smaller in 1993 compared to 1985. This may reflect the impact of trade 
liberalisation. There are several mechanisms by which trade liberialisation could 
reduce the influence of industry size on concentration. The obvious one is that access 
3 In section 7.8, we report tests for structural change in the coefficients of the concentration equation. 
The tests sh•JW that the coefficients of the industry siie and capital cost variables are statistically 
smaller in 1993 compared to 1985. 
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to export markets increases the chances that producers will fully attain the available 
economies of scale, which in tum enlarges the size of firms. Consequently, the 
negative influence of industry size on concentration should be smaller in export-
oriented industries. However, we could not find support for this proposition in our 
1993 equation. Our export variable had the positive sign, but was not significant.4 
Another mechanism may be through productivity improvements. If trade 
liberalisation induces firms to become more efficient, then efficient firms should 
grow faster than less efficient firms for any given initial industry size. Thus, the 
negative effect of larger outputs might be smaller in a more competitive environment. 
De Melo and Urata (1984) speculated that productivity gains of firms increased 
concentration of Chilean manufacturing industries after trade liberalisation. Finally, 
the decline in the influence of market size and capital costs on concentr"'tion may also 
reflect the process of rapid growth and industrialisation that has been occurring in the 
last three decades. 
7 .3 Profitability 
The 2SLS estimates of the determinants of inter-industry differences in profitability 
are reported in Table 7.3. Table 7.4 reports the elasticities of the significant 
independent variables. The dependent variable is the price-cost margin and is defined 
as the ratio of gross profits to sales (Chapter 6): 
PCM 1 = value of output - inputs- wages 
value of output 
All equatil)ns reported in Table 7.4 are in linear form. In all cases, the linear 
specification was preferable to alternative specifications (e.g., the log-linear) in terms 
4 In an alternative specification of the concentration equation we replaced the export intensity variable 
with an export-oriented industry dummy variable on industry size, EXl=IZ*dummy, where the dummy 
equals 1 if the industry is an export-competing industry, otilerwise zerc. Export-competing industries 
are listed in the Appendix to Chapter 6. This variable tests whether the slope of the industry size 
variable is different for export-competing industries (Caves et al, 1980). A positive coefficient ofEXl 
indicates that the negative effect of industry size is weaker in export-competing industries. A negative 
sign of the coefficient indicates that the negative influence of industry size is stronger in export-
competing industries. In the 1993 concentration equation the coefficient of EXl was positive but 
statistically insignificant at the 10 per cent level, rejecting the hypothesis that industry size has a 
different effect on concentration in export-competing industries compared to manufacturing industries 
as a whole. 
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of Ramsey RESET test for functional form misspecification. Regressions (2) and (4) 
are our preferred specification of the profits model based on the higher adjusted R2. 
We removed the seven regulation dummy variables, economies of scale (BOS), 
consumer goods industry (CG) and the interaction terms (except for the 
concentration-RERP interaction term) on the basis that their t-ratios were extremely 
low, indicating that these variables have no explanatory power. The results of the 
non-nested test also suggest that these variables should be deleted from the model. 
The foreign ownership (MNC) and state ownership (SOE) variables showed erratic 
sign changes under different specifications, and were always statistically 
insignificant. This indicates that the variables are not robust and should be dropped 
frc. 1 the model. In the experim~ntal stages of our ~conometric work we explored 
whether a critical concentratim~ ratio existed in our sample of industries, but could 
not find one. We accept the null hypothesis that the concentration-profits relation is a 
continuous one. 
Ship building (ISIC 38411) is identified as an outlier in the 1993 equation.5 An outlier 
is an observation that has undue influence on the estimation results. Other factors 
(particularly unobservable or non-quantifiable factors) may explain its current profit 
level. We control for this outlier by including a dummy variable in the model. We 
define a dummy equal to one, if the industry is ship building, zero otherwise. 
In the pre-trade reform E•~5 C':!uation (1) the foreign trade-adjusted concentration 
(CR4MX) variable has a positive sign, but it is not statistically significant.6 This 
finding is consistent with the highly restrictive foreign trade regime of Indonesia's 
manufacturing sector in the mid-l 980s. Many industries were protected by import 
~ 
quantity restrictions (QRs). With QRs more binding in these industries, it is not 
surprising to find an insignificant relation between trade-adjusted concentration and 
profitability. A similar result was also found in a previous study on trade 
liberalisation in Chilean manufacturing (De Melo and Urata,1986). 
5 We identified ship building as an outlier on the basis of an extremely high residual term. 
6 In the experimental stages of the econometric work we also included CR4, RERP and imports (MS) 
separately (i.e. as additive terms rather than interaction terms) as independent varia,bles in the profit 
equation. These variables were insignificant in the 1985 equation, indicating that they should enter the 
statistical specifications as interaction terms. In the 1993 equation the unadjusted CR4 variable was 
weakly significant, while the RERP and i:nport variables were stattstically insignificant. 
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In equation (2), we replace CR4MX and RERP with an interaction variable, 
CR4MX*RERP. The interaction variable is positive, and is statistically significant at 
the 5% level of ;;ignificance. This result supports the hypothesis that protection and 
industrial concentration interact to determine the level of industry profits in 1985. In 
other words, it is in more protected indu~;tries that concentration has a greater impact 
on profits. The interaction variable elasticity derived from regression (2) is reported 
in Table 7.2. The elasticity value of 0.212 tells us that a 10 per cent increase in the 
concentration-RERP interaction term will cause industry profits to increase by 2.1 per 
cent. 
Table 7.3: Determmants of Profitabilitv: 2SLS Resu ts 
Pre-trade form Pre-trade form 
1985 equation (1) 1985 equation (2) 
CR4MX 0.068 
(0.81) 
CR4MX*RERP 0.314 
RERP 0.236 
ORO 
PC 
PD 
Ship building 
Constant 
Adjusted RZ 
H-test(a) 
(I .46)c 
-0.187 
( 1.86)b 
0.00002 
(3.96)a 
-0.320 
(0.61) 
0.001 
(0.05) 
0.046 
(0.46) 
0.167 
(1.97)b 
0.24 
6.62 
Notes: All etjuations are in linear fuml 
(2.74)a 
-0.198 
(2.48)a 
0.00001 
(4.lO)a 
-0.435 
(0.97) 
-0.005 
(0.78) 
0.013 
(0.15) 
0.251 
(5.77)a 
0.38 
4.33 
Post-trade form Post-trade form 
1993 eauation (3) 1993 eouation (4) 
0.166 
(1.46)c 
0.008 
(0.05) 
0.086 
(1.27) 
0.000003 
(0.62) 
-0.319 
(0.45) 
-0.010 
(0.79) 
0.232 
(2.86)a 
0.207 
(3.22)a 
0.05 
0.794 
0.371 
(1.48)c 
0.088 
(1.33)c 
0.000006 
(1.39)c 
-0.259 
(0.38) 
-0.005 
(0.50) 
0.343 
(2.95)a 
0.227 
(4.23)a 
0.11 
0.206 
t-ratios are given in parentheses. Significance levels are a=l %. b=5%, c=l0%. 
(a) Heteroskedasticity test. Chi-square test under 2SLS (critical value at 1 % is 6.63). 
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Table 7.4:Elasticities 
Elasticities Evaluated at Sample 
Mean Values 
(equations (2) and (4)) 
1985 1993 
CR4MX*RERP 0.212 0.102 
GRO -0.221 0.100 
PC 0.121 0.065 
Only elasticities of statistically significant explanatory variables are reported. 
We now turn to the results of the market power variables in our post-trade reform 
(1993) equations (3) and (4). In equation (3) the coefficient of the foreign trade-
adjusted concentration (CR4MX) variable is positive, and statistically significant 
The distortion caused by QRs in the denominator of CR4MX is minimal in our 1993 
sample. Only four of the 67 industries had QRs in 1993, and the output coverage of 
QRs in two of these industries was less than 5 per cent. This result for 1993 provides 
support for the market concentration hypothesis that high trade-adjusted 
concentration leads to higher profits. The interaction term (CR4MX*ERP) in 
equation (4) remains positive and statistically significant. This result also establishes 
a direct link between trade liberalisation and industry profits. The reduction in 
protection reduces excessive profits in concentrated industries. The elasticity value of 
0.102 derived from the 1993 regression (4) tells us that a 10 per cent fall in the 
concentration-ERP interaction tenn will cause a decline in industry profits by 1.02 
per cent. 
Economic theory predicts that, in the long run, after adjustments to the trade policy 
refonns have taken place, concentration would have a significantly reduceq impact on 
profitability as domestic prices for a small open economy would tend to be 
detennined by foreign markets. Tentative evidence supporting this proposition is 
provided in our 1993 results. While th~ coefficients of the interaction term are similar 
in the l c,q3 and 1985 equa·:ions, its significance level is much lower in the 1993 
equation. This suggests that the concentration~profits relation has weakened after the 
1980s trade policy reforms. Our findings are also consistent with the results of 
previous studies for other developing economies that have liberalised (de Melo and 
Urata, 1986; Weiss. 1993). Furthermore, the F~test for overall fitness of the 
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regression is statistically weaker in the 1993 regression (4) compared to the 1985 
regression (2), and this may also be indicative of the effects of the trade policy 
reforms on industry profits, as domestic prices tend to determined by foreign markets. 
The results for the other variables are mixed. The coefficient on the capital intensity 
(PC) variable has the expected (positive) sign, and is statistically significant in all the 
equations, except that for 1993 equation (3). This result supports the hypothesis that 
profitability tends to be higher in those industries where capital requirements are a 
major barrier preventing new entrants. The reduced impact of the capital variable in 
the 1993 post-reform equations is consistent with the proposition advanced in 
Chapter 5, that greater exposure to foreign trade should weaken the influence of 
explanatory variables, like capital requirements, in a small, open economy.7 The 
coefficient on the regional market (RM) variable is statistically insignificant, with the 
unexpected (negative) sign. There appears to be no evidence that regionally 
segmented industries have higher profit rates than national industries. The coefficient 
on the product differentiation (PD) variable is statistically insignificant, with the 
unexpected (negative) sign in all equations. The industry output growth (GRO) 
variable gave mixed results between the two years. The coefficient of industry growth 
is negative and statistically significant in 1985, indicating that rapid growth reduced 
profits. This could occur if rapid growth attracted entry, or triggered a breakdown in 
collusion. In the 1993 equation (4), the growth variable is positive and weakly 
significant. Therefore, no firm conclusions can be: drawn about the effect of growth 
on profits. 
7 .4 Multinational Enterprise Preslmce 
The 2SLS estimates of the determinants of multinational presence in manufacturing 
industries are reported in Table 7.5. The elasticities of the significant explanatory 
variables are repbrted in Table 7.6. All equations reported in Table 7.5 are in linear 
form. In all cases, the linear specification was preferable to alternative specifications 
(e.g., the log-linear) in terms of Ramsey RESET test for functional form 
misspecification. On the basis of the Farrar-Glauber test of multicollinearity, we 
7 In section 7 .8, we report tests for structural change in the coefficients of the profit equation. The tests 
show that the coefficient of the capital variable is statistically smaller in 1993 compared to 1985. 
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excluded human capital (HC) and economies of scale (BOS) from the model. The 
inclusion of the capital intensive (PC) variable in our model also proxies economies 
of scale. In a number of experimental runs, imports and price-cost margins gave 
unsatisfactory results in terms of conventional coefficient signs and tests of 
significance, and were dropped fwm the model. Finally, we removed regional market 
segmentation (RM), resource intensity (RI), and the consumer goods (CG) variables 
from the model on the basis that their t-ratios were extremely low, indicating they did 
not have any explanatory power. The results of the non-nested test also suggested that 
we delete these variables for the same reason. 
We will examine the post-trade reform 1993 results (equation 2) first, and later 
compare them with the pre-trade reform 1985 results (equation 1). The coefficient of 
the capital intensity (PC) variable is positive and statistically significant at the 10% 
level. This result supports the hypothesis that MNCs are concentrated in capital 
intensive industries, reflecting the comparative advant11ge structure of the capital 
exporting country and, conversely, reflecting Indonesia's weak comparative 
advantage in capital-intensive industries. The capital intensity elasticity value of 
0.227 tells us that, at the sample mean values of PC and MNC, a 10 per cent increase 
in the degree of capital intensity of industry causes an increase of 2.27 per cent in 
multinational presence. The coefficient of the technology intensity (Tn variable is 
positive, and statistically significant at the 10% level. This result is consistent with 
the intangible assets hypothesis, that MNC:s have a competitive advantage over local 
firms in technology-intensive industries, and are consistent with those results of 
previous studies for other developing economies (e.g. Lall and Mohammed, 1983). 
The elasticity value of 0.032 tells us that a 10 per cent increase in the degree of 
technological intensity of the industry causes a 0.32 per cent increase in multinational 
presence. 
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Table 7.5: Determmants o fM If t' IE u ma aona nterpr1se P ence: 2SLS Results res 
2SLS Results 
Pre-trade reform 1985 Post-trade reform 
Eauation 1993 equation 
CR4 0.216 0.626 
(1.19) (3.35)a 
EX -0.547 0.409 
(0.87) (1.56)c 
RERP 0.061 0.040 
(2.00)b (l.33)c 
SOE -0.490 -0.609 
(3.13)a (2.99)a 
PC 0.00004 0.00002 
(2.50)a (l.53)c 
TI 4.056 4.870 
(1.25) (1.38)c 
ORO 0.001 -0.002 
(0.13) (0.89) 
PD -0.281 -0.960 
(0.20) (0.58) 
REG -0.162 0.062 
(1.96)b (0.28) 
Constant 0.044 -0.204 
(0.27) ( l.19) 
Adjusted RL 0.22 0.16 
H-test(a) 6.559 7.238 
··-Notes: Equations are in linear form. 
t-ratios are given in parentheses. Significance levels are a=1%. b=5%, c=10%. 
(a) Heteroskedasticity test. Chi-square test under 2SLS (critical value at 1%is6.63). 
Table 7.6: Elasticities 
Elasticities Evaluated at Sample Mean 
Values 
1985 1993 
CR4 0.116 0.337 
EX -0.053 0.114 
RERP 0.123 0,035 
·-
I-· 
PC 0.311 0.227 
SOE -C.OJ8 ·0.067 
TI 0.026 0.032 
Only elasticities of statistically significant explanatory variables are reported. 
The coefficient of the industry concentration (CR4) variable is positive and 
statistically significant at 1 %, suggesting that MNCs presence is high in oligopolistic 
markets. The elasticity value of 0.337 tells us that a 10 per cent increase in the CR4 
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ratio causes an increase of 3.37 per cent in multinational presence. The export 
orientation coefficient is positive and statistically significant at the 10% level. This 
result supports the hypothesis that MNCs are also concentrated in export-oriented 
industries in 1993. The elasticity value of 0.114 also tells us that a 10 per cent 
increase in the degree of export orientation causes an increase of 1.14 per cent in the 
multinational presence 
Among the three policy variables, trade policy has a positive coefficient that is 
statistically significant at tl-ie 10% level. This result supports the hypothesis that 
MNCs are attracted by protection granted to import0 substituting industries. The 
' 
elasticity value of 0.035 tells us that a 10 per cent increase in the real effective rate of 
protection causes an increase of 0.35 per cent in multinational presence in 1993. 
However, this relationship between protection and MNC presence is weaker in the 
post-reform equation compare with the pre-reform 1985 equation (see below) .. 1s 
expected, the coefficient of the state ownership variable is negative, and statistically 
significant at a 1 % level. Statr. enterprises tend to crowd out private investment and 
deter multinational entry to the extent that investors fear that the government will bias 
commercial conditions to the benefit of their own companies. The final government 
policy variable, entry regulations in 1985, is included to test for the effect of the 
removal of most of the entry restrictions on FDI by 1993. The coefficient of the 
regulation dummy variable is positive, but is statistically insignificant. This result is 
expected, of course. By the early 1990s many industries were open to FDI with 
minimal entry conc!itions attached (Chapter 2). In our sample of 67 industries, only 
kretek cigareaes and malt beer had entry prohibitions, and the latter industry is 
dominated by multinational joint ventures anyway. 
The product differentiation variable is negative, but is statistically insignificant. This 
result suggests that MNCs do not appear to be heavily concentrated in product 
differentiated industries. However, given the positive association between 
concentration and product differentiation in the concentration equation, it is possible 
that conce.rtration may be capturing some of the influence of product differentiation 
on the foreign ownership variable. This result is consistent with an earlier study of the 
determinants of foreign ownership in Indo11esian manufacturing (Aswicahyono and 
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'-J dill, 1995). Finally, the coefficient of the industry output growth variable is negative, ' 
but statistically insignificant. There is no evidence that MNCs enter the fastest 
growing industries over and above the other variables conlidered in the analysis. To 
some extent this result is not surprising since foreign firms can produce at home and 
export their production to foreign markets whenever there are no advantages in 
exploiting foreign markets by FD!. 
It is of interest to compare the 1993 results with those of the pre~trade reform period, 
proxied by the 1985 equation (1). The changing pattern of FDI in Indonesian 
manufacturing is shown by the change in the sign of the export orientation coefficient 
. 
between the two years. The sign of the export coefficient switches from negative in 
1985 to positive and statistically significant in 1993. This result supports the 
hypothesis that the foreign investment and trade policy reforms have increased FDI in 
export-oriented industries. The positive impact of the removal of entry restrictions on 
FDI in' manufacturing is shown by the change in the sign of the regulation dummy 
coefficient between the two years. The sign of the dummy coefficient ,~hanges from 
negative and statistfoally significant in 1985 to positive anci statistically :insignificant 
in 1993. 
The resti.irs for the other explanatory variables in the 1985 equation are similar to 
those in the 1993 equation. The coefficient of the trade protection (RERP) variable is 
' 
positive, but is more significant in 1985 than in 1993, indicating that protection had a 
stronger significant influence on FDI in 1985. The coefficient of the ca?ttdf intensity 
(PC) variable is positive and is also more significant in 1985 than in 1993. These two 
findings are consistent with the observed shift in the pattern of FDI away from heavy 
concentration in highly protected, capital-intensive industries in the mid-1980s to 
export-oriented industries by the early 1990s (Chapter 3). The coefficient of the 
technofogy intensity (Tl) variable is positive, but statistically insignificant at the 10% 
level. The concentration variable (CR4) is positive, but it is statistically im;lgnificant 
in 1985. The lack of significance of the concentration variable is due to collinearity 
with the capital interisity variable in the 1985 equation.8 
8 This is confirmed when we drop the capital intensity variable from the 1985 equation. When capital 
intensity is dropped, the CR4 variable becomes :"~tistically significant at the 1 per cent level. 
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7.5 Export Orientation 
The 2SLS estimates of the detenninants of export intensity are reported in Table 7.7. 
We removed capital intensity (PC) and consumer goods (CG) variables from the 
model on the grounds that their t-ratios were extremely low, indicating that they have 
no explanatory power. With the exception of the MNCs and RERP variables, all the 
variables are transformed into natural logaritl:ms (including the dependent variable, 
EX). Thus, the coefficients of these independent variables are interpreted as constant 
elasticities. For example, the coefficient of the human capital variable (HC, measured 
by average wage) in equation (2) is -1.509. This means that a 10% i• .crease in average 
wage reduces export intensity by 15.1 %. The MNCs variable has some zero 
observations and the RERPs variable has some non-positive observations (zero and 
negative RERPs values) and, thus, these two variables can not be transformed into 
natural logarithms. The estimates of the elasticities for the MNCs and RERP 
variables are evaluated at their sample mean values, and are repon-.:d in the square 
brackets below their coefficients in Table 7.7. In all cases, the log-linear specification 
of the export equation was preferable to alternative specifications (e.g., linear form) 
in 1erms of Ramsey RESET test for functional form misspecification. The adjusted R 
square of around 0.24 in the 1993 regression is not particularly high, indicating that 
there is a large unexplained residual. However, they compare favourably to cross-
"iectional studies for other developing and developed countries (Caves et al, 1980; 
Koo and Martin, 1984: Chou, 1986). 
We will examine the post-trade reform 1993 results (equation 2) first, and later 
compare them with ~he pre-trade reform 1985 results (equation 1). The coefficient of 
the real effective rate of protection (RERP) is negative, and it is statistically 
significant at the 1 % level of significance. The elasticity value of -0.429 tells us that 
a 10 per cent increase in the real effective rate of protection reduces export intensity 
by 4.29 per cent. This negative relation indicates that Indonesia's export successes are 
inversely related to government assistance.9 
9 Recall, from Chapters 3 and 6, a major limitation of the estimated average RERPs is that the duty 
rebates given to export producers are not captured in the ERP estimates. The duty exemption and 
drawback facility for export-oriented firms had provided free access to imported intennediate inputs 
for these firms. However, as domestic market-oriented firms still had to purchase their intermediate 
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The coefficients of the factor intensity variables (HC, RI and WP) have the expected 
signs, and all are statistically significant at a 1 % level of significance. The labour 
intensity (HC) variable has a negative sign, indicating that Indonesia's exports are 
higher in low wage, labour intensive industries. This result provides support for the 
price version of the factor proportions theory, that a labour abundant country }ike 
Indonesia has a 1;omparative advantage in labour-intensive industries and will export 
the latter. The resource intensity (RI) variable has a negative sign indicating tha·~ 
export intensity ratios are lower in primary (agriculture and fisheries) resource-
inten:,~ve manufactures like processed foods and beverages. This result supports the 
view, presented in Chapter 3, that some remaining restrictions in the agriculture 
sector and the general lack of development in processed foods has hindered this 
sector's export perfonnance. The coefficient of the wood products dummy variable 
(WP) is positive, confirming that Indonesia has a comparative advantage in wood 
processing industries and wood products, such as furnimre, building materials, and 
wood panels. 
1 he results for the market structure variables (concentration, economies of scale, 
product differentiation, regional market segmentation and MNCs) are mixed. The 
coefficient of the foreign ownership variable is positive and statistically significant at 
a 5% level. The elasticity value of 0.956 tells us that a 10 per cent increase in foreign 
ownership presence causes exports to rise by 9.56 per cent. This result supports the 
hypothesis that MNCs invest in export-oriented projects when the policy environment 
is supportive. The significant and positive correlation between MNCs and export 
intensity in both the foreign-ownership and export intensity equations confirms the 
proposition advanced in Chapter 5 that MNCs and exports are jointly detennined 
variab!es. 
The coefficient of the economies of scale variable is positive, but i;:. statistically 
insignificant. This result is also consistent with other studies for small economies. 
Caves et al ( 1980) could not find a significant relationship between economies of 
inputs in the protected domestic markets, the ERP for these two categories of firms differed from one 
another. 
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scale and export performance in Canadian manufacturing industries, and Ratnayake 
(1990) could not find one for Australian manufacturing industries. The coefficient of 
the industrial concentration variable has a negative sign, but is statistically 
insignificant. Thus, industrial concentration appears to have no significant effect on 
export performance in Indonesian manufacturing. 
T bl 7 7 D t a e . : e ermman ts f E 0 xpor to· tr r1en a 100: 2SLS R Its esu 
Pre-trade reform 1985 Post-trade reform 1993 
Eauation Eauation 
CR4 0.987 -0.650 
( 1.12) (1.00) 
MNC 1.990 3.501 
(0.74) (l.9l)b 
[0.472] [0.956] 
RERP -0.594 -0.488 
(l.53)c (2.54)a 
[-1.1991 [-0.429] 
HC -1.680 -1.509 
(l.45)c (2.65)a 
RI 0.160 -0.449 
(0.72) (2.74)a 
WP 2.754 2.678 
(l.96)b (2.67)a 
EOS 0.379 0.272 
(0.98) (1.26) 
PD -0.044 -0.043 
(0.12) (0.17) 
RM 0.339 0.751 
(0.32) (0.90) 
Constant 3.028 2.072 
(0.55) (0.67) 
Adjusted R" 0.11 0.24 
H-test (a) 4.708 1.291 
Equations are in log-linear form. t-ratios are given in parentheses. Significance levels are a=l%. b=5%, c=l0%. 
(a) Heteroskedasticity test. Chi-square test under 2SLS (critical value at I% is 6.63). 
As expected, the coefficient of the product differentiation (PD) variable is negative, 
but is statistically insignificant. This result is consistent with the commonplace 
observation that Indonesia's exports are not highly product differentiated. Finally, the 
coefficient on the regional market segmentation (RM) variable is positive, but is 
statistically insignificant. This finding is contrary to the conventional hypothesis that, 
in a geographically dispersed country, high transportation costs reduce the volume of 
exports from regional markets. The performance of this variable may also be the 
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result of measurement problems associated with the definition of regionally 
segmented markets, as discussed in Chapter 6. 
It is of interest to compare the 1993 results with those of the pre-trade reform period, 
proxied by the 1985 exrort intensity equation (1). There are two major differences in 
the performance of the two equations that can be directly linked to the structure of 
protection prevailing in 1985, and the subsequent trade policy reforms. First, the 1985 
equation performed poorly relative to the 1993 equation. The F-test for overall fit is 
significan!ly lower in the 1985 regression compared to that of 1993. Further, only 
three variables are statistically significant in the 1985 equation: labour intensity {HC), 
real effective rate of protection (RERP) and wood products (WP), and tht!ir t-ratios 
are much lower in the 1985 equation. The poor performance of the 1985 equation 
supports the well established fact that the structure of protection prevailing in the 
mid-l 980s adversely affected Indonesian manufacturing exports. Trade policy was 
biased against export-oriented industries, resulting in very low export levels (Fane 
and Phillips, 1991). In other words, there is not much export orientation to explain in 
the 1985 equation. Second, the coefficient of the MNCs variable is insignificant in 
the pre-reform equation, but significant in the post-refonn equation. This result 
supports our earlier finding that changes in foreign investment and trade policies 
directed a substantial proportion of new FDI to export-oriented industries. 
7 .6 Import Penetration. 
The 2SLS estimates of the determinants of import penetration are reported in Table 
7.8. We will test two alternative dP.;endent import penetration variables. They are the 
ratio of imports to industry production (IMDP), and the ratio of imports to domestic 
consumption (IMDC), where domestic consumption is equal to industry output minus 
exports plus imports. We removed the consumer goods (CG) variable from the model 
on the grounds of collinearity with product differentiation. We also removed the 
human capital variable (HC) on the grounds that its t-ratio was extremely low, 
indicating that the HC variable has no explanatory power. 
With the exception of the MNCs and RERP variables, all the variables are 
transformed into natural logarithms (including the two alternative dependent 
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variables). Thus, the coefficients of these independent variables are interpreted as 
constant elasticities. The elasticities of the MNC and RERP variables, evaluated at 
the sample mean values, are reported in square brackets below their estimated 
coefficients in Table 7 .8. Jn all cases, the log-linear specification of the import 
equation was preferable to alternative specifications (e.g., linear form) in terms of 
Ramsey RESET test for functional form misspecification. The adjusted R squares, of 
around 0.21 in the 1993 regressions, are not particularly high, indicating that there is 
a large unexplained residual. However, they compare favourably to cross-sectional 
studies for other developing and developed countries (Koo and Martin, 1984; Chou, 
1986; Athukorala, 1988). 
A problem encountered in investigating the relationship between industrial 
concentration and import penetration is that there exists a positive statistical bias in 
the relationship which has nothing to do with market behaviour. Consider the 
determinants of industrial concentration analysed in section 7 .2. Suppose that the 
minimum efficient scale is the same in all industries and that total demand in 
Indonesia has the same money value (at competitive equilibrium prices) for every 
industry. Concentration would be higher in industries facing more import 
competition, simply because room is left for fewer domestic firms of efficient size. Jn 
other words, imports squeeze the residual size of the domestic market. hnports and 
concentration may thus be positively related through the influence of costs and 
technology, and no market behaviour need be involved. Following Caves et al 
( 1980:71) we put the expected positive relation between imports and concentration to 
a more appropriate test by using the variable 
CR4M=CR4/(1 +IMDP) 
which has the effect of deflating the four-firm concentration ratio on the assumption 
that imports function competitively the same way that a fringe of smnll domestic 
producers does. This test is rigorous because errors in the measurement of imports 
tend to produce a negative statistical relation between our measures of import 
penetration (IMDP and IMDC) and CR4M and obscure any positive behavourial one. 
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We will examine the post-trade reform 1993 results (equations 2 and 4) first, and later 
compare them with the pre-trade reform 1985 results (equations 1 and 3). The 
coefficients of the factor intensity variables (PC, RI, TI) are statistically significant 
with the expected signs. The result for capitai intensity (PC) providee support for the 
factor proportions theory that a labour abundant country like Indonesia has a 
comparative disadvantage in capital-intensive industries and will generally import the 
latter. The technology intensity (TI) variable has the expected positive sign, and is 
statistically significant. This result provides support for the neo-technology version of 
the factor proportions theorj, that a human capital and technology-scarce country like 
Indonesia will have a comparative disadvantage in technology-intensive industries 
and will import the latter. As expected, the resource intensity (RI) variable has a 
neg~tive sign, indicating that Indonesia's imports are lower in primary (agriculture, 
fisheries and forestry) resource-intensive manufactures 
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T bl 7 8 D t ts fl t p t ti 2SLS R Its a e . e ermman a mpor e11e ra on: esu . . 
IMDP IMDC 
Pre-trade Post-trade Pre-trade Post-trade 
refonn 1985 refonn 1993 reform 1985 reform 1993 
equation eQuation eQuation equation 
CR4M -0.506 -0.229 -0.444 -0.534 
(0.60) (0.37) (0.51) (0.79) 
MNC 1.239 2.505 I.008 2.829 
(0.61) (1.62) c (0.49) (I.68) c 
[ 0.294] [0.684] [ 0.239] [ 0.772] 
RERP -0.427 -0.169 -0.444 -0.294 
(I .30)c (0.93) (1.34) c (I.49) c 
(-0.862] (-0.149] [ -0.896] [ -0.258] 
EOS 0.291 -0.409 0.314 -0.372 
(0.86) (2.02)b (0.92) (I.69)b 
PC 0.178 0.975 0.142 0.705 
(0.25) (2.48)a (0.20) (I.65) c 
RI -0.251 -0.288 -0.255 -0.356 
( 1.23) (1.8 l)b (1.23) (2.05)b 
TI 0.274 0.387 0.248 0.279 
(0.93) (1.67)c (0.84) (l.4l)c 
PD -0.429 -0.432 -0.185 -0.::164 
(1.30) c (1.76) c (0.54) (I.37)c 
RM -0.377 -0.222 -0.402 -0.279 
(1.69)b ( I.23) (l.78)b (l.4.1)c 
Constant -7.090 -3.999 -6.979 -2.~14 
(l.54)c (1.01) (1.50) c (0.58) 
Adjusted R2 0.07 0.20 0.06 0.21 
H-test(a) 3.555 2.452 3.76 1.262 
Notes: Equations are in log-linear form. 
t-ratios are given in parentheses. Significance levels are a=l %. b=5%, c=l0%. 
(a) Heteroskedasticity test. Chi-square test under 2SLS (critical value at 1%is6.63). 
The market structure variables - MNC, economies of scale, product differentiation, 
and regional market segmentation - are statistically significant with the expected 
signs. The coefficient of the foreign ownership vl'riable is positive. The positive sign 
confirms the proposition, advanced in Chapter 5, that MNCs a.re expected to have a 
positive relation with imports because of the prevalence of intra-firm trade and 
various forms of international sourcing in arm's length trade (Wilmore, 1993). The 
coefficient of the economies of scale variable is negative, indicating that imports are 
lower in industries with large economies of sea.le. Thus, there is some support for the 
hypothesis that lower average costs achieved through economies of scale deter 
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competing imports. The coefficient of the product differentiation (PD) variable is 
negative and statistically significant. This result supports the hypothesis that product 
differentiation impedes entry by imports, presumably because of the fixed costs of 
creating goodwill assets in the domestic marketplace. The result is also consistent 
with the analysis of multinational companies in Chapter 5, according to which a firm 
skilled in product differentiation and promotion of a product will choose to serve a 
foreign market by means of !ocal production instead of exports. Industrial 
concentration (CR4M) consistently takes a negative sign, but it is not statistically 
significant, even at the 10 per cent level. The statistical bias discussed above is a 
sufficient explanation for the sign. Thus, we reject the hypothesis that imports are 
higher in concentrated industries, because· of the profit-maximising beJiaviour of 
firms in these industries. As expected, both natural protection (RM) and policy-
induced protection (RERP) reduce foreign competition in the domestic market. 
It is of interest to compare the 1993 results with the results of the pre-trade reform 
period, proxied by the 1985 import equations (1) and (2). Li~e exports, the 1985 
import equation performed poorly relative to the 1993 equation. The F-test for overall 
fit is significantly lower in the 1985 regression comparert with the 1993 regression. 
Further, only three of the 10 variables are statistically significant in the 1985 
equations (real effective rate of protection (RERP), regional markets (RM) and the 
constant term) compared to seven significant variables in the 1993 equations. These 
results are consistent with the highly restrictive foreign trade regime of Indonesia's 
manufacturing sector in the mid-1980s. 
7. 7 Trade Protection. 
The 2SLS estimates of the determinants of real effective rates of protection are 
reported in Table 7.9. The elasticities of the significant explanatory variables, 
evaluated at their sample mean values, are reported in Table 7.10. All equations 
reported in Table 7 .9 are in linear form. In all cases, the linear specification was 
preferable to alternative specifications (e.g., the log-linear) in terms of Ramsey 
RESET test for functional form misspecification. At the experimental stage, we 
removed growth in industry output (GRO), human capital (HC); technology intensity 
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(Tl), resource intensity (RI), historical real effective rates of protection (RERP(t-1)), 
regional ma;:ket segmentation (RM), and consumer goods industry (CG) from the 
model or, the basis that these variables had littie explanatory power (i.e. their t-ratios 
were extremely low). 
A number of outliers are identified in each of the two equations. The outliers in the 
1985 equation are paper (ISIC 34112), basic chemicals (ISIC 35110), resins (ISIC 
35130), ceramics (ISIC 36110), and ship building (ISIC 38411). The outliers in the 
1993 equation are soft drinks (ISIC 31340), plastics (ISIC 35600), tyres (35510), and 
manufacture and assembling of automobiles (ISIC 38430). We control for these 
outliers by including a dummy variable in the model. We define a dummy equal to 
one, if the industry is an outlier, zero otherwise. Later we will speculate on some of 
the 'other factors' that might explain the high levels of protection in these industries. 
Table 7.9: Determinants of Levels of Protection: 2SLS Results 
2SLS results 
Pre-trade reform 1985 Post-trade reform 1993 
equation Equation 
CR4 3.832 2.540 
(l.44)c (l.41)c 
PCM -1.980 -7.012 
(0.67) (I.62)c 
MNC 1.511 1.182 
(I.12) (0.72) 
IMDP -0.157 -0.302 
(0.26) (0.14) 
SOE -0.072 -0.379 
(0.04) (0.30) 
PC -0.0003 -0.00004 
<2.4l)a (0.82) 
IZ* 0.00001 0.000001 
(2.22)c (1.43)c 
Dummy 2.237 5.141 
(l.72)b (9.15)a 
Constant 0.289 0.881 
(0.19) (l.19) 
Adjusted R:l 0.19 0.51 
H-test(a) 0.009 0.146 
Notes: Dependent variable is real effective rates of protection 
All equations are in linear fonn 
The coefficients of IZ were multiplied by 10,000 to improve presentation. 
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t-ratios are given in parentheses. Significance levels (one-tailed test) are a=l %, b=5%, c=l0%. 
(a) Heteroscedasticity test. Chi-sguare test under 2SLS (critical value at I% is 6.63). 
Table 7.lO:Elasticities 
Elasticities Evaluated at 
Sample Mean Values 
1985 1993 
CR4 1.023 1.555 
PCM -0.245 -2.270 
PC -0.296 -0.131 
lZ 0.233 0.247 
Only elasticities of the statistically significant exp!"natory variables are reported. 
The physical capital intensity (PC) variable has a negative sign in both equations, but 
is statistically significant only in that of 1985. This result rejects the comparative 
disadvantage hypothesis that capital-intensive industries should attract more 
protection in the Indonesian manufacturing sector, either on national interest or 
interest group grounds. The result for 1985 supports Pangestu and Boediono's (1986) 
contention that the government felt under pressure to offer protection on equity 
grounds to labour-intensive industries. During this period many labour-intensive 
industries - a number of them major traditional industries such as textiles - were 
being squeezed by the inter-sectoral effects of the oil boom. Our insignificant result 
in 1993 suggests that equity considerations are less important in the determination of 
the pattern of protection in the post-reform period. Basri and Hill (1996) also found 
an mverse relation between capital intensity and protection in their recent study of the 
determinants of protection in Indonesian manufacturing in the early 1990s. They 
argued that this unexpected inverse relation might arise because a number of the 
labour intensive industries are export-oriented, and the ERP numbers are sensitive to 
the treatment of duty drawback and other schemes which neutralise the impact of the 
protection regime. 
The coefficient of the PCM variable has the expected (negative) sign, but is 
statistically significant only in 1993. This result supports the hypothesis that more 
profitable industries do not receive high protection, because they are less likely to 
demand it since they are in a position to compete with imports. The coefficient of the 
industry size variable (IZ) has the expected positive sign and is significant in 1985 
and 1993. This res1.1lt supports the notion that larger industries have the resources to 
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be able to lobby more effectively fo.r protection than smaller ones. It is also 
conceivable that industry size alone attracts government support on the grounds of 
both national interest and concern about equity. For example, some of the large 
industries are also major employers of labour (e.g., cigarettes). 
The results for the remaining variables (CR4, MNC, SOE) are mixed. Industry 
concentration (CR4) has a positive sign, and is weakly significant at the 10% level in 
both years. This supports the hyp.:thesis of the interest group model, that a 
concentrated industry will find it easier to organise lobbying activities. The 
coefficient of the MNC variable is positive in 1985 and 1993, but is statistically 
insignificant in both years. While the variable is not statistically significant, there is 
anecdotal evidence that MNCs did bargain for protection before the 1980s trade 
reforms (Hill, 1988). The insignificant relation in 1993 is not entirely unexpected, 
While it was common in Indonesia for MNCs to bargain for protection before the 
1980s trade reforms, there is little anecdotal evidence to suggest that this has occurred 
in the 1990s (Basri and Hill; 1996). Evidence for Indonesia and other countries 
suggests that MNCs benefit from trade liberalisation because of their world-wide 
market networks and sourcing of components and raw materials and, thus, are less 
likely to lobby for protection. The sign of the SOEs coefficient is negative, but 
statistically insignificant in both years. The unexpected results for the SOEs variable 
probably reflect the fact that they receive assistance in less transparent forms than 
trade barriers. The import variable has a negative sign in both years, but is statistically 
insignificant. 
Finally, it is worth speculating on some of the factors that might explain the high 
levels of protection in our industry outliers (i.e., our dummy variables). Strong 
political-business connections are likely to be a major determinant in some of these 
industries (and probably in other industries as well). Jn their study on protection in 
Indonesian manufacturing, Basri and Hill (1996) speculated that political~business 
connections in automobiles, plastics, and tyres, among others, might explain the very 
high levels of protection in these industries in the early 1990s. While it is difficult to 
identify these 'other factors', the exercise does highlight the fact that close political-
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business connections are likely be important i:i. explaining protection in some 
Indonesian manufacturing industries. 
7.8 Structural Change in the Structure-Performance Model 
Table 7 .11 reports the tests for structural shifts in the coefficients of our two main 
equations, concentration and profitability, between 1985 and 1993. We report the 
coefficients of the dummy variables only. 1 We examine the industrial concentration 
equation first. The coefficient on the capital cost dummy variable (D* AKC) is 
negative and statistically significant at the 5% level. The coefficient on the industry 
size dummy variable (D*IZ) is positive and statistically significant at the 1 % level. 
This tells us that the values of the coefficients of these two variables have changed 
significantly between the two years. The negative sign on the capital cost dummy 
variable tells us that the positive effect of capital costs on the degree of concentration 
observed in section 7.2 is smaller in 1993 compared to 1985. The positive sign on the 
industry size dummy variable tells us that the negative effect of industry size on the 
degree of concentration observed m section 7.2 is smaller in 1993 compared to 1985. 
In the profit equation, there is a statistically significant incr.ease in the coefficient of 
the growth (D*GRO) variable, and a statistically significa1it decline in the capital cost 
(D* AKC) variable between the two years. The latter result tells us that the positive 
influence of the capital cost barrier to entry on industry profits is smaller in 1993 
compared to 1985. 
1 Dummy variables ate used to test for stability of regression coefficients ttS follows. Consider two 
equations: 
Ys5 = <Xs, + /Js1Xs5 + µs, f~ir 1985 
Y93 = a9J + /J9JX9J + µ9J for 1993 
We can write the equations for the two years. as 
Y = tXss + (CX9, -CXs5)D1 + f3ssX + ({393 - f3as)D2 + µ 
Where the dummy variables arc defined as; 
DI= I for 1993, zero for 1985 
Dz= X93 for observations in 1993, zero for all observations in 1985. 
The null hypothesis of stability is: a 81 = a93 and /Jas :a {3 9J. lf the coefficient of the dummy 
variable is statistically different from zero, then we reject the null hypothesis that the coefficient of the 
variable under consideration is stable (constant) between the two years. Thus, we can conclude that 
there hns been structural change in the coefficient of the variable between the two years. Soc Maddata, 
(1992; Ch 8). 
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Table 7.11: Structural Change Test for Concentration and Profitability 
(Pooled 1985 and 1993 data) 
Dummv Variables Concentration Profitability 
D*RERP ·0.017 
(0.53) 
D*CR4MX*RERP 0.057 
(0.38) 
D*EOS -0.00009* 
(0.06) 
D*AKC -0.0003* 
(1.7l)b 
D*PC -0.000009 
(1.60)c 
D*IZ 0.000002* 
(2.69)a 
D*GRO 0.286 
(2.5 I )a 
D*RM -0.003 0.000 
(0.34) (0.05) 
D*PD 0.408 0.176 
(0.33) (0.13) 
D*Constant 0.041 -0.024 
(Q.87) (0.19) 
Notes: the coefficients of BOS, AKC ancl IZ were multiplied by 10,000 to improve presentation. 
7 .9 Summary of Major Findings 
The main focus of the Chapter is on the determinants of industrial concentration and 
its relationship with other aspects of market structure, international trade ru~d 
performance. The major findings of the Chapter are summarised below. 
Industrial Concentration: Our results suggest that market structure factors are the 
major determinants of industrial concentration in Indonesian manufacturing: 
economies of scale, absolute capital requirements, industry size, regional market 
fragmentation, and product differentiation all have the expected significant relation 
with concentration. We could not find a direct significant relation between trade 
policy and concentration, either in 1985 or 1993. However, trade policy may affect 
concentration indirectly through other variables such as economies of scale. Our 
results for the export and import variables suggest that foreign trade does not have a 
significant impact on the degree of industrial concentration. The result for export 
orientation is consistent with the observation in Chapter 4 that export-oriented and 
Ui1concentrated industries share common structural characteristics, namely low 
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barriers to entry, and it is the barriers' to entry variables that are dominant in the 
concentration equation. Finally, foreign and state ownership of industry do not have 
significant effects on industrial concentration over and above the other variables 
considered in the ai.ialysis. This result may also be due to measurement problems 
associated with the ownership variables discussed in Chapter 6. 
Profitability: Our analysis of the determinants of industry' profits is consistent with 
the well established proposition that higher levels of con~entration lead to higher 
profitability.4'he results also show that it is in the more protected industries that 
concentration has a greater impact on industry profits. The study also provides 
evidence that this positive association has weakened since the 1980s policy reforms, 
establishing a direct link between trade liberalisation and industry profits in 
concentrated industries. The reduction in protection reduces excessive profits in 
concentrated industries. By contrast the positive relationship between profits and 
barriers to entry postulated in the literature is not strongly supported by Indonesian 
manufacturing data. Only the capital mtensity variable is significant with the expected 
sign, and only weakly significant in the 1993 post-reform equation (4). The other 
hypothesised barrier to entry, product differentiation, is not statistically significant. 
The growth variable gave us inconsistent results between the two years. These results 
are consistent with previous studies for other small. open economies (e.g., Caves et 
al, 1980: Kirkpatrick et al, 1984). 
Foreign ownership: 
Our results for the determinf ts of foreign ownership in manufacturing show that 
there is a similarity between the determinants of foreign ownership in developed and 
developing economies. Most of the conventional industrial factors (concentration, 
capital intensity and technology intensity) are statistically significant 1:/ith the 
expected signs. There are, however, some unconventional results. These are the 
negative, but insignificant influence of product differentiation and the insigdificance 
of the industry growth variable. The results also show that there has been a shift in the 
pattern of FDI in manufacturing towards export-oriented industries since the mid-
1980s. This is partly attributed to trade and inveslment reforms during this period. 
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Export-orientation: 
Our analysis of the detenninants of export-orientation shows that the factor intensity 
(HC, WP) variables are the major structural determinants of export performance in 
Indonesian manufacturing. Our results show that exports are concentrated in products 
in which that Indonesia has a comparative advantage. These are the labour-intensive 
industries and the forestry-based products. The market structure factors do not appear 
to be important determinants of Indonesia's export orientation in the 1990s. 
Economies of scale, concentration, regional market segmentation, and product 
differentiation all have the expected signs, but are statistically insignificant. Finally, 
we observe an inverse relationship between export orientation and trade protection 
(RERPs). 
Import penetration: 
The analysis of the import penetration equation generally supports the findings of the 
analysis of the export intensity equation. The factor intensity variables (PC, RI, TI) 
are important determinants of impo1t penetration in manufacturing industries since 
the 1980s reforms. Our results show that imports are concentrated in industries in 
which Indonesia has a comparative disadvantage, such as capital (PC) and technology 
(TI) intensive activities. Foreign ownership and market structure variables -
economies of scale, product differentiation, rnd regional market segmentation - have 
a greater influence in the import penetration equation than they do in the export 
iatensity equation. All these variables are statistically significant, with the expected 
siE:ns. Concentration is not statistically significant in the import penetration equation. 
Fi.nally, our results for \he trade policy variable (RERPs) show that trade protection 
reduce foreign competition in the domestic market. 
Trade protection: Our results support the findings of other studies for Indonesia !hat 
political-economy factors are important determinants of the pattern of protection m 
Indonesian manufacturing. This of course is consistent more broadly with the 
political economy of decision-making processes in Indonesia, and in particular the 
vulnerability to capture ot micro-level policy-making processes. A number of 
variables generated results consistent with the political economy models, such as 
concentration. price-cost margins, industry size. Concentration and industry size 
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variables are positive and significant in both the pre-reform and post-reform periods. 
The profit variable has the expected negative sign and is significant in the 1993 
equation. In contrast, economic factors (comparative disadvantage considerations) do 
not appear to be important determinants of the pattern of protection. Only the capital 
intensity (PC) variable was statistically significant in the pre-refonn equation. 
lu8 
Chapters 
Dynamics of Leading Firms' Market Shares 
8.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 4 we noted that a major limitation of seller concentration statistics is that 
they are static measures of competition. They simply record the characteristics of a 
size-distribution at some particular point in time. The industrial organisation literature 
has long recognised that high concentration ratios can be found along with 
considerable instability in leading firm•>' market shares. Industrial organisation theory 
tells us that if the identity of the dominant firms were to change over time, then even 
persistently high levels of concentration would not necessarily imply the absence of 
competitive forces (Baldwin and Gorecki, 1994; Davis and Gerosld, 1997). 
The purpose of this Chapter is twofold. First, we measure the magnitude of changes 
in leading firms' market shares and determine whether it is the case for Indonesian 
manufacturing that persistently high levels of concentration can be found along with 
considerable instability in leading firms' market shares. 'fo do this, we construct a 
data Ret for a sample of industries from the annual manufacturing surveys. The data 
set records the changes in finns' rank and market shares in each industry between 
1985 and 1993. Our results show considerable instability in leading firms' market 
shares and rank across industries. The second purpose is to identify the determinants 
of changes in leading firms' market shares and to estimate their influence on the 
observed changes for our cross-section of 67 manufacturing industries. 
The are several important empirical findings in this Chapter that provide valuable 
insights into the competitive process, and how government policies impact on this 
process. First, government regulations on a selected number of industries - sugar 
processing, coe;!Jng oil, alcoholic beverages, fertiliser, cement, and steel - constrain 
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domestic rivalry. This provides a direct link between deregulation and competition. 
Removing regulatory constraints on firm behaviour will trigger rivalry among firms in 
these industries. Trade liberalisation, however, does not appear to have disturbed 
market shares except in export-oriented industries. Second, there is no evidence that 
MNCs have any impact on domestic rivalry, over and above the other variables 
considered in the analysis. This result provides some evidence to reject the 
proposition that large MNCs' business practices reduce market rivalry in the host 
developing country's markets. Finally, the results of most of the other industrial 
organisation factors tend to be consi.<,tent with studies for other countries. Market 
shares tend to be more stable in highly concentrated industries, all other things being 
equal. Rapid growth in industry destabilises market shares, while large absolute 
capital requirements constitute a barrier to entry and mobility, thereby insulating 
leading firms' market shares. 
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly r1~views the theory of market 
share instability. Section 3 discusses the various tumover-based measures of 
competition, and section 4 reviews the major empirka! 1;mdies on the topic. Section 5 
presents evidence on market share instability in Indonesian manufacturing industries. 
Section 6 presents the hypotheses to be tested in this Chapter. Section 7 specifies the 
empirical model and discusses the sample. Section 8 presents and discusses the 
empirical findings, while section 9 summarises the main findings of the Chapter. 
8.2 Theoretical Background 
The industrial organisation literature has long recognised that high concentration 
ratios can be found along with considerable instability in market shares of leading 
firms. fadustrial organisation theory tells us that, if the identity of the dominant firms 
were to change over time, then even persistently high levels of concentration would 
not necessarily imply the absence of competitive t'<.rces. In the absence of regulatory 
constraints on competition, changes in the relative po&icions or market shares of the 
leading firms would indicate healthy competitive conditions prevailing in that 
inJustry (Baldwin and Gorecki, 1994; Davis and Geroski, 1997). 
According to Geroski and Taker (1996), turnover in firms' rankings provide at least 
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some useful information on the vibrancy of the competitive process, and turnover-
based [i.e changes in rank or market shares] measures of competition may reflect the 
dynamics of the competitive process more accurately than conventional static 
measures of competition (like the concentration ratio). 
Caves and Porter (1978) argue that the instability of leading firms' market shares 
provide a measureable indicator of a rival's behaviour in oligopolistic markets. For 
example, rivalry in advertising, product or process innovations and other marketing 
variables should change shares because competitive moves in these areas are 
replicable only with a lag, if at all, and so give an advantage to the successful 
advertiser or innovator. The time required to match non-price moves and the 
discontinuous nature of responses increase the chance of prolonged and oscillatory 
adjustments, or a very different new equilibrium. 
While most research-:-rs agree that changes in market shares are indicative of 
competition, there is a divergence of views about whether stable market shares 
indicate collusion. Caves and Porter (1978) argue that the stability of shares reflects 
the stability of the oligopolistic bargain among firms or the cartel, as well as the size 
and the nature of exogenous disturbances to that bargain. As Stigler (1964: 46) writes, 
'Fixing market shares is probably the most efficient of all methods of 
combating secret price reductions. No firm can profit from price 
cutting if it is moving along the industry demand curve, once a 
maximum profit price has been chosen. With inspection of output and 
an appropriate formula for redistribution of gains and losses for 
departures from quotas, the incentive to secret price cut is eliminated.' 
In the absence of any kind of disturbance, market shares would remain constant over 
the life time of the collusive arrangement. The distributbn would be revised in the 
face of some types of disturbances. For example, capacity could be added to serve a 
growing market only in efficient-size lumps that could change shares. The distribution 
would by assumption not be altered by a breakdown of, or incomplete adherence to, 
the collu'>ive arrangements, or by incomplete coverage in the agreement of the key 
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market variables when exogenous market disturbances are occurring. 
The alternative view is that, while unstable market shares indicate competiton among 
firms, stable market shares are consistent in principle with either collusion or 
competition (Schmalensee 1989: 999). For example, if a price war breaks out among 
firms, price cuts can be easily matched by rivals, and market shares may not be 
disturbed. Thus, under price competition it is possible for market shares to remain 
stable over time. I 
The theory of perfectly contestable markets makes it plain that the identity of leading 
firms is unlikely to be an important determinant of market performance. If a market is 
contestable, excess profits will be eliminated regardless of whether it is the incumbent 
who lowers price and remains in the market, or whether the work is done by an 
entrant who displaces that incumbent. According to Geroski and Toker (1996: 142), 
this view 'probably pushes what is basically a static view of markets too hard'. 
8.3 Market Share Turnover-Based Measures of Competition 
A rich menu of alternative market share instability statistics, including the one 
presented in this study (viz., absolute market share instability index), have been put 
forward in the literature. It is convenient to begin with Hymer and Pashigan's (1962) 
criticism of the commonly used measure of market share instability at that time - the 
change in the rank of incumbents. Joskow (1960) used the rank measure to study 
mobility in the shoe manufacturing industry.2 He arranged the top 150 firms in both 
194 7 and 1954 by order of size, and calculated the rank correlation coefficient. The 
higher the rank coefficient, the greater was the stability of finns' relative position in 
the industry. 
1 Of course, it is possible that unstable market shares are also associated with intense price 
competition. Firms that introduce new cost-reducing processes are able to expand their market shares 
by undercutting prices of their higher cost rivals. This competitive pressure will stimulate rivals to 
adopt similar cost-saving devices to regain or protect their market shares. This process would lead to 
turbulence in market shares. 
2see also Boyle and Sorensen (1971), and Heggestad and Rhoades (1976) for studies using variants of 
the change in rank measure of firm market share instability. See Gort (1963) for an alternative measure 
of firm mobility based on the OLS estimate of the regression of market share in time t on market share 
in time t-1. 
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Hymer and Pashigan showed that the rank correlation coefficient is sensitive to the 
size distribution of firms included in the sample. The value of the rank correlation 
coefficient tends to fall, the great~r the number of firms included in the sample, 
because smaller firms can change their rank more easily than larger one.:;. Thus, a low 
rank correlation coefficient for an industry may be the result of small firms changing 
their rank, and not large ones. They did note that this problem could be reduced by 
truncating the sample towards large firms. However, large market share gains are 
often required to lodge the top firm from its place, so that in a highly concentrated 
industry with a large standard deviation of market shares, stability would be expected 
when using the change in rank measure. 
They proposed an alternative measure of market share instability: the absolute 
instability index (All). 
n 
All = ~J~ms1.1• 1.d i = 1.. .. n leading firms in industry j at time t-1. 
i=l 
Where fl ms1.1 is the change in market share of firm i in industry j, between time t and 
t-1. The absolute instability index measures the magnitude of change in market shares 
in an industry. It is the summation of the absolute value of the change in market 
shares of leading firms between time t and t-1. The value of the index ranges between 
zero and one. If the iadex is close to zero, then this indicates that market shares are 
relatively stable. If the index is close to one, then this indicates that market shares are 
unstable. 
The index can obviously be affected by the number of firms included in the sample, 
but it is not very sensitive to it. Small firms do not significantly contribute to the 
value of the index since they account for a small share of the industry output. The 
index weights a given percentage point increase in the market share of a small firm 
equally with the same percentage point increase in the market share of a large firm. 
This measure is subject to a possible bias, in· that it is easier for a given change in 
market shares to occur among large firms in highly concentrated markets than in less 
concentrated markets where large firms have lower market shares. This explains why 
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some studies have found a positive relationship between industrial concentration and 
All (see Table 3.1 below). 
Heggestad and Rhoades (1976) proposed an alternative measure to the absolute 
market share instability index: the relative market share instability index (Ril). The 
index is defined as: 
",~ms· RII = L 1,1,1-1 i = 1...n leading firms in industry j. 
i=I ms;,1-1 
The relative instability index is the summation of the absolute value of the percentage 
change in the market shares of leading firms between two points of time. A limitation 
of this measure is that it gives greater weight to equal absolute changes in market 
share of smaller firms relative to larger firms. 
Finally, the question remains, how many firms should be included in the calculation 
of the instability statistics? Many studies have used a variety of sample sizes ranging 
from the largest three firms in an industry (Heggestad and Rhoades, 1976) to ~1e 
largest 15 (Gort, 1963). The main reason for the ~runcated sample size is that it is in a 
restricted size range that market share stability is most relevant for analysis of 
competitive structure (Gort, 1963). The problem with this argument is that there is no 
objective method for determining the appropriate number of leading firms in ead, 
industry. Furthermore, the number of leading firms in one industry may not be the 
same in another industry. The best practical solution is to use the san1e number of 
firms as defined by the concentration ratio. In our study, we use the four-firm 
concentration ratio, so it makes sense to include only the four largest firms in the 
calculation of the instability index. 
8.4 Review of Empirical Studies 
There are numerous empirical studies on leading firm market share turnover in the 
industrial organisation literature. Selected studies are discussed below,3 However, 
3 Other studies include Hnvrilesky and Barth \1969), McGuckin (1972), Reekie (1974), Hirschey 
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there are no cross-sectional studies of this kind for other developing economies 
known to the author, so our study is the first to examine market share instability in ~ 
developing economy.4 
One of the most recent studies is Geroski and Toker ( 1996). They estimated the 
determinants of sales growth of leading firms in U .K. manufacturing between 1979 
and 1986 for a cross-section of 54 industries. Leading firms were defined as the five 
largest firms in each industry in 1979. In their model they included several firm-
specific and industry-specific variables that may affect firms' sales growth (and by 
implication market shares). Firm-specific variables included finns' advertising 
expenditure in 1979 and the number of innovations produced between 1970 and 1979. 
Industry-specific variables included industry sales growth over the period 1979 to 
1986, variability in industry growth rates over the period 1970 to 1979, industry 
exports in 1979, imports in 1979, variability in exports and imports over the period 
1970 to 1979, industry advertising in 1979, the total number of industry innovations 
produced over the period 1970 to 1979, and industrial concentration in 1979 
(measured by CR5). Most of the variables turned out to be statistically insignificant 
and were dropped from their model. They found a positive and significant relationship 
between firm growth and firm advertising expenditure, the number of firm 
innovations, industry growth and industrial concentration. The positive effect of 
advertising and innovations on firm growth suggests that those firms that spent more 
on advertising and produced more innovations grew faster than other firms. 
Davies and Geroski (1997) estimated the determinants of changes in leading firms' 
market shares in U .K. manufacturing using the same data base as Geroski and Toker 
(1996). In their model, they included firms' relative advertising expenditure in 1979 
(RELADV, ratio of a firm's advertising expenditure to competitors' advertising 
expenditures) and the relative number of innovations over the period 1970 to 1979 
(RELINN. ratio of a firm's number of innovations to competitors' innovations). They 
(1981), Meisel (1981), Lynk (1981), Sandler (1988), Eckard (1991). and Das et al (1993). 
4 Lindsay ( 1979) described turnover of the largest 20 and 60 industrial enterprises in Philippine 
manufacturing over the period 1961 to 1970. He did not examine the determinants of leading finn 
turnover within individual industries, which is more relevant to the analysis of competition than 
turnover among the largest industrial enterprises. 
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found a significant and positive relationship b~tween RELADV and changes in 
market shares, suggesting that advertising competition shifted market shares among 
rivals. A significant and positive relationship between changes in market shares and 
total industry advertising expenditure was also found, suggesting that industries 
characterized by high advertising competition had relatively more unstable market 
shares. The coefficient of RELINN had the expected (positive) sign, but was 
statistically insignificant. 
Caves and Porter (1978) is one of the most cited empirical studies in this area. They 
estimated the influence of a selected number of industry-specific explanatory 
variables on two measures of market share turnover: the absolute (Am and relative 
(Ril) market share instability indexes for a cross-section of U.S.A. manufacturing 
industries over the period 1970 - 3,5 They hypothesised a non-linear relationship 
between concentration and market share instability. As seller concentration rises from 
moderate to high levels, the effectiveness of collusion and hence stability of shares 
shmdd rise. It should also rise as concentration falls from moderate to low levels, so 
that firms' behaviour approach that under pure competition and there are no mutual 
arrangements to be violated. They approximated the non-linear relationship using a 
piecewise linear model. A piecewise linear model fits a separate linear regression on 
each sub-sample and, thus, allows the coefficients of variables to differ across sub-
samples. In Caves and Porter's study three sub-samples of CR4 values were chosen: 
CR4 greater than 77.5% (high CR4), CR4 between 50% and 77.5% (moderate CR4) 
and CR4 less than 50% (low CR4). 
5 A criticism of their study is that the three year period is not long enough to minimise short-run, 
random fluctuations in market shares. 
196 
Table 8.1 
Independent 
Variables 
Dependent 
Variables 
CR 
EX 
IM 
AS IND 
AS squared 
AS*CR 
R&D 
Firmadv 
Firminn 
GRO 
VGRO 
Entry 
Exit 
VI 
EOS 
PC 
REG 
Firm size 
Adjusted R2 
Some Empirictlll Studies of Market Share Instabilitya 
Heggestad & Caves & Allen 
Rhoades Porter (1981) 
(1977) (1978) 
AII&RII Ail&RII SDMS 
+* :-+---+-+--.:-+--+*-··· 
+* 
·* 
0.13 
+* 
+ 
+"' 
+* 
+ 
+* 
+* 
+ 
+* 
·* 
0.35 0.31 
Eckard Geroski & 
(1987) Toker 
(1996) 
DCR Sales growth 
+* +* 
+ 
+ +* 
+ 
+* 
+* 
+* +* 
+* 
0.23 0.32 
Davis and 
Geroski 
(1997) 
MSrMS1.1 
+ 
+* 
+* 
+ 
·* 
+* 
·* 
0.40. 
Sector Banking Industry Gasoline Industry Industry Industry 
Period 1969-72 1970-73 1969-74 1963-82 1979-86 1979-86 
Country U.S.A. U.S.A. U.S.A. U.S.A. U.K. U.K. 
a. The values of the coefficients are not presented in Table 8.1, because differences in model 
specification (i.e., linear, log-linear, non-linear) mean that the coefficient values can not be compared 
with each other. 
CR refers to the concentration ratio, EX to export inten:iity ratio, IM to import penetration rate, AS is 
the industry advertising-sales ratio, CR*AS is the concentration-advertising interaction term, R&D 
refers to industr!f reseach and development-sales ratio, Firminn refers to number of firm innovations, 
Firmadv refer~ to firm advertsing expenditure, ORO refers to growth in industry output, VGRO refers 
to variance of growth rates, VI refers to vertical integration of production, EOS is economies of scale, 
REG is a regulation dummy variable, firm size is measured by firms sales, MS refers to market share. 
"' denote statistically significant at the 10% or better significance level. 
AU refers to the absolute instability index, RII is the relative instability index, SDMS is the standard 
deviation of leading firms' market shares, DCR is the mean of the absolute deviation from the simple 
trend of CR4 from 1963 to 1984. 
Heggestad and Rhoades (1977) and Cave:s and Porter (1978) only reported the coefficients of the CR4 
variable in the All equation. 
All samples refer to industry observations, except for Geroski and Taker (1996) and Davies and 
Geroski (1997) who used firm level data. 
Caves and Porter found that the coefficients of absolute shares (All) remain positive 
in all sub-samples but decrease in size and significance from the low to medium and 
high sub-samples. The coefficients of relative share swing from positive and 
insignificant to increasingly negative and s gnificant as concentration rises from low 
to medium and high concentrated sub-samples. They explained that the different signs 
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of the coefficients of relative and absolute shares arise because of their different 
statistical relationship to the size of share disturbances. The coefficients of absolute 
share contain a built-in upward bias, and those of relative share are biased downward 
because of the construction of these dependent variables. For example, larger market 
share changes are more likely to occur in concentrated industries than in less 
concentrated industries where the leading firms have lower market shares. Thus, a 
positive relationship between absolute market share change and concentration is 
expected. Conversely, larger relative changes in market shares are more lik~ly to 
occur in less concentrated industries where leading firms' initial market shares are 
small relative to leading firms in more concentrated industries. Thus, a negative 
, 
relationship between concentration and relative change in market shares is normally 
expected. Caves and Porter argued that their results do lend some support to the 
hypothesis that the true relation swings from positive to negative as concentration 
rises. 
The authors also found some evidence to support the hypothesis that some forms of 
non-price competition destabilise shares: market share instability increases with 
product research and development effort. However, they could not find evidence that 
advertising competition destablises market shares. The authors also found that greater 
import competition, new entry and rapid growth in demand destabilise shares in 
highly concentrated industries (defined by them as industries with a CR4 greater than 
77 .5 per cent). 
Heggestad and Rhoades (1976) were concerned with testing the concentration·market 
share hypothesis in the US banking industry. They used All and RII measures of 
market share turnover. They found an inverse relationship between concentration and 
relative shares (RII), and a positive relationship between concentration and absolute 
shares (All). Of interest to our study, they also included a dummy variable to capture 
barriers to entry ~aused by state regulation of the number of regional branchs per 
bank. The sign of the coefficient was negative and significant, providing evidence that 
these regulations minimised changes in market shares and rank among leading finns. 
Allen (1981) examined market share instability in the regionally segmented U.S 
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gasoline industry. The dependent variable in his analysis was the standard deviation 
of each gasoline marketer's market share in each U.S state, computed over the period 
1969 to 1974. The author found a positive relationship between concentration (CR4), 
industry output growth and his measure of market share instability. He argued that the 
positive relation with concentration arises because seller interdependence leads to the 
replacement of price competition by non-price competition. However, this, positive 
coefficient may contain a built-in upward bias similiar to that of the absolute market 
share instability index discussed by Caves and Porter (1978). A larger standard 
deviation of leading firms' market shares is more likely to occur in concentrated 
industries than in less concentrated industries, where the leading firms have lower 
market shares. 
In sum, most studies find that, in man11facturing industries in developed economies 
market shares tend to be more stable the higher the concentration. However, the 
results are sensitive to the measure of market share instability and the specification of 
the model. Most studies confirm that rapid growth disturbs market shares, but only a 
few studies find evidence that advertising or product differc:ntiation affect market 
share stability. The little evidence that exists on the relation between international 
trade and share stability suggests that market shares tend to be more unstable the 
greater is import competition. Apart from Heggestad and Rhoades, no studies have 
investigated the influence of regulation or changes i:i. trade p~Jicy on market share 
instability. 
8.5 Market Share Instability in Indonf.sian Manufacturing 
Industries 
This section describes the changes in leal.iing firms' rank and market shares in 102 
ISIC manufacturing industries during the period of trade liberalisation and industry 
deregulation, 1985 and 1993. The descriptive analysis enables one to gauge the 
degree of turbulence in market shares that have occurred in these industries, ancl 
provides a backdrop for the statistical analysis into the underlying factors explainink; 
the observed market share instability in section 8.8. 
For this purpose, we constructed a data set for a sample of 102 ISIC industries from 
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the 'backcasted' annual manufacturing surveys. These are the same 102 industries 
included in the analysis of trends in concentration in Chapter 4. The data set records 
the changes in firms' rank and market shares in each industry between 1985 and 
1993. We define leading firms as the four largest firms in 1985. This definition is 
consistent with our earlier analysis of the trends in the four-firm concentration ratio. 
We present two descriptive statistics of market turbulence. The first describes the 
changes in the ide~tity of leading firms during the period 1985 to 1993. We refer to 
this measure as firm turnover. It describes the number of survivors, exitors and 
entrants into the top four finns h1 an industry. The second measure is the absolute 
instability index (All) described in the preceding section. We divide the All by the 
number of leading firms included in the index (i.e., the largest four firms in 1985) lo 
obtain the average absolu1.~ market share instability index. This measures the average 
absolute changr in the leading four firms market shares and is defined as: 
4 lms. -ms. I All = L 1•1993 1'1985 where n = 4, the leading !our firms in industry j in 
•=I 4 
1985. This index tells us the average percentage point change in a leading firm's 
market share between 1985 and 1993. 
-,~· 
\ 
Table 8.2 presents firm turnover statistics and the market share instability index (All) 
by CR4 class intervals between 1985 and 1993. 'Survivors' indicate the number of 
leadmg firms in 1985 that remained in the top four firms in 1993. 'Exitors' indicate 
the number of firms that were among the top four firms in 1985, but exited out of the 
industry in 1993. 'Entrants' indicate the number of new entrants into the top four in 
1993. The table shows that entry and exit into the top four firms was relatively 
frequent during this period; the typical industry had around two entrants or exitors. Of 
the 40f leaders in the sample of 102 industries in 1985, 173 exited from the top four 
nine years later (and, thus, 173 firms entered the top four between 1985 and 1993). 
This finding suggests considerable turbulence in firm turnover across industries 
during this period. 
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Table g,2 
Leading Four-Firm Turnover and Market Share Instability, 198_:5-_1_99_3 _ _ 
Average Number of 
CR4 Class Interval Survivors Exitors Entrants All STDEV of A.IT 
---•" , ____________ , __ ------------
75 to 100 3.2 0.8 0.8 0.098 0.052 
50 to 74 2.3 1. 7 1.7 0.095 0.032 
25 to 49 
Oto24 
2.0 2.0 2.0 0.066 0.022 
1.5 2.5 2.5 0.037 0.024 
Average for 2.3 1.7 
Manufacturing 
Correlation co1.~fficient between Ck 1. and A.IT 
Sub-samples: 
CR4: 75 to 100 
CR4: 50 to 74 
CR4: 25 to 49 
CR4: 0 to 24 
1.7 ~).078 0.042 
0.54* 
0.10 
0.16 
0.61* 
0.63* 
Notes: 102 industries. All industries recorded four or more finns in 1985, except for wheat flour 
milling, which ,ecorded three incumbents. Including wheat flour milling does not significantly bias the 
results for the high concentration class. 
STDEV deno~es the sample standard deviation of the All index. It measures the degree of dispersion in 
the index within the sample. 
*Statistically significant at 95% confidence level 
Leading firm turnover in Indonesian manufacturing is relatively high compared to 
developed economies. Davit.•s and Geroski ( 1997), for example, investigated firm 
turnover in a sample of 54 U.K. manufacturing industries over the period 1979 to 
1986. They found that entry and exit into the top five was relatively infrequent. Of the 
270 leaders in the 54 industries in 1979, 213 survived in the top five seven years later. 
The higher degree of turnover among leading firms is expected in a rapidly 
industrialising and growing economy, as Indonesia was over this period.6 In a fast 
growing manufacturing sector, entry is easier and, thus, firm tt nover and market 
shares are less stable. 
The degree of leading firm turnover varies considerably with the level of industrial 
concentration. Table 8.2 shows that entry and exit into the top four firms is less 
frequent in highly concentrated industries (industries with a CR4 ratio greater than 75 
per cent) compared with low concentrated industries. For example, the average 
6 There are no similar published studies for other developing economies known to the author, Thus, 
we are unable to make a comparison with manufacturing industries in other developing economies. 
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number of 'survivors' in highly concentrated industries was around three, compared 
with 1.5 firms in low concentrated industries. This finding suggests that leading firm 
rank is more stable in concentrated industries, and this is consistent with the findings 
of other studies for developed countries. 
Table 8.2 also presents the average market share instability index (All), measured 
over the period 1985 to 1993. Examining the index, a considerable amount of 
turbulence in market shares is observed across manufacturing industries. The average 
index for our sample of 102 industries is 0.078. This tells us that, on average, leading 
firms' market shares (in absolute values) changed by 7.8 percentage points between 
1985 and 1993. The ind~x is positively correlated with the degree of industrial 
concentration. For example, the average change in leading firms' market shares was 
9.8 percentage points in highly 1.:oncentrated industries, compared with 3.7 percentage 
points in industries with concentration levels below 25 per cent. This positive 
correlation arises because it is easier for a given change in market shares to occur 
among large firms in highly concentrated markets than in less concentrated markets 
where large firms have lower market shares. The dispersion of the index, measured by 
t1:.e standard deviation, is substantially greater in the highest CR4 class interval 
compared with the other three CR4 classes. This indicates that there is greater inter-
industry variation in market share instability in highly concentrated industries. In 
other words, high concentration ratios exist along with considerable instability in 
leading firms' market shares for some manufacturing industries. 
An examination of the determinants of market share instability, requiring the 
construction of an econometric model, is undertaken in the section 8.8 of this 
Chapter. But for illustrative purposes it is useful to examine the pattern of fum 
turnover in persistently concentrated industries. This is done in Table 8.3 for the 
industries for which the CR4 exceeded 75 per cent in 1985 and 1993. The results 
show the following; 
( 1) A number of the persistently concentrated industries experiem.:ed considerable 
firm turnover and market share instability during the period 1985 to 1993. For 
example, four vf the 20 persistently concentrated industries had two new 
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leading finns by 1993. These industries were cigarettes, carpet and rugs, paper 
products and structural clay products. Finn twnover in these industries were 
well above the manufacturing average of 1.7 entrants (Table 8.2). 
(2) While many concentrated industries recorded low rates of finn turnover (i.e. 
little change in the identity of the four leading finns) many of these industries 
still experienced considerable instability in market shares, as measured by All 
relative to the manufacturing average. For example, large changes in leading 
finns' market shares occurred in animal slaughtering, ice cream, processed 
"'Juits and vegetables, and motor bikes, despite little change in the identity of 
the top four finns in these industries. This tells us that intense rivalry among 
firms can exist along with high concentration ratios and low rates of rank 
changes, as noted earlier by Hymer and Pashigan (1962). 
(3) A number of the industries with 'stable incumbency' (i.e., low All and no 
change in the identity of the four leading finns) during thir period were 
heavily regulated. Many of these industries had regulations restricting <entry 
and exit of firms, distribution controls, and protection from import 
competition. Examples of these industries include, wheat flour milling, 
alcoholic beverages, fertiliser and cement. 
(4) Stable firm market shares are to some extent associated with state ownership" 
but much less so with foreign ownership. In the case of state ownership, 
government policies have insulated state enterprises from competitive 
pressures. In the case of foreign ownership, there does not appear to be any 
iStrong association with leading firm turnover. Foreign l esence can be found 
in industries with considerable turbulence in market shares (e.g., paper 
products, and cigarettes), and can also be found in industries with stable 
incumbency (e.g., beer, tyres, and sheet glass). 
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Table 8.3 
Persistentl~ Concentrated Industries and Market Share Instabilit~, 1985-1993 
ISICNo. Industry CR4 Turnover of Top Four Firms Ownership Share RERP(a) Regulation 
(% of production) (b) __ 
1985 1993 Survivor Exit Entrant All Foreign State 1987, 1993 
31111 Animal Slaughtering 78 90 3 1 1 0.12 0 66 -1:.1,174 
31122 Ice cre3m 95 95 4 0 0 0.10 0 0 600+,85 
31130 Proc. ve!J and fruit 84 90 4 0 0 0.15 0 0 -30,-26 
31164 WhP.atflour 100 100 3 0 0 0.06 0 0 600+,-33 entry 
31310 Alcoholic liquors 86 100 4 0 0 0.10 0 0 90,62 entry 
31320 'Nine 87 96 3 I 1 0.03 0 0 90.62 entry 
31330 Malt beer 97 98 4 0 0 0.07 99 0 90,62 entry 
31420 Clove cigarettes 78 82 3 I 1 0.09 0 0 600+, 108 price, entry 
31430 White cigarettes 82 94 3 I I 0.06 54 0 600+, 108 price 
314213 Cigarettesa 71 7C 2 I I 0.09 J1 0 600+,IOB 
32140 Carpet and rugs 89 78 2 2 2 0.15 7 0 12,-12 
34190 Paper products 91 86 2 2 2 0.10 34 17 28,31 
35120 Fertiliser 87 80 3 I J 0.07 JO 85 56,-24 distribution 
35232 Cosmetics 77 78 3 1 1 0.06 57 0 88,116 
35510 Tyres 78 76 4 0 0 0.06 44 0 600+,600+ 
36220 Sheet glass 100 91 4 0 0 0.05 90 0 111,-2 
363rn Cement 77 83 4 0 0 0.05 6 31 138, -18 price, 
distribution 
36490 Structural clay prod 91 90 2 2 2 0.15 0 12 68,42 
38430 Motor vehicles 100 100 4 0 0 0.09 50 0 428,600+ Local 
content 
38440 Motorbikes 96 97 4 0 0 0.12 16 0 600+,-7 
39020 Musical instruments 99 99 3 I 0 0.06 98 0 i08,63 
Notes: a. 'Cigarettes (ISIC 314213)' include both clove (!SIC 31420) and white {ISIC 31430) cigarette firms. 'Entry' indicates the presence of entry restrictions; 
'distribution' indicates the presence of distribution controls or monopoly practices; 'price' denotes price setting or controls; 
a. RERPs are taken from Fane and Conrlon (1996). b. Source: Xie and de Bruyn Kops (1995) and the author's fieldwork in 1995. 
CR4 ratios, rank turnover statistics, and ownership shares are calculated from BPS, Annual Manufacturing Surveys, I 985 93. 
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8.6 Determinants of Market Share Instability in Indonesian 
Manufacturing 
This section identifies the detenninants of changes in leading firms' market shares. 
Section 8.8 estimate their influence on the observed changes for our cross-section of 
67 manufacturing industries. Drawing on previous empirical studies for other 
countries and the Indonesia.~ policy regime, leading firm market share turnover in 
Indonesian manufacturing is specified as a function of concentration, economies of 
scale, demand conditions of the industry (growth in demand, variability in demand 
growth), barriers to entry and mobility (product differentiation, capital requirements), 
foreign ownership, international trade (exp~rt intensity and import competition), and 
government intervention through trade policy, public sector investment and regulatory 
constraints on domestic competition. 
Concentration (CR4)7 
We hypothesise a quadratic relationship (inverted U-shape relation) between 
concentration and market share instability. This quadratic relationship is supported by 
economic theory. Caves and Porter (1978) implicitly assumed a quadratic relationship 
when they hypothesised their non-linear relationship between market share instability 
and concentration: as seller concentration rises from moderate to high levels, the 
effectiveness of collusion and hence stability of shares should rise. It should also rise 
as concentration falls from moderate to low levels, so that firms' behaviour 
approaches that under pure competition and there are no mutual arrangements to be 
violated. To test for the quadratic relationship between concentration and leading firm 
market share instability we include the four-firm concentration ratio (CR4) and the 
square of the four-firm concentration ratio (CR42), We expect the coefficient of the 
CR4 ratio to be positive, and the coefficient of the square of the CR4 ratio to be 
negative. 
Economies of scale ( EOS) 
Economies of scale should affect market shares. The direction of the relationship, 
7 Conglomerates may also influence the nature of rivalry in a market for reasons discussed in Chapter 
Four (e.g. horizontal integration, financial staying power, multi-market contact). However, our data 
base does not allow us to identify which firms are conglomerates. 
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however, is ambiguous. Economies of scale may destabilise market shares. Where 
economies of scale are large, firms increasing capacity to respond to demand growth 
must add it in discrete lumps that necessarily destabilise market shares, raising a 
seller's share as its new capacity comes on stream and lowering those of its rivals 
(Caves and Porter, 1978). This suggests a positive relationship between economies of 
scale and market share instability. However, in practice we might expect that these 
discrete 'lumps' are quite small, in which case economies of scale are unlikely to be 
disruptive. A negative relationship is possible to the extent that economies of scale 
acts as an entry barrier into the top four placed firms and the industry as a whole 
(Davies and Geroski 1997). 
Demand conditions (GRO and VGRO) 
Two aspects of demand are considered as important influences on market share 
turnover. These are industry growth and demand instability. It is hypothesized that 
market shares should be less stable in industries that are growing more rapidly (GRO) 
as the entry of new competitors is easier. Thus, we expect a positive relationship 
between rapid industry growth and market share turnover. 
Variations in overall demand (VGRO) should affect market shares. However, the 
direction of the relationship is ambiguous. Instability in '.lemand might transmit 
instability into leading firms' market shares: demand fluctuations cause variations in 
market shares because firms can not predict such changes with perfect foresight. This 
proposition suggests a positive relationship between instability in demand and market 
share turnover. However, a negative relationship is also possible if firms have an 
incentive to minimise risk arising from demand fluctuations. Normally, instability in 
profit rates is associated with instability in demand conditions. Therefore, it may be in 
the interest of firms to adopt strategies or arrangements to minimise instability in 
demand (McBride, 1983). 
Barriers to entry and mobility (.-oD and AKC) 
According to Geroski (1994: 155), the success of leading firms will also depend on 
the extent to which there are entry barriers, both into the top four firms and the 
industry as a whole. Barriers into the top four firms are referred to as mobility 
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barriers. Geroski noted that barriers to mobility have the same basic features and arise 
from the same kinds of sources as do entry barriers into the industry. Thus, we include 
the same two barriers to entry variables used in the concentration and profit equations 
in Chapter 7: capital requirements of establishing a plant of minimum efficient scale 
(AKC) and product differentiation (PD). 
We expect a negative relationship between capital requirements and market share 
instability. Large capital requirements may deter entry to the extent that they are sur1k 
costs. Lhfge sunk cost of production reduces the contestability of the industry for local 
entrants. On a similar reasoning, large capital requirements may inhibit small firms 
from graduating to become large firms (i.e., mobility barriers), which in tum protects 
existing leading firms' market shares. 
The effect of product differentiation on market share instability is ambiguous. On the 
one hand, product differentiation may reduce market share instability. Product 
differentiation insulates each seller's market by a downward sloping demand curve, 
and this constitutes an entry barrier to new competition and upward mobility by 
smaller firms (Scherer and Ross, 1990). Such firms therefore face less elastic demand 
and, thus, greater market power. This suggests that smaller displacements of shares 
follow a disturbance such as a reduction of one seller's costs. Thfa in turn implies a 
negative relationship between product differentiation and leadh1g firm market share 
instability. On the other hand, non-price competition like product differentiation 
increases market rivalry among firms and facilitates the entry of new firms (Nelson, 
1974; Scherer and Ross, 1990). The result is greater market share instability. Further, 
competitive moves in this area are replicable only ,. 1th a lag, if at all, and so give 
advantage to the successful advertiser. This in tum implies a positive relationship 
between product differentiation and leading firm market share instability. 
International influences (EX. IM, MNC) 
The intensity of rivalry in a domestic industry is influenced by the degree of openness 
to international competition. We include two variables to capture international 
competition: import penetration (IM) and export intensity (EX). 
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It is hypothesised that high import competition reduces interdependent behaviour 
among domestic firms, which in tum triggers rivalrous behaviour among firms 
because they have to compete with imports, in addition to products from local 
producers (Caves 1980; 132). Caves and Porter (1978; 298) also argue that foreign 
competition provides a transm:ssion belt for disturbances occurring in th~ world 
market that feed into the local market, thus deGtabilising market shares. Thus, we 
expect a positive relationship between import penetration (IM) and market share 
instability. 
The effect of exports on market rivalry is ambigious. On the one hand, high exports 
signal the presence of a world market with correspondingly greater rivalry than 
recorded by the domestic concentration ratio. Greater rivalry implies greater market 
share instability. Furthr.r, the world market is a source of disturbances, and exports 
(like imports) can introduce exogenous disturbances and deter an oligopoly consensus 
tight enough to stabilise market shares. These propositions suggest that there will be a 
positive relationship between exports and changes in market shares. On the other 
hand, concentrated industries may expon a proportion of their output to stabilise 
market shares in the domestic market. Caves and Porter { 1978) referred to this as a 
'dumping oligopoly'. If the home market is assumed to be protected by trade policy or 
high transportation costs, exports would signal the opportunity for profitable price 
discrimination and an outlet for competitive behaviour that does not destabilise the 
domestic market (Caves et al 1980; 132). Caves and Porter argue that members of a 
dumping oligopoly have a substantial incentive to vent disturbances to the domestic 
market by varying their foreign sales. If so, the presence of er.port opportunities 
should permit the stabilisation of shares in the domestic market. This proposition 
suggests that there is an inverse relationship between exports and market share 
instability. 
The other possible international influence on market share instability is the presence 
of multinational enterprises in the domestic market. However, the effect of MNCs on 
market share instability is ambiguous. On the one hand, MNCs might increase market 
share instability by increasing competition in the domestic market. Foreign firms are 
able to break down local oligopolies and widen the scope for competition by 
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increasing the number of firms in the industry. This is possible because foreign firms 
have greater access to resources on international capital markets, and ii.tangible assets 
to overcome domestic entry barriers. This proposition suggests a positive relationship 
between MNCs and market share instability. On the other hand, MNCs might reduce 
rivru1J' and, thus, market share instability in the long run. It is possible that when a 
MNC enters an industry there is a temporary competitive phase as the MNC competes 
for market share. However, once the MNC has won sufficient market share and 
established itself as a leading firm, rivalrous behaviour may decline and the oligopoly 
stabilises (eg market shares become stable over time). Furthermore, MNCs may 
introduce restrictive business practices (tie-in sales, exclusive dealerships and 
territories) that limit rivalry among finns.s The dominant MNC may also see tangible 
benefits in colluding with local firms and other MNCs in the same industry (Lall 
1978, Newfarmer, 1980). These propositions suggest a negative relationship between 
MNCs and market share instability. 
Government intervention 
We include here our three policy variables, trade protection (RERP), constraints on 
domestic competition (REG), and state ownership of industry (SOE). 
(a) Changes in trade policy (ERP) 
Our sample period of 1985 to 1993 covers the major trade policy reforms. It is often 
argued in the literature that trade reforms reduce the interdependent behaviour among 
firms and generate greater competitive pressures that trigger market rivalry.9 This 
should be reflected in greater market share instability. To capture the dynamic effect 
of changes in trade protection on market share instability, we use changes in the levels 
of real effective rates of protection (6RERPs) between 1985 and 1993. However, a 
small number of iudustries have been given increases in RERPs over this period 
(Chapter 2). It is equally plausible that an increase in protection may stimulate market 
share changes, as increased protection may attract new entrants. Therefore, we use the 
absolute value of changes in RERPs. If changes in RERPs trigger greater market share 
8 See Long ( 1981) for a survey of MNCs' restrictive business practices in developing economies. 
9 Since the late 1980s many Indonesian firms expected reductions in protection to continue. Thus, it is 
also possible that expected changes in protection may trigger greater competition among domestic 
firms as they prepare for more import competition. 
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instability, then we would expect a positive relation between the absolute value 
of b,. ERPs and market share instability. 
(b) Constraints on domestic competition (REG) 
In Chapter 2 we noted that constraints on domestic competition in Indonesia take 
many fonns, including entry and exit controls, exclusive dealing, and price controls. 
In our sample we have six industries that have been intensely regulated over the 
period 1985 to 1993. These industries are: sugar processing (ISIC 31181), alcoholic 
beverages (ISIC 31310/30), cooking-oil (!SIC 31150), fertiliser (ISIC 35120), cement 
(!SIC 36310), and basic iron and steel (ISIC 37100). It is hypothesised that 
restrictions (REG) in these industries inhibit competition and rivalry among firms, 
and this will be reflected in a negative relationship between regulation and changes in 
leading firms' market shares. We capture the effect of regulation in these industries by 
introducing a dummy variable equal to one if the industry is one of those listed above, 
otherwise it is zero. 
( c) State owned enterprises (SO Es) 
The fina1 form of government intervention is through state-ownership of industry. In 
Indonesia, industries that are dominated by state owned enterprises (SOEs) are often 
insulated from domestic and foreign competition. Further, a large stat~ enterprise 
sector crowds out private sector investment in the industry and deters private sector 
investment to the extent that private investors fear that the government will bias 
commercial conditions to the benefits of their own companies. Thur,, we ex.pect a 
negative relation between SOEs' dominance of an industry and market share 
instability. 
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8.7 Equation Specification 
The functional relationship suggested by the discussion above is 
Equation ( 1) 
+ -2? + ? ? - . ? ? + 
Aij593 =f(CR4ss, CR4s, EOSs, GRQ~93, VGROsss, MNCSOJ;': AKQ5, P.Q EX IM 
+ 
L\ERPs•93, REG,i593) 
Where All is the average absolute instability index between 1985 and 1993. 
CR4 is the four-firm concentration ratio in 1985. 
EOS is economies of scale in 1985. 
GRO is growth in industry output between 1985 and 1993. 
VGRO is the instability in industry growth rates between 1978 and 1985. 
MNC is the share of industry output produced by multinational enterprises, 
averaged over the period 1985 to 1993. 
SOE is the share of industry output produced by state-owned enterprises, 
averaged over the period 1985 to 1993. 
AKC is absolute capital requirements in 1985. 
PD is product differentiation measured by the advertising-sales ratio of U.S.A. 
counterpart industries. 
IM is import penetration ratio, averaged over 1985 to 1993. 
EX is export intensity ratio, averaged over 1985 to 1993 • 
.6.ERP9~_87 is the absolute value of the change in ERPs between 1987 and 1993. 
REG is the regulation dummy variable. 
With the exception of demand instability (VGRO) variable, all the independent 
variables are defined in Chapter 5. The demand instability variable is defined as the 
variance of the annual growth rates in .industry output over the period 1978 to 1985. 
We use the period 1978 to 1985 to calculate VGro to avoid colinearity with our 
demand growth variable, which is calculated over the period 1985 to 1993. Because 
there has been considerable variation in the export intensity and import penetration 
ratios over the period 1985 to 1993, we use the averages of these ratios over the 
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period 1985 to 1993 instead of the 1985 ratios. Similarly, since there has been some 
variation in MNCs' and SOEs' share of industty output over this period, we also use 
the averages of these ratios over the period 1985 to 1993, instead of the 1985 ratios. 
Equation ( 1) constitutes the maintained hypothesis af our specification search. This 
general model is tested down (using OLS) by dropping statistically insignificant 
variables. The testing procedure continues until a parsimonious representation is 
obtained which retains the a priori theoretical model. To be acceptable, the final 
equation must satisfy various diagnostic tests relating to the OLS estimation 
procedure. 
The model was estimated for the same cross-section of 67 industries used to estimate 
the SCP model in Chapter 7. Market share changes are measured between 1985 and 
1993. The nine year period (1985-93) should be long enough to minimise short term 
fluctuations in market shares, and also long enough for firms to enter and expand 
capacity in most industries 
8.8 Estimation results 
Table 8.4 reports the OLS estimates of the determinants of the market share 
instability index (Ail),IO The elasticities of the statistically signifkant explanatory 
variables are reported in Table 8.5. Regression (b) in Table 8.4 is our preferred 
specification of the model. Equation (b) passes the F-test for overall significance at 
the l % level. Statistically, equation (b) performed very well, exhibiting no problems 
of ftmctional form misspecification (RESET), and heteroskedasticity (HSC). Based 
on the Ramsey RESET test, the preferred functional form of the model is a semi-log 
linear specification; i.e., where only the dependent variable is used in log form. We 
also use the logs of two explanatory variables, economies of scale (EOS) and capital 
costs (AKC). This improves the equation in terms of the Ramsey RESET test. Two 
10 The model was re-estimated using the relntive change in lending finm' market shares (RII) as the 
dependent variable. The two dependent variables yield 11bout the same statistical conclusions. 
However, in any given specification the cxpl:iined proportion of the variance of the absolute meuure 
1s twice as high as that of the relative mell$ure, and mo$t indepcndcrtt variables arc more sisnificant for 
the absolute measure. Therefore, the results we present in this chapter are the better of our two sets. 
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variables (product differentiation and vari<J.bility in growth rates) were dropped from 
the equation because their t-ratios were sMistically insignificant, The results of the 
non-tested test also suggest that these variables should be deleted from the model. I I 
Equation (a) presents the model without the inclusion of the quadratic term in CR4. 
This allows us to make a comparison with the other studies repon .. ..; in Table 8.1. The 
positive and significant coefficient of CR4 i!: consistent with the studies referred to in 
section 8.4. However, the equation does not pass the Ramsey RESET test at a 10 per 
cent level, suggesting that this functional form is not the correct one. Equation (b) 
extends the model to include the quadratic term in CR4. The equation does pass the 
Ramsey RESET test at a 5 per cent level, confirming that this equation is the correct 
functional form. The coefficient of the linear term in CR4 remains positive and the 
coefficient of the squared term in CR4 is negative, and both estimates are significant 
at the l % level. The highly significant coefficients of CR4 and the quadratic term in 
CR4 provides strong support for the hypothesis that the relationship between changes 
in leading firms' market shares and concentration is quadratic: as seller concentration 
rises from moderate to high levels, market share instability declines. It also declines 
as concentration falls from moderate to low levels, so that firms' behaviour 
approaches that under pure competition and there are no mutt.al arrangements to be 
violated. The quadratic function in concentration has a maximum at CR4 = 0.88512: 
market share instability increases with concentration to reach a maximum at 
CR4=0.885 and declines thereafter. The negative relation between market share 
instability and concentration beyond C'R4=0.885 is consistent with the conclusion of 
the other studies that market shares tend to be more stable in highly concentrated 
industries. 
----------
11 In the earlier stages of the experimental econometric work, we included the regional market 
segmentation (RM) variable to control for possible statistical bia5 in our measure of All. Like the CR4 
rauo, the market share instability index is calcul11ted at the national level, and 1s not adjusted for 
regional market fragmentation. Thu!, there is 11 pouible st111istic11t bins in the calcuhition of the index 
for mdustries with regional sub-markets. However, the RM varinble wns statistically in.significant in 
the regression and was dropped. from the model. Refer back to Chapter 3 for a discussion on this issue. 
12 The maximum of the quarirnttc function is found by setting the first derivattve of the market share 
function with respect to CR4 equal to zero 11nd solving for CR4: 
!1og(AII) ::i 4.71 ~ .S.32CR4..., O.Thus,CR4,.. ~ ... 0.885 
iCR4 5.32 
Table 8.4 
Determinants of Market Share Instability 
I Dependent V<>riable: Average Change in leading Firms' Market Shares 
I independent Varia~les Equation (a) 
CR4g5 1.959 
(7.38)3 
CR42g5 
LnEOS35 0.104 
(2.22)b 
LnAKC35 -0.164 
(2.IO)b 
GR035.93 0.005 
(i.64)C 
MNC 
-0.323 
(1.27) 
SOE 0.366 
(0.86) 
EX 
.. ,/1' 0.5~4 
(2.JO)b 
IM 
-0.018 
(0.30) 
~ RERP93.37 -0.0003 
(0.90) 
REG 
-0.922 
(2.70)a 
Constant 
-3.88 
(6.30la 
R-Z 0.55 
F-Stat 8.9711 
Het(a) 2.88 
RESET(b) 9.25 
Notes: Dependent variable is Ln(AII) 
T-ratios are given in parentheses. 
Significance levels are a=l%, b=5%, c=10%. 
Equation (b) 
4.712 
(5.SO)a 
-2.66 
(3.30)a 
0.061 
( 1.36) c 
-0.066 
(1.43)C 
0.004 
(1.58) c 
-0.223 
(0.95) 
0.472 
(1.21) 
0.485 
(1.89)b 
-0.045 
(0.85) 
-0.0003 
(0.98) 
-0.915 
(2.89)b 
-4.312 
(7.40)a 
0.62 
10.68a 
0.07 
4.07 
(a) Heteroskedasticity test. Chi-square test under OLS (critical value at 5% is 3,84) 
(b) Ramse, regression specification test. F-test under OLS (critical value at 5% is 4.00) 
/ 
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Table 3.5 
Elasticity of Market Share Instability With Respect 
To Independent Variables 
Independent 
Variable 
CR4 13 
LogEOS 
LogAKC 
Gro 
ES 
Elasticities evaluated at 
sample mean values 
(derived from regression (b)) 
1.05 
0.061 
-0.066 
0.046 
0.090 
Only e;:lasticities of the statistically significant explanatory variables are reported. 
The concentration elasticity is reported in Table 8.5. The elasticity value of I.OS tells 
us that, calculated at the sample mean values of CR4 (0.539) and All, a 10% increase 
in concentration causes changes in leading firms' market shares to increase by 10.5%. 
The mean value of CR4 (0.539) is below the maximum of the quadratic function in 
concentration (CR4=0.885), so that any percentage increase in concentration below 
CR4=0.885 will always lead to a percentage increase in market share turnover. To the 
right of the maximum, a percentage increase in concentration will always lead to R 
percentage reduction in market share turnover. For example, at CR4=0.90 the 
elasticity is -0.082 so that a 10% increase in concentration will cause market share 
turnover to declir~ by 0.82%. 
The coefficients of the conventional industrial organization variables (industry 
growth, economies of scale and capital costs) have the expected signs, and all are 
statisdcally significant. The coefficient of the growth in demand (GRO) variable is 
positive, suggesting that rapid growth attracts entrants and, thus, destabilises market 
shares. The elasticity value of 0.046 tells us that, evaluated at the sample mean values 
of Gro and All, a 10% increase in industry growth causes a 0.46% rise in market share 
instability. The coefficient r f the economies of scale (EOS) variable is statistically 
significant at the 10% level. This resu!c suggests that, where economies of scale are 
large, firms wishing to increase capacity to respond to demand growth must add it in 
discrete lumps that destabilise market shares, raising a seller's share as new capacity 
comes on stream and lowering those of its rivals. The elasticity value of0.061 tells us 
13 The elasticity of All with respect to CR4 is calculated as follows: 
4A.U. • ~ = (4.71 - 5.3 *~)•(CR)= I.OS, where CR= 0.539 
All dCR 
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that a 10% increase in economies of scale causes a rise of 0.61 % in market share 
instability. The coefficient of the capital cost (AKC) variable is negative, suggesting 
that the large capital costs of establishing a plant of MES scale constitute a barrier to 
entry and mobility and, thus, protect leading firms' market shares. 
Only one of the three variables representing government intervention has the expected 
sign and is statistically significant. The regulation dummy variable (REG) has the 
expected negative sign and is significant at the 1 % level, suggesting that government 
constraints on domestic competition in the six industries (sugar processing, malt beer, 
cooking oil, fertiliser, cement, basic steel and iron industries) have reduced market 
rivalry. This result also establishes a direct link between industry deregulation and 
market rivalry. The removal of constraints on market behaviour should lead to greater 
market rivalry and competition in these industries (and possibly in other industries 
outside our sample). The sign of the state ownership variable is unexpectedly positive, 
but is statistically insignificant. The hypothesised negative e:ffect of state-ownership is 
probably captured by the regulation variable, since four of the five regulated 
industries have significant state enterprise participation. The absolute value of the 
change in the real effective rate of protection variable has an unexpected negative sign 
but is not statistically significant. This finding suggests that trade liberalisation has 
not significantly disturbed market shares. This result is consistent with our earlier 
empirical findings for concentration in Chapters 4 and 7 .14 The coefficient of import 
penetration is negative but is not statistically significant. This result is also consistent 
with our finding for changes in real effective rates of protection ( LlRERPs ). 
Howev:~r. clearer inferences can be made about the impact of trade liberalisation on 
market share turnover in export-oriented industries. The positive and significant 
coefficient of export intensity (EX) variable provides support for the proposition that 
the expansion in export opportunities over this period has destabilised market shares 
in e:irport-oriented industries. In Chapter 4 we also observed a continuous reduction in 
concentration of export-oriented industries between 1985 and 1993, and this declining 
14 In alternative specifications of the model we dropped the ERP and import variables. When we 
dropped the import variable from the model, the ERP variable did not improve significantly. Similarly, 
when we dropped the ERP variable from the equation the import variable did not improve 
significantly. 
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trend is also reflected in leading firm market share instability. The positive 
relationship also supports the proposition outlined in section 8.6 that high export 
intensity indicates greater exposure to international competition, and thus greater 
market rivalry than recorded by the industry's domestic concentration ratio. The 
elasticity value of 0.089 tells us that a I 0% increase in export intensity causes market 
share instability to rise by 0.89%. Finally, the coefficient of the multinational (MNC) 
variable is negative, but is statistically insignificant. Thus, there is no evidence in our 
sample of 67 industries that foreign enterprises affect market share instability over 
and above the other variables considered in the analysis. 
8.9 Summary of Major Findings 
Industrial organisation theory tells us that, in the absence of regulatory 
constraints on competition, changes in the relative positions or market shares of 
the leading firms would indicate healthy competitive conditions prevailing in that 
industry. Market turbulence (i.e. changes in market shares) provide some 
information on the competitive process, and turnover-based measures of 
competition reflect the dynamics of the competitive process more accurately than 
static measures of competition (i.e., CR4 ratio). The results of this chapter 
provide several insights into the dynamic competitive process and the influence 
of government intervention on market rivalry in Indonesian manufacturing. The 
major findings of the Chapter are twofold: 
First, several persistently concentrated industries had considerable turbulence in firm 
turnover and market share instability, suggesting that intense rivalry among firms 
exist in these industries. These industries include cigarettes, motor bikes, structural 
clay products, carpets and rugs, and vegetable and fruit processing. 
Second, consistent with the studies referred to in Table 8.1, we find that leading 
firms' market shares are more stable in highly concentrated industries, when 
allowance is made for other relevant influences. However, our study differs from 
otlier studies in that we have approximated the concentration-market share stability 
relationship using a quadratic function, which is more consistent with economic 
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theory as outlined earlier in the Chapter. Also consistent with the studies for other 
countries, we find that rapid growth in demand destabilises leading firms' market 
shares, while product differentiation has no significant effect on market sh1.tre 
instability. In addition to these results, we find that large capital costs of establishing a 
MES plant size constitute a barrier to entry and mobility, thereby insulating leading 
firms' market shares ffl)m new entrants and smaller firms. Finally, we do not find any 
evidence that MNCs affect market rivalry over and beyond the other variables 
considered in the analysis. 
Third, we find a significant direct link between industry deregulation and 
competition: the removal of these restrictions may trigger greater market rivalry 
between firms in these industries. Finally, trade liberalisation does not appear to have 
disturbed market sh::.:res except in export-oriented industries. There is a significant 
positive relationship between export intensity and market 5hare instability. 
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Case Studies 
Chapter 9: Structural Change and Competition in 
Cigarette Industry 
Chapter I 0: Advertising Competition in the Cigarette 
Industry 
Chapter 11: Regulation and Competition in Cement 
Industry 
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Chapters 
Structural Change and Competition 
in the Cigarette Industry 
9.1 Introduction 
This Chapter provides an overview of the .development of the Indonesian cigarette 
industry over the last three decades. The descriptive analysis enables one to gauge the 
linkages between competition, government policy and industrial structure over time, 
and provides a backdrop for the statistical analysis into the effects of advertising 
competition on firms' market shares in the next Chapter. 
The descriptive analysis shows that there has been a considerable growth and 
structural change in the cigarette industry over the last 30 years. Per capita 
consumption of cigarettes has grown at an average rate of 4.3 per cent per annum. The 
dualistic structure of the industry - a small number of modern MNCs existing side by 
side with hundreds of ~.'1.bour-intensive, small-scale domestic firms - observed by 
Castles (1967) in the 1950s and 1960s had greatly diminished by the late 1980s. By 
the early 1980s, several domestic firms had replaced the dominant position of MNCs 
in the cigarette industry. The level of seller concentration had increased continuously 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s. The four-firm concentration ratio increased from 43 
per cent in 1976 to 75 per cent by 1994. Coinciding with the increase in concentration 
has been the decline in the number of producers, from around 900 firms in the early 
1960s to just over 160 firms in 1994. However, the high levels of concentration in 
the 1980s and 1990s hide considerable turbulence in leading firms' market shares and 
rank. Rankings among the top ten firms continuously changed during the last three 
decades, suggesting intense competitive pressures are operating in the cigarette 
industry. This rapid change in the structure of the industry is due to a combination of 
factors, such as the mechanisation of production by domestic firms since the late 
1970s, rising consumer incomes and changing consumer tastes from 'western' 
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cigarettes to locally produced, clove flavoured cigarettes (known as kretek in 
Indonesia), and intense competition among firms. Government intervention through 
investment, excise tax, and minimum retail price regulations has at different times 
affected the fortunes of firms, the structure of the industry and the nature of 
competition. 
This Chapter is divided into three main parts. The first part deals with the growth and 
development of the cigarette industry, changing industrial structure and changes in 
leading films' fortunes over the last three decades. The second part discusses the role 
of government policy in protecting the small-scale cigarette sector by trying to 
constrain competition from the larger firms. The final part provides a description of 
the different forms of competition (especially advertising) among the large firms and 
the competitive fringe where price competition more often prevails. 
9.2 Kretek and White Cigarettes 
Cigarettes are produced in Indonesia in what, from the perspective of the technology, 
is often considered as two separate industries: clove cigarettes (sigaret kretek) and 
'western' white cigarettes (sigaret putih).1 'White' cigarettes are made purely from 
tobacco by cigarette-making machines. K.retek are either hand-rolled (referred to as 
sigaret kretek tangan-SKT) or machine-made (referred to as sigaret kretek mesin-
SKM), and contain tobacco, cloves and a secret mixture of spices. Each firm has its 
own secret blend of cloves and 'sauce', and the recipe is usually known only by the 
owner or a close relative(s). The hand-rolled kretek may also be rolled in 'corn paper' 
- a dried and ironed shreath of the maize plant - and is known as klobot. 
Mechanisation in the kretek industry was introduced only on a large scale in the late 
1970s, and by 1994 about 70 per cent of total kretek production was from cigarette-
making machines. 
The basic technology in making and packing hand-rolled kretek has remained almost 
unchanged in the last 60 years. The process cf manufacture is simple and may be 
described briefly as follows. The tobacco is shredded and blended; the cloves are 
1 The Central Bureau of Statistics, for example, classifies kretek and white cigarettes as two separate 
industries in its industrial classification (industries ISIC 31420 and 31430 respectively). 
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soaked in water, chopped in tiny pieces, and then blended in a proportion which 
averages about 70 per cent tobacco and 30 per cent cloves. The mixture is then 
sprayed with 'sauce' consisting of flavour essences, and apportioned among the main 
body of workers, called rollers (or penggiling). The rollers are usually women. The 
rollers sit on the factory floor with a simple wooden roHing machine. Although much 
bigger, it uses the same principle as the small "roll-your-own" cigarette-rollers once 
popular in European and North American countrie<:. Once the c.Jgarette is rolled using 
the wooden instrument, the cutter (known as tukang mbatil) trims the shreds of 
tobacco projecting from the ends of the cigarette. The cutter is also a women, usually 
a friend or relative of the roller. Each roller has one tukang mbatil. The cigarettes are 
then dried and assembled into packs of six, 12 or 16 sticks by women packers. 
Despite the contrast in the products (i.e., machine-made kretek, hand-rolled kretek 
and machine-made white cigarettes), they do compete with each other. They seH 
closely substitutable products in the same markets, usually in the same cigarette st2Jls, 
and there is a wide range in the quality and price of the three types of cigarette. 
9.3 The Development of the Cigarette Industry 
Kretek is one of the oldest industries in Indonesia. The industry began to develop at 
the end of the last century. It flourished in the early part of the 20th century in heavily 
populated regions of Central and East Java, especially in Kudus in northern Central 
Java and along the Brantas valley in south and central East Java. According to Castles 
( 1967: 26-8), the availability of cheap supplies of labour, proximity to major tobacco 
growing areas in Central and East Java and a relatively developed 'smoking habit' 
we:-e probably the major factors which influenced the growth of the industry in these 
regions of Java. 
The industry began as a cottage industry. This was followed by the abon (or putting-
out) system, which developed on a large scale prior to the emergence of the factory 
sector as the dominant mode of production in the 1920s and 1930s. Under the abon 
system, the entrepreneur obtained the tobacco and cloves and mixed them, but the 
task of rolling was let out to workers called abons who called at the entrepreneur's 
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establishment to collect the mixture of tobacco and cloves and returned with the hand-
rolled cigarettes a week later. Each abon had his own workers (called kornets) in his 
home or village. The large entrepreneurs had hundreds of abons (Castles, 1967: 34). 
By 1929 the industry employed 65,000 workers and was one of the largest employers 
of labour in manufacturing in Indonesia (Castles, 1967: 36). During the ten years 
before the Japanese occupation this abon system was replaced by the factory system. 
The production process, however, remained labour-intensive and all kretek was hand-
rolled using the simple wooden tool described above. 
From the mid-l 920s kretek producers faced strong competition from machine-made 
'white' cigarettes. In 1925, British American Tobacco (BAT) acquired the Egyptian 
Tobacco Company which was established by two Dutchmen in 1924. Until then, all 
v.hite cigarettes were imported, to the extent of about 4 billion sticks annually 
(Castles, 1967: 35). Three years later BAT built a second factory in Surabaya and by 
1931 production of white cigarettes had reached 6 billion sticks, compared with 1.1 
billion imported sticks. The consumption of white cigarettes had thus reached 7 
billion, almost exactly comparable to kretek. Though domestic production had almost 
replaced imports, the white cigarette industry was wholly foreign owned. 
The success of the new foreign-owned factories threatened the existence of the kretek 
industry. The survival of the kretek industry during this period was partly th~ result of 
protection provided by the colonial government in the form of a differential excise on 
cigarettes, a minimum retail price for white cigarettes, and limitations on increased 
investment in machine-made cigarettes. In 1936, the government imposed an excise 
of 30 per cent on white cigarettes and 20 per cent on kretek (Harahap, 1952: 210; 
Castles, 1967: 36). The purpose of these measures was to prevent competition within 
the white cigarette industry from leading to a dominant position by BAT, and to 
conserve a share of the market for hand-made kretek. As we will show later, this fear 
of 'excessive' competition and the desire to protect small firms' market shares 
continued throughout the post independence period. 
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Table 9.1 Cigarette Production, 19~1-94 
(billion sticks) 
Year Kretek White Cigarettes 
1921 1.1 Ill!. 
1929 7.1 6.0 
1939 15.1 na 
1949 16.1 na 
1957 18.3 na 
1963 20.7 na 
1969 14.3 11.0 
1974 21.1 21.7 
1980 49.2 33.4 
1985 ~2.4 24.3 
1990 138.3 15.6 
1 991 128.6 18.7 
1994 156.0 21.2 
Sourt;e: For Kretek and white cigarettes: Castles (1967) for the period 1921 to 1957; Indonesian 
cigarette producers association (GAPPRI) for 1957 to 1994. 
na== data not available. 
Table 9.1 shows the production levels of kretek from 1921 to 1994. Figure 9.1 
provides a visual interpretation of the growth in kretek and white cigarettes 
prndw;;tlun ;)in~t: 1969. K.retek production grew from 1.1 billion sticks in 1921 to 7.1 
billion in 1929, and then doubled to reach 15 billion in 1939. Production stagnated as 
a result of the Japanest... occupation and the disruption to the Indonesian economy 
caused by Holland's attempted re-occupation of Indonesia from 1945 to 1949. 
Production recovered after 1950 and by 1960 had reached 20 billion. In the 1960s 
production of kretek stagnated and fell to 14 billion in 1969, the lowest recorded level 
of production since independence. Quite dramatic increases in the price of cloves over 
the period 1968 to 1969 appear to have adversely affected production levels. 2 The 
fortunes of the white cigarette producers were even more desperate in the early 1960s. 
All the foreign-owned white cigarette factories were nationalised between 1958 and 
1964 by the Soekarno government, thus putting the major cigarette producers at the 
time under state ownership and control. Subsequent poor management of the 
companies led to a decline in sales. The companies were later returned to their 
original foreign owners after 1966. 
2 The price of cloves rose sixfold in 1968-9 (from Rp 250 to Rp 1,500 per kilogram) and by another 
300 per cent between 1973 to 1975 (Manning, 1979: 202). 
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Under the New Order production of kretek has grown at a faster rate than ever seen 
since ind1q:iendence, and much faster than white cigarettes. By 1975 production had 
already top~d 30 billion and by 1980 it exceeded 50 billion, compared with white 
cigarette productic~ which had reached only 33 billion sticks in 1980. According to 
Manning (1979: 198) part of the success of the kretek industry during the 1970s was 
due to continued protection. The policy of differential excise taxes and minimum 
retail prices for white cigarettes had been retained throughout the period of 
independence (see section 9.7).3 In addition, machine-made cigarette production had 
been limited by application of strict licensing. Several ~1ppeals by white cigarette (and 
also kretek) factories to use new machinC't'Y i1ad been turned down. Castles (1967: 
107) reports two cases - one involving a kretek company and one involving BAT - in 
which applications for use of cigarette-making machinery were rejected in the 1960s. 
Manning (1979: 199) noted that in the mid-1970s BAT again failed in an attempt to 
introduce new machinery. 
1 Between 1967 and 1979 the excise had been set nt 35 per cent for krctek and 50 per cent for white 
cigarettes. 
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introduce new machinery. 
Over the next 14 years kretek production more than tripled to top 156 billion sticks by 
1994. Conversely, white cigarettes declined from 33 bHlion in 1980 to 15.6 billion in 
1990, but recovered to around 21 billion in 1994 (or 12 per cent of total cigarette 
production). Part of the success of the kretek industry in the 1980s rw1st be attributed 
to the introduction of mechanisation on a large scale :from the late 1970s. Bentoel, one 
of the ieading kretek firms in the 1970s, was the first to obtain permission from the 
Department of Industry to mechanise part of its production in 1972. This was 
followed by Djarum in 1976 and Gudang Garam in 1978. Initially, these two firms 
were allowed to mechanise only around 10 per cent of their production in 1978 
(Manning, 1979: 199). Gudang Garam, for example, was only permitted to use eight 
of its 28 new filter machines (Tempo, 21 April, 1979: 51). In 1979 these restrictions 
were replaced with a required production ratio between machine and hi4'1.d-made 
kretek of 1 :2. That is, machine-made kretek was not to exceed 50 per c~nt of the 
firms' production of hand-rolled k.retek. The purpose of these restrictions was to 
protect smaller firms' market shares and existing employment levels. As a 
consequence of the change, however, growth of machine-made kretek has grown 
·~. 
rapidly since 1980. Figure 9.1 clearly show that the growth in kretek production in the 
1980s was wholly attributed to machine·made kretek. Non-compliance with the 
production ratio was widespread, and in 1983 the Department of Industry revised the 
ratio to 2:3. Tarmidi (1996: 101) notes that the 2:3 ratio has not been complied with, 
anu the government has been reluctant to enforce the regulation. 
In addition, rising disposable incomes, improved quality and image of the kretek 
brands and greater advertising and promotional activities have enabled the larger 
kretek firms to expand their markets at phenomenal rates. Production levels of hand-
rolled k.retek have stagnated since 1983 but ha.ve not declined, indicating a stable 
demand for hand-rolled kretek. This stable demand is partly the result of differential 
excise taxes between hand-rolled kretek and machine-made kretek (see section 9.7). 
Corresponding to the stability in production of hand-rolled kretek, employment levels 
have also remained stable at around 140,000 employees throughout the 1980s (Figure 
9.2). The expansion in total kretek production and stable employment numbers 
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together imply sharply rising labour productivity in the 1980s. 
Figure 9.2 
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The decline in the demand for white ": .;arettes during the 1980s is more difficult to 
explain. Government policy is partly an explanation of the decline, but not the major 
reason. Restrictions on mechanisation certainly constrained growth in the 1970s, but 
these were eased in the 1980s. Higher minimum retail prices for white cigarettes were 
retained during this period. A differential excise tax rate existed between machine-
mac;e kretek and white cigarettes, but it was not large (about 5 per cent in 1979) and 
had narrowed considerably during the 1980s. The best explanation appears to be the 
reformulation of the image of kretek in the 1980s. The introduction of the filter kretek 
in the early 1980s, improved packaging, and intensive advertising and promotional 
activities induced a shift in consumer tastes from white cigarettes and hand-rolled 
kretek to machine-made kretek (Permana, 1989: 172). Culture and local tastes may 
also help to explain why many consumers switched from white cigarettes to kretek. 
Production of machine-made kretek declined by 11.3 per cent in 1991. This large 
slump in sales was due to two policy changes in that year. Fjrst, to raise more revenue 
the government increased excise taxes for large kretek finns. Second, to protect small 
fim1s • market shares from competition from larger firms the government introduced 
differential minimum retail prices between small and large firms. The differential 
minimum retail prices were based on a firm's production volume. In other words, the 
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larger the firm's production volume, the higher its legislated minimum retail price per 
cigarette stick. The effect of this policy was to increase large firms' relative retail 
prices and, tnus, reduce demand for their brands. These policy changes had a positive 
impact on sales of hand-rolled kretek and white cigarettes, production of which 
increased by 4.5 percent and 18.2 percent r~s_pectively in 1991. 
Exports of cigarettes, in particular white cigarettes, have grown substantially over the 
last decade (Figure 9.3). White cigarette exports increased from a negligible 3 tonnes 
in 1983 to top W3,000 tonnes in 1993 or an average growth rate of 68.7 per cent per 
annum. Exports of white cigarettes grew partly in response to declining domestic 
demand for the product in the 1980s, but also because the MNCs (e.g,, BAT) are well 
pl.-iced t~ penetrate export markets as they have specialised knowledge of and access 
to export markets through their subsidiaries located around the world. Kretek 
cigarettes have also grown rapidly in the last decade, fro;n 346 tonnes in 1983 to 
reach 3,848 tonnes by 1995, or an average growth rate of 23.6 per cent per cent per 
annum. A substantial proportion of these exports go to Malaysia where there is a 
sizeable Indonesian expatriate community, although in recent years they have also 
been export~d to ln•lochina, South America and North America. The three largest 
producers - Gudang Garrun, Djarum and Sampoema - accour.t for most of these 
kretek exports. 
Figure 9.3 
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9.4 Demand For Cigarettes 
Figure 9.4 depicts per capita consumption of cigarettes (both kretek and white 
cigarettes) during 1970 - 1994. Per capita consumption is measured as the annual 
consumption of cigarettes per person over 15 years old. It is apparent that cigarette 
consumption per person has increased substantially over the last 25 years. The annual 
average growth of consumption for the period is 4.3 per cent. The sharp drop in 
consumption in the early part of the 1990s was due to the substantial increase in 
excise taxes and the introduction of minimum retail prices in 1991. 
Figure 9. 4 
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In this section we estimate the price and income elasticities of the demand for 
cigarettes in Indonesia. Many researchers have investigated the determinants of 
cigarette consumption for other countries. In general, these studies find that demand is 
both price aud income inelastic. Further, some of these studies find that advertising 
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and various anti-smoking campaigns and government health warnings affect the 
demand for cigarettes.4 We follow these studies and specify the demand function for 
cigarettes as: 
- + + 
Q1° = f(P1, Y1, A1, ) (1) 
where Q1° is the quantity demanded of cigarettes in period t (t=l ... N), Pis the price 
of cigarettes, Y is disposable income, A is advertising expenditures. P is expected to 
be inversely related to cigarette demand, and income and advertising to be positively 
related to demand. A dummy variable, D 1980, which is equal to one for the years 
1980 and 1981 and zero otherwise, is included to capture the positive impact of the 
introduction of mechanised filter kretek in 1980 and 1981 on cigarette demand. Price 
(P) is usually treated as an endogenous variable in a simultaneous demand-supply 
equation for the reason that price and quantity are simultaneously deterroJned 
variables. However, the price for cigarettes in Indonesia is partly determined 
exogenously by the tax regulators (see section 9.7). Further, since 1991 the 
government has fixed minimum retail prices. Thus, P can be treated as an exogenous 
varidble in the demand function. Health considerations are not yet strong in Indonesia, 
and are ignored in our model. 
In estimating the demand function, it is necessary to allow for possible time lags 
involved in the hypothesised relationships between demand, price and incor,,\e. For 
this, we make use of the error correction method (ECM), which is considered a highly 
appropriate dynamic specification when one works with relatively short time series. 
Under the ECM method, the long-run (steady state) relationship being investigated is 
embodied with a dynamic specification including'lagged dependent and independent 
variables (Hendry, 1995). The ECM procedure has the added advantage of separating 
long-run r~l?itionships from the short-run impact in the estimated equation.5 
The ECM redres3es the spurious regression problem associated with modeling with 
time series data. If the time series is non-stationary in level form, then the regression 
4 Baltagi and Levin, 1986; Boyd and Seldon, 1990; Tegene, 1991; Tansel, 1993; Valdes, 1993; and 
Hondroyiannis and Papapetrou, 1997. 
5 With the exception of Hondroyiannis and Papapetrou (1997), all the other studies have not drawn 
upon recent advances in time-series analysis (i.e. the BCM) that allow us to investigate the short-run 
impacts and the long-run equilibrium relationships between economic variables. 
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is estimating a spurious relationship, and thus, tells us nothing about the behavioural 
relationships between the variables (Bane:rjee et al, 1993: 138-9). Guarding against 
the possibility of uncovering spurious relations is important when we work with 
variables (consumption and price) which seem to have a strong trend component 
(Athukorala, 1994, 1995). The ECM procedure minimises the possibility of 
estimating a spurious relation while retaining long run information when modeling 
with time series data (Hendry, 1995). 
The estimation procedure starts with an over-parameterised autoregressive distributed 
lag (ADL) specification of an appropriate order: 
m m 
Qd, =a+ LbliQdr-i + Lh2.1X,_, +u, (2) 
i=I l=O 
where a is a constant, Q,v is a (n x 1) vector of endogenous variables, Xis a (k x 1) 
vector of exogenous variables, and bi and b2 are (n x n) and (n x k) matrices of 
parameters. 
Equation (2) is then reparameterise1' in terms of differences and lagged levels so as to 
separate the short-run and long-run mu~tirliers of the system. 
(3) 
m m 
where c1 =-(/- Lb1,;), c2 = (Lb2,;) 
i=I l=O 
and where the long-run multipliers of the system are given by 1. 
CJ 
Equation (3) constitutes the maintained hypothesis of our specification search. This 
general model is tested down (using OLS), by dropping statistically insignificant lag 
terms, and imposing data-acceptable restrictions on the regression parameters. The 
testing procedure continues until a parsimonious error correction representation is 
obtained which retains the a priori theoretical model as its long run solution. To be 
acceptable, the final equation must satisfy various diagnostic tests relating to the OLS 
error process. 
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The sample period is 1970 to 1994. The price of cigarettes is measured by the relative 
cigarette price index (ratio of the cigarette price index to the consumer price index: 
the base year is 1983). The cigarette price index includes both kretek and white 
cigarette prices.6 The source is the various issues of BPS Indikator Ekonomi 
(Economic Indicators). Income is measured by the per capita real disposable income 
(World Bank, World Tables, 1970-94). We do not have advertising data for the period 
1970 to 1991. However, television advertising was banned for a decade until 1989. 
Thus, we include a dummy variable (Dadv) to capture the effect of television 
advertising on demand since 1989 (dummy variable= one for the years 1989 to 1994, 
otherwise zero). All variables (except the two dummy variables) are used in log form 
so that the coefficients can be directly interpreted as constant elasticities. 
The final parsimonious estimates of cigarette demand are reported in Table 9.2 
together with the diagnostic statistics. The long-run ivcome and price elasticities 
derived from the estimated coefficients of the lagged level variables are also reported 
in Table 9.2. The equation passes the F-test for overall significance at the one percent 
level. Statistically, the equation performed very well, exhibiting no problems of 
functional form misspecification (RESET), heteroskedasticity (HSC), or serial 
correlation (LM). The adjusted R square is 0.92, higher than most other studies on 
cigarette demand. 
6 Data limitations prevent us from constructing separate price indices for kretek and white cigarettes 
and estimating the demand equation separately for kretek and white cigarettes. 
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Table 9.2 Determinants of Cigarette Consumption: Regression Results 
~ Qd = 2.249 - 0.599 ~ P + 0.701 ~ Y -0.245 Pt-1 +0.471 Yt-1 - 0.570 Qdt-1 
(2.7)* (8.2)* (2.6)* (2.0)** (6.8)* (6.7)* 
+ 0.075 D1980 - 0.103 Dadv 
(4.8)* (5.5)* 
Long-run price elasticitya = -0.43 (t-ratio = 2.5)* 
Long-run income elasticitya = 0.83 (t-ratio = 15.1)* 
R2 = 0.92 F (7, 16) = 36.7 LM (1, 15) = 0.26 
JBN (2) = 0.63 HSC (1, 22) = 1.17 
RESET (1, 15) = 0.10 
* t-ratios of regression coefficients are given in brackets with the level of statistical 
significance (one-tailed test) denoted as * 1 per cent,** 5 per cent 
a: The long-run price and income elasticities are derived from the long-run (steady-
state) solution to the model. 
Test statistics 
LM Lagrange multiplier for serial correlation; RESET Ramsey RESET test for 
functional form misspecification; JBN Jarques-Bera test for normality of residuals; 
HSC test for heteroskedasticity (based on squared residuals). Except JBN, which is 
based on the X2 distribution, all other tests are based on the F-distribution. The 
degrees of freedom for the respective tests are given in brackets. 
As expected, cigarette price impacts negatively and real disposable income positively 
on cigarette demand. The long-run price and income elasticities are -0.43 and 0.83 
respectively. Both estimated elasticities are less than one, suggesting that cigarette 
demand is price and income inelastic: A 10 per cent increase in the relative cigarette 
price will reduce cigarette demand by 4.3 per cent in the long-run. A 10 per cent 
increase in real disposable income will increase the demand for cigarettes by 8.3 per 
cent in the long-run. The short-run price elasticity of demand of -0.599 is higher than 
the long-run price elasticity of -0.43. This suggests that the demand effects of a 
change in price are greater in the short-run compared with the long-run. Conversely, 
the demand effects of a change in income are smaller in the short-run. (short-run 
income elasticity of 0.701) compared with the long-run. 
The dummy variable (Dadv) intended to capture the effect of television advertising 
since 1989 is negative and statistically significant at the 1 per cent level. This suggests 
that television advertising had no positive effect on demand. However, the dummy 
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variable is most likely capturing other policy changes that had a stronger negative 
effect on per capita cigarette consumption, such as the sharp increase in excise taxes 
and the establishment of minimum retail prices in 1991. As expected, the coefficient 
of the dummy 'luriable 01980 is positive and statistically significant at the one per 
cent level. This indicates that the introduction of filter kretek caused a jump in the 
demand for cigarettes in the early 1980s. 
Our results are consistent with studies for other countries. Hondroyiannis et al (1997), 
for example, found a long-run price elasticity of -0.66 per cent and an income 
elasticity of 0.54 for Greece. 
9.5 Structural Change in the Cigarette Industry 
The Indonesian cigarette market can be characterised as a product differentiated 
oligopoly with a competitive fringe. In 1994 the four-firm concentration ratio was 75 
per cent (total kretek and white segments) and the number of firms was in excess of 
155. In the two sub-markets of kretek and white cigarettes the CR4 ratios were 85 per 
cent and 93 per cent respectively. These ratios are comparable with those of other 
countries' cigarette markets (Chapter 4, Table 4.11). However, this oligopolistic 
market structure evolved only in the last 20 or so years due to a combination of 
factors, such as the mechanisation of production on a large scale from the late 1970s, 
changes in demand conditions, and intensive competition among firms. 
Castles (1967: 20-22) described the Indonesian cigarette industry in the 1960s as 
having a 'dualistic' structure. A small number of large, foreign-owned white cigarette 
producers existed side by side with hundreds of small-scale domestic kretek 
producers.7 White cigarette producers used modern filter machines to produce 
cigarettes, while kretek producers used simple labour-intensive techniques to produce 
kretek. Even in the largest kretek firms, rolling of cigarettes continued to employ 
simple wooden rolling tools, trimming was done with scissors and packing and 
packaging by hand. From the colonial period three foreign-owned firms dominated 
the white cigarette industry: British American Tobacco (BAT), Belgian-owned 
7 Castles (1967:21) reported that 941 kretek firms existed in 1961. 
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Faroka, and the Dutch-owned Industria. Castles (1967: 20-1) reported that these three 
accounted for over 65 per cent of white cigarette production in the 1950s, and 
probably an even higher share before the war. In the 1950s a number of domestic 
owned firms were established but these were mostly small scale and never produced a 
major share of total white cigarette output. In contrast to the white cigarette industry, 
ownership and control in the kretek industry was widely dispersed. Castles (ibid: 21) 
observed, 
' though some of the more popular brands have been able to secure 
fairly stable market for themselves, conditions in the kretek industry [in 
1961 J approximate pure competition more closely than is usual for 
secondary industries, and the price tends to remain close to the cost of 
production.' 
Since the late 1960s the kretek industry has become increasingly dominated by three 
firms: Bentoel in Malang, Djarum in Kudus and Gudang Gararn in Kediri. These three 
fi1ms' combined share of kretek production in 1970 was 36 per cent, rising to 56 per 
cent in 1976. The rising trend in concentration in the kretek industry during this 
period had little to do with changes in technology since the basic technology in 
making and packing cigarettes remained almost unchanged since the 1930s. Manning 
( 1979, 202-5) suggested that productivity differences between firms, easier access to 
capital (for larger firms) and increased efforts in marketing and advertising 
contributed to the rising trend in concentration in the 1970s. In addition, the dramatic 
increase in clove prices over the period 1968 to 1974 appears to have adversely 
affected many small-scale producers, who were unable to obtain sufficient working 
capital to maintain their stocks of cloves, thus, resulting in their closure (Manning, 
1979: 202). 
Figure 9.5 shows the trends in the four-firm conr.entration ratio since 1976 in the 
cigarette industry and the two sub-sectors of kretek and white cigarettes. It is apparent 
that there has been a continuous increase in concentration in the total cigarette 
industry (both white and kretek) since 1976. The CR4 ratio increased from 43 per cent 
in 1976 to 75 per cent in 1990, and has remained stable since then. In the kretek 
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industry the bulk of the increase in concentration occurred before 1981. The CR4 
increased from 61 per cent in 1976 to 80 per cent in 1980, and gradually increased 
over the next 14 years to reach 85 per cent in 1994. Concentration also rose in the 
white cigarette sector from 76 per cent in 1975 to around 93 per cent by 1994. 
Figure 9.5 
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Increasing seller concentration in the cigarette industry since the late 1970s can be 
attributed to rising scale economies resulting from the larger kretek firms mechanising 
production. Increased efforts in distribution and advertising by the major kretek firms, 
and the decline in the sales of the major white cigarette producers, also help to explain 
rising concentration in the 1980s. Corresponding to the rise in concentration is the 
decline in the number of firms over the period 1968 to 1994. Figure 9.6 (a) shows that 
the number of kretek firms declined from 653 in 1968 to 144 in 1994. Figure 9.5 (b) 
shows that the number of white cigarette producers declined from 22 firms in the 
1976 to 11 in 1994. 
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Figure 9.6 (a) 
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9.6 Changes in Leading Firms' Market Shares 
The rising concentration in the cigarette industry hides considerable instability in 
leading firms' market shares. In Chapter 8 we contended that, in the absence of 
constraints on competition (which we will discuss shortly), fluctuations in leading 
firms' market shares and rankings are good indicators of competitive rivalry in an 
industry. Turnover of leading firms' rankings provides some information on the 
vibrancy of the competitive process, and turnover-based measures of competition 
reflect the dynamics of the competitive process more accurate1)' than static measures 
of competition such as seller concentration. Table 9.3 traces changes in leading firms' 
market shares since 1979. 
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Table 9.3 Changes in Leading Firms' Market Shares 
Market Share Change in Market Share 
(%) (Eercentage Eoint change} 
Rankin 1979 1979 1989 1994 1979-89 1979-94 
1. BAT (W) 15 3 5 -12 -10 
2. Djarum (K) 13 28 18 15 5 
3. Gudang Garam (K) 12 28 43 16 31 
4. STTC (W) 10 4 1 -6 -9 
5. Bentoel (K) 8 11 7 3 -1 
6. Noyorono (K) 4 3 2 -1 -2 
7. Faroka (W) 4 1 1 -3 -3 
13. Sampoema (K) 1 3 7 2 6 
Malboro (W)a 0 2 5 2 5 
Source: GAPRI, and Survey Research Indonesia. K=kretek, W = white cigarettes 
a. Malboro was introduced in 1983. 
A significant amount of turbulence in market shares is observed over the period i979 
to 1994 in Table 9.3. Both Gudang Garam's and Djarum's market shares expanded 
rapidly over this period. Gudang Garam's share increased from 12 per cent in 1979 to 
43 per cent in 1994, a change of 31 percentage points. Djarum's share expanded from 
13 per cent in 1979 to 28 per cent in 1989, but declined to 18 per cent in 1994. The 
other leading kretek producer, B~ntoel, experienced a long tenn decline in market 
share from around 8 per cent in 1975 to 6 per cent in 1994. Sampoema achieved a 
significant increase in share since the. late 1980s, and by 1994 had surpassed Bentoel 
as the third largest cigarette producer in Indonesia. The three largest white cigarette 
producers in 1979 also experienced long term declines in their market shares, 
con&istent with the switch in demand from white cigarettes to kretek in the 1980s. 
BAT, for example, saw its market share decline from 15 per cent in 1979 to around 3 
per cent in 1989, but recovered to just under 5 per cent in 1994. The Sumatra Tobacco 
Trading Company (SITC) experienced a similar fate to BAT, and its market share 
was just 1 pe1 cent by 1994. Faroka saw its market share decline from around 4 per 
cent in 1979 to less than 1 per cent in 1987 when Rothmans of Pall Mall,· Australia, 
acquired it. 
Turbulence is also observed in the changes in the rank order of the leading four firms. 
Two of the top four finns (Gudang Garam and Djarum) in 1979 remained in the top 
four in 1994. Two firms (BAT and STTC) exited out of the top four finns after 1979, 
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and two firms (Bentoel and Sampoema) entered the top four firms before 1994. This 
continuous change in market shares and rankings among firms suggests that intense 
competitive pressures were operating in the cigarette industry over the period 1979 to 
1994. 
There are several reasons why Gudang Garam and Djarum grew at a much faster rate 
than other producers during the 1980s. First, Gudang Garam and Djarum were two of 
the first three firms to mechanise production. They had a lead time of more than four 
to six years over their nearest kretek competitors and this 'first mover' advantage 
certainly contributed towards higher growth rates and consolidation of market shares 
by the end of the 1980s. Several medium-sized firms delayed mechanising production 
for reasor.s that appellr to be related to management inertia, rather than government 
opposition to mechanisation. Management at Noyorono, for example, were not 
entirely convinced that machine-made kretek would significantly affect their sales of 
hand-rolled kretek. They adopted a 'wait and see' strategy before undertaking such a 
large capital investment. The success of Gudang Ga.tam and Djarum, and the fact that 
two of its closest rivals, Sampoema and Sukun, began to mechanise production in 
1983, moved Noyorono to mechanise production in 1984 (firm interview). 
A second factor was Gudang Garam and Djarum' s success in expanding distribution 
networks across Indonesia and being the first to establish national brands for their 
products. Prior to the 1970s, the kretek industry was regionally fragmented, and 
regional brand loyalty was very strong (and still is for many brands). Bentoel, the 
leading kretek producer in the mid- l 970s, sold its brands mainly to smokers around 
Malang in East Java and Central Java. Djarum's brands were popular in Central Java, 
while Gudang Garam's brands were popular in East Java. In the 1970s and early 
1980s, Djarum and Gudang Garam invested heavily in establishing distribution 
networks across Indonesia. The two firms also spent heavily on advertising and 
promoting their brands in all provinces.8 By the mid-1980s their major brands could 
be purchased across the archipelago. Djarum's market share fell in 1991 and remains 
well below its 1989 level. We will show later that this downsizing is a deliberate 
strategy of Djarum so that it can fall into a lower excise rate and, thus, raise its profit 
8 Interview with n Gudang Gnrnm marketing official. 
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margin. 
Sampoerna has emerged as one of the 'big shakers and movers' of the 1990s. This 
firm adopted an entirely different marketing strategy from the other leading firms. 
While Gudang Garam, Djarum and Bentoel targeted the lower profit margin, mass 
market (middle to lower income consumers), Sampoema targeted the more 
'profitable', but smaller niche markets. Sampoerna is the only firm to have 
established a 'premium' kretek brand (known as Oji Sam Soe or 234 in Chinese), and 
the first to have introduced a mild tar, low nicotine kretek brand called A MJLD. Both 
these brands generate forge profit margins for Sampoema, and have also resulted in 
significant increases in market share in the last few years.9 
British American Tobacco and the other MNCs' market shares declined in the 1980s 
for at least two reasons. First, as discussed earlier, there was a substantial shift in 
demand from white cigarettes to kretek since the early 1980s. A second reason is that 
entry restrictions in the kretek industry prevented BAT and other MNCs from shifting 
production to the kretek sector to off set the fall in the demand for white cigarettes. 
9.7 Regulatory Constraints on Firm Growth and Rivalry 
Before analysing the nature 0f competition among the major cigarette firms in more 
detail we will first discuss the regulatory constraints on firm rivalry. Table 9.4 lists 
several government policies affecting the cigarette industry. Restrictions on entry and 
mechanisation, differential excise tuxes between small and large firms, and minimum 
retail prices have been used to protect the small-scale kretek sector (and employment 
levels) from competition from MNCs and the larger kretek firms. The effect of the 
restriction on mechanisation was addressed earlier and does not need to be repeated 
here. 
9 Jardine Fleming Securities (1995) estimated Dji Sam Soe's gross profit margin to be 56 per cent, 
more than twice the industry average. 
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Table 9.4 
Entry restrictions 
Mechanisation 
Excise taxes 
domestic 
Import tariff 
Minimum retail 
Prices 
Clove monopoly 
~cgulations in the Cigarette Industry 
BKPM restricts MNC entry into the kretek sector 
Restricted in the 1970s. 
Production ratio of 2: 1 between hand-rolled and machine-made 
k.retek replaced mechanisation restriction<: in 1979. Ratio 
revised to 3:2 in 1983. 
Differential excise taxes between small and large firms, 
and imported cigarettes. 
Tariff and surcharges of 30 per cent each on imported white 
cigarettes 
Differential minimum retail prices between small and large 
firms introduced in April 1991 
A buying and selling clove monopoly established in December 
1990 
Advertising Televfo: )Il advertising banned between 1980 and 1989. 
Health Health warning on cigarette packs introduced in 
_ October 1991. Restrictions on smoking in some public places. 
The clove monopoly was disbanded in June 1998 under the IMF structural reform programme. 
9.7.1 Entry Restrictions 
Entry restrictions in the kretek industry were primarily designed to protect domestic-
owned firms from competition from large MNCs. For most of the 1980s and the 
1990s the kretek cigarette industry was officially closed to both domestic and foreign 
inve:stment. In July 1992, entry was allowed in kretek with certain conditions: new 
investments were to begin with the production of hand-rolled kretek, after which the 
company would be permitted to produce machine kre.tek in the ratio of 2:3 with hand-
rolled kretek (BKPM Negative Investment List, 1992). In an attempt to offset the 
decline in its market share, BAT entered the kretek market in 1982 with its 
introduction of a mildly flavoured dove cigarette called "Carita". Initial market 
acceptance was positive, but -:ight months after its introduction the government 
advised BAT to withdraw it from the market (BAT, 1982). This decision mainly 
served to protect large k.retek firms' market shares as BAT was in direct competition 
with these firms, and not with the cheap, low quality products of the small-scale 
sector. 
While the regulatory authorities strictly enforced the regulation against the large 
MNCs, they were less strict on domestic firms. A number of smaller domestic white 
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cigarette producers were allowed to switch production to kretek in the 1980s.10 
Ftfber, entry into the white cigarette segment was not restricted, and a number of 
I6etek producers entered the market •11 the 1980s and 1990s. 11 
9.7.2 Differential Excise Taxes and f{t.linimum Retail Prices 
Differential excise taxes and minimum retail prices based on a finn's annual 
productiol'! volume are two other measures used by the government to try to conserve 
a share of the market for small kretek producers. 
The excise tax on cigarettes is levied by reference to the retail or "banderole" price. 
The Director General of Customs and Excises detennines the banderole price for each 
producer. The excise tax payable by each producer is then calculated by the excise ~ax 
rate times the banderole price (Permana, 1987: 99). The differential excise treatment 
of machine-made and hand-rolled cigarettes was first introduced by the Dutch 
colonial government in the 1930s, when it imposed an excise tax of 30% on white 
cigarettes and 20% on kretek. The major puzpose (besides raising tax revenue) of the 
differential exdse tax regime was to protect kretek firms from competition from the 
larger white cigarette producers. The Indonesian government widened the excise tax 
differenth~l from IO percentage points in 1950 to 30 percentage points in 1959, but 
later reduced it to 15 percentage points in 1970. While the amount of protection 
declined between l 91i9 and 1970 the excise tax differential still provided protection 
for the kretek industry (Tannidi, 1996: 101). 
The introduction of machine-made kretek on a large 1cale at the end of the 1970s 
threatened the survival of small kretek firms and existing employment levels. 
Consequently, the go-.,rmment introduced differential excise tax rates based on the 
total production volume (both hand-rolled and machine-made kretek) of firms. The 
larger the firm, the higher is the excise tax rate on both machine-made and hand-
10 These finns were: P.T Artha Tobacco Company (shifted to kretek in 1980), P.T Dewan Daru (1981) 
and P.T Perosi (1983). 
11 In 1983, Bentoel established a subsidiary named P.T Tresno Industria and licensed Malboro from 
Phillip Morris. By 1995 Malboro was the largest selling white cigarette brand in the main urban centres 
of Indonesia with a market share of around 6 per cent of the total cigarette market (SRI, 1995). Gudang 
Garam established a subsidiary named P.T Halim Wonowijoyo and launched its own white cigarette 
brand. In the early 1990s Djarum introduced Alain Delon, and Sampoerna licensed Salem frcm Philip 
Morris in 1991. 
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rolled kretek. For example, in 1995 a kretek firm with total production greater then 60 
billion sticks incurred excise tax rates of 38 per cent and 18 per cent on machine-
made and hand-rolled kretek respectively. This compares with excise tax rates of 28 
per cent and 8 per cent for small-sized firms (production between 2 and 5 billion 
sticks). While an excise tax differential between machine-made kretek and locally 
produced white cigarettes existed in the 1970s (about 2.5% to 5% in 1979), it 
narrowed considerably in the 1980s, and by 1990 exci!>t! tax treatment between white 
cigarette and large krntek producers was more or less the same. However, imported 
cigarettes are subject to an excise tax of 70 per cent. They are also subject to tariff and 
surcharges of 30 per cent each, providing significant protection for local producers, 
including white cigarette producers. 
The differential excise tax regime affected the behaviour of large kretek firms in two 
ways. First, the increase in the highest production threshold from 8.5 billion sticks in 
1990 to 30 billion sticks in 1991 induced Djarnm to reduce its production to below 
the 30 billion threshold so that it could incur a lower excise tax rate (~\"!e Table 9.5). 
Table 9. 5 
Changes in Djarum's Production in Response to Changes in Excise Tax Rates 
Djarum Gudang Garam 
Excise Tax Rate On: Excise Tax Rate On: 
Year Production SKT SKM Production SKT SKM 
______ (._Inl_._ll_ion ~cicks) (million sticks) 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
35 14J 25.0 35.0 40 980 25.0 35.0 
39 550 17.5 37.5 39 500 17.5 37.5 
37 114 17.5 37.5 56 780 17.5 37.5 
29 306 15.0 35.0 58 352 17.5 37.5 
28 938 15.0 35.0 64 068 17.5 37.5 
SKT = hand-rolled kretek, SKM = machine-made kretek 
Production data from GAPPRI. 
By incurring a lower excise tax rate on its products, Djarum could increase its profit 
margin (Jardine Fleming Securities, 1991). Gudang Garam did not have the same 
option because its production was well over 56 billion sticks in 1990, and a reduction 
to below 30 billion sticks was not feasible. 
Second, the major kretek firms sub-contracted out production of new brands to 
smaller firms, which incur lower excise tax rates. A Ministry of Finance regulation 
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prohibits firms from sub-contracting out production of existing brands to smaller 
firms. 12 The smaller firms are often subsidiaries of the kretek firm, but are treated as 
separate legal entities for the purpose of taxation. For example, Djarum established 
P.T Filastra (brand name Crystal) in 1992 and P.T Mustang (brand name Mustang) in 
1993. In 1994, Mustang and Filastra produced around one billion and three billion 
sticks respectively, and incurred excise tax rates of 24% and 28% on machine-made 
cigarettes. Thus, while total Djarum/Filastra/Mustang qroctuction exceeded 30 billion 
sticks in 1994, their separate legal entities meant that each firm incurred excise tax 
rates below the 30 billion threshold rate of 37.5% and 17.5% f0r machine-made and 
hand-rolled kretek respectively. Other large kretek firms th~1t have sub-contracted out 
new brands to smaller firms for similar tax reasons are: Gudang Garam sub-
contracted production to its subsidiary P.T Karya Niaga Persama (brand name 
Grendel); Noyorono sub-contracted out new brands to its subsidiary P.T Nikki Super 
Tobacco Company (brand name Nikki Super). 
To protect small-scale kretek firms the Minister of Finance in April 1991 fixed 
minimum prices for kretek and white cigarettes, with the excise tax included. Like the 
excise tax regime, minimum prices were determined according to the total production 
volume of the firm. The larger the firm, the higher is the minimum retail price. For 
example, in 1995 a kretek firm with total production exceeding 60 billion sticks per 
annum must charg~ at least Rp 75 per machine-made stick and Rp 65 per hand-rolled 
stick. This compares to Rp 50 per mac!> lne-made stick and Rp 40 per hand-rolled 
stick for a medium-sized firm producing betwee 2 and 5 billion sticks per year. The 
immediate effect of this policy was to increase medium and large-scale firms' retail 
prices of kretek, resulting in a slump in their sales in 1991 (see Figure 9.3 above). The 
severity of the slump in sales encouraged the government to revise downward the 
minimum prices in December 1991. 
9.7.3 Clove Monopoly 
In December 1990 the government granted a private-state trading enterprise joint 
venture (known as the Clove Trading Agency, or BPPC) a monopoly right to purchase 
12 Ironically, the prohibition on large firms sub-contracting out production of existing brands is anti-
small firm. 
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cloves from the producer cooperatives and sell them to the kretek finns. The result of 
the monopoly was an increase in the price of cloves to kretek producers from an 
average of Rp7,000 per kg in 1990 to Rpl2,500 per kg in 1991. This translated into 
an increase of around 20 per cent in the cost of production of the large kretek 
producers (Jardine Fleming Securities, 1990).13 
The establishment of the BPPC received considerable public criticism for its rent-
seeking activities. While the events surrounding the formatiou of the monopoly are 
not central to our study, they are of interest in themselves. It is therefore worthwhile 
to describe them in some detail. 
At the end of the 1980s, P .T Bina Reksa Perdana - a consortium of clove traders and a 
private company owned by Hutomo Mandala Putra (the youngest son of the former 
President) - was accumulating stocks of cloves in a speculative bid to 'corner the 
market'. By 1990 the consortium had accumulated around 65,000 metric tonnes of 
cloves, equivalent to about two thirds of annual cloves consumption in Indonesia. In 
1990 the company lobbied the government to form a national clove buffer agency to 
support the government's floor price of Rp6,500 per kg. 14 In December, the 
government announced the establishment of BPPC, which was a 80:20 joint venture 
between P.T Kembang Cengkeh Nasional (owned by Hutomo Mandala Putra) and P.T 
Kerta Niaga (a state-owned trading enterprise). The trading monopoly would purchase 
all the cloves from the farmers through the local village cooperative (Kooperasi Unit 
Desa or KUD), anc'.. then sell them to the kretek firms. It immediately offered farmers 
Rp7,000 per kg, more than double the then current farmers price, and sold the cloves 
to kretek producers for Rpl2,000 per kg. 
However, through 1991, as the demand from kretek companies waned and clove 
production responded to the clove prices, the board's clove stocks rose dramatically, 
to about 170,000 metric tonnes by mid-1991, equivalent to about two years supply .15 
13 In 1989, cloves made up 27 per cent and 33 per cent of the total cost of production of machine-made 
and hand-rolled kretek respectively (Gappri, 1989). 
14 In 1980, the government introduced a floor price of Rp 6,500 per kilogram. Cooperatives were 
required to purchase cloves to maintain the floor price. As expected, this floor price stimulated an 
increase in production of cloves, which in tum led to an oversupply, and prices frequently fell below 
Rp 6,500. For example, in early 1989 the price of cloves fell to Rp 3,500 per kg in Surabaya. 
15 Cigarette companies reduced their purchases of cloves by running down their existing stocks of 
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The result for BPPC was rising debt costs associated with the stockpile, which in turn 
threatened the long-term viability of the board. To fund the large stockpile of cloves, 
BPPC used its close connections with government to secure loans amounting to 
US$350 million from Bank Indonesia (the central bank), and two state-owned banks, 
Bank Bumi Daya and Bank Rakyat Indonesia. 
In an effort to increase the demand for cloves from the large kretek firms, the owners 
of BPPC again lobbied the government to make a number of adjustments to the excise 
tax regulations. In December 1991, a Joint Decree of the Minister of Trade and the 
Minister of Finance stipulated that from 1 January the purchase of cigarette excise 
bands was to be linked to the purchase of specified quantities of cloves from BPPC. 
In other words, firms must provide invoices from BPPC before obtaining the excise 
tax bands. The specified quantity of cloves for which kretek producers must provide 
invoices from BPPC were as follows: 
Table 9.6 Regulated Clove Purchases from BPPC 
Grams Per Stick 
Firm Annual Output 
(billion of Sticks) 
>30 
;..i.'~ - 30 
>0.75 - 4.5 
>0.05 - 0.75 
Mechanised Kretek 
0.63 
0.46 
0.35 
0.17 
Decree of the Minister of Trade and the Minister of Finance, 1991 
Hand-Produced Kretek 
0.81 
0.63 
0.52 
0.23 
Larger firms are required to purchase from BPPC a greater amount of cloves per stick 
produced compared to smaller firms. For example, firms with annual production 
above 30 billion sticks (i.e. Gudang Garam and Djarum in 1991) are required to 
purchase 0.63 and 0.81 grammes of cloves per stick of machine-made and hand-rolled 
kretek respectively. The normal usage of cloves for large firms is between 0.5 and 0.7 
grammes per stick of machine-made and hand-rolled kretek. The requirement to show 
proof of clove purchases resulted in either write-offs of existing clove stocks or at 
least higher inventory levels than normal for the large firms. 
cloves, and reducing the content of cloves per cigarette stick. It is nonnal practice for cigarette 
producers to hold stocks equivalent to one year's consumption. 
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In an effort to reduce the stockpile Mr Hutomo declared that clove production would 
have to be cut, and in February 1992 publicly suggested that farmers bum 40-50 per 
cent of their crop and cut down 30 per cent of their trees. The ensuing public outcry, 
including criticism by the House Speaker and also the Secretary-General of Golkar, 
resulted in Presidential intervention. In April 1992, following a meeting between the 
President and eight Ministers, it was announced that BPPC's buying price would be 
cut from Rp7 ,000 per kg to Rp4,000 per kg, well below the world price of around Rp 
6,000 per kg at the time (Indikator Ekonomi, 1994). The board continued to seJl 
cloves to kretek companies at Rpl3,000 per kg. 
The higher clove prices threatened the survival of small firms. Demand for the 
smaller firms' products tend to be more price sensitive and it is more difficult for 
smaller firms to absorb input price increases as profit margins are already small. A 
number of small firms reportedly closed down during this period as a result of higher 
clove prices. 16 
9.7.4 Advertising Restrictions 
In Chapter 4 we noted that television advertising was banned in the 1980s. In addition 
to television, the largest Indonesian language daily, Kompas, introduced a voluntary 
ban on tobacco advertising in its newspaper in the early 1980s. Consequently, tobacco 
companies were confined to advertising their products in print media (most 
newspapers and magazines), radio and outdoor advertising. The ban on television 
advertising was removed in 1989. Except for the condition that tobacco 
advertisements are not permitted to show the cigarette, no other restrictions are 
imposed on tobacco television advertising. 
9.7.5 Health Regulations 
Health considerations related smoking are not yet strong in Indonesia, reflecting the 
low level of awareness in the country. There is no vocal anti-smoking movement 
within the government or in the wider community. Smoking is permitted in most 
16 The biggest losers from the cloves monopoly are the clove fanners themselves. Sondakh (1995:160) 
reported that farmers received only around Rp 2,700 per kg after BPPC deducted compulsory savings 
and other fees from the farmer's price. This price is just over half of the market price prevailing before 
the establishment of the monopoly. 
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public places, although in recent years the national airline carrier Garuda has 
prohibited smoking on both domestic and international flights. In May 1991 a Decree 
of the Minister of Health required all cigarette producers to print a health warning on 
cigarette packets. Initially, only Gudang Garam complied with the October 1 deadline. 
Most medium and large-scale firms have complied with the Decree in the last few 
years under pressure from the Department of Health. 
9.8 The Nature of Competition in the Cigarette Industry 
The structure of the cigarette market (i.e., a highly segmented, product differentiated 
oligopoly) shapes the nature of competition among firms. A feature of the industry 
worldwide is the preference of companies not to compete on price, but through other 
marketing efforts such as advertising. 17 Relative price changes in the cigarette 
industry are infrequent and this rigidity tends to indicate a lack of price competition 
(Telser, 1962, Shepherd, 1984). There are price differentials between brands, and 
these are intended to signal differences in quality. Interviews with marketing 
executives from several large cigarette companies and industry analysts during my 
fieldwork in Indonesia confirm that cor, lpanies do not compete on price. Price strata 
of brands are reported in the Appendix to this Chapter. 
Image differentiation is the main instrument of competition among the large 
Indonesian cigarette firms. Finns try to establish favourable imagt;s for their brands 
by means of advertising and appealing ways of packaging. All the major firms 
advertise heavily on television, print media and radio. They also spend heavily on 
sales promotional activities. According to a leading Indonesian advertising magazine, 
Cakra, the Indonesian cigarette industry spent an estimated US$ l billion on 
advertising in the last few years alone (Cakra; October issue, 1995). Unfortunately, 
cigarette producers in Indonesia do not publish their own advertising expenditures for 
the simple reason that such data are considered as sensitive competitive information. 
Further, there are no other published sources of advertising expenditure before 1992. 
Thus, it is not possible to analyse the effect of advertising competition on market 
shares before 1992. Since 1992 a Jakarta-based market research company, Survey 
17 Telser, 1962; Alemson, 1970; Metwally, 1975; Roberts and Samuelson, 1988. 
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Research Indonesia (SRI), has been collecting advertising expenditures and market 
shares of all advertised brands on a monthly basis. SRI estimates advertising 
expenditure for each brand by valuing the recorded time length of each television and 
radio commercial, and the size of all print advertisements. Market shares for each 
brand are estimated by surveying 1200 stores in the nine main urban centres of 
Indonesia: Jakarta, Bandung, Semarang, Solo, Yogyakarta, Surabaya, Medan, 
Palembang, and Padang. SRI has provided us with each firm's monthly advertising 
expenditure and market share data from August 1992 to October 1995. 
Table 9.7 shows the advertising and market shares of the leading producers averaged 
over the period 1992-95. A firm's advertising share is defined as its percentage share 
of total industry advertising expenditure. These seven firms account for over 90 per 
cent of total industry cigarette sales and advertising expenditure during this period. 
Monthly market share and advertising share of each firm is shown in the Appendix to 
this Chapter. Table 9.7 shows that the three largest firms accounted for the largest 
share of total industry advertising during this period, although. not by a large margin. 
Gudang Garam's advertising share of 14.5 per cent is a little more than Bentoels' 12.7 
per cent, BAT' s 11.5 per cent, and Malboro' s 10.2 percent of total industry 
advertising expenditure. However, the smaller firms (Bentoel, BAT, Malboro, and 
Rothmans) have much larger adve1tising shares relative to their market shares 
compared with the larger firms. For example, BAT's advertising share is 2.17 times 
larger than its market share, Bentoels' advertising share is 2.44 times lmger than its 
market share, and Rothmans' advertising share is 8.3 times greater than its market 
share. This compares with advertising share-market share ratios of 0.31, 1.07 and 1.26 
for the three largest firms respectively. This implies that smaller firms have higher 
advertising-sales ratios. In other words, smaller firms must spend a much larger 
proportion of their sales revenue on advertising to compete with larger firms. 
This necessity arises for two major reasons. First, there are substantial fixed costs in 
advertising (especially for television) that all firms must pay, irrespective of firm size. 
These fixed costs make up a larger proportion of sales revenue of small firms 
compared with larger firms. Second, the successful firms (i.e., those with large market 
shares) may rely less on current advertising because they are able to reap the benefits 
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of positive image which have been created with advertising in past periods. That is, 
advertising creates positive goodwill. This in tum results in lower advertising-sales 
ratios for large firms relative to smaller firms. 
These two factors also explain why advertising acts as a barrier to upward mobility 
wjthin the Indonesian cigarette industry: (1) advertising is generally too expensive for 
small firms to purchase, and (2) advertising goodwill asset is an asymmetry that 
presents a barrier to upward mobility of less favoured existing firms. 18 An 
examination of the relationship between relative advertising expenditure and market 
shares of the leading firms, requiring the construction of a dynamic econometric 
model, is undertaken in the next chapter. 
Table 9.7 
Competitors 
Market Shares and Advertising Shares of Leading Firms 
(averaged over the period 1992 to 1995) 
Market Share Advertising Ratio of Advertising 
Share Share to Market Share 
Gudang Garam (K) 46.3 14.5 0.31 
Djarum (K) 16.5 17.7 1.07 
Sampoerna (K) 14.1 17.8 1.26 
Malboro (W) 6.3 10.2 1.62 
BAT (W) 5.3 11.5 2.17 
Bentoel (K) 5.2 12.7 2.44 
Rothmans (W) 1.0 8.3 8.30 
-'-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
Total 94.7 92.7 
Source: Survey Research Indonesia 
9.9 Competition in the Competitive Fringe 
As mentioned earlier, the Indonesian cigarette industry is characterised as a product 
differentiated oligopoly with a competitive fringe. Firms belonging to the competitive 
fringe produce relatively cheap, low quality kretek. In contrast to large firms, price is 
the main instrument of competition among small-scale firms. Table 9.8 lists the prices 
of several brands produced by small-scale firms. Prices of these brands were collected 
during my fieldwork in Indonesia in 1995. Prices for their brands (mainly hand-rolled 
kretek) are clustered around Rp300 per pack of 10 cigarettes in 1995, compared to 
18 Advertising is more of a barrier to upward mobility than a barrier to entry in the Indonesian cigarette 
industry as firms can enter the industry through the competitive fringe where barriers to entry m-e much 
lower. 
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around Rp800 for the larger brands. Demand for their brands tends to be price 
sensitive, and gross profit margins are low, in the range of 5 per cent to 15 per cent. 
The relatively high price elasticity of demand, and the low profit margins, mean that 
small firms are vulnerable to fluctuations in the prices of inputs, particularly cloves. 
Firms undertake little or no promotional activities. Very few firms advertise in the 
local newspapers or on radio, and 0nly during special events, such as the Moslem 
New Year and Independence Day. The only marketing technique used by these finns 
is direct selling to food stalls, hawkers and small retail outlets through their 
distributors. Firms sell their brands in established regional markets. For example, 
Djoharmanik's main selling areas are North Sumatra, Lampung and Pulau Bangka. 
Pantai Padang's main selling area is the Kudus-Jepara-Demak region, while Pamor's 
main selling region is Manado in North Sulawesi. Many of the films' regional 
markets developed due to historical reasons. Djoharrnanik, for example, spread to 
North Sumatra throvgh Javanese migrant workers on the rubber plantations in the 
1950s. Brand loyalty also tends to be strong in these regional markets, and firms often 
find it difficult to penetrate other markets. 
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Table 9.8 Characteristics of Small-Scale Kretek Producers 
Name Major Brands Price per pack Major Selling Areas No of Employees 
{Year began operations) 1995 
Sidodadi Djoharmanik Rp300/10 stks North Sumatra, Lampung 250 
(1950) Ideal Rp450/12 stks and Pulau Bangka 
Gen tong Gentong Gotri. Sigma Rp400/12 stks West Java, Lampung. and 600 
Gotri Texas. Gala, Stafflnfl South Sumatra 
(1927) 
Banyulntan Pompa. Oepex Rp300/10 stks Cirebon in West Java 159 
Mulyorahadjo Pam or Rp350/10 stks Kudus, Jepara. Demak 574 
(1974) Pamor Filter Rp500/12 stks 
Pahala Filter Rp600/12 stks 
Nyusul Pantai Padang Rp600/12 stks North Sulawesi 250 
Express (1978) 
Sri Asih Supiah Rp300/10 stks East Java 100 
(1961) 
Source: Firm interviews 
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The competitive fringe has been gradually declining over time owing to a 
combination of factors, such as changes in the technological and demand conditions 
of the industry, rising clove prices, and intensive advertising competition by the larger 
. firms. This decline has occurred despite protection given to small-scale kretek 
producers through entry restrictions, differential excise taxes and minimum retail 
prices. We observed in section 9.5 that the number of small firms declined from 
around 653 in 1968 to 139 in 1994 (Figure 9.6). Figure 9.7 shows the growth in 
production of the five largest kretek firms and the competitive fringe. 19 
Figure 9.7 
Output Growth of the Five Largest Kretek Prodacers and Competitive Fringe 
(billion of sticks) 
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Source: GAPPRI 
Yenr 
Large firms Competitive Fringe 
11.8 6.7 
11.2 4.1 
-7.7 -0.4 
7.0 -1.3 
Examining Figure 9.7 it is apparent that most of the growth in the industry has been 
concentrated among the five largest firms. The rate of output growth in the 
competitive fringe has continuously declined since 1979. Average annual growth was 
19 Competitive fringe output is calculated as the difference between total industry output less the output 
of the largest five firms plus their subsidiaries (Gudang Garam+Grendcl, Djarum+Mustang+Filastra, 
Sampoema + Panamas, Bentoel, and Noyorono+Nikki). 
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6.7 per cent between 1979 and 1985, 4.1 per cent between 1985 and 199C, .lld minus 
1.3 per cent between 1991 and 1994.20 While the differential excise tax policy might 
have helped to protect the small-scale kretek sector in the 1980s, it appears to have 
had little effect in the 1990s, despite the added protection from the introduction of 
minimum retail prices in 1991. Higher clove price as a result of the clove monopoly 
was one factor that contributed to negative growth in the small-scale kretek sector in 
the first half of the 1990s. However, there are other factors that are contributing 
towards a long-term decline of the sm~U-scale kretek sector. 
As explained earlier, since the late 1970s several medium and large-scale firms began 
to upgrade the quality of their products by introducing mechanised filter kretek, using 
better quality tobacco and cloves and more appealing cigarette packaging. Coupled 
with rising incomes of consumers and intensive advertising and promotion, these 
innovations induced a shift in consumption away from cheap, low quality hand-rolled 
kretek produced by the competitive fringe to machine-made kretek produced by the 
large producers (Permana, 1989). 
Yet, despite the gradual decline in the competitive fringe, a few small and medium-
sized firms are in the process of 'graduating' to a larger size. One example is 
Wismilak, a kretek producer located in East Java. Wismilak has grown from a small 
firm supplying the East Java region in the late 1980s to become a medium-sized firm 
now supplying most regions in Java; by 1995 it was about half the size of Noyorono. 
The success of this firm has b.::en due to the l.)Wner's ability to identify and produce 
for niche markets, adapting quality and price to market demand. In recent years 
Wismilak has advertised its Diplomat brand on national television and has invested 
heavily in expanding distribution networks across Java. This example indicates that it 
is still possible for small, innovative firms to overcome upward mobility barriers in 
the cigarette industry and to 'graduate' to a larger size. 
20 In Figure 9.1 we reported positive growth in the l.nnd-rolled kretek segment over the period 1990 to 
1994. This growth was mainly driven by Sampocrnn's rapid growth in its premium hand-rolled brand, 
Dji Sam Soc, over this period, and not the competitive fringe. 
254 
9.10 Summary 
This Chapter has described the development of the cigarette industry over the last 
three decades, the nature of competition among large firms and the competitive 
fringe, and the role of government policy in protecting the small-scale kretek sector. 
The most notable features of the analysis are: 
( 1) The rapid rise in the dominance of several kretek finns, all domestically-owned, 
and the decline in the dominance of foreign-owned white cigarettes producers since 
the late 1970s. This change is mainly due to mechanisation in the kretek sector at the 
end of the 1970s, and a shift in consumer tastes away from white cigarettes and hand-
rolled kretek to machine-made kretek. Goyernment entry restrictrions in the kretek 
sector prevented MNCs from shifting production to kretek, and this also helps to 
explain the decline in the market shares of the large MNCs during the 1980s. 
(2) There has been a rapid decline in the number of small kretek finns and white 
cigarette producers over the last three decades. Corresponding to this decline in the 
number of firms is an increase in the four-firm seller concentration ratio from 43 per 
cent in 1976 to 75 per cent in 1994. The major causes of this increase in concentration 
are mechanisation by the three largest kretek finns at the end of the 1970s, and 
increased efforts in distribution and promotion. However, we observed that llie 
change in concentration does not reflro.:t a common increase in the shares of the four 
leading finns but, rather, is driven mainly by the change in the market shares of the 
two leading firms, Gudang Garam and Djarum. 
(3) The success of government protection of the small-scale sector is mixed. While 
the differential excise taxes may have protected the small-scale kretek sector in the 
1980s it appears to have had little effect in the 1990s, despite the added protection of 
minimum retail prices, Regulatory limitations on large finn' s sub-contracting out 
production of existing brands to small firms hindered growth opportunities for small 
firms. Rising per capita incomes, and changing consumer tastes towards better quality 
and image filter kreteks produced by the larger firms. explain the decline of the 
competitive fringe in the 1990s. 
(4) Finally, the main instrument of competition among large finns is image 
differentiation by means of advertising. Large finns do not appear to compete with 
price, and this is consistent with studies of the cigarette industry for other countries. 
In contrast. small firms' main instrument of competition is price. Small finns sell 
cheap, low quality kretek. 
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Appendix2 
Figure la 
Price Range 
(Rp Per Pack) 
HMS 
Rp2000 
234 (SKT) 
234 
RplOOO 
Rp800 A Mild 
600 
Rp400 
Rp 300 
Price Strata of Kretek Brands, 1995 
Gudang Djarum 
Garam 
International 
Surya Super 
Crystal 
Co kl at 
The Competitive :Fringe 
Ben toe I Noyorono Others 
International 
Nikk:t Super 
Minak Djinggo 
JambuBol 
Sunkun 
Gentong C~tri 
,Djoharmanik 
Banyu Intan 
Pam or 
Supiah 
HMS=Sampoerna 
Brunets priced below Rp400 are produced by several small-scale firms surveyed during my fieldwork in 
Indonesia in 1995. 
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Figure lb 
Price Range 
(Rp Per Pack) 
Rp2000 
Delon 
RplOOO 
Rp800 
600 
Price Strata of White Cigarette Brands, 1995 
BAT 
B&H 
555 
Lucky Strike 
Ardath 
Commodore 
Tresno 
(Bentoel) 
Malboro 
Rothmans 
Dunhill 
S'ITC 
Winston 
Others 
Alain 
Salem 
Salem is licensed to Sampoema; Alain Delon is licensed to Djarum; Malboro is licensed to P.T Tresno, 
a subsidiary of Ben toe!. 
Winston is licensed to Sumatra Tobacco Trading Coy. 
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Appendix2 
Figure 2 
Firms' Monthly Market Shares and Atlver(,sing Shares, 1992-95 
(advertising share indicates each firm's share of total ind~~t~ advertising expenditure) 
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Chapter 10 
Advertising Competition in the Cigarette 
Industry 
10.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 9 we noted that image differentiation is the main instrument of 
competition among large firms in the cigarette industry. This Chapter estimates the 
effect of advertising expenditure on seven leading firms' market shares, using 
monthly advertising and market share data from August 1992 to October 1995. These 
seven firms account for over 90 per cent of total market sales, and 90 per cent of total 
industry advertising expenditure. Our study stands out from previous research on 
advertising for other countries on at least three grounds. First, we employ recent 
advances in time-series analysis that allow us to separate the long-run relationship 
between advertising and market share from the short-run impact in the estimated 
equation. Second, we use monthly advertising and market share data, which are 
considered more appropriate than annual data in these kinds of studies (Landes and 
Rosenfield, 1994). Finally, unlike most other studies, our data set has time series 
sufficiently long to support a regression analysis for a single firm. This allows us to 
investigate whether the success of advertising differs among firms. 
Our results show that advertising competition reallocates sales between firms. 
Increases in own advertising expands market share in four of the seven firms. 
Increases in rivals' advertising reduce market share in three of the seven firms. An 
important finding of our study is that an equal increase in advertising by all firms will 
change the distribution of market shares in favour of the more successful, larger firms 
in the long-run. This arises because larger finns have an image advantage over the 
smaller firms. This image advantage is an asymmetry that constitutes a barrier to 
upward mobility of smaller, less-favoured existing firms. 
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The remainder of this Chapter is divided into five sections. Section 2 briefly reviews 
the theoretical background to the study. Section 3 reviews the existing empirical 
literature on the topic. Section 4 presents our empirical model. Section 5 reports the 
estimation results and provides a discussion. Finally, section 6 summarises the main 
findings of the Chapter. 
10.2 Theoretical Framework 
The Indonesian cigarette industry represents a suitable industry to examine 
empirically advertising competition between firms. The cigarette industry has been 
characterised by many studies for other countries as the most representative case of 
o · · q0polistic competition, in wb1ch companies prefor not to compete on prices, but 
through other marketing efforts such as advertising.1 Advertising competition is 
expected to shift market shares between firms for at least two reasons. First, rivalry in 
advertising has a greater potential for destabilising shares because competitive moves 
in these areas are replicable only with a lag, and so give an advantage to the first 
mover (Scherer and Ross, 1990; Davies and Geroski, 1997).2 Unlike rival retaliation 
to aggressive price cuts, it takes weeks or even months to set a retaliatory nationwide 
advertising campaign in motion. During the interim, the first mover may enjoy gains 
in market share and profits. A second reason is that success in advertising depends at 
least as much upon the way the appeal is presented as on the amount of money spent. 
As Scherer and Ross (ibid: 595) observe: 
'any fool can match a price cut., but counteracting a clever advertising 
gambit is far from easy. In this unpredictable clash of creative power, 
sellers often over-estimate their own ability to make market share 
gains and underestimate their rival's ability to retaliate successfully, 
exhibiting little concern for mutual interdependence.' 
In the Indonesian cigarette market, price differentials tend to persist over time, and as 
mentioned earlier tobacco marketing executives in Indonesia confirmed that 
1 Se1,1, for example, Telser, 1962; Schmalensee, 1972; Montameni, 1987; Roberts and Samuelson, 1988; 
Scherer and Ross, 1990 
2 Refer back to Chapter 8 for a discussion of non-price determinants of changes in market shares, 
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companies do not compete on price. Further, the establishment of minimum retail 
prices in 1991 implies that price competition is now non-existent. Many previous 
studies on the determinants of market shares in the cigarette industry have found price 
to be statistically insignificant (Metwally, 1975), or have omitted price from the 
models on the ground that firms do not compete with price (Telser, 1962, Roberts and 
Samuelson, 1988). Therefore, from the marketing viewpoint, advertising may be 
considered as the most important variable that creates differential advantage for 
brands in this industry. 
In the industrial organisation literature, advertising is hypothesised to have a dynamic 
effect on market shares. Periodic advertising expenditure builds up positive image or 
goodwill and increase sales for some period of time into the future. In other words, 
current advertising contributes to a long-lived asset - called goodwill - that affects 
future sales (Martin, 1993: 138). Goodwill depreciates over time, but can be 
replenished by advertising. The positive image or advertising goodwill hypothesis has 
two important implications for competition. First, it implies that firms that are 
successful in creating an image advantage for their brands will gain market share at 
the expense of less successful firms. Further, successful firms (i.e. those with large 
market shares) may then rely less on current advertising because they are able to reap 
the benefits of positive image which has been created with advertising in past periods. 
This in turn results in lower advertising-sales ratios for large firms relative to smaller 
ones. Second, the image advantage or goodwill asset is an asymmetry that presents a 
barrier to entry of new firms and a barrier to upward mobility of less-favoured 
existing firms. 
The advertising-goodwill hypothesis has been under attack in recent years by several 
economists (Thomas, 1989, Seldon and Boyd, 1990, Landes and Rosenfield, 1994). 
Seldon and Boyd ( 1990), for example, showed that the effects of advertising on 
cigarette demand are short-Uved, and 'appear to be fully depreciated within a year' 
(ibid: 378). They concluded that 'any concern that an accumulated advertising effect 
may constitute a barrier to entry may be ill founded.' 
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10.3 Empirical Literature Review 
In the empirical literature the most commonly used specification for research on 
advertising competition in an oligopoly is the depreciable-advertising model or 
reduced form Koyck model (Roberts and Samuelson, 1988; Landes and Rosenfield, 
1994). In this model researchers specify a firm's market share as a function of its own 
stock of goodwill and that of its rivals. For example, Roberts and Samuelson (1988) 
specified a model in which advertising by cigarette manufacturers in the U.S.A. 
market contributes to a firm-specific stock of goodwill: 
Git = 11.G;,1-t + A;,1 O<A.<1 
where G is the stock of goodwill that has accumulated over time. 
A is advertising expenditure, 
(1) 
A. is the retention rate of goodwill. The value of 1- r 1 describes the rate at which 
goodwill depreciates over time. 
A firm's market share (MS) is expected to be positively related to its own stock of 
goodwill (G) and negatively related to a rival's goodwill (GR). 
+ 
MS;, = a; + a 0 G,,, + b, GR;,,+µ;,, (2) 
The coefficients of G and GR capture the effect of a change in own and rival-firm 
goodwill stocks, respectively, on firm i's output share in the market. To develop 
estimable market-share equations researchers must assume some dynamic structure 
for the accumulation of advertising goodwill. Studies usually rely on the Koyck 
transformation of the effect of advertising on futt~re market share.3 The Koyck 
transformation assumes a geometric decay in the effect of advertising on future 
3 Many of the recent studies on the effect of advertising on sales have relied on the Koyck model 
include Baltagi and Levin, 1986; Thomas, 1989; Seldon and Boyd, 1990; Tegcne, 1991; Landes and 
Rosenfield, 1994. See Clarke (1976) for a review of the earlier empirical studies using the Koyck 
distributed lag model. 
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market share: a1, = LA! A,_; , where o < A. < 1 is the Koyck weight, and i is the time 
i=O 
period.4 
Lagging G by one period and simplifying results in current goodwill stocks being 
replaced with current advertising expenditure and lagged market shares,5 the market 
share response equation (2) br~comes: 
+ + 
MS11 =a;+ a 0 A,,,+ b0 AR1,1+ A.MS1,1-1+ µ 1,1 (3) 
Where A is own advertising expenditure, and AR is rival firms' advertising 
expenditure. The coefficient a0 captures the short-term effect of advertising on 
market share. The coefficient (A.) of the lagged market share variable is the retention 
rate of goodwill. It measures the proportion of past sales that continue into the current 
time as a result of previous advertising expenditures. The higher the value of the 
retention rate, the longer is advertising's useful life. The coefficient ~ measures 
1-A. 
the long-term effect of advertising on market share. Similarly, the coefficient J!.L 
1-A. 
measures the long-term effect of rivals' advertising on the firm's market share. 
Empirical results of selected market share studies using equation (3), or variants of 
equation (3), are reported in Table 10.1. 
4 The Koyck transformation is often used by researchers because of it results in a reduced form which 
can be conveniently manipulated and tested. 
5 Assume a sales response function S1,1 =a+ a 1Gu where Gil= AG;,t-1 + A1,1 • Applying the Koyck 
transformation to the sales response function we get: 
S, =a+{J(A1 +Mr-1 +J\?A,+ ... )+µ 1 
or S, =a+f3°LA.1A(t-j)+µ 1 
i=O 
Lagging equation (1) by one period and simplifying, we obtain the Koyck model: 
s, = a(I - A.)+ .ils,_1 + {JA, + v1 
or s, = Y + Y1S1-1 + Y2A1 + v, 
Thus, current sales are a function of current advertising expenditure and lagged sales of firm i. 
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(1) 
Table 10.1 Selected Studies on the Cigarette Industry 
(dependent variable is firm market share) 
Independent 
Variables 
Telser Metwally Roberts et al 
(1962) (1975) (1988) 
Camel LS Chesterfield high-tar 
0.048 0.082 0.083 Constant 
MSt-1 
At 
0.736* 0.596* 
0.091 * 0.123* 
0.657* 
0.030 
ARt 
Rivals relative pricet 
Own brandst 
Rival brandst 
Firm dummies 
on intercept: 
Philip Morris 
R.J Reynolds 
American brands 
Brown and Williamson 
Lorillard 
R2 
Country 
0.69 0.87 0.44 
U.S,A. 
10 
0.157 
0.441* 0.892* 
0.041* 0.005 
-0.001 
2.212 
0.003 
0.001 
0.038* 
0.031* 
0.007 
0.016* 
0.006* 
0.934 na 
Australia U.S.A. 
11 72 
low-tar 
0.831* 
-0.001 
0.006 
0.008* 
-0.002* 
0.052* 
0.062* 
0.016 
0.015* 
0.022* 
na 
No. observations 
Period 1929- 39 1960- 70 1970-82 
Mett.od estimated for each brand pooled firm data pooled firm data 
*Statistically significant at the 5% or better level. LS = lucky strike. 
All variables are in log form so that the coefficients can be interpreted as constant elasticities. 
Telser' s (1962) seminal study investigated the effect of advertising competition on 
three leading brands' market shares in the U.S.A. cigarette industry over the period 
1929 to 1939. Telser measured competitive advertising as the ratio of a firm's 
advertising expenditure to total competitors' advertising outlays. Telser found that 
relative advertising had a positive and significant effect on the market shares of Lucky 
Strike and Camel, but not on that of Chesterfield. Telser argued that the insignificant 
effect of advertising on Chesterfield's share suggested that Chesterfield's advertising 
was less effective compared to the other two firms. Metwally (1975) investigated the 
effect of advertising competition on leading firms' market shares in the Australian 
cigarette industry over the period 1960 to 1970. He also included rival relative price 
(ratio of rival's price to own price) as an independent variable. Like Telser''l study, 
Metawally measured competitive advertising as the ratio of a firms advertising to total 
competitors advertising outlays. He found that relative advertising had a positive and 
statistically significant effect on a firm's market share. The coefficient of the relative 
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price was not statistically significant, providing some evidence that firms do not 
compete on prices. Roberts and Samuelson (1988) used annual firm data to estimate 
the effect of own advertising and rivals' advertising on market shares in the U.S.A. 
cigarette industry. They expanded the equation to include the number of own brands 
and rival brands. The equation was separately estimated for the high-tar and ; w-tar 
segments. In their model the intercept term was allowed to diffe!.' ncross firms to 
capture firm-specific, time-invariant factors (such as quality differences) that affect 
marl<.et shares. However, they restricted the retention rate, and the coefficients on own 
ar.!vertisine and rivals' advertising, to be equal for all firms, thus implying that the 
effect of advertising (both own and rivals) on market share is identical for all firms. 
The estimated effects of own advertising and rivals' advertising on market shares 
were not statistically significant in their study. Their results reject the hypothesis that 
advertising competition shifts market shares between firms. The coefficients (or 
retention rate of goodwill) on the lagged market shares were statistically significant 
and very high (0.83 and 0.89), indicating that advertising is long-lived. Thus, even 
though current advertising did not have a statistically significant efk ~t on shares, the 
simple Koyck lag model implied that advertising is long-lived. 
These empirical studies are subject to several major criticisms. First, the model 
specification assumes that the lag structure follows a geometric decay (i.e Koyck 
transformation) in the market share effect of advertising. If the lag structure is 
different, then the model is misspecified. A number of studies have experimented 
with different lag structures. Ward (1976) considered a polynominal lag structure and 
Mann (1975), Weiss, Houston and Windal (1978) used a Pascal lag structure. 
However, these two studies fell into the same trap of restricting the lag structure to 
follow a pre-determined form, Recent work in econometrics adopts a flexible 
approach ~f allowing the data to detemJne the lag structure, rather than imposing a 
lag structure Oli !he data (Hendry 1995). In other words, investigators search for a lag 
structure which is data-acceptable. 
Second, as a result of the Koyck transformation the parameter of lagged market share 
is interpreted as the retention rate of advertising. This interpretation has been 
criticised in both the economics and marketing literatures on the grounds that the 
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parameter might be capturing the notion of 'retained consumers' or 'habit persistence' 
a~ a result of the total marketing programme (e.g product quality), and not just 
advertising (Lambin, 1979; Thomas, 1988). 
A third major criticism is that these studies may be estimating spurious relationships. 
If the time series is non-stationary in level form, then the regression is estimating a 
spurious relationship and, thus, tells us nothing about the behavioural relationships 
between the variables (Banerjee et al, 1993: 138-9). Guarding against the possibility 
of uncovering spurious relations is important when we wor11. with variables (market 
shares and advertising in our case) which seem to have a strong trend component 
(Athukorala, 1995). Recent advances in econometrics have designed estimation 
techniques (i.e the error correction modeling procedure) that minimise the possibility 
of estimating spurious relation while retaining long run information when modeling 
with time series data (Hendry, 1995). 
A fourth criticism is that the studies ignore the dynamic effects of rivals' ad'l;i;rtising 
on a firms' market share. In these studies, rivals' goodwill stocks are proxied by tneir 
current advertising, implying that there are no lagged effects of rivals' advertising on 
a firm's market share. Finally, the studies use annual data and, thus, are subject to 
what Clarke ( 1976: 355) termed the 'interval data bias'. Clarke showed that the length 
of the estimated duration interval of advertising on sales or market shares was itself 
closely correlated with the periodicity of the data used in the study. On the basis of 
studies using monthly, bimonthly, or quarterly data - studies less likely to be affected 
by data inter«:~i bias than those based on annual data - Clarke concluded that "the 
duration of cu,nmulative advertising effect on sales is between 3 and 15 months; thus 
this effect is a short-term (about a year or less) phenomenon.0 If the effects of 
advertising on market share depreciate fully within one year then the use of annual 
data in models of advertising are inappropriate. 
10.4 The Empirical Model for the Indonesian Cigarette Market. 
The empirical approach adopted by our study is to allow the data to determine the lag 
structure of the effect of advertising competition on market shares, rather than to 
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impose a pre-detennined one (i.e Koyck model). To do this, we make use of the error 
correction method (ECM). The ECM procedure was described in Chapter 9. We will 
briefly describe it again. The ECM method is considered a highly appropriate 
dynamic specification when one works with relatively short time series. Under the 
ECM method, the long run (steady state) relationship being investigated is embodied 
with a dynamic specification including lagged dependent and independent variables in 
order to minimise the possibility of estimating spurious relationships. The ECM 
procedure has the added advantage of separating long-run relationships from the 
short-run impact in the estimated equation. 
The estimation procedure starts with an over-parameterised autoregressive distributed 
lag (ADL) specification of an appropriate order: 
m m m 
MS,= a+ Lb11 MS1-1 + Lb2,1A1_ 1+Lb3,1AR11-1+111 (4) 
i=I i=O i=O 
where a is a constant, MS is a (n x 1) vector of market share variables, A is a (k x 1) 
vector of own advertising expenditure, AR is a (k x 1) vector uf rivru~· advertising 
expenditures, and bi. b2, and b3 are (n x n), (n x k) and (n x k) matrices of 
parameters. 
Equation (4) is then reparameterised in terms of differences6 and lagged levels so as to 
separate the short-run and long-nm multipliers of the system. 
m-l m-1 Hi-I 
t..MS1 =a+ L b1~1t..MS1-1 + 2,. b;,,M,_1 + L b;,,MR,_1 + c1MS1_m + c2A1_m + c3AR1_m + 111 (5) 
1~1 l=O i=O 
m m m 
where c1 =-(I - :~:>1.1 ), c2 = (~>2.;), c3 = <~>J.;) 
i=I ;,,o t=O 
and where the long-run multipliers of the system are given by EL (long run effect of 
Ct 
own advertising on market share) and c3 (long run effect of rivals' advertising on the c, 
6 Taking the difference of a variable between two periods removes any trend component in the time 
series and, thus, minimises the problem of spuri.ous correlation. 
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firm's market share). The short-run effects of own and rival advertising are measured 
by the coefficients of the differenced advertising variables . 
Equation (5) constitutes the maintained hypothesis of our specification search. This 
general model is tested down (using OLS), by dropping statistically insignificant lag 
terms, and imposing data-acceptable restrictions on the regression parameters. The 
testing procedure continues until a parsimonious error correction representation is 
obtained which retains the a priori theoretical model as its long run solution. To be 
acceptable, the final equation must satisfy various diagnostic tests relating to the OLS 
error process. Equation (5) is estimated for each firm. This allows us to examine 
whether the long-run advertising elasticities are equal across firms. 
10.5 Estimation Results 
Monthly market share and advertising expenditure data of the seven leading firms are 
provided by the Jakarta-based market research company, Survey Research Indonesia 
(SRI). SRI collects advertising expenditures and market shares of all advertised 
brands on a monthly basis. It estimates advertising expenditure for each brand by 
valuing the recorded time length of each television and radio commercial, and the size 
of all print advertisements. Market shares for each brand are estimated by surveying 
1200 stores in the nine main urban centres of Indonesia: Jakarta, Bandung, Semarang, 
Solo, Yogyakarta, Surabaya, Medan, Palembang, and Padang. The sample period is 
August 1992 to October 1995, generating a total of 39 observations for each firm. 
These seven firms account for over 90 per cent of total industry cigarette sales and 
advertising expenditure during this period. 
Own advertising expenditure (A) is the firm's monthly advertising expenditure. To 
calculate rivals' advertising expenditure (AR), we make the valid assumption that all 
kretek and white cigarette producers are competing with each other for market share. 
Thus, rival advertising is the total advertising expenditure of the other :-six competing 
firms. 
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All variables are used in log form so that the coefficients can be directly interpreted as 
constant elasticities.7 The final parsimonious estimates of changes in market shares 
are reported in Table 10.2 together with the diagnostic statistics. The long-run 
advertising elasticities derived from the estimated coefficients of the lagged level 
variables are also reported in Table 10.2. A summary of the long-run elasticities is 
reported in Table 10.3. The long-run elasticities tell us the percentage change in 
market share due to a change in own advertising and rival's advertising outlays once 
all the short-run dynamics have worked themselves out. 
All the equations pass foe F-test for overall significance at the one per cent level. 
Statistically, the equations perfom1ed very well, exhibiting no problems of functional 
fonn misspecification (RESET), heteroskedasticity (HSC), or serial correlation (LM). 
We included a time trend (T) in each firms' market share equation to capture any 
other systematic factors (product quality, brand strategies) that affect changes in 
market shares beyond advertising competition, but not included in our model. The 
time trend variable is statistically significant in all equations except for Rothmans. 
The statistically insignificant time trend is dropped from the Rothmans equation.8 
7 
In all cases the log-linear specification was preferl'lilP, to the linear specification in terms of Ramsey 
RESET test for functional form misspecification. 
8 
Rothman's did not spend on advertising for several monthly observations during the period 1992 to 
1995 (see Figure 9B in the appe11dix of Chapter 9). To allow a log form of the advertising expenditure 
variable, we replace the zero expenditure values with Rpl value (equivalent to 0.25 US cents in 1995). 
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Table 10.2 
Effect of Advertising on Firms' Market Shares: Regression Results 
(1) Gudang Garam 
Li MSt = 0.74 + 0.006 At-1 - 0.003 ARt-1 - 0.19 MSt-1 - 0.001 T 
(2.1)** (2.2)** (0.7) (2.2)** (4.1)* 
Long-run own advertising (A) elasticity= 0.031 (t-ratio = 2.1)** 
Long-run rivals' advertising (AR) elasticity= -0.017 (t-ratio = 0.8) 
R2= 0.32 F(4, 33) = 5.44 LM-F(l, 32) = 0.02 RESET (1, 32) = 0.03 
JBN (2) = 0.71 HSC (1 36) = 1.82 
(2) Djarum 
Li MSt = 0.85 + 0.01 Li At - 0.003At-1 + 0.003ARt-1 - 0.29MSt-1 
(2.0)** (1.9)** (0.5) (0.5) (2.2)** 
-0.003T 
(2.1)** 
Long-run own advertising (A) elasticity= -0.011 (t-ratio = 0.4) 
Long-run rivals' advertising (AR) elasticity= 0.011 (t-ratio = 0.4) 
R2= 0.23 F (1, 36) = 3.27 LM-F(l, 30) = 0.044 RESET (1, 30) = 0.04 
JBN (2) = 1.25 HSC (136)=0.11 
(3) Sampoerna 
.!lMSt=0.47 + 0.015.!lARt + 0.021ARt-1 + 0.005At-1- 0.39MSt-1 + 0.008T 
(2.4)* (1.6)* (2.3)** (1.1) (3.3)* (3.3)* 
Long-run own advertising elasticity (A)= 0.013 (t-ratio = 1.2) 
Long-run rivals' advertising (AR) elasticity= 0.055 (t-ratio = 2.7)* 
R2= 0.17 F (5, 32) = 2.55 LM-F(l, 31) = 3.94 RESET (1, 31) = .').14 
JBN (2) = 0.75 HSC (136)=1.49 
(4) Bentoel 
Li 2MSt = 0.46 + 0.007 Li At + 0.012.!l At-1+0.023 Ll At-2 + 0.036At-3 
(2.0)** (2.2)** (2.6)* (4.0)* (5.1)* 
-0.012ARt-1-0.40MSt-2 - 0.004 T 
(1.1) (5.3)* (5.1)* 
Li 2 denotes second difference (MSrMSt-2) 
Long-run own advertising (A) elasticity = 0.09 (t-ratio = 3.8)* 
Long-run rivals' advertising (AR) elasticity= -0.03 (t-ratio = 1.1) 
R2= 0.64 F (7, 28) = 10.0 LM-F(l, 27) = 0.007 RESET (1, 27) = 0.22 
JBN (2) = 0.28 HSC (1, 34) = 0.60 
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(5) British American Tobacco {BAT) 
.!l MSt = 0.97 + 0.006 .!l At - 0.023 .!l ARt + 0.020 At-1 - 0.043 ARt-1 - 0.39 MSt-1 
(3.6)* (1.1) (1.4)*** (2.7)* (2.7)* (3.8)* 
+ 0.004T 
(3.9)* 
Long-run own advertising (A) elasticity = 0.05 (t-ratio = 2.6)* 
Long-nm rivals' advertising (AR) elasticity = -0.11 (t-ratio = 2.3)* 
R2= 0.32 F(6, 31) = 3.9 LM-F(l, 30) = 3.90 RESET (1, 30) = 3.7 
JBN (2) = 0.96 HSC (1, 36) = 0.0002 
( 6) l\ialboro 
.!l MSt = 2.55 + 0.023 .!l At + 0.041 Ll At-1 - 0.007 .!l ARt - 0.054 .!l AP.t-1 
(5.1)* (2.1)** (3.0)* (0.5) (3.5)* 
- 0.088 .!l ARt-2 + 0.056At-2 - 0.133 ARt-3 - 0.81 MSt-1 + 0.012 T 
( 4.4)* (3.0)* (5.2)* (5.7)* (5.4)* 
Long-run own advertising (A) elasticity= 0.069 (t-ratio = 3.2)* 
Long-run rivals' advertising (AR) elasticity= -0.166 (t-ratio = 7.1)* 
R2= 0.52 F(9, 26) = 5.2 LM-F(l, 25) = 0.04 RESET (1, 25) = 1.55 
JBN (2) = 1.71 HSC (1, 34) = 5.13 
(7) Rothmans of Pall Mull (Dunhill) 
.!l 2MSt = 0.89 - 0.016.!l 2ARt - 0.056ARt-2 - 0.002At-2 - 0.34 MSt-2 
(2.5)* (0.9) (2.4)* (1.2) (3.4)* 
Long-run own advertising (A) elasticity= 0.007 (t-ratio = 1.2) 
Long-run rivals' advertising (AR) elasticity= -0.167 (t-ratio = 2.3)* 
R2= 0.32 F(4, 32) = 5.3 LM-F(l, 31) = 0.13 RdSET (1, 31) = 1.01 
JBN (2) = 0.59 HSC (1, 35) = 0.23 
~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
* t-ratios of regression coefficiem.:; are given in bracl<·its with the level of s~atistical 
significance (one-tailed test) denoted as* 1 per cent,** 5 per cent,*** 10 per c,~nt. 
Test statistics 
LM Lagrange multiplier for serial correlation; RESET Ramsey RESET test for 
functional form misspecification; JBN Jarques-Bera test for normality of residuals; 
HS~: test for heteroskedasticity (based on squared residuals). All tests are based on the 
F-distribution, except JBN, which is based on the x2 distribution. The degrees of 
freedom for the respective tests are given in brackets. 
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Table 10.3 
Summary of Results: Long-Run Advertising Elasticities and Time Trends 
A 10% increase in A 10% increase in Time 
own advertising rivals' advertising Trend 
will increase market will reduce market 
Rank Finn share by share by 
1 Gudang Garam 0.31 ** 0.17 -0.001 * 
2 Djarum -0.11 -0.11 -0.003** 
3 Sampoema 0.13 -0.55* 0.004* 
4 Bentoel 0.90* 0.30 -0.004* 
5 BAT 0.50* 1.10** 0.004* 
6 Malboro 0.69* 1.66* 0.012* 
7 Rothmans - 0.07 1.67** insignificant 
* Denotes t-ratios of the regression coefficients statistically significant (one-tailed 
test) at * 1 per cent, ** 5 per cent, *** 10 per cent level. 
With the exception of Sampoerna, Djarum and Rothmans, a finn's own advertising 
expenditure (A) has a positive and statistically significant effect on its market share, 
as indicated by the long-run own advertising elasticities reported in Table 10.3. The 
elasticities tell us that a 10 per cent increase in own advertising will increase Gudang 
Garam's market share by 0.31 per cent; Bentoel's by 0.9 per cent; BAT's by 0.50 per 
cent; and Malboro's share by 0.69 per cent. These elasticities are not high, but are 
comparable to those estimated for other countries (Table 10.1). Djarum's advertising 
has a negative, but statistically insignificant, effect on its market share in the long-
run. Examining Djarum's estimated market share equation in Table 10.2 (equation 2), 
it is apparent that Djarum's advertising only has a short-run effect on its market share. 
This is indicated by the positive and statistically significant coefficient (0.01) on the 
difference term A At and the insignificant coefficient on the long-run advertising 
elasticity. Sampoerna's long-run advertising elasticity is positive, but just falls short 
of statistical significance at the 10 per cent level (equation 3, Table 10.2). 
Rothmans' advertising has no effect on its market share, both in the short-run and 
long-run (equation 7, Table 10.2). The result for Rothmans is not unexpected, and is 
consistent with their misdirected advertising campaign in the mid-1990s. During this 
period Rothmans launched two advertisements for their Dunhill brand. The first 
advertisement depicted scenes from the Indonesian soccer league competition. Soccer 
is the favourite sport among the lower income groups in Indonesia. · The second 
advertisement depicted a successful, young Indonesian businessman dining with his 
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beautiful fiancee in London. This campaign was obviously directed at the lifestyle 
aspirations of the urban professional. Given these two opposing images, it is not 
surprising that the campaign failed to associate Dunhill with the aspired lifestyle of a 
particular group of smokers. Consequently, the advertising campaign did not persuade 
smokers to switch to Dunhill, and sales hardly moved. 
Rivals' advertising has a negative and statistically significant effoct on the market 
shares of the three smallest finns, as indicated by the long-nm rival advertising 
elasticities reported in Table 10.3. A 10 per cent increase in all competitors' 
advertising will reduce BAT's market share by 1.1 per cent; Malboro's by 1.66 per 
cent; and Rothman's by 1.69 per cent. In the case of Bentoel, rivals' long-run 
advertising elasticity is negative, but just falls short of statistical significance at the 10 
per cent level. Rivals' advertising has no significant negative effect on Gudang 
Garam's and Djarum's mfl.rket shares. In the case of Sampoema, rival's advertising 
has an unexpected positive and significant effect on its market share. These results 
suggest that larger firms' (Gudang Garam, Djarum, and Sampoema) market shares are 
less affected by competitors' advertising. Conversely, smaller firms' (BAT, Malboro, 
Dunhill) market shares are more vulnerable to competitors' aggregate advertising 
outlays. This arises because the mc,re successful, larger firms have an image 
advantage over the smaller firms. This image advantage is an asymmetry that 
constitutes a barrier to upward mobility of smaller, less-favoured existing firms. 
A notable feature of Table 10.3 is that the smaller firms' rival advertising elasticities 
are larger than their own advertising elasticities, except for Bentoel. This tells us that 
an equal percentage increase in all firms' advertising expenditure will have a negative 
net effect on the market shares of the smallest firms. For example, a 10 per cent 
increase in BAT's advertising expenditure will increase its market share by 0.50 
µercent, while a 10 per cent increase in rivals' aggregate advertising will reduce 
BAT' s market share by 1.1 per cent. The net effect of a 10 per cent increase in 
advertising outlays by all firms is a 0.60 per cent reduction in BAT's market share in 
the long-run. Similarly, a 10 per cent increase in all firms' advertising expenditure 
will reduce Malboro's market share by 0.97 per cent and Rothman's share by more 
than 1.69 per cent. This is consistent with our argument that smaller, less-favoured 
firms have an image disadvantage rel11tive to the more successful, larger firms and, 
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thus, are more sensitive to rivals' aggregate advertising outlays. This finding is 
important, and is often overlooked in the industrial organisation literature. For 
example, Roberts and Samuelson (1988) made the assumption (without testing it) that 
the advertising effect on market share is equal across finns. Davies and Goreski 
(1997: 387) specified advertising competition as a zero-sum game with the leading 
five firms in the market: an equal percentage increase in advertising by all five firms 
will leave market shares unchanged. In other words, the effectiveness or productivity 
of each $1 spent on advertising is the same for all firms. Our results clearly refute this 
assumption of equality. An equal percentage increase in advertising by all leading 
firms will change the distribution of market shares in favour of the more successful, 
larger firms in the long-nm. The implication of this finding is that smaller firms must 
spend more on advertising than larger firms to defend or increase their market shares. 
This result is consistent with the observation made in the previous chapter that the 
smaller finns tend to spend a greater proportion of their sales revenue on advertising 
••. ..n their larger rival~. 
The carryover effect of advertising on market share appears to be short-lived. Own 
advertising and rivals' advertising tend to have at most a one month lag effect on the 
market shares of most finns. There are a few exceptions. Malboro's advertising has a 
two month lag effect on its market share. Bentoel's advertising has a three month lag 
effect on its market share. Our results are consistent with recent evidence for the U.S 
cigarette industry that ~he effect of advertising on cigarette demand is short-lived 
(Boyd and Seldon, 1990). Further, current (i.e., this month's) advertising positively 
affects current (this month's) market share in only three of the seven firms (Djarum, 
Bentoel and Malboro). This indi:ates that it takes more than one month from the time 
the adve1tisement commenced before there is a significant increase in market shares 
of the majority of finns. A lagged response in market share is expected because it 
takes an extended porfod of repetitive adverfo:ing to persuade smokers to switch 
brands. 
Finally, the results show that the coefficients of the time trends (T) are negative for 
Gudang Garam, Djarum, and Bentoel, and positive for Sampoerna, BAT and 
Malboro. This indicates that there are other systematic factors beyond advertising 
expenditures that are shifting market share from Gudang Garam, Djarum, and Bentoel 
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to the other three firms. In Djarum's case, the negative time trend is partly capturing 
Djarum's own strategy of down-sizing to fall into a lower excise tax bracket during 
this period.9 Sampoerna's rising market share has as much do with its brand strategy 
as it has with its large advertising budget. As mentioned in Chapter 9, part of 
Sampoerna's success during the last decade has been its strategy of identifying and 
targeting profitable market segments such as the 'premium kretek' and low-tar, low-
nicotine segments. The shift in market share to Malboro and BAT is indicative of the 
small shift in demand away from kretek to white cigarettes in the 1990s, and is partly 
the result of the minimum price and excise tax changes described in Chapter 9. 
10.6 Summary 
Our study stands out from previous research on the market share effects of advertising 
on a number of grounds. First, instead of imposing a pre-determined lag structure on 
the data, we search for the lag structure which is data-acceptable. Second, we make 
use of the error correction modeling procedure which is considered as a highly 
appropriate dynamic specification when one works with relative~y short time series. 
The ECM procedure has the added advantage of separating long-rvn relationships 
from the short-run impact in the estimated equation. Tfird, we exploit monthly 
advertising and market share data which is considered more appropriate than annual 
data in these kind of studies. Finally, unlike most other studies, our data set has time 
series sufficiently long to support a regression analysis for a single firm. This allows 
us to investigate whether the success of advertising differs among firms. 
Our results show that advertising competition does shift market shares among firms. 
Increases in own advertising expands market share in four of the seven firms. 
Increases in rivals' advertising reduces market share in three firms. An important 
finding of our study is that an equal increase in advertising by all firms will change 
the distribution of market shares in favour of the more successful, larger firms in the 
long-run. This arises because larger firms have an image advantage over the smaller 
firms. This image advantage is an asymmetry that constitutes a barrier to upward 
mobility of smaller, less-favoured existing firms. 
9 This is also consistent with the observed decline in Djarum's relative advertising expenditure during 
this period, as depicted in Figure 2 of the Appendix to Chapter 9. 
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Chapter 11 
Regulation and Competition in the Cement 
Industry 
11.1 Introduction 
This Chapter analyses the role of government policies in shaping the structure of the 
cement industry and the nature of competition among firms. In Indonesia, cement is 
considered as a 'strategic' commodity because of its importance. to the construction 
sector and the importance of that sector to economic development. As a result, there is 
substantial public sector investment in the industry. Five of the nine producers are 
government-controlled firms. These firms produced around 38 per cent of total 
cement production in 1994. Until 1998, the industry was heavily regulated. There 
were regulations governing the distribution of cement, both domestically and for 
exports, and the setting of reference retail prices. 
The objective of the regulatory regime was to ensure a continuous supply of cement to 
all provinces at reasonable and stable prices. The analysis of this Chapter shows that 
the distribution arrangements had limited success in ensuring a continuous supply at 
stable prices in the face of cyclical demand for cement. Rather, the government 
regulated distribution arrangements exacerbated price instability by reducing the 
contestability of regional markets, deterring new entry and erecting barriers to 
competing imports. Administrative allocation of supplies prevented supplies from 
other regions, including imports, entering to dampen price incn!ases when demand 
rose. The distribution arrangements resembled a cartel. Regional markets and market 
shares were allocated among firms. The Indonesian cement producers association and 
the Ministry of Industry and Trade monitored compliance with the distribution system 
by acting as 'trading posts' whereby market information - market shares, export and 
import data - was collected by them and widely disseminated among producers. The 
administered retail prices acted as floor prices during periods of excess capacity, The 
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industry was a classic case of 'capture' by private commercial interests taldng over, 
and benefiting from, a national 'development objective'. 
The remainder of this Chapter is divided into six sections. Sections 2 and 3 discuss 
the development of the cement industry over the lasl. three decades. Section 4 
examines the demand conditions of the industry and estimates the price and income 
elasticities of demand. Section 5 analyses the role of government policies in shaping 
the structure of the industry and the nature of competition, Section 6 discusses the 
competitive implications of the domestic Jistribution channels. Finally, section 7 
summarises the main findings of the Chapter and discusses the competitive 
implications of the recent deregulation of the industry under the IMF structural reform 
programme. 
11.2 The Development of the Indonesian Cement Industry 
Portland cement is one of the oldest heavy industries in Indonesia.1 Table 1.1 lists the 
nine cement plants that operate in the Indonesian cement industry. The first cement 
factory was built in Indarung, West Sumatra in 1910 by the Dutch firm N.V 
Nederlands Indische Portland Cemem Maatscappij. This company held a monopoly 
position in Indonesia until the Japanese confiscated the plant during World War II. 
After the war the Dutch reclaimed ownership of the factory. In 1958 .he Soekarno 
government nationalised the cement plant and renamed it Semen Padang (semen is 
the bahasa Indonesia word for cement). The Soekarno government built the second 
cement factory in Gresik, East Java in 1957. The third government-owned cement 
plant was completed in Tonasa, South Sulawesi in 1968 with financial and technical 
assistance from the Czechoslovakian government. 
Table 11.2 shows the capacity and production levels of cement from 1961 to 1994. 
Figure 11.1 provides a visual interpretation of the growth in cement capacity and 
production since 1961. Between 1961 and 1967 cement capacity remained constant at 
485,000 tonnes per annum. Capacity increased to 715, 000 tonnes in 1969 as a result 
of the coming on stream of the Tonasa plant in 1968 and capacity expansion at Semen 
1 Portland cement is a mineral binding agent. It is well known as the fine grey powder which, when 
mixed wit!? sand, aggregate and water in appropriate proportions, sets to fonn concrete. 
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Padang. Under the New Order, capacity and production of cement has grown at the 
fastest rate since independence, reflecting rapid industrialization of the economy 
during this period, and the opening up of the sector to both domestic private and 
foreign investment. Between 1968 and 1975 capacity tripled to top 2.05 million 
tonnes as a result of two new entrants, Semen Cibinong and Indocement. Semen 
Cibinong started out as a government-foreign joint venture between the Swiss cement 
producer Kaiser Group (75 per cent equity) and the state-owned Semen Gresik (25 per 
cent equity). In 1979 Gresik sold its share to Tirtamas Majutama, a private domestic 
company owned by Hashim Djojohadikusumo, the son of the farnous Indonesian 
economist Sumitro Djojohadikusumo. Later in 1988, Tirtamas purchased Kaiser's 
controlling share in Semen Cibinong, and· the company changed its status from a 
foreign joint venture to a private domestic company. Indocement is majority owned 
by Liem Sioe Liong the founder of Indonesia's largest conglomerate (Salim group) 
today and a close associate of former President Soeharto. The government purchased 
35 per cent equity in Indocement as part of a 'bailout' package in the mid-1980s. 
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Table 11.1 Producer Ownership, Location and Capacity 
(a) Producer Ownership and Location 
Firm Starting Year Location No. of Kilns Ownership 
Semen Padang 1910 Indarung, West Sumatra 5 Semen Gresik/Govt 
Semen Gresik 1957 Gresik and Tuban, East Java 4 Govt/Public/Foreign* 
Semen Tonasa 1968 Tonasa, South Sulawesi 2 Semen Gresik/Govt 
Indocement 1976 Citereup, West Java 9 Salim Group/public/govt 
Semen Cibinong 1976 Narogong, West Java 3 Hashim Djojohadikusumo/public 
Semen Nusantara 19'77 Cilacap, Central Java 1 Semen Cibinong 
Semen Baturaja 1980 Baturaja, South Sumatra 1 Govt 
Semen Andalas 1983 Belawan, Aceh 1 Foreign/public 
Semen Kupang 1984 Kupang, NIT 1 Govt 
(b) Installed Capacity, 1965 - 1994 (OOOs of tonnes) 
Firm 1965 1975 1985 
Semen Padang 
Semen Gresik. 
Semen Tonasa 
Indocement 
Semen Cibinong 
Semen Nusaw'lra 
Semen Baturaja 
Semen And.alas 
Semen Kupang 
Capacity 'kCap <.{-MS 
110 23 
375 77 
Total Industry Cap 4g5 100 100 
Capacity %Cap %MS 
330 16 27 
500 24 44 
120 6 10 
500 24 10 
600 ?9 9 
2050 100 100 
Capacity %Cap 
2130 12 
1500 9 
1210 7 
8700 50 
1500 9 
750 4 
500 3 
1000 6 
120 0.7 
175W 100 
%MS 
13 
13 
6 
41 
10 
7 
4 
5 
1 
100 
1994 
Capacity %Ca 
3000 13 
4100 17 
1180 5 
9500 40 
3000 13 
1100 5 
500 2 
1100 5 
120 0.5 
23600 100 
%MS 
11 
9 
7 
47 
11 
5 
3 
6 
1 
100 
Source: Indonesian Cem<"1t Producers Association. Notes: 9CCap indicates percentage share of total industry capacity; %MS indicates percentage market share in 
terms of actual cement sa.'es. *Mexican cement producer, Cemex, purchased 14 per cent of total shares in Gresik from the government in 1998. 
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Table 11.2 Cement Capacity and Production, 1961-94 
(million of tonnes) 
Year Capacity Production Capacity Utilisation(%) 
1961 0.49 0.45 92 
1965 0.49 0.39 80 
1970 0.72 0.55 76 
1975 2.05 1.09 53 
1980 8.50 5.83 69 
1985 17.40 9.81 56 
1990 17.50 15.78 90 
1994 22.00 21.00 95 
Source: Indonesian Cement Producers Association 
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Between 1975 and 1985, total industry capacity increased eightfold to top 17 million 
tonnes. lndocement's capacity expanded the greatest during this period. Its capacity 
increased from 500,000 tonnes in 1975 to 8.7 million tonnes (or 51 per cent of total 
industry capacity) in 1985 to become the largest cement producer in Indonesia (Table 
11.1). According to Sato (1993: 418), Indocement aggressively expanded capacity to 
'overcome the long standing market advantage held by the state-owned producers and 
to beat out foreign investors who were also moving into the industry'. During tltls 
period two new government-owned factories were built. Semen Baturaja (located in 
Baturaja in South Sumutra) began production in 1980 with a capacity of 500,000 
tonnes, and Semen Kupang (located in Kupnng, West Timor) commenced operations 
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in 1984 with a capacity of 120,000 tonnes. Two foreign joint ventures also 
commenced operations during this period: Semen Nusiµitara (located in Cilacap, 
Central Java) and Andalas {located in Belawan, Aceh). Thus, by 1985 almost 60 per 
cent of cement capacity was generated by domestic private and foreign joint venture 
h1vestment, and the remaining 40 per cent was government owned. 
The drop in oil prices in 1983 and the resulting cancellation of major government 
infrastmcture projects contributed to the fall in cement demand in the mid-1980s. 
Indocement also experienced severe difficulties in servicing its foreign debt as a result 
of the devaluation of the Indonesian rupiah in 1983. Sato (1993: 422) describes how 
Liem used his close connections in government to shift the group's debt burden in 
cement and other investments in heavy industries (e.g. :iteel) onto the government. 
First, to avoid further currency risk the foreign loans were converted by the Indonesian 
State banks into Rupiah denominated funds in 1983. Second, when the repayments 
came due in 1985, the group asked anrl was given permission to reschedule 
repayments. Third, in June 1985 the government, by an exceptional government 
regulation (No. 22, 1985), bought up 120,000 shares in this company for Rp.364.3 
billion or 35 per cent of total equity. Fourth, in 1989 three charity foundations headed 
by the then President Soeharto purchased Rp.60 billion worth of Indocement's 
convertible bonds to assist with fund management. Fifth, in October 1989 another 
exceptional ministerial decree made possible the listing of Indocement on the Jakarta 
stock exchange although the company had not made profits during the previous two 
years, which is a requirement for listing. The company raised Rp.599 billion (about 
US$3.4 billion at the average exchange rate of US$1.00 = Rp.1,770) by this device. 
About 56 per cent of the raised capital went towards debt repayment. According tv 
Sato the result of this series of exceptional moves was that by the end of 1989 
Indocement had moved into the black, and by the end of 1990 it had been transfomH;d 
' 
into a highly profitable company with a gross profit-sales ratio as high as 37 per cent. 
The economic recovery and construction boom after 1987 increased cement 
consumption, and capacity utilisation rates were well above 90 per cent for most of 
the first half of the 1990s (Table 11.2). Capacity expanded to reach 23.6 million 
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tonnes in 1994. However, this expansion in capacity could not keep up with rising 
demand and seasonal cement shortages developed in the 1990s. 
During the 1990s, two acquisitions occurred in the industry, which 1.; .. c:ed substantial 
increases in seller concentration. The first of these was Semen Cibinong's takeover of 
the Japanese-controlled, Semen Nusantara in 1992. The first step in the takeover 
process was Hashim Djojohadikusumo's (owner of Cibinong) purchase of the local 
joint venture partner (Gunung Ngadeg Djaya) in 1989, which gave Cibinong a 30 per 
cent share in Semen Nusanatara. Later in 1991, Hashim invoked Indonesia's foreign 
divestment laws, which required foreign investors to sell their shares after 20 years. 
Negotiations over the selling price stalemated in 1992. Hashim then threatened to cut 
supplies of limestone to the cement works. Under Indonesian law foreign companies 
are not allowed to own the limestone deposits. In Semen Nusantara's case the local 
partner, Hashim, held the rights to the limestone deposits. This action threatened the 
viability of Semen Nusantara and after protracted, but faileci, court hearings the 
Japanese sold their 70 per cent share to Semen Cibinong for $US 48 million, an 
amount considered as a bargain by some industry analysts (Smith New Court, 1994).2 
The second acquisition involved three state-owned producers. Semen Gresik, the 
largest and most profitable state-owned cement producer, was partially privatised in 
1995 when the government sold 23 per cent of its shares to the public through the 
Jakarta s~ock exchange. One year later, Gresik acquired ownership of two other state-
owned foctories, Semen Padang and Semen Tonasa, to become the second largest 
producer with a combined market share of 27 per cent in 1994. In 1998, Mexican 
cement producer, Cemex, purchased 14 per cent of shares in Gresik, rerlucing the 
government's stake in the company to 63 per cent. 
The result of these acquisitions was to increase seller concentration. Figure 11.2 
shows the trend in seller concentration between 1974 and 1996. The four-firm 
concentration ratio increased from 76 per cent in 1991 to 83 per cent in 1992, as a 
2 Smith New Court is an international stock brokerage firm '"ith a subsidiary in Jakarta. 
r., 284 
result of Cibinong' s acquis,tion of Nusantara, and to 96 per cent in 1996 as a result of 
Gresik' s acquisition of the two government-owned cement producers. 
Figure 11.2 Seller Concentration in the Indonesian Cement Industry 
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Source: Indonesian Cement Producers Association. 
11.3 International ,.,. rade in Cement 
As a result of the rapid expansion in domestic capacity, Indonesia switched from 
being a net importer of cement in the mid-1970s to a net exporter in the late 1980s. 
Figure 11.3 shows cement imports and exports between 1961 and 1995. Up until the 
mid-: :J !Os over half of Indonesia's cement requirements were imported, mainly from 
Japan. By 1975, Indonesia was importing 1.74 million tonnes of cement, compared to 
local production of 1.09 million tonnes (an import-penetration rate of 61 per cent). 
Imports began to decline after Indocement and Cibinong began full commercial 
operations in 1976 and by the early 1980s no cement was imported. 
Part of this import substitution is attributed to tailor-made import protection given to 
cement producers. In 1974 the government introduced import licences in addition to a 
30 per cent tariff on cement imports. These licences were introduced at the time 
Cibinong and Indocement began constructing their cement plants. Under the licensing 
system only the cement producers and ten trading companies were allowed to import 
cement. Initially ten per cent of all imports were allocated to domestic producers, 60 
per cent to government-owned trading companies, and the remaining 30 per cent to 
private domestk trading companies. Many of the latter were affiliated to the cement 
285 
producerc; through interJocking ownership arrangements. The private trading 
companies were restricted to supply West Java, Jakarta, and West Kalimantan, the 
former two being the major markets. 3 The amount of imports was specified and as 
such there was a built-in quota under this system. The amount of imports allowed was 
determined after discussions between the interdepartmental team and the Cement 
Producers Association (Asosiasi Semen Indonesia), representing all cement producers. 
Figure 11.3 
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In response to the rising cement shortages in the 1990s, the government removed the 
30 per cent tariff and all official quantitative restrictions on cement imports in 1990. 
Imports of c..:ment have remained low, at around 1.4 per cent of total domestic supply 
in 1994. Most of these imports are concentrated in the northern and eastern parts of 
Indonesia - markets that are closer to producers in The Philippines than to most 
domestic producers (see Table 11.8 below). The low import penetration rates are not 
unusual in the cement industry and can be partly explained by the structural 
characteristics of the product. First, cement is a bulk low value commodity, so 
transportation costs make up a relatively high proportion of the retail price. Data on 
transportation costs, as a &hare of regional retail prices, are not available. However, 
3 In 1976 the Director 01'.l'leral of Domestic Trade was given power to vary the respective shares of the 
trading companies. 
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rough estimates of average shares can be extracted from the Input-Output Tables. 
According to the 1990 Tables, in cement the domestic transport cost margin alone was 
12 per cent of average producer price, compared with the manufacturing average of 
around 5.0 per cent. As transport cost3 are an important component of the price of 
cement to consumers, there will be a significant margin between ex-factory and import 
prices. Thus, we would expect some natural protection from import competition in 
local markets further away from foreign exporters. 
Second, cement, if imported in bulk, requires specialised transportation and port 
unloading and storage facilities. This requires significant investment in equipment and 
silos (storage tanks). As a consequence, bulk cement imports are normally undertaking 
by specialised cement importers, distributors and producers. In Indonesia, many of the 
producers and some of their main distributors have port unloading facilities but, 
according to a World Bank ( 1996) report, these unloading and storage facilities are not 
available to third party importers. However, according to an interview with executives 
from Cemex, imports of bagged cement do not require specialised unloading and 
storage facilities at the port. They can easily be imported using standard containers. 
Thus, general importers and/or construction companies can import bagged cement 
without having to invest in specialised facilities. However, according to the same 
interview, ship and overland transportation costs per unit of bagged cement can be 
substantially higher compared with bulk cement, as there are significant economies of 
scale in transportation. 
Distribution controls in the Indonesian cement industry also made it difficult to import 
cement, and this partly explains the low imports in the 1990s as well. Distribution 
controls are discussed in sections 5 shortly. 
With the emergence of excess capacity in Indonesia in the mid-1980s, three prducers 
- Semen Andalas, Semen Padang and Indocement - began to export cement and 
clinker,4 so as to maintain full production capacity. By 1989 exports of cement 
reached 2.6 million tonnes and exports of clinker reached 1.5 million tonnes, or 23.5 
4 Clinker are marble-sized chunks that go through a process of grinding to produce cement. 
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per cent of total industry capacity. Most of these exports went to Bangladesh and Sri 
Lanka. Producers export cement at prices lower than those charged to domestic 
consumers. This arises because transportation costs create a margin between ex-
factory prices and import prices in local markets, which in tum allows local producers 
to price discriminate between the domestic market and the more competitive export 
markets. For example, estimates of Semen Padang's average fob export prices were 50 
per cent lower than its local wholesale price in Padang in 1994 (Table 11.3). 
Table 11.3 
Comparison of Semen Padang Export and Wholesale Prices in 1994 
(US$/40kg) 
Price 
Export price 
Wholesale price 
1994 
1.41 
2.91 
Notes. The export price is estimated by calculating the average fob export price per 40kg of cement. 
Wholesale price refers to Semen Padang's average wholesale price in Padang, converted into US 
dollars at the average 1994 exchange rate of US$1.00=Rp.2, 160. 
Ex-factory prices are not availabl~. 
Source: BPS, Export Statistics and Indikator Ekonomi. 
In response to the rising cement shortages in the 1990s, the government also imposed 
export quotas on producers. Under the quota system, each export order was required 
to have approval from the Ministry of Industry and Trade. The decision to give 
approval was based on the Ministry's assessment of the demand and supply conditions 
at the time. The drop in expmts after 1990 was a direct result of restrictive export 
quotas. Producers complained that the quotas disrupted exports and hindered the 
development of long-tenn relationships with overseas buyers. For example, in 1995 
Semen Padang was forced to cancel an export order to Bangladesh that had already 
been delivered to the local harbour, apparently resulting in the loss of a long-term 
buyer. 
11. 4 Demand Conditions of Cement 
Demand for cement is derived from the demand for construction activities. The 
primary determinant of the level of construction activity is economic growth. This is 
strongly influenced by government through macro-economic policy and the 
development budget, especially infrastructure provision. Because of its dependence on 
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growth, demand for cement can be potentially unstable - a widespread slowdown in 
the rate of growth can cause significant falls in cement consumption. Figure 11.4 
depicts per capita consumption of cement during the period 1970 - 1994. Per capita 
consumption is measured as the annual consumption of cement (in kilograms) over 
the total Indon~sian population. It is apparent that cement consumption per person has 
increased substantially over the last 25 years, and this is indicative of rapid 
industrialisation. Cement consumption increased from 10.2 kilograms per person in 
1970 to 94 kilograms in 1993. The average annual growth of consumption for the 
period was 9.0 per cent. 
Figure 11.4 
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Table 11.4 shows the consumption of cement according to different regions in 
Indonesia between 1980 and 1993. In 1993, Java accounted for 68 per cent of total 
consumption, of which West Java contributed 22.8 per cent, Jakarta 19 per cent, East 
Java 13.6 per cent, and Central Java 11 per cent. Sumatra accounted for a further 18.4 
per cent of total consumption. The other regions (Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Nusa 
Tenggara, Irian Jaya and Maluku) accounted for the remaining 13.6 per cent of total 
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consumption. Growth in demand for cement has been relatively unifonn across all 
regions over the period 1985 to 1993, as indicated by the relatively constant regional 
percentages in total consumption. 
Table 11.4 Regional Consumption of Cement 
(OOOs of tonnes and % share of national consumption) 
Year 1980 1985 1993 
Sumatra Vol 1390 1708 3278 
% 24.8 18.8 18.4 
Java Vol 3429 6152 12186 
% 61.2 67.8 68.4 
Kalimantan Vol 151 250 480 
% 2.7 2.8 2.7 
Sulawesi Vol 403 484 926 
% 7.2 5.3 5.2 
Nusa Tenggara Vol 155 357 661 
% 2.8 3.9 3.7 
Irian Jaya/ Vol 76 129 273 
Maluku % 1.4 1.4 1.5 
Source: Indonesian Cement Producers Association 
The demand for cement in Indonesia follows two distinct and persistent cycles. First, 
cement demand closely follows the pattern of growth in construction activities. Figure 
11.5 shows the growth rates in cement consumption and real construction expenditure 
over the period 1971 to 1994. Real construction expenditure is defined as total 
national construction expenditure valued at 1983 prices (National Income Statistics, 
BPS). Examining Figure 11.5, it is apparent that cement 1.:onsumptio11 is pro-cyclical. 
That is, cement is positively correlated with construction expenditure. Furthermore, 
growth in cement consumption fluctuates widely over the business cycle, indi;;ating 
that c ~ment demand is very sensitive to changes in economic activity. 
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Figure 11.S 
Growth in Cement Consumption and Real Construction Expenditure 
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Source: Growth in cement consumption: Indonesian Cement Producers Association. 
Real construction expenditure: BPS, National Incl)me Statistics. 
Second, cement demand follows a seasonal pattern. Figure 11.6 shows the pattern in 
monthly cement consumption for selected years: 1988, 1990, and 1993. The figure 
shows that the demand for cement is higher in the second half of the year than in the 
first half. Typically, 55 per cent of total cement consumption occurs in the second half 
of the year <'nd only 45 per cent in the first. This variation in demand reflects the split 
between the wet (November to March) and the dry season (April to October), and is 
accentuated by the government's development hudgetary allocation of funds for 
infrastructure projects between April and June of each year. Demand for cement also 
falls during the month of Idul Fitri (the moslem fasting month) when economic 
activity slows down across most sectors of the economy, induding the construction 
sector. Usually cement purchases fall by about 30 per cent of average monthly demand 
during this period. The fasting month moves baclr 11 days each year and, thus, the fall 
in cement purchases shifts back 11 days ac; well. 
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Figure 11.6 
Monthly Cement Consumption for Selected Years: 1988, 1990, and 1993 
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In this section we estimate the price and expenditure elasticities of the demand for 
cement in Indonesia. As noted earlier, the demand for cement is derived from the 
demand for construction activities. Several resear£hers have investigated the 
determinants of cement consumption for other countries. In general, these studies find 
that demand is price inelastic and expenditure elastic (Rosenbaum, 1994). We foll / 
these studies and specify the demand function for cement as: 
• + 
Q,D = f(P1, Y1) (1) 
where Q,D is the quantity demau.ded of cement in period t (t=l ... N), Pis the relative 
price of cement, Y is construction expenditure (proxies demand for construction). P is 
expected to be inversely related to cement demand. Construction expenditure is 
expected to be positively related to demand. 
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In estimating the demand function, it is necessary to allow for possible time lags 
involved in the hypothesised price and construction expenditure relationships. For 
this, we make use of the error correction method (ECM). This procedure was 
discussed in detail in Chapter 9 when we estimated the demand for cigarettes, and we 
do not need to repeat the discussion here. The sample period is 1970 to 1994. We use 
annual data. Cement demand is measured by per capita cement consumption. The 
price of cement is measured by the relative cement price index (ratio of the wholesale 
cement price index to the producer price index; the base year is 1983). The source is 
the various issues of fudikator Ekonomi (economic indicators) published by BPS. 
Construction expenditure is measured by real construction expenditure per capita 
(National Income Statistics, BPS, various issues). All variables are used in log form so 
that the coefficients can be directly interpreted as constant elasticities. 
The final parsimonious estimates of cement demand are reported in Table 11.5 
together with the diagnostic statistics. The long-run construction expenditure and price 
elasticities derived from the estimated coefficients of the lagged level variables are 
also reported in Table 11.5. The equation passes the F-test for overall significance at 
the 5 percent level. Statistically, the equation performed very well, exhibiting no 
problems of functional form misspecification (RESET), heteroskedasticity (HSC), or 
serial correlation (LM). 
Table 11.S Determinants of Cement Consumption: Regression Results 
ti Qd = -2.364 + 1.115 8 Y + 0.667Yt-1 - 0.164 Pt-1 -0.419 Qdt-1 
(2.1)** (1.3)*** (2.4)* (1.4)*** (2.7)* 
Long-run elasticitiy of price with respect to Qd = -0.39 
Long-run elasticity of construction expenditure w\th respect to Qd = 1.59 
R2 = 0.27 F (4, 19) = 3.1 LM (1, 18) = 0.33 RESET (1. 18) = 1.36 
JBN (2) = 2.00 HSC (1, 22) = 0.26 
* t-ratios of regression coefficients are given in brackets with the level ot statistical 
significance (one-tailed test) denoted as * ! per cent, ** 5 per cent, *** 10 per cent 
Test statistics 
LM Lagrange multiplier for serial correlation; RESET Ramsey RESET test for 
functional form misspecification; JBN Jarques-Bera test for normality of residuals; 
HSC test for heteroskedasticity (based on squared residuals). Except JBN which is 
based on the %2 distribution, all other tests are based on the F-distribution. The 
degrees of freedom for the respective tests are given in brackets. 
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As expected, cement price impact negatively and real construction expenditure 
positively on cement demand. The long-run price and expenditure elasticities are -0.39 
and 1.59 respectively. The estimated price e:lasticity is less than one, suggesting that 
cement demand is price inelastic: A 10 per ,cent increase in the relative ..)ement price 
will reduce i::ement demand by 3.9 per cent in the long-run. The estimated expenditure 
elasticity is greater than one, suggesting that cement demand is construction 
expenditure elastic. A 10 per cent increase in real construction expenditure will 
increase the demand for cement by 15.9 per cent in the long-run. The short-run 
construction expenditure elasticity of demand of 1.12 is slightly lower than the Iong-
run expenditure elasticity of 1.59. This suggests that the demand effect of a change in 
real construction expenditure is slightly greater in the long-run compared with the 
short-run. In our earlier econometric work we found that the coefficient of the change 
in the cement price ( ~ P) variable was statistically insignificant, and was thus dropped 
from the model. This result indicates that there is no short-run impact of a price 
change on cement demand. This result is not entirely unexpected. Developers and 
construction companies are contractually committed to a construction project and, 
thus, they have little scope for reducing cement purchases during a short-run period 
such as a construction project. 
11.5 Government Policy and the Nature of Competition 
In industrial organisation theory, the cement industry is characterised as a regional 
oligopoly facing a cyclical pattern of demand (Iwand and Rosenbaum, 1991). Cement 
plants are geographically dispersed and sell within distinct regional markets, which 
arise due to the relatively low value of cement compared to the costs of transporting 
cement (Scherer and Ross, 1990). A few finns primarily serve a particular regional 
market. The plants operate under conditions of high fixed and sunk costs and, thus, 
substantial economies of scale. Combined with the limited number of competitors and 
a low price elasticity of demand, these cost conditions give rise to an oligopolistic 
pricing structure (Koller and Weiss, 1989). Regional market segmentation introduces 
two effects: ( 1) it pem1its a rigid and discrirninatOf'/ price structure; and (2) it protects 
each plant's market to the extent that the plant is a spatial monopolist. A particular 
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plant feels the effects of competition in areac with an overlap with other finns' plants 
(McBride, 1983). Over time the boundary of regional markets may become blurred 
with improvements in transport infrastructure and costs, and cement plants typically 
penetrate each other's markets at timf'!S of excess capacity. 
The fadonesian cement industry can be characterised as a regional oligopoly (Table 
11.6). There are nine producers, of which the largest four firms accounted for 83 per 
cent of total domestic supply in 1994. The nine cement plants are geographically 
dispersed. Transportation costs are an impo1tant component of the price of cement to 
consumers. According to the 1990 Input-Output '.fables, in cement the transport cost 
margin was around 12 per cent of average producer prices, compared to an average 
margin of 5 per cent for the manufacturing sector as a whole. This provides plants 
with some natural protection in local markets further away from other suppliers, 
including foreign exporters. The degree of natural protection m local markets is likely 
to have declined as real transportation costs have fallen with improvements in 
transport infrastructure in recent years. This is partly reflected in the decreasing 
transport cost margins reported in Table 11.6. 
Table 11.6 
Structure of the Cement lndui;try 
Number of firms a 
National seller CR4a 
Average regional CR2a 
Transport cost marginb 
Average for manufacturing sectorb 
Price elasticity of demand 
1985 1994 
9 9 
72 83 
96 92 
19 12 
7.2 5.0 
0.39 (inelastic demand) 
Source: a) Indonesian Cement Producers Association. b) 1985 and 1990 Input-Output Tables. Transport 
margin is calculated as the ratio of total transportation cnsts to value of production at producer prices. 
The national CR4 ratio increased to 83 per cent in the 1992 as 11 result of Semen Cibinong acquiring 
Semen Nusantara. The CR4 ratio increased to 96 per cent in 1996 as a result of Semen Grcsik's 
acquisition of Semen Padang and Seman Tonasa. 
However, government regulations have shaped the structure of the industry and the 
nature of competition.5 Until February 1998, when the industry was deregulated, the 
regulatory arrangements in the cement industry were based on a decree issued by the 
~ See Plunkett ct al ( 1997) for n recent discussion of the price and distribution an angements in the 
Indonesian cement industry. 
29S 
Minister of Trade in April 1979. The decree governed th~ distribution of cement, both 
domestically and for export, and included the setting of retail pri~es for principal cities 
in each of the 27 provinces. Table 11.7 lists the main elements of the regulatory 
arrangement in the cement industry. 
Table 11.7 
Regional 
Markets 
Distributors 
Prices 
Imports 
Exports 
Investment 
Raw 
Materials 
The Regulatory Arrangements in the Cement Industry 
The national cement market is divided into 27 regional sub-markets. 
Each local market cnrresponds to a province. Each producer is assigned 
quotas to particular regional markets. Producers are not permitted to 
sell cement in non-allocated markets. 
Producers are allowed to appoint their own distributors 
The Ministry of Industry and Trade sets reference or guidan,~e 
retail prices for each regional market, known as Harga Pedoman 
Setemp~t (HPS). In 1995 the government established reference 
ex-factory prices, known as Harga Jual Pabrik (HJP) 
Up until 1990, imports of cemc-nt were restricted to cement producers 
and selected trading companies. There was also a 30 per cent tariff on 
cement imports, All official imp1)rt restrictions were removed in 1990. 
Export quotas 
New entry was restricted in the mid-1980s 
Foreign owned firms are prohibited from owning limestone deposits. 
Source: Decree No. 318/KPtuVn9 of April 21, 1979; Decree No. 147/KPN/9C of May 28, 1990; 
Decree No. 48/KP/III/95 of March 31, 1995; Decree No. JO/KPnV/95 of April 17, 199.5; Priority 
Investment List 1985, BKPM. 
Administered prices, distribution controls and the export quota system were eliminated in February 
1998 under the IMF Structural Reform programme. 
Under the regui~~l)ry arrangements, the national cement market was divided into 27 
regional markets. Each regional market corresponded to a provin~<.':. Producers were 
assigned quotas to specific markets, and were not ljllowed w sell their proC:Jct in non-
allocated markets. Distribution quotas for the domestic' and ei;port markets were 
negotiated at monthly meetings between officials from the Mi.nistry of Industry and 
Trade and the Cement Producers Association (A~o~,iasi Semen Indonesia), which 
represents the nine cement producers. The Ministry of Industry and Trade also set 
reference or guidance retail prices for each province, known as Harga Pedoman 
Setempat (HPS). The Cement Producers Association and the Ministry of Industry and 
Trade monitored compliance to the distribution sy!ltem by acting as 'trading posts' 
whereby market information - regional cement sales, regional l'etnil prices, import and 
export data - was collected by them and widely disserrunated among producers. 
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The objective of this system was to ensure a continuous supply of cement to all 
provinces at stable prices. However, as shown below, the distribution system had 
limited success in stabilising prices in the.face of cyclical demand for cement. Rather, 
tt ~ distribution arrangements exac;erbated price instability by greatly reducing the 
contestability of regional markets. The administered allocation of supplies prevented 
supplies from other regions, including impo~s, entering to dampen price increases 
when demand rose. The regulatory arrangements and their effects on competition are 
discussed in the ren aining sections of this Chapter. The cement industry was 
deregulated in 1998 under the IMF Structural Reform programme. This is discussed 
later in Section 11.8. 
11.5.1 The HPS Pricing Arrangement 
The Minister of Indu:-try and Trade set HPS prices for the capital cities of each 
province. The HPS prices were not fixed prices, but refenmce or guidance prices. The 
objective of the HPS price system was to create price stability by providing producers 
and distributors with benchmark prices. 
The reference prices were based on an ex-factory price for cement derived from 
'representative' operating costs. The Ministry estimated average production costs of a 
representative firm based on information collected from domestic producers. Added to 
this cost base was interest paid on borrowings, depreciation and other overheads to 
derive operating costs. A 10% gross profi'. margin was added to this amount to derive 
the ex-factory price. The HPS price was established by adding transport costs from the 
closest cement plant or supplier, distribution and retail margins, and value added tax. 
Thus, HPS prices were lowest in capital cities closer to a cement plant, such as in 
Jakarta, Bandung, Semarang, Yogyakarta, Surabaya, Padang, Bandar Lampung. 
Conversely, 1-rns prices were highest in cities without a cement plant nearby, such as 
in Manado in North Sulawesi, Jayapura in Irian Jaya, and the capital cities in 
Kalimantan. HPS prices for 1994 are listed in the appimdix to this Chapter. The HPS 
prices were designed to provide a normal return to thr. higher cost or least efficient 
firms. This allowed the lower cost firms to earn a higher return than the one implicit in 
the HPS price. HPS prices were adjusted upwards every one or two years. The 
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adjustment was based on the Ministry's assessment of changes in the cost conditions 
of the industry, demand conditions and installed capacity. For example, incrnases in 
HPS prices could be justified on the grounds that it would encourage new investment 
in the industry or to compensate for rising input costs or exchange rate depreciation. 
The basing of HPS prices on the ex-factory plus freight cost from the nearest plant 
resembles the oligopolistic pricing structure that might occm undr;r an unregulated 
cement market (McBride, 19R3; Iwanci md Rosenbaum, 1991; Plunkett et al, 1997). 
However, there are a number of important differences between the admimstered HPS 
system and the price structure that might 0ccur in an unregulated oligopoly. First, the 
HPS system eliminates any potential for price competition in areas where firms 
overlap with each other. Second, according to Plunkett et al (1997), the HPS system 
does not nece~sat:1y imitate its efficiency, as in the Indonesian case pricing is not 
driven solely by commercial considerations. In a deregulated and more contestable 
market, the producer located closest to the consumer would become the dominant 
supplier and price leader. Other producers would absorb the additional costs of 
transport in order to compete in the market. In the short run, producers would be 
willing to absorb additional transport costs to sell in more distant markets until their 
marginal revenue equals marginal c·..>sts. 
Compliance with HPS Prices 
As indicated above, HPS prices were not fixed, but reference or guidance prices. 
Retail prices were allowed to deviate fror .. HPS pricec;. In practice, HPS prices acted 
as floor prices and actual retail prices often rose above reference prk •s, especially 
during peak demand periods, or when HPS prices had not been adjusted for some 
time. Typically, retail prices remained close to HPS prices in the first half of the year, 
but rise sharply in response to increased demand for cement in the second half. In 
recent years market prices have risen sharply in response to increased demand for 
cement, and domestic capacity constraints, as a result of the 1990s construction boom. 
Figure 11.7 shows the variation in actual retail prices from HPS prices in Jakarta for 
the years 1993 to 1995. In the first eight months after the increase in the HPS price in 
January 1993, local retail prices remained close to the HPS price - on average they 
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were one per cent above it. In October 1993, retail prices rose sharply in response to 
increased demand for cement, and in November peaked at around 14 per cent above 
the HPS price. Retail prices remained at this level for most of the first half of 1994. 
They increased again in August, peaking in October 1994 at 56 per cent above the 
HPS price. Retail prices eased a little in January 1995, but remained around 40 per 
cent above the HPS price until April 1995. In March the Ministry of Industry and 
Trade increased HPS prices by an average of 40%, more or less in line with retail 
prices prevailing at the time. However, in rP,sponse to consumer outrage the Minister 
reduced the average HPS price by 14 percentage points a month later, thus, resulting 
in a net increase of 26 per cent over the pre-March HPS price.6 In August 1995 retail 
prices again rose in response to increased demand, and were 15 per cent above the 
new HPS price in September. This pattern of retail prices in Jakarta was typical of 
other provinces at the time. Figure 11.8 shows the variation in actual retail prices for 
27 provinces during the period 1993 to 1995. Prices varied most and were highest in 
regions without a cement plant nearby such as in Irian Jaya, Kalimantan and other 
parts of east Indonesia. 
During periods of cement shortage, according to firm interviews, private producers 
monitor retail prices and change delivery prices to ensure that part of the increase in 
retail prices is returned to them (firm interviews). However, because of the non-
transparent nature of price setting in the industry the actual proportion returned to 
private producers is unknown. Their distributors and retailers capture some proportion 
of the increase in retail prices. Each prv:iucer has one main distributor, which in turn 
appoints sub-distributors to regional markets. The main distributor is affiliated to the 
private producer through interlocking ownership arrangements, and this allows the 
producer to capture part of the increase in retail prices through the main distributor 
changing delivery prices to :;uh-distributors. For example, the main distributor of 
6 The March decree also established separate HPS prices for 50kg bags of cement (25% above those for 
40kg sacks) and specified that the HPS prices would apply to all cities within a lOOkm radius of the 
reference city, rather than just in the reference city as previously regulated. The Ministry also 
introduced separate single reference ex-factory prices (known as Harga Jual Pabrik), in both 40kg and 
50kg sac'ts, and provided for HJP and HPS prices to be updated twice yearly, in January and July. 
According to Plunkett et al (1997: 88) the March-April decrees were an attempt to re-establish the 
influence of HPS prices in the cem1 it distribution system. 
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Semen Cibinm~g and Semen Nusantara is the majority shareholder of these two 
companies, Tirtamas Majutama. Semen Cibinong allows its main distributor to change 
delivery prices to ensure that part of the increase in retail prices is returned to the 
group (HG ASIA, 1995). The state~owned cement producers were under strong 
pressure from the Ministry of Industry and Trade to continue to charge only the ex-
factory price implicit in the HPS price, in the belief that this would dampen rising 
retail prices. The result of this compliance by SOEs was that their distributors gained a 
windfall profit during periods of cement shortages. This in effect acted as a tax on 
government-owned cement producers, except the revenues went to distributors. 
However, in recent years the govemment-owne~ producers have began to change 
delivery prices to capture part of the increase in retail prices. 
The cement crisis in 1994 and 1995 aroused intense public criticism of the cement 
industry and its regulatory arrangements. The industry Wl\S accused of cartel control 
by vested interest groups, hoarding and speculation by producers and distributors, and 
there were calls for the industry to be deregulated. Representatives of the Cement 
Producers Association were even summoned to a special parliamentary hearing to 
explain the cement shortage in 1995. At the peak of the concern in late 1995, an army 
general threatened to slap a charge of sabotage on a producer, distributor or any one 
else found guilty of 'manipulating' cement prices above the HPS prices. While no one 
took this particular threat seriously, it did highlight the depth of the public's 
frustration with cement prices as well as the political sensitivity of the industry. 
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11.5.2 Distribution Controls 
Control of the regional distribution of cement was the most important element of the 
regulation of the industry. Under the distribution arrangement producers were 
allocated both natural and special marketing areas. The natural marketing area was 
defined as the province in which the plant was located. For example, Indocement's 
plants are located in West Java, so its natural market was West Java. Special 
marketing areas were allocated to each producer based on plant location and installed 
production capacity. Distribution quotas for the local markets were negotiated at 
monthly meetings between officials of the Ministry of Industry and Trade and Cement 
l'roducers Association. Each producer was assigned delivery quotas to particular 
provinces based on historic supply, and the cement market situation as assessed from 
data on prices, orders and stocks.7 For example, if local retail prices were consistently 
above HPS prices then this suggested a 'cement shortage'. The Ministry would then 
require assigned producers to increase cement supplies to these regions. Producers 
could fill their quotas from their existing production, by importing cement, by 
importing clinker to produce cement, or by purchasing cement from other domestic 
producers. 
Table 11.8 shows the quantities of cement supplied to the provinces by each producer 
in 1994. The Cement Producers Association provided us with the data on cement 
deliveries to the regions. A number of observations can be made. First, each province 
was supplied by only two or three firms: in general, there was one main supplier and 
one or two smaller suppliers. The second feature is that, there appeared to be 
considerable cross-hauling of cement within Indonesia, more so than would be 
expected in an unregulated market.8 In particular, two firms, Semen Padang (a 
government-owned factory) and lndocement (a private firm), made deliveries to over 
80% of total provinces in Indonesia. Semen Padang supplied 22 of the 27 provinces, 
7 Each month staff at the provincial offices of the Ministry of Industry and Trade surveyed retail prices 
and cement stocks in each capital city and selected provincial towns and villages. This data was then 
used to assess regional cement market conditions. The data was, and still are, published in the 
Ministry's monthly bulletin on trade statistics. 
8 For example, in the U.S.A cement market, producers sell around 83 per cent of their cement to 
consumers located within a 360km radius of their plant. Producers operating sea barges can ship cement 
up to l,OOOkm along the U.S.A coast (lwand and Rosenbaum, 1991). 
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and Indocement supplied 20 in 1994. Semen Padang supplied consumers in Bali 
(1,850 km from Padang), East Timor (2,870 km from Padang), Maluku (3140 km 
from Padang), and Irian Jaya (4,450 km from Padang), all located in East Indonesia 
and markets far away from Semen Padang, and closer to Semen Gresik and Semen 
Tonasa. Indocement supplied consumers in North Sumatra (l,420 km from Jakarta) -
a market closer to Semen Padang and Andalas. Both Semen Padang and Indocement 
supplied significant amounts of cement to consumers in Sulawesi, the natural market 
of Semen Tonasa. 
Third, and as indicated earlier, most cement imports were concentrated in the northern 
and eastern parts of Indonesia - markets that are closer to The Philippines than to 
most domestic producers. High import penetration rates were recorded for North 
Sulawesi (22.7 per cent) and Maluku (29.3 per cent) in 1994. However, cement 
producers and selected state trading enterprises imported all of this cement under the 
distribution arrangements (Table 11.9).9 Thus, these imports can not be considered as 
competitive imports since they were not effectively competing with local producers. A 
few independent importers were reported to have imported bagged cement during the 
peak demand season in 1995, but this was apparently on a small scale (Jakarta Post, 
April 25, 1995). Sh011ly we explain how the Clistribution controls deterred competitive 
imports. 
Table 11.9 shows the number of firms and regional concentration ratios for the 27 
provinces in 1985 and 1994. Seller concentration was very high in all provinces. The 
average market share of the dominant supplier was 72 per cent, and the average two-
firrn concentration ratio was 92 per cent in 1994. 
9 State enterprises were PT Karya Niaga and PT Dharmn Niagn. 
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Table 11.8 Actual Cement Sales bl Provincial Market and Producer in 1994 (in tonnes) 
Province P.TPadang P.TGresik P.TTonasa P.T Indocement P.T Cibinong P.T Nusantara P.T Baturaja Aceh 11,756 0 0 0 0 0 0 North Sumatra 421,988 0 0 29,848 0 0 0 West Sumatra 498,030 0 0 0 0 0 0 Riau 545,210 0 0 47,579 18,975 0 0 Iambi 158,840 0 0 11,959 3,025 0 18,227 South Sumatra 72,461 0 0 19,740 9,935 0 348,488 Bengkulu 111,029 0 0 0 0 0 6,349 Larnpung 92,600 0 0 69,448 0 0 261,625 Jakarta 378,809 0 0 2,804,795 1,244,603 0 \; West Java 0 0 0 4,142,665 868,537 40,793 0 Central Java 58,075 155,105 (J 879,043 162,270 802,402 0 Yogyakarta 0 48,156 0 64,622 0 238,415 0 EastJava 164,790 2,256,492 0 184,346 69,634 15,976 0 Central Kalimantan 600 9,064 8,400 5,460 0 0 0 South Kalimantan 16,485 49,8970 51,090 32,368 0 0 c West Kalimantan 10,180 0 14,300 85,326 7,885 0 0 East Kalimantan 18,550 0 174,134 22,616 0 0 0 West Sulawesi 0 0 74,252 0 0 0 0 Central Sulawesi 10,000 0 92,400 5,288 0 0 0 South Sulawesi 0 0 667,384 0 0 0 0 North Sulawesi 76,425 0 56,870 32,868 0 0 0 Bali 35,600 127,679 33,450 128,214 0 0 0 West Nusa Tenggara 33,300 0 78,700 45,146 0 0 0 East Nusa Tenggara 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 EastTimor l:i,521 0 39,740 0 0 0 0 Maluku 32,000 0 65,820 10,376 0 0 0 IrianJaya 48,900 0 53,480 45,784 0 0 0 Domestic 2,811,159 2,646,393 l,410,020 9,067,511 2,384,864 1,097,586 634,689 deliveries 
Cement exports 137,600 0 0 114,504 32,902 0 0 Total 2,948,759 2,646,393 1,410,020 9,182,{)15 2,417766 1,097,587 634,689 Clinker Imports 0 0 91,806 51,534 0 116,249 149,909 
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Province Andalas Kupang Total Domestic deliveries Imports Total deliveries Import Pe~1etration Rate(%) Aceh 247,995 0 259,751 0 259,751 0 North Sumatra 610,663 0 1,062,509 0 1,062,509 0 West Sumatra 0 0 498,030 0 498,030 0 Riau 162.424 0 774,188 1,326 775,514 0.2 Iambi 0 0 192,051 0 192,051 0 South Sumatra 0 0 450,624 5,100 455,724 I.I Bengkulu 0 0 117,378 0 117,378 0 Lampung 0 0 423,673 9,260 432,933 2.1 Jakarta 0 0 4,428,207 77,140 4,505,347 1.8 West Java 0 0 5,051,995 0 5,051,995 0 Central Java 0 0 2,056,895 7,000 2,063,895 0.3 Yogyakarta 0 0 351,193 0 351,193 0 East Java n 0 3,091,238 47,548 3,138,786 1.5 Central Kalimantan 0 0 23,544 0 23,544 0 South Kalimantan 0 0 149,840 0 149,840 0 West Kalimantan 0 0 118,641 13,300 126,941 6.5 East Kalimantan I 0 215,300 18,000 233,300 7.7 West Sulawesi 0 0 74,252 0 74,252 0 Central Sulawesi 0 0 107,688 10346 llS.034 8.8 South Sulawesi 0 0 667,384 0 667,384 0 North Sulawesi 0 0 166,163 48,886 215,049 22.7 Bali 0 0 324,943 6,500 331,443 2.0 West Nusa Tenggara 0 0 157,146 0 157,146 0 East Nusa Tenggara 0 159,657 159,657 0 159,657 0 East Timar 0 9.168 64,429 0 64,429 0 
.Maluku 0 0 108,196 44,810 153,006 29.3 IrianJaya 0 0 148,164 6,500 154,664 4.2 Domestic l,022,032 168,825 21,243,079 290,716 21,533795 l.4 d.eliveries 
Cement exports 201,849 0 486,164 Total 1,223,881 168,825 21,729,534 
Clinker Imports l,326 0 144,666 
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Table 11.9 Regional Selfar Concentration in 1985 and 1994 
1985 1994 
Province N CRl CR2 CR3 CR4 N CRl CR2 CR3 CR4 
Aceh 1 100 2 96 100 
North Sumatra 3 53 85 100 3 59 95 100 
West Sumatra 1 100 l 100 
South Sumatra · 4 92 98 100 3 74 .82 100 
Jambi 3 64 94 100 3 73 88 100 
Bengkulu 3 76 90 100 3 85 98 100 
Lampung 2 79 100 3 53 80 100 
Jakarta 3 65 91 JOO 3 69 94 100 
West Java 3 72 99 100 2 82 100 
Central Java 4 66 97 99 100 4 53 95 99 100 
Djogakarta 3 81 96 JOO 3 61 84 100 
East Java 2 85 100 4 63 91 98 100 
Central Kalimantan 1 100 3 65 90 100 
South Kalimantan 4 51 88 95 100 3 43 71 100 ,, 
West Kalimantan 2 84 100 3 83 94 100 
East Kalimantan 3 77 97 100 3 74 92 100 
West Sulawesi 2 84 100 I 100 
Central Sulawesi 2 77 100 2 79 JOO 
South Sulawesi 1 100 1 100 I North Sulawesi 2 53 100 3 62 93 100 
Bali 4 61 91 96 100 4 69 85 93 100 
West Nusa Tenggara 6 51 92 96 98 3 52 91 100 
East Nusa Tenggara 2 86 100 1 100 
EastTimor 3 60 87 100 3 67 94 100 
Maluku 3 68 97 100 3 68 88 100 
Irian Ja~a 3 49 93 100 3 51 93 100 
Average regional 
oncentration 2.7 74A 96.0 99.5 100 2.7 72.3 92.2 99.6 100 
National concentration 9 39 51 63 72 9 47 63 74 83 
Source: Indonesian Cement Producers Association, ASI. N = number of suppliers 
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The distribution arrangements had little success in stabilising prices or supply to all 
provinces. As shown in Figures 11.7 and 11.8, retail prices remained significantly 
above HPS prices for most of the last three years, and supply shortages were reported 
during the peak demand periods. Rather, the distribution controls had probably 
exacerbated price instability across provinces. The administrative allocation of 
supplies prevented supplies from other regions quickly entering lo dampen price 
increases when demand rises. Under such conditions, producers and distributors 
would earn additional profits without the threat of supplies from other regions 
entering to erode additional profits. If regional markets were contestable, firms would 
allocate sales to the most profitable markets. Under such circumstances regionw 
shortages would probably be less pronounced than they were during this period. 
Over time the distribution system had evolved into a market system that resembled a 
cartel. Indeed, the distribution system described above exhibited standard textbook 
characteristics of a cartel (see Scherer and Ross, 1990). Regional markets and market 
shares were negotiated between officials from the Ministry of Industry and Trade and 
the Cement Producers Association. The number of suppliers to each province was 
kept small, regional concentration was very high and market shares of dominant 
suppliers to each province were relatively stable. Both the producers association and 
the Ministry monitored compliance to the distribution system by acting as 'trading 
posts' whereby market information - producers' regionrJ cement sales, imports, 
exports, and regional retail prices - were collected by them and widely disseminated 
among members. 
The regulated distribution arrangements had also erected barriers to new entry and 
competitive imports. The need for new entrants to negotiate with both members of the 
Cement Producers Association and the Ministry of Industry and Trade on plant 
location, regional markets and quotas had deterred independent entrants. Instead, the 
regulatory arrangements encouraged potential entrants to establish joint ventures with 
existing producers to make entry easier. The only new entrant announced since 1985 
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is a joint venture betwc.en a South Korean cement producer, Kodeco, and 
Indocement. 10 
While the government eliminated the restrictive import licensing system and the 30 
per cent tariff on cement imports in 1990, the distribution controls erected non-tariff 
barriers to competitive imports. Under the distribution arrangements cement producers 
and selected state trading enterprises were given responsibility to import cement. The 
amount of imports allowed was determined after negotiations between the 
interdepartmental team and representatives of the Cement Producers Association. As 
indicated earlier, producers were assigned delivery quotas to particular provinces. 
Producers would fill their quota from their existing production and by importing 
cement to meet any shortfall. The state trading companies would also be allocated 
cement import quot<.\<; for particular regional markets. As such there was a built-in 
import quota under this distribution system. This heavy involvement of cement 
producers and state trading enterprises in importing cement crowded out independent, 
private sector importers of cement. Press statements by Ministry officials indicated 
that the Government viewed imports as only temporary measures whenever there was 
a domestic supply shortage, and were not intended to be competing with producers. 
Furthermore, while genernl importers were officially free to import cement, it was 
unclear whether they were allowed to distribute cement themselves or had to distribute 
through producers. Under the distribution arrangements, only producers were 
allocated regional supply quotas (and state trading enterprises for imports). General 
importers were technically in violation of the distribution regulations if they 
distributed cement themselves, as they did not have regional quotas. 
There are also infrastructure barriers to potential competitive imports. According to a 
World Bank (1996) report on the distribution system in Indonesia, independent, 
private sector importers of cement are constrained by limited availability of port 
unloading facilities. As noted earlier, importers of bulk cement require access to port 
unloading facilities, including sufficient storage facilities or silos. Many of the cement 
producers and some of their main distributors have their c,,vn port unloading facilities 
w At the time of completing this study, the joint venture was still in its planning stages to constt'Uct a 
plant in Central Kalimantan at a cost of USS4RO million. 
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and silos, but these are not available to third party importers. Thus. general importers 
tend to be confined to importing bagged cement. 
However, despite the apparent 'tightness' of the formal distribution system, produc:ers 
did occasionally cheat on the quota system, especially during times of excess capacity 
in the late 1980s. On a few occasions, producers had complained to the Ministry of 
Industry and Trade about other produ1..~rs penetrating their ..:located markets 
(lndocommercial, 1991 ). Cheating arises because monitoring compliance to ~he 
distribution arrangements is not an easy task, despite the involvement of both th~ 
Ministry and Cement Prodm:ers Association in this process. This is essentially due to 
the characteristics of the cement industry and the buyers involved. The major cement 
buyers are construction companies which often have constrnction activities spanning 
several provinces and buy OP an irregular basis. Because of this, cement companies 
are able to make secret deals with these construction companies (especially the large 
construction firms) to undercut their rivals' prices and supply cement in non-allocated 
markets. These characteristics meke cartel practices in the cement industry vulnerable 
to periodic breakdown and price wars, unless, as was the case in the Indonesian 
cement industry, there are regulations reinforcing cartel practiccs.11 
11.6. Restrictive Trade Practices in the Distribution Channels 
Restrictive trade practices also exist within the distribution channels in the cement 
industry. As indicated earlier, each producer appoints one main distributor. which in 
tum appoints distributors in the regions. The main distributor is usually affiliated to 
the cement producer through interlocking ownership arrangements. Producers impose 
two types of restrictions on their distributors. The first restriction is known in 
economks as exclusive dealerships; distributors are not allowed to handle competing 
bninds, including imports, without the producer's permission. The seconc.. .!strktion 
is known as territorial restrictions. Producers limit the number of distributors per sub· 
region (although, distributors are often assigned more than one sub-r~gional market). 
11 See Losecher (1954), Stigler (1Cl64), and Scherer and Ross (1990) for a cHscuS&ion on why cartel 
practices in the US cement inllUstry in the 1930s and 1940tl wag vulnerable to periodic breakdown and 
price wars. 
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For example, Semen Padang had appointed five distributors to West Java in 1995. 
Limiting the number of distributors per region reduces competition among distributors 
of the same .1rand (intrabrand) and, thus, helps maintain attractive profit margins for 
distributors. Attractive profit margins in tum deter distributors from viol8Ling their 
agency agreements with producers (World Bank, 1996). Producers are ablt; to impose 
these restrictions on distributor5 because they have allocated regional markets, and 
distributors have limited alternative sources of supply, including imports. 
In general, these vertical restraints are not anti-competitive per se if there is sufficient 
competition at the producer level, or inter-brand rivalry (Tirole, 1988). Vertical 
restraints in the cement industry could have positive efficiency effects. They enable 
producers to better coordinate distribution and marketing activities in the regions and 
more effective rn::>!:1dgement of delivery of (:ement. By providing the right financial 
incentives (i.e., attractive distribution margins), producers can influence distributors to 
increase their investment in specialised cement storage facilities and materials 
handling and information systems necessary for efficient distribution of the 
commodity. These benefits are more likely when there is enough inter-brand 
competition, because of both competing manufacturers and the possibility of easy 
accc.:s to imports through low tariffs and non-tariff barriers. However, as discussed in 
section 11.7, the administrative allocation of markets had greatly restricted 
competition among cement producers and this had also constrained rivalry among 
main distributors. 
11. 7 Summary 
This Chapter has described the development of the cement industry over the last three 
decades, and the role of government policies in shaping the structure of the industry 
and the nature of competition. The industry was heavily regulated. There were 
regulations governing the allocation of markets and setting of reference retail prices. 
The objective of ihis regulatory regime was to ensure a continuous supply of cement 
to all provinces at reasonable and stable prices. However, the analysis of this Chapter 
has shown that the distribution arrangements had little success in stabilising prices in 
the face of cyclical demand for cement. Rather the distribution system exacerbated 
'.Hl 
price instability by reducing the contestability of regional markets. Administrative 
allocation of markets prevented supplies from other region~, including imports, 
entering to dampen price increases when demand rose. 
Under the Indonesiaa government and IMF structural reform programme, the industry 
is being deregulated, includi>1g the elimination of the distribution controls, export 
quotas, and reference r.ement prices. It is too early to examine empirii;ally the impact 
of deregulation on competition m.d re;.;;ional prices. However, deregulation is likely to 
improve overall economic efficiency in the industry. The removal of administered 
prices will improve the transparency of pricing in the industry. Producers are now free 
to change delivery prices to capture most of the increase in retail prices during periods 
of high demand. Distribution margins will not vary over the demand cycle as much as 
they did under the previous pricing arrangements. Eliminating distribution controls 
should also reduce excessive. cross-hauling of cement within Indonesia that existed 
under the previous distribution arrangements. Deregulation should also promote 
efficient regional investment. The continuation of high cement prices in significant 
regional markets will signal the opportunity for profitable new regional investment in 
the cement industry without having to negotiate plant location and capacity size with 
officials from the Ministry of Industry and Trade and existing cement producers. 
Eliminating the distribution controls increases the 'contestability' of regional markets, 
and this should reduce regional price instability compared to the previous regulatory 
regir.1e. In a contestable regional market, the nearest producer is the price leader, with 
other distant suppliers (including importers) matching its price in order to compete 
(Plunkett, et al, 1997). In periods of excess capacity, producers are willing to accept 
lower net prices in more distant (including export) markets to maintain full capacity. 
However, there is the possibility that monopolistic or cartel practices, similar to those 
under the previous regulatory regime, could develop in the domestic market, at least in 
the short run. For 20 years the Cement Producers Association has been allocating 
regional markets and market shares among its members. Cartel monitoring 
mechanisms are well developed within the industry. These 'institutionalised' cartel 
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practices are likely to take some time to breakdown. The success of the recent 
deregulation of the industry in promoting competition among firms will partly depend 
on the government's competition policy, including the implementation of the 
competition law, which is likely to be enacted into law in 1999. The draft competition 
law prohibits market sharing arrangements. The draft law is ~iscussed in Chapter 13. 
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Chapter 12 
Summary and Conclusion 
12.1 Introduction 
This Chapter summarises the major findings of the study and provides a discussion of 
competition rolicy in Indonesia. Our study has investigated the interrelationship 
between market structure, firm rivalry and various forms of government intervention 
in the non-oil/gas manufacturing sector over the period 1975 to 1995. Two research 
methodologies were used for this purpose: the Structure-Conduct-Performance (S-C-
P) approach to industrial organisation, and two industry case studies. 
Using the S-C-P framework, we specified a simultaneous equations model consisting 
of six endogenous variables and equations. The endogenous variables were seller 
concentration, industry profitability, import penetration, export-orientation, foreign-
ownership and trade policy (measured by real effective rates of protection). The 
model was estimated for two different policy regimes using the 2SLS estimation 
technique. For this purpose, a database of 67 four and five-digit ISIC manufacturing 
industries for the years 1985 (a proxy for the pre-liberalisation period) and 1993 
('post' trade liberalisation) was constructed from a variety of sources, including the 
annual manufacturing surveys and input-output tables produced by the central bureau 
of statistics. In Chapter 8, the S-C-P framework was extended to include an 
estimation of the determinants of changes in leading firms market shares during the 
trade liberalisation period. 
For the second research approach, two industry studies are undertaken to explore 
aspects of firm rivalry and government policy not adequately captured in the 
aggregated S-C-P model. The two industry studies are cigarettes and cement. Both 
industries have high levels of seller concentration. However, they differ in the extent 
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of government intervention in the industry, the nature of rivalry among firms and the 
competitive outc:mme. 
12.2 Findings of the Study 
There are several important findings from the study that provide invaluable insights 
into the development of market structures and the competitive process in a rapidly 
developing economy, and into how government policies impact on this process. Many 
of 1he findings of the study, summarised below, are established in economic theory 
and are consistent with the results of similar studies for other developing economies. 
However, other aspects of this study have not been fully explored in most studies of 
developing economies. For example, while there are several studies analysing the 
dynamics of market shares in developed economies, there are no similar studies for 
other developjng economies known to the author and, thus, our study is the first to 
examine market share dynamics in a developing economy. 
Trends in Industrial C011centration (Chapter 4) 
Contrary to popular public perceptions, there is a long-term declining trend in 
industrial concentration, particularly in those industries that were highly concentrated 
in the mid-l 970s. The descriptive analysis presented in Chapter 4 (Trends in 
Industrial Concentration) shows that there is a tendency towards industrial 
deconcentration across manufacturing over the period 1975-93. The simple average 
CR4 ratio declined from 64 per cent in 197 5 to 53 per cent in 1985, but increased 
slightly to 54 per cent by 1993. Similarly, the output weighted average CR4 declined 
from 55 per cent in 1975 to 47 per cent in 1985 and to 44 per cent by 1993. When we 
adjusted the industrial concentration statistics to include oil/gas manufacturing, the 
decline in weighted average CR4 was even greater compared with non-oil/gas 
manufacturing. The weighted average CR4 declined from 58 per cent in 1985 to 51 
per cent in 1993, a fall of 10 percentage points. The greater decline in the weighted 
average CR4 for all manufacturing was principally due to the significant decline in 
the oil and gas sector's share of total MVA during this period. As noted in Chapter 4, 
oil/gas share of total MVA declined from 28 per cent in 1983 to 13.3 per cent in 1993. 
The percentage of total industries that are classified as highly concentrated (CR4 
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above 75 per cent) declined from 40 per cent in 1975 to 29 per cent in 1993. 
Introducing foreign trade reduces average concentration substantially. In 1993, for 
example, the average concentration of a sample of 67 non-oil/gas manufacturing 
industries without adjustment for foreign trade was 53 per cent whilst allowing for 
foreign trade it was 41 per cent. Thus, allowing for trade indicates that competition is 
prima facie stronger in Indonesian markets than domestic concentration ratios would 
suggest. 
This pattern of change in industrial concentration is typical of a rapidly growing, 
small industrial sector: initially high levels of concentration, declining over time as 
rapid growth reduces barriers to entry and broadens the industrial base. Further, the 
results suggest that liberalisation has not had the major effects on industrial structure 
that its opponents - or in some cases proponents - maintain. Average concentration in 
import-competing industries has remained fairly stable since 1986. There has been a 
slight increase in concentration since 1991, but it is too early to reach a conclusion on 
whether this increase is due to liberalisation. However, more confident conclusions 
can be reached about the impact of policy reforms on export-oriented industries. The 
results show th •. 1t there has been a continuous reduction in average concentration since 
1986. The reduction is due to an expansion of the market facing domestic sellers. The 
expansion of export opportunities means that the domestic industry can support a 
greater number of viable producers, thereby reducing concentration. 
Challges in Leadillg Firms' Market Shares (Chapter 8) 
As indicated earlier in the study, a major limitation of seller concentration statistics is 
that they are static measures of competition; they simply record the characteristics of a 
size-distribution at some particular point in time. Recent literature has shown that 
previous studies of seller concentration, including studies emphasising changes in 
seller concentration over time, conceal much of the nature of the underlying 
competitive process (Geroski and Toker, 1996). The industrial organisation literature 
has long recognised that high concentration ratios can be found along with 
considerable instab111ty in leading firms' market shares. Industrial organisation theory 
tells us that, in the absence of regulatory constraints on competition, changes in the 
relative positions or market shares of the leading firms would indicate healthy 
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competitive conditions prevailing in that industry (Baldwin and Gorecki, 1994; Davis 
and Geroski, 1997). According to Geroski and Toker (1996), turnover in firms' 
rankings provide at least some useful information on the vibrancy of the competitive 
process, and turnover-based measures of competition [i.e. changes in market shares] 
may reflect the dynamics of the competitive process more accurately than 
conventional static measures of competition. 
The descriptive analysis of changes in leading firms' rankings and market shares 
during the period 1985 to 1993 shows considerable turbulence in market shares for 
several persistently concentrated industries, suggesting healthy competitive conditions 
prevailing in many of these industries. Concentrated industries that were characterised 
as having turbulent market shares included cigarettes, sheet glass, carpets, structural 
clay products, and cosmetics. Conversely, industries that were identified as having 
stable market shares during this period included cement, fertiliser, malt beer, and 
wheat flour milling. The study identified regulatory constraints on competition as a 
major factor insulating dominant firms' market shares from encroachment by their 
rivals or new firms in these 'stable' oligopolies. 
The descriptive analysis on concentration and changes in leading firms' market shares 
provided the backdrop for the statistical analysis into the underlying factors 
explaining the observed levels of concentration and market share instability and their 
effect on other aspects of market structure and performance in Chapters 7 to 8. These 
results are summarised below. 
Empirical Results: 
The Structure-Conduct-Performance Model (Chapters 7 and 8) 
Industrial Concentration 
Our estimation results suggest that market structure factors are the major determinants 
of industrial concentration in Indonesian manufacturing: economies of scale, capital 
requirements, industry size, regional market fragmentation, and product 
differentiation all have the expected significant relation with concentration. We could 
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not find a direct significant relation between trade policy, regulation and 
concentration, either in 1985 or 1993. However, trade policy and regulation may 
affect concentration indirectly through other variables such as economies of scale. 
The poor performance of these two variables may also arise due to problems 
associated with cross-sectional tests of government policies. Generally, one should 
approach a cross-sectional test of the effect of protection and regulation on seller 
concentration cautiously, because protection and regulation may take time to affect 
market structures. Our results for the export and import variables suggest that foreign 
trade does not have a significant impact on the degree of industrial concentration. The 
result for export orientation is consistent with the observation in Chapter 4 that 
export-oriented and unconcentrated industries share common structural 
characteristics, namely low barriers to entry, and it is the barriers to entry variables 
that are dominant in the concentration equation. Finally, foreign and state ownership 
of industry do not have significant effects on industrial concentration over and above 
the other variables considered in the analysis. This also arises because MNCs and 
SOEs share common structural characteristics, namely product differentiation and 
high capital cost requirements - the estimation results of the determinants of MNC 
presence verify this relationship. This result may also be due to measurement 
problems associated with the ownership variables discussed in Chapter 6. 
Industry Profitability 
Our analysis of the determinants of industry profits is consistent with the established 
proposition that higher levels of concentration lead to higher profitability. The results 
also show that it is in the more protected industries that concentration has a greater 
impact on industry profits. In other words, concentration and protection interact to 
produce relatively high profit rates in manufacturing. The study also provides 
evidence that this positive association has weakened since the 1980s policy reforms, 
establishing a direct link between trade liberalisation and industry profits in 
concentrated industnes. The reduction in import protection reduces excessive profits 
in concentrated industries. By contrast the positive relationship between profits and 
barriers to entry postulated in the literature is not strongly supported by Indonesian 
data. Only the capital intensity variable is significant with the expected sign, and only 
weakly significant in the 1993 post-reform equation. The other hypothesised barrier to 
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entry, product differentiation, is not statistically significant. The growth variable gave 
us inconsistent results between the two years. These results are consistent with 
previous studies for other small, open economies. 
Foreign ownership 
Our resu1ts on the determinants of foreign ownership in manufacturing show that 
there is a similarity between the determinants of foreign ownership in developed and 
developing economies. Most of the conventional industrial organisation factors 
(concentration, capital intensity and technology intensity) are statistically significant 
with the expected signs. There are, however, some unconventional results. These are 
the negative, but insignificant, influence of product differentiation, and the 
insignificance of the industry growth variable. The results also show that there has 
been a shift in the pattern of FDI in manufacturing towards export-oriented industries 
since the mid-l 980s. This is attributed to trade and investment reforms during this 
period. 
Export orientation 
Our analysis of the determinants of export orientation shows that the factor intensity 
variables are the major structural determinants of export performance in Indonesian 
manufacturing. Our results show that exports are concentrated in products that 
Indonesia has a comparative advantage. These are the labour-intensive industries and 
the forestry-based products. The market structure factors do not appear to be 
important determinants of Indonesia's export orientation in the 1990s. Concentration 
appears to have no significant relationship with export orientation. Economies of 
scale, regional market segmentation, and product differentiation all have the expected 
signs, but are statistically insignificant. Finally, we observe an inverse relationship 
between export orientation and trade protection (RERPs). 
Import penetration 
The import penetration equation generally supports the findings of the export intensity 
equation. The factor intensity variables are important determinants of import 
penetration in manufacturing industries since the 1980s reforms. Our results show that 
imports are concentrated in industries in which Indonesia has a comparative 
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disadvantage such as capital (PC) and technology (Tl) intensive activities. Foreign 
ownership and market structure variables - economies of scale, prodi.lct 
differentiation, and regional market segmentation - are statistically significant, with 
the expected signs. Concentration is not statistically significant in the impo11 
penetration equation. Finally, our results for the trade policy variable (f:ERPs) show 
that trade protection reduces foreign competition in the domestic market. 
Trade protection 
Our results support previous findings for Indonesia that political-economy factors are 
important determinants of the pattern of protection. This of course is consistent more 
broadly with the political economy of decision-making processes in Indonesia, and in 
particular the vulnerability to capture of micro-level policy-making processes. A 
number of variables generated results consistent with the political economy models, 
such as concentration, price-cost margins, and industry size. Concentration and 
industry size variables are positive and significant in both the pre-form and post-
reform periods. The profit variable has the expected negative sign and is significant in 
the 1993 equation. 
Changes in Market Shares of Leading Firms (Chapter P) 
The estimation results of the market share equation show that government regulations 
of a selected number of industries- processed sugar, beer, cooking oil, fertiliser, 
cement, and steel - constrain domestic rivalry in these industries. This provides a 
direct link between deregulation and competition. Removing regulatory constraints on 
firm behaviour should trigger rivalry among firms in these industries. However, trade 
liberalisation (measured by changes in real effective rates of protection) does not 
appear to have disturbed market shares, except in export-oriented industries. Second, 
there is no evidence that MNCs have any impact on domestic rivalry over and above 
the other variables considered in the analysis. This result provides 8ome evidence to 
reject the proposition that large MNCs' business practices reduce market rivalry in the 
host developing country's markets. Finally, the results of most of the other industrial 
organisation factors tend to be consistent with studies for other countties. Market 
shares tend to be more stable in highly concentrated industries, all other things being 
equal. Rapid growth in industry destabilises market shares, while large absolute 
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capital requirements constitute a ba..7ier to entry and upward mobility, thereby 
insulating leading firms' market shares. 
At least. two major conclusions can be drawn from the findings of the S-C-P study. 
First, the study shows that high seller concentration is not a sufficient condition for 
anti-competitive behaviour. The possibility of anti-competitive behaviour depends on 
a number of factors including the height of barriers to entry and government trade and 
industry policies. Our estimation results in the industry profitability equation show 
that it is in the more protected industries that high concentration leads to anti-
competitive outcomes. Conversely, trade liberalisation reduces excessive profits in 
concentrated industries. Furthermore, high concentration can be found along with 
considerable instability in leading finns' market shares in Indonesian manufacturing, 
suggesting that competitive conditions prevail in these industries. 
Second, the estimation results for the RERP and regulation variables in the 
concentration, profitability and market share equations provide insights into the 
mechanisms through which trade liberalisation and deregulation increase domestic 
competition. Recall that the trade policy variable (interacted with concentration) was 
only statisticaHy significant with the expected (positive) sign in the profitability 
equation, and not statistically significant in the concentration and dynamic market 
share equations. Together these results suggest that trade liberalisation increases 
domestic competition and economic efficiency directly through influencing price 
behaviour of dominant firms in an industry, rather than by reducing the level of seller 
concentration or changing the distribution of leading firms' market shares. In other 
words, greater import competition through low tariff and non-tariff barriers puts 
pressure on dominant firms to cut their prices towards world prices, thereby reducing 
excessive profits. The exception is export-oriented industries: market shares were 
relatively unstable in export-oriented industries during the liberalisation period. The 
regulation dummy variable was statistically sig.iificant with the expected (negative) 
sign only in the market share equation. The conclusion drawn from this result is that 
deregulation of industry - removal of entry restrictions, distribution controls, and 
price fixing - should destabilise leading firms' market shares, indicating increased 
domestic rivalry based on this measure of competition. 
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Industry Case Studies 
Findings from the two case studies provide further insights into the development of 
market structures in a rapidly growing developing economy, the competitive process, 
and how government interventions impact on this process. In the cement industry, 
government vzgulations had created and reinforced cartel-like practices. Regional 
markets and market shares were allocated among firms. The Cement Producers 
Association and the Ministry of Industry and Trade monitored compliance with the 
distribution system by acting as 'trading posts' whereby market information - market 
shares, export and import data - were collected by them and widely disseminated 
among producers. These distribution arrangements had deterred new entry and 
competitive imports, and exacerbated instability in regional cement prices. 
Administrative allocation of supplies prevented supplies from other regions, including 
imports, entering to dampen price increases when demand rose. 
The highly concentrated cigarette industry can be characteri1>1ed by intense rivalry as 
reflected in continuous turnover in leading films' rank and market shares during the 
past twenty years. The major instrument of competition among large firms is 
advertising. The estimation results of the dynamic market share - advertising model 
specified in Chapter 10 shows that advertising competition destabilises market shares 
in this industry, suggesting that competitive conditions prevail in the cigarette 
industry. However, government interventions in the cigarette industry have 
constrained other forms of rivalry. Foreign firms were not permitted to enter the 
kretek segment, and were therefore prevented from directly competing with local 
kretek producers. This restriction exacerbated the decline in MNCs' market shares 
during the 1980s when demand switched from white cigarettes to kretek. In 1991 the 
government introduced higher minimum retail _!lrices for large firms. This restriction 
removed price competition among large firms. The objective of these regulations is to 
reserve a share of the market for sn.1fill-scale firms. However, our study shows that the 
competitive fringe is gradually declining due to changes in technology and consumer 
tastes from cheap,. low quality kretek to higher quality, filter kretek brands produced 
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by the larger firms. This gradual decline in the ('Ompetitive fringe has occurred despite 
the added protection through higher minimum retail prices. for large finns' brands. 
A conclusion that can be drawn from the findings of these case studies is that market 
structure itself does not fully determine the degree of competitiveness in an industry. 
The case studies show that a range of firm behaviour and competitive outcomes are 
possible across concentrated industries, An important influence in all these studies is 
government policy. Government controls reduced competition in cement. 
12.3 The IMF Structural Reform Programme and Competition 
Policy 
Indonesia's approach to competition policy (broadly defined here to include trade 
liberalisation, deregulation, privatisatim~ and competition law) has been ad hoc and 
unsystematic. By the time the financial crisis began in 1997, substP ... "!tial progress had 
been made in dismantling barriers to entry and other restrictions on competition. 
Deregulation of the industrial sector over the past decade or so eliminated many (but 
not all) of the restrictions on new entry, including foreign investment. The reform of 
international trade policies over the same period eliminated most of the licensing 
requirements related to importing goods (Chapter 2). This liberalisation, however, had 
been accompanied by several egregious exceptions as well as increased relianf!e on 
other forms of regulation - e.g., the national car programme, and protection of 
Chandra Asri, a large petrochemical producer. Furthermore, many of the government· 
sanctioned monopolies and cartel arrangements, as well as other so-called 'sensitive' 
regulated sectors - cement, fertiliser, processed sugar, BULOG, aircraft 
manufacturing and steel - remained relatively untouched during the deregulation 
period, and new 'exceptions' emerged (e.g., cloves monopoly). 
At the time of completing the thesis, the banking and financial crisis eropted in 
Indonesia and other countties in the region. The massive drop in the rupiah during 
1997/98, combined with the capital flight nnd severe banking sector crisis, led to a 
series of agreements between the Indonesian government and the IMF, World Bank, 
ADB and major bilateral donors for a stroctural reform loan programme of US$43 
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billion. The programme is comprehensive, covering trade and industry, the banking 
and financial sectors, and commercial laws and institutions. Measures announced 
under the IMF agreement in January 1998, and later amended/supplemented in April 
(and June/July), were aimed at improving economic efficiency by removing anti-
competitive regulations in specific industries. The elimination the statutory basis of 
many of the remaining monopolies - e.g., cement, plywood, cloves, sugar, wheat flour 
milling - was also included. The IMF programme also included a commitment from 
the Government to introduce a competition law. Paragraph 15 of the April MOU with 
the IMF is of relevance here: 
The Government has already taken steps as part of its restructuring 
program to improve competitive conditions in a number of specific 
markets. In order to enhance the overall efficiency of markets, the 
Govemmen.: will write and implement a law on competition policy to 
establish guidelines for fair business practices and to avoid anti-
competitive behaviour. Competition policy will benefit consumers by 
making quality goods available at the lowest possible price: small 
enterprises will benefit from improved access to the widest range of 
goods and trade facilities. 
The measures under the IMF structural reform pMgramme dealt with a number of the 
most important anti-competitive aspects of economi~ policy. However, it would be 
incorrect to assume that competition is now largely unfettered by regulation. The 
policy environment is still characterised by a myriad of regulatory and licensing 
requirements that undermine efficiency. For example, a number of important 
government created monopolies are not dealt with under the programme - e.g., 
fertiliser, wholesale and retail trade in gasoline and oil products. Restrictions in 
several industries adversely impact on economic efficiency such as in salt, alcoholic 
beverages, and plastics (Table 2.8). In addition, the complex syl;tem of approvals and 
licences required for almost any commercial activit} ._npose a significant cost burden 
on firms, of which the greatest is borne by small and medium enterprises. 1 
1 A recent report estimated that the cost of compliance with the licensing system amounted to at least 
30 per cent of gross profits of micro and small enterprises (Asia Foundation, 1998). 
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The focus now should be on $trengthening the broader policy framework as the. 
foundation for competition policy. This would entail developing and implementing 
refonns in those areas not addressed under the IiviF programme. This should also 
include developing the institutional resources necessary to maintain and promote 
competition. In the current policy environment these reforms should include a 
comprehensive deregulation that eliminates a large share of the existing requirements 
for approvals and licences, removal of the statutory basis of remaining anti-
competitive market structures, and acceleration of trade liberalisation already 
committed under the IMF programme, especially the remaining import licensing 
restrictions. 
In November 1998, the Indonesian Parliament had drafted an anti-monopoly law and 
submitted it for discussion among its members. The draft law includes provisions 
prohibiting price fixing and market-sharing arrangements, vertical restrictions on 
trade (exclusive dealerships and territories, etc), vertical integration, firms 
undercutting rivals' prices, and limits on market shares of 30 per cent. While it is 
beyond the sc1ipe of the study to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of a 
competition law or anti-monopoly law, there are serious concerns about the draft law 
submitted to Parliament. As it stands, the law greatly risks damaging competition, 
rather than promoting and maintaining it. The reason is that the law protects 
competitors, rather than the competitive pro.:ess. The former generally tends to 
protect inefficient firms and gives rise to a distorted economy. It is worth elaborating 
on some of the major provisions of the draft law. 
As noted, the draft law prohibits most kinds of vertical restrictioP!. - exch18ive 
dealerships and territories. This prohibition h:1~ little foundation in economics. Recent 
developments in industrial organisation sr,ow that vertical restraints on trade are not 
as serious as was once thought to be (Tirole, 1988). In sou1e instances vertical 
restraints may improve economic efficiency and consumer welfare. This wouid occur 
if vertical restraints reduce transaction and coordination costs bvolved in marketing 
and distribution. By providing the right financial incentives, prnducers can influence 
distributors to increase their investment in materials handling and information 
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systems necessary for efficient distribution of commodities. These benefits are more 
likely when there is enough inter-brand competition, because of both competing 
manufacturers and the possibility of easy access to imports through low tariff and 
non-tariff barriers. For these reasons, most countries that have implemented 
competition laws do not prohibit vertical restraints. Usually, these various types of 
practices are assessed on a case-by-case basis under a rule of reason approach, which 
weighs the relative costs and benefits of the business practice. Under the draft law, the 
blanket prohibition of vertical restraints would reduce efficiency in cases where the 
effects of these practices on consumer welfare and economic efficiency are positive. 
Vertical integration of production and distribution is prohibited in the draft law where 
it 'damages competition'. There are no definitions of 'damaging competition' or 
monopoly in the draft law. There is no economic rationale for prohibiting vertical 
integration. The literature shows that vertical integration usually enhances et.::onomic 
efficiency by reducing transaction costs (Tirole, 1988). The apparent rationale behind 
this provision in the draft law is to prevent an upstream monopoly from monopolising 
a downstream industry. There are a few publicised cases in Indonesia where large, 
vertically integrated firms have monopolised downstream markets, but in all cases 
known to the author these have occurred because of regulatory barriers to entry in the 
upstream input market. For example, Indofood's dominant position in the instant 
noodle industry by the early 1990s was made possible only because the government 
granted a wheat flour monopoly t0 the noodle producer, and not because of vertical 
integration per se. Under the IMF programme, the government has eliminated the 
domestic wheat flour monopoly by allowing free imports of wheat and wheat flour -
quantitative import restrictions were removed in 1998. Economic theory and 
empirical evidence show that, if there are no regulatory or natural barriers to vertical 
integration, rival firms will integrate to avoid paying higher prices to the upstream 
monopoly. If a sufficient number of finns integrate, the input will eventualiy be 
supplied competitively (Tirole, 1988). Thus, in the absence of constraints on vertical 
integration or imports of the input, any market power arising from an upstream 
monopoly is likely to be short lived. 
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Equally concerning is the prohibitioa on firms undercutting rivals' prices, if they 
threaten to increase seller concentration in the future. This clause was probably 
intended to capture cases of 'predatory pricing'. Ho·vever, depending on the 
evidential burden of the plaintiff, it is conceivable that firms could use this provision 
to prevent healthy price competition, or price wars from breaking out among firms. In 
such circumstances, the provision would be protecting inefficient firms from 
competition or reinforcing cartels. In both cases this would lead to economic 
distortions, resulting in consumer welfare losses. 
The anti-monopoly law includes structural-based measures. The law put!) a ceiling on 
firms' market shares at 30 per cent. Beyond a 30 per cent market share, the firm 
would have to divest assets under the law. No country has ever included such a clause 
in their competition laws. Moreover, there is no economic reason why finns should 
have limits on their market shares. One theme of this study is that, in the absence of 
regulatory constraints on competition, changes in market shares reflect the outcome of 
the competitive process. Efficient firms grow and become larger, while inefficient 
firms decline and become relatively smaller. We observed for several highly 
concentrated industries considerable instability in leading firms' market shares, 
suggesting competitive conditions prevailing in these industries. Thus, placing a 
ceiling on firms' market shares would greatly damage the competitive process. 
Moreover, the provision reflects a misunderstanding of the determinants of market 
structures. Indonesian manufacturing is concentrated partly because of its small 
industrial size. A structure-based attempt to reduce the level of concentration would 
lead to overcrowding of sub-optimal plants, duplication of products and excessive 
costs of production. The higher costs of production would be passed on to consumers 
and the welfare loss to them might be greater than if industries remained 
concentrated. Many countries deal with the potential for abuse of market power in 
concentrated industries by Uberalisir1g trade and industry regulations. Indonesia has 
substantially reduced protection for many concentrated industries, and the empirical 
results of the study show that trade liberalisation reduced anti-competitive pricing and 
excessive profits in concentrated industries. 
327 
Political, rather than efficiency, considerations appear to dominate the drafting of the 
law. This is partly driven by the political environment in which the law is drafted. 
Government rhetoric and policy in the post-Soeharto era has placed much attention on 
the so-called 'empowerment' of cooperatives and small and medium-scale firms and 
the 'peoples economy'. At the same time, large firms and conglomerates (many 
owned by ethnic Chinese) have been blamed for the economic crisis. In the preamble 
of the anti-monopoly 1aw, :i stated objective is to protect small and medium-sized 
firms from unfair competition from larger firms. Cooperatives are exempted from the 
anti-monopoly law, despite the fact that they hold local monopoly rights over the 
distribution of key agricultural commodides such as fertilisers and pesticides. There is 
a widely held view that the draft anti-monopoly law is designed to break up large 
firms and conglomerates through the enforcement of the provisions on vertical 
integration and market shares. 
It is important that the draft law be kept simple. The primary objective of a 
competition law should be to maintain and encourage competition as a vehicle to 
promote economic efficiency and to avoid business practices that unambiguously 
redt.ce consumer welfare. The heal point should be on the actual conduct of the firm 
and not on absolute or relative firm size or the structure of the industry. Objectives 
like 'protection of small firms and cooperatives', 'public interest' and 'asset 
re.distribution to the cooperatives' usually lead to rent-seeking behaviour and are 
ger.erally recognised to be inconsistent with marketplace efficiency. In this 
connection, a distinction needs to be made between protecting competition (and the 
wmpetitive process), and protecting competitors - whether small or large enterprises 
or cooperatives. The latter generally tends to protect inefficient firms and gives rise to 
a distorted economy. 
The law should target blatant cases of anti-competitive behaviour such as price fixing 
and market sharing arrangements, rather than developing complex rules for 
competition. The aforementioned clauses should be removed on the grounds that they 
are likely to reduce economic efficiency. Clear anti-competitive business practices 
could be captured under a carefully worded 'abuse of dominant position' clause. 
Moreover, the anti-monopoly law or competition law should not be viewed as a 
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substitute for continued efforts to remove regulations which, our study shows, limit 
competition. 
12.4 Implications for Further Research 
Our study has investigated the interrelationship between market structure, finn rivalry 
and various forms of government i.itervention in the non-oil/gas manufacturing sector 
over the period 1975 to 1995. Two research methodologies were used for this 
purpose: the structure-conduct-performance (S-C-P) framework and tw? industry case 
studies. There are, however, several research areas that require further work. These 
can be classified into two areas: (1) data improvement and methodologies, and (2) 
industrial organisation issues pertaining to Indonesia, as well as other developing 
countries. 
Data improvement: The Central Bureau of Statistics (BPS) produces one of the 
richest manufacturing surveys in the region. Compared to other countries in the 
region, the quality of the surveys (and access to them) is among the best. However, 
there are areas for further improvement. First, one of the most important 
improvements would be the provision of enterprise data, in addition to establishment 
data already provided by BPS. This would enabie researchers to calculate 
concentration and market share statistics with more accuracy. A limitation of our S-C-
P model was the unavailability of statistical proxies for other important market 
structure variables, such as vertical integration and buyer concentration. It would be 
useful if BPS could include data on vertical integration, and if possible, buyer 
concentration. 
Methodologies: The structure-conduct-performance framework is a very :.iseful tool in 
industrial analysis. However, the implementation of the model using cross-sectional 
data is based on the implicit assumption that each market is in long-run equilibrium. 
However, in more dynamic maricet conditions, responses to change are continuous 
and non-instantaneous and in such conditions simple forms of comparative .::tatic 
analysis are less appropriate. We attempted to overcome this weakness by comparing 
cross-sectional estimates of the six equations between two points in time, 1985 and 
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1993. Thus, we assumed that all markets reached a new long-run equilibrium in 1993. 
This may not be the case in practice, particularly for a developing economy where 
market structures are not yet 'stabilised' to the degree that is found in mature 
industrial economies. Many markets may still be in a process of structural adjustment. 
A dynamic S-C-P model would be better able to capture the structural adjustment 
process from a long-run equilibrium to a new one in the endogenous variables, such 
as concentration and profitability and exports. One direction for further research 
would therefore be to modify the S-C-P model to include structural adjustment in the 
endogenous variables. Business cycle effects on concentration and profitability could 
also be incorporated into the dynamic moclf'l. For this purpose, a panel data base 
(cross-sectional, time series data) would have to be constructed. 
Industrial organisation issues: There are several relevant areas of research that were 
not explored in this study, but are pertinent to Indonesia, as well as other developing 
economies. For example, little research has b~en undertaken on the pattern of firm 
entry, growth, and exit in developing economies. In particular, the impact of 
liberalisation of trade policy and industry regulation on firm entry, growth and exit, 
and the impact of these on industrial concentration and market performance. 
Therefore, one area of further research would be on firm entry and exit. Empirical 
tests of the relevance of the Theory of Perfectly Contestable Markets to Indonesian 
manufacturing could easily be incorporated into such studies. In addition, little 
research has been done on firm strategic behaviour - both price and non-price forms 
of rivalry - in developing economies, especially on how firms respond to 
liberalisation of trade and industry regulation. For this purpose, industry case studies 
using primary time series data would be needed. 
With the attention on competition policy in Indonesia, substantial research on 
domestic competition issues is needed to provide greater input into informed 
discussions on the future direction of competition policy in Indonesia, as well as other 
countries in the region. 
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